From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
"Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
"Kleen, Andi" <andi.kleen@intel.com>,
"Yamahata, Isaku" <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>,
Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>,
Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFCv2 02/13] x86/kvm: Introduce KVM memory protection feature
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 2021 18:10:30 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210416161030.GC22348@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210416154106.23721-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
On Fri, Apr 16, 2021 at 06:40:55PM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> Provide basic helpers, KVM_FEATURE, CPUID flag and a hypercall.
>
> Host side doesn't provide the feature yet, so it is a dead code for now.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h | 5 +++++
> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 3 ++-
> arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
> include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h | 3 ++-
> 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index 84b887825f12..d8f3d2619913 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -238,6 +238,7 @@
> #define X86_FEATURE_VMW_VMMCALL ( 8*32+19) /* "" VMware prefers VMMCALL hypercall instruction */
> #define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES ( 8*32+20) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */
> #define X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH ( 8*32+21) /* "" VM Page Flush MSR is supported */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_KVM_MEM_PROTECTED ( 8*32+22) /* "" KVM memory protection extension */
That feature bit is still unused.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-04-16 16:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-04-16 15:40 [RFCv2 00/13] TDX and guest memory unmapping Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:40 ` [RFCv2 01/13] x86/mm: Move force_dma_unencrypted() to common code Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:40 ` [RFCv2 02/13] x86/kvm: Introduce KVM memory protection feature Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 16:10 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2021-04-19 10:10 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:40 ` [RFCv2 03/13] x86/kvm: Make DMA pages shared Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:40 ` [RFCv2 04/13] x86/kvm: Use bounce buffers for KVM memory protection Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 16:21 ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-16 15:40 ` [RFCv2 05/13] x86/kvmclock: Share hvclock memory with the host Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:40 ` [RFCv2 06/13] x86/realmode: Share trampoline area if KVM memory protection enabled Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-19 16:49 ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-16 15:41 ` [RFCv2 07/13] mm: Add hwpoison_entry_to_pfn() and hwpoison_entry_to_page() Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:41 ` [RFCv2 08/13] mm/gup: Add FOLL_ALLOW_POISONED Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:41 ` [RFCv2 09/13] shmem: Fail shmem_getpage_gfp() on poisoned pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:41 ` [RFCv2 10/13] mm: Keep page reference for hwpoison entries Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:41 ` [RFCv2 11/13] mm: Replace hwpoison entry with present PTE if page got unpoisoned Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:41 ` [RFCv2 12/13] KVM: passdown struct kvm to hva_to_pfn_slow() Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:41 ` [RFCv2 13/13] KVM: unmap guest memory using poisoned pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 17:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-04-19 11:32 ` Xiaoyao Li
2021-04-19 14:26 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-19 16:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-04-19 16:40 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-19 18:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-04-19 18:12 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-04-19 18:53 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-19 20:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-04-19 22:57 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-20 17:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-05-21 12:31 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-05-26 19:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-05-31 20:07 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-06-02 17:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-06-02 23:33 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-06-03 19:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-06-04 14:29 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-06-04 17:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-04 17:54 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 16:46 ` [RFCv2 00/13] TDX and guest memory unmapping Matthew Wilcox
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