linux-arm-kernel.lists.infradead.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: catalin.marinas@arm.com (Catalin Marinas)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 6/7] arm64: xen: Enable user access before a privcmd hvc call
Date: Fri,  2 Sep 2016 16:02:12 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1472828533-28197-7-git-send-email-catalin.marinas@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1472828533-28197-1-git-send-email-catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Privcmd calls are issued by the userspace. The kernel needs to enable
access to TTBR0_EL1 as the hypervisor would issue stage 1 translations
to user memory via AT instructions. Since AT instructions are not
affected by the PAN bit (ARMv8.1), we only need the explicit
uaccess_enable/disable if the TTBR0 PAN option is enabled.

Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S b/arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S
index 329c8027b0a9..211620dde4de 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/assembler.h>
+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <xen/interface/xen.h>
 
 
@@ -91,6 +92,24 @@ ENTRY(privcmd_call)
 	mov x2, x3
 	mov x3, x4
 	mov x4, x5
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_TTBR0_PAN
+	/*
+	 * Privcmd calls are issued by the userspace. The kernel needs to
+	 * enable access to TTBR0_EL1 as the hypervisor would issue stage 1
+	 * translations to user memory via AT instructions. Since AT
+	 * instructions are not affected by the PAN bit (ARMv8.1), we only
+	 * need the explicit uaccess_enable/disable if the TTBR0 PAN option is
+	 * enabled.
+	 */
+	uaccess_enable x6, x7
+#endif
 	hvc XEN_IMM
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_TTBR0_PAN
+	/*
+	 * Disable userspace access from kernel once the hyp call completed.
+	 */
+	uaccess_disable x6
+#endif
 	ret
 ENDPROC(privcmd_call);

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-09-02 15:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-09-02 15:02 [PATCH v2 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 1/7] arm64: Factor out PAN enabling/disabling into separate uaccess_* macros Catalin Marinas
2016-09-05 15:38   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-12 14:52     ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-12 15:09       ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-12 16:26         ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 post-update workaround into a specific asm macro Catalin Marinas
2016-09-05 16:11   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable, enable} functionality based on TTBR0_EL1 Catalin Marinas
2016-09-05 17:20   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-06 10:27     ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-06 10:45       ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-11 13:55         ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel
2016-09-12  9:32           ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-09 17:15   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] arm64: Disable TTBR0_EL1 during normal kernel execution Catalin Marinas
2016-09-06 17:31   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] arm64: Handle faults caused by inadvertent user access with PAN enabled Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] arm64: Enable CONFIG_ARM64_TTBR0_PAN Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:47   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-07 23:20 ` [PATCH v2 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Kees Cook
2016-09-08 12:51   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-08 15:50     ` Kees Cook
2016-09-09 16:31     ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-09 18:24       ` Kees Cook
2016-09-09 23:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Brown
2016-09-10  9:51 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-10 10:56   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-09-11 12:16     ` Catalin Marinas

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1472828533-28197-7-git-send-email-catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --to=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).