linux-arm-kernel.lists.infradead.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: catalin.marinas@arm.com (Catalin Marinas)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching
Date: Sun, 11 Sep 2016 13:16:25 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160911121624.GA16859@MBP.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKv+Gu9P4_90LEoyu1apeKZH20imLPD_EiB=zNAvyin-67ivKQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Sat, Sep 10, 2016 at 11:56:14AM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 10 September 2016 at 10:51, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> wrote:
> > On Fri, Sep 02, 2016 at 04:02:06PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> >> This is the second version of the arm64 PAN emulation by disabling
> >> TTBR0_EL1 accesses. The major change from v1 is the use of a thread_info
> >> member to store the real TTBR0_EL1 value. The advantage is slightly
> >> simpler assembler macros for uaccess_enable with the downside that
> >> switch_mm() must always update the saved ttbr0 even if there is no mm
> >> switch.
> >
> > FYI, I got the Juno board rebooting in a loop with defconfig +
> > ARM64_TTBR0_PAN enabled. It takes about 20-40 reboots to get the panic
> > below on the EFI run-time services. I'll look into it on Monday (and
> > cc'ing Ard who I forgot to add originally). Including the full log
> > below:
> 
> Could you please try to reproduce it again, but this time with
> 'efi=debug' on the kernel command line? Thanks

Just for the record, following our private email exchanges: when
executing an EFI runtime service, an interrupt comes in and Linux
disables TTBR0 accesses. When returning from interrupt, the kernel
restores TTBR0_EL1 with the value in current thread_info which is
different from the efi_mm one.

Two potential solutions:

1. Temporarily update the current thread_info ttbr0 during EFI runtime
   services (preemption is disabled). Suggested by Ard

2. Go back to per-CPU saving of TTBR0_EL1 as in v1

I'll implement 1 on Monday and give it a try.

-- 
Catalin

      reply	other threads:[~2016-09-11 12:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-09-02 15:02 [PATCH v2 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 1/7] arm64: Factor out PAN enabling/disabling into separate uaccess_* macros Catalin Marinas
2016-09-05 15:38   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-12 14:52     ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-12 15:09       ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-12 16:26         ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 post-update workaround into a specific asm macro Catalin Marinas
2016-09-05 16:11   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable, enable} functionality based on TTBR0_EL1 Catalin Marinas
2016-09-05 17:20   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-06 10:27     ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-06 10:45       ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-11 13:55         ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel
2016-09-12  9:32           ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-09 17:15   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] arm64: Disable TTBR0_EL1 during normal kernel execution Catalin Marinas
2016-09-06 17:31   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] arm64: Handle faults caused by inadvertent user access with PAN enabled Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] arm64: xen: Enable user access before a privcmd hvc call Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] arm64: Enable CONFIG_ARM64_TTBR0_PAN Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:47   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-07 23:20 ` [PATCH v2 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Kees Cook
2016-09-08 12:51   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-08 15:50     ` Kees Cook
2016-09-09 16:31     ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-09 18:24       ` Kees Cook
2016-09-09 23:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Brown
2016-09-10  9:51 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-10 10:56   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-09-11 12:16     ` Catalin Marinas [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20160911121624.GA16859@MBP.local \
    --to=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).