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From: mark.rutland@arm.com (Mark Rutland)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/7] arm64: Factor out PAN enabling/disabling into separate uaccess_* macros
Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2016 16:38:28 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160905153828.GA27305@leverpostej> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1472828533-28197-2-git-send-email-catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Hi Catalin,

On Fri, Sep 02, 2016 at 04:02:07PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> This patch moves the directly coded alternatives for turning PAN on/off
> into separate uaccess_{enable,disable} macros or functions. The asm
> macros take a few arguments which will be used in subsequent patches.
> 
> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> ---
>  arch/arm64/include/asm/futex.h       | 14 ++++-----
>  arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h     | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>  arch/arm64/kernel/armv8_deprecated.c | 10 +++----
>  arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S          |  8 ++----
>  arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S      |  8 ++----
>  arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S        |  8 ++----
>  arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S        |  8 ++----
>  7 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/futex.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/futex.h
> index f2585cdd32c2..7e5f236093be 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/futex.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/futex.h
> @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@
>  #include <asm/sysreg.h>
>  
>  #define __futex_atomic_op(insn, ret, oldval, uaddr, tmp, oparg)		\
> +do {									\
> +	uaccess_enable(ARM64_HAS_PAN);					\
>  	asm volatile(							\
> -	ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_PAN(0), ARM64_HAS_PAN,		\
> -		    CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)					\
>  "	prfm	pstl1strm, %2\n"					\
>  "1:	ldxr	%w1, %2\n"						\
>  	insn "\n"							\
> @@ -44,11 +44,11 @@
>  "	.popsection\n"							\
>  	_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 4b)						\
>  	_ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 4b)						\
> -	ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_PAN(1), ARM64_HAS_PAN,		\
> -		    CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)					\
>  	: "=&r" (ret), "=&r" (oldval), "+Q" (*uaddr), "=&r" (tmp)	\
>  	: "r" (oparg), "Ir" (-EFAULT)					\
> -	: "memory")
> +	: "memory");							\
> +	uaccess_disable(ARM64_HAS_PAN);					\
> +} while (0)

It might be worth noting in the commit message that this change means
that any memory accesses the compiler decides to spill between uaccess_*
calls and the main asm block are unprotected, but that's unlikely to be
an issue in practice.

[...]

>  /*
> + * User access enabling/disabling.
> + */
> +#define uaccess_disable(alt)						\
> +do {									\
> +	asm(ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_PAN(1), alt,			\
> +			CONFIG_ARM64_PAN));				\
> +} while (0)
> +
> +#define uaccess_enable(alt)						\
> +do {									\
> +	asm(ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_PAN(0), alt,			\
> +			CONFIG_ARM64_PAN));				\
> +} while (0)

Passing the alternative down is somewhat confusing. e.g. in the futex
case it looks like we're only doing something when PAN is present,
whereas we'll manipulate TTBR0 in the absence of PAN.

If I've understood correctly, we need this to distinguish regular
load/store uaccess sequences (eg. the futex code) from potentially
patched unprivileged load/store sequences (e.g. {get,put}_user) when
poking PSTATE.PAN.

So perhaps we could ahve something like:

* privileged_uaccess_{enable,disable}()
  Which toggle TTBR0, or PAN (always).
  These would handle cases like the futex/swp code.
 
* (unprivileged_)uaccess_{enable,disable}()
  Which toggle TTBR0, or PAN (in the absence of UAO).
  These would handle cases like the {get,put}_user sequences.

Though perhaps that is just as confusing. ;)

Otherwise, this looks like a nice centralisation of the PSTATE.PAN
manipulation code.

Thanks,
Mark.

  reply	other threads:[~2016-09-05 15:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-09-02 15:02 [PATCH v2 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 1/7] arm64: Factor out PAN enabling/disabling into separate uaccess_* macros Catalin Marinas
2016-09-05 15:38   ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2016-09-12 14:52     ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-12 15:09       ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-12 16:26         ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 post-update workaround into a specific asm macro Catalin Marinas
2016-09-05 16:11   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable, enable} functionality based on TTBR0_EL1 Catalin Marinas
2016-09-05 17:20   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-06 10:27     ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-06 10:45       ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-11 13:55         ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel
2016-09-12  9:32           ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-09 17:15   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] arm64: Disable TTBR0_EL1 during normal kernel execution Catalin Marinas
2016-09-06 17:31   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] arm64: Handle faults caused by inadvertent user access with PAN enabled Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] arm64: xen: Enable user access before a privcmd hvc call Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] arm64: Enable CONFIG_ARM64_TTBR0_PAN Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:47   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-07 23:20 ` [PATCH v2 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Kees Cook
2016-09-08 12:51   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-08 15:50     ` Kees Cook
2016-09-09 16:31     ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-09 18:24       ` Kees Cook
2016-09-09 23:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Brown
2016-09-10  9:51 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-10 10:56   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-09-11 12:16     ` Catalin Marinas

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