* [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns
@ 2021-12-16 5:43 Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 01/14] ima: Add IMA namespace support Stefan Berger
` (14 more replies)
0 siblings, 15 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2021-12-16 5:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: zohar, serge, christian.brauner, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Stefan Berger
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
The goal of this series of patches is to start with the namespacing of
IMA and support auditing within an IMA namespace (IMA-ns) as the first
step.
In this series the IMA namespace is piggy backing on the user namespace
and therefore an IMA namespace gets created when a user namespace is
created. The advantage of this is that the user namespace can provide
the keys infrastructure that IMA appraisal support will need later on.
We chose the goal of supporting auditing within an IMA namespace since it
requires the least changes to IMA. Following this series, auditing within
an IMA namespace can be activated by a user running the following lines
that rely on a statically linked busybox to be installed on the host for
execution within the minimal container environment:
mkdir -p rootfs/{bin,mnt,proc}
cp /sbin/busybox rootfs/bin
cp /sbin/busybox rootfs/bin/busybox2
echo >> rootfs/bin/busybox2
PATH=/bin unshare --user --map-root-user --mount-proc --pid --fork \
--root rootfs busybox sh -c \
"busybox mount -t securityfs /mnt /mnt; \
busybox echo 'audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC' > /mnt/ima/policy; \
busybox2 cat /mnt/ima/policy"
[busybox2 is used to demonstrate 2 measurements; see below]
Following the audit log on the host the last line cat'ing the IMA policy
inside the namespace would have been audited. Unfortunately the auditing
line is not distinguishable from one stemming from actions on the host.
The hope here is that Richard Brigg's container id support for auditing
would help resolve the problem.
The following lines added to a suitable IMA policy on the host would
cause the execution of the commands inside the container (by uid 1000)
to be measured and audited as well on the host, thus leading to two
auditing messages for the 'busybox2 cat' above and log entries in IMA's
system log.
echo -e "measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC uid=1000\n" \
"audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC uid=1000\n" \
> /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
The goal of supporting measurement and auditing by the host, of actions
occurring within IMA namespaces, is that users, particularly root,
should not be able to evade the host's IMA policy just by spawning
new IMA namespaces, running programs there, and discarding the namespaces
again. This is achieved through 'hierarchical processing' of file
accesses that are evaluated against the policy of the namespace where
the action occurred and against all namespaces' and their policies leading
back to the root IMA namespace (init_ima_ns).
The patch series adds support for a virtualized SecurityFS with a few
new API calls that are used by IMA namespacing. Only the data relevant
to the IMA namespace are shown. The files and directories of other
security subsystems (TPM, evm, Tomoyo, safesetid) are not showing
up when secruityfs is mounted inside a user namespace.
Much of the code leading up to the virtualization of SecurityFS deals
with moving IMA's variables from various files into the IMA namespace
structure called 'ima_namespace'. When it comes to determining the
current IMA namespace I took the approach to get the current IMA
namespace (get_current_ns()) on the top level and pass the pointer all
the way down to those functions that now need access to the ima_namespace
to get to their variables. This later on comes in handy once hierarchical
processing is implemented in this series where we walk the list of
namespaces backwards and again need to pass the pointer into functions.
This patch also introduces usage of CAP_MAC_ADMIN to allow access to the
IMA policy via reduced capabilities. We would again later on use this
capability to allow users to set file extended attributes for IMA appraisal
support.
My tree with these patches is here:
git fetch https://github.com/stefanberger/linux-ima-namespaces v5.15+imans.v7.posted
Regards,
Stefan
v7:
- Dropped 2 patches related to key queues; using &init_ima_ns for all calls
from functions related to key queues where calls need ima_namespace
- Moved ima_namespace to security/integrity/ima/ima.h
- Extended API descriptions with ns parameter where needed
- Using init_ima_ns in functions related to appraisal and xattrs
- SecurityFS: Using ima_ns_from_file() to get ns pointer
- Reformatted to 80 columns per line
v6:
- Removed kref and pointer to user_ns in ima_namespace (patch 1)
- Moved only the policy file dentry into ima_namespace; other dentries are on
stack now and can be discarded
- Merged James's patch simplifying securityfs_remove and dropping dget()
- Added patch with Christian's suggestion to tie opened SecurityFS file to
the user/IMA namespace it belongs to
- Passing missing ima_namespace parameter in functions in ima_kexec.c (ppc64)
- Reverted v5's change to patch 4 related to protection of ima_namespace
v5:
- Followed Christian's suggestions on patch 1. Also, reverted increased reference
counter on init_user_ns since ima_ns doesn't take reference to its user_ns.
- No addtional reference is taken on securityfs dentries for user_ns != init_user_ns.
Updated documentation and removed cleanup of dentries on superblock kill.
(patches 12 & 16)
- Moved else branch to earlier patch (patch 11)
- Protect ima_namespace by taking reference on user namespace for delayed work queue.
(patch 4)
v4:
- For consistency moved 'ns = get_current_ns()' to top of functions
- Merge in James's latest SecurityFS patch
v3:
- Further modifications to virtualized SecurityFS following James's posted patch
- Dropping of early teardown for user_namespaces since not needed anymore
v2:
- Folllwed Christian's suggestion to virtualize securitytfs; no more securityfs_ns
- Followed James's advice for late 'population' of securityfs for IMA namespaces
- Squashed 2 patches dealing with capabilities
- Added missing 'depends on USER_NS' to Kconfig
- Added missing 'static' to several functions
Mehmet Kayaalp (2):
ima: Define ns_status for storing namespaced iint data
ima: Namespace audit status flags
Stefan Berger (12):
ima: Add IMA namespace support
ima: Move policy related variables into ima_namespace
ima: Move ima_htable into ima_namespace
ima: Move measurement list related variables into ima_namespace
ima: Only accept AUDIT rules for IMA non-init_ima_ns namespaces for
now
ima: Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses
securityfs: Only use simple_pin_fs/simple_release_fs for init_user_ns
securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support
ima: Move some IMA policy and filesystem related variables into
ima_namespace
ima: Use mac_admin_ns_capable() to check corresponding capability
ima: Move dentry into ima_namespace and others onto stack
ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace
include/linux/capability.h | 6 +
include/linux/ima.h | 56 ++++++
include/linux/user_namespace.h | 4 +
init/Kconfig | 13 ++
kernel/user.c | 7 +
kernel/user_namespace.c | 8 +
security/inode.c | 77 ++++++--
security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 4 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 178 ++++++++++++++-----
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 34 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 28 +--
security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 4 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 126 ++++++++-----
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 19 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c | 53 ++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c | 15 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 147 ++++++++++-----
security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 88 +++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c | 127 +++++++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 168 ++++++++++-------
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 80 +++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 11 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 5 +-
23 files changed, 967 insertions(+), 291 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 01/14] ima: Add IMA namespace support
2021-12-16 5:43 [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-16 5:43 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 14:08 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 02/14] ima: Define ns_status for storing namespaced iint data Stefan Berger
` (13 subsequent siblings)
14 siblings, 1 reply; 36+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2021-12-16 5:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: zohar, serge, christian.brauner, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Stefan Berger, James Bottomley
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Implement an IMA namespace data structure that gets created alongside a
user namespace with CLONE_NEWUSER. This lays down the foundation for
namespacing the different aspects of IMA (eg. IMA-audit, IMA-measurement,
IMA-appraisal).
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
---
include/linux/ima.h | 33 ++++++++++++
include/linux/user_namespace.h | 4 ++
init/Kconfig | 10 ++++
kernel/user.c | 7 +++
kernel/user_namespace.c | 8 +++
security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 3 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 8 +++
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 4 ++
security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c | 28 ++++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
10 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index b6ab66a546ae..61461ee5b208 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
struct linux_binprm;
@@ -210,6 +211,38 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
+extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+
+void free_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *ns);
+int create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns);
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
+{
+ return current_user_ns()->ima_ns;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static inline void free_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
+ user_ns->ima_ns = &init_ima_ns;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
+{
+ return &init_ima_ns;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
+
#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
extern bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func);
#else
diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
index 33a4240e6a6f..5249db04d62b 100644
--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ struct uid_gid_map { /* 64 bytes -- 1 cache line */
#define USERNS_INIT_FLAGS USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED
struct ucounts;
+struct ima_namespace;
enum ucount_type {
UCOUNT_USER_NAMESPACES,
@@ -99,6 +100,9 @@ struct user_namespace {
#endif
struct ucounts *ucounts;
long ucount_max[UCOUNT_COUNTS];
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
+ struct ima_namespace *ima_ns;
+#endif
} __randomize_layout;
struct ucounts {
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 11f8a845f259..27890607e8cb 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1242,6 +1242,16 @@ config NET_NS
Allow user space to create what appear to be multiple instances
of the network stack.
+config IMA_NS
+ bool "IMA namespace"
+ depends on USER_NS
+ depends on IMA
+ default y
+ help
+ Allow the creation of IMA namespaces for each user namespace.
+ Namespaced IMA enables having IMA features work separately
+ in each IMA namespace.
+
endif # NAMESPACES
config CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c
index e2cf8c22b539..287751d89b44 100644
--- a/kernel/user.c
+++ b/kernel/user.c
@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
+extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns;
+#endif
+
/*
* userns count is 1 for root user, 1 for init_uts_ns,
* and 1 for... ?
@@ -67,6 +71,9 @@ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
.keyring_name_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_user_ns.keyring_name_list),
.keyring_sem = __RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_user_ns.keyring_sem),
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
+ .ima_ns = &init_ima_ns,
+#endif
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_user_ns);
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index 6b2e3ca7ee99..6fa01323aac9 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
#include <linux/bsearch.h>
#include <linux/sort.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
@@ -141,8 +142,14 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
if (!setup_userns_sysctls(ns))
goto fail_keyring;
+ ret = create_ima_ns(ns);
+ if (ret)
+ goto fail_sysctls;
+
set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
return 0;
+fail_sysctls:
+ retire_userns_sysctls(ns);
fail_keyring:
#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
key_put(ns->persistent_keyring_register);
@@ -196,6 +203,7 @@ static void free_user_ns(struct work_struct *work)
kfree(ns->projid_map.forward);
kfree(ns->projid_map.reverse);
}
+ free_ima_ns(ns);
retire_userns_sysctls(ns);
key_free_user_ns(ns);
ns_free_inum(&ns->ns);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 2499f2485c04..b86a35fbed60 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -7,13 +7,14 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
- ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
+ ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o ima_init_ima_ns.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) += ima_modsig.o
ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += ima_asymmetric_keys.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS) += ima_queue_keys.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_NS) += ima_ns.o
ifeq ($(CONFIG_EFI),y)
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT) += ima_efi.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index be965a8715e4..4606d3b1493f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -119,6 +119,10 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr {
u64 count;
};
+struct ima_namespace {
+ int avoid_zero_size;
+} __randomize_layout;
+
extern const int read_idmap[];
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
@@ -418,6 +422,10 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */
+int ima_ns_init(void);
+struct ima_namespace;
+int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns);
+
/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index b26fa67476b4..f6ae4557a0da 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -120,6 +120,10 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
{
int rc;
+ rc = ima_ns_init();
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
ima_tpm_chip = tpm_default_chip();
if (!ima_tpm_chip)
pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..46d8cb2113a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2021 IBM Corporation
+ * Author:
+ * Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
+ * Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int __init ima_ns_init(void)
+{
+ return ima_init_namespace(&init_ima_ns);
+}
+
+struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns = {
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_ima_ns);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bc9a2c11d70a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2021 IBM Corporation
+ * Author:
+ * Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
+ * Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+static struct kmem_cache *imans_cachep;
+
+int create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
+{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns;
+ int err;
+
+ ns = kmem_cache_zalloc(imans_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ns)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ pr_debug("NEW ima_ns: 0x%p\n", ns);
+
+ err = ima_init_namespace(ns);
+ if (err)
+ goto fail_free;
+
+ user_ns->ima_ns = ns;
+
+ return 0;
+
+fail_free:
+ kmem_cache_free(imans_cachep, ns);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static void destroy_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+ pr_debug("DESTROY ima_ns: 0x%p\n", ns);
+ kmem_cache_free(imans_cachep, ns);
+}
+
+void free_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
+{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = user_ns->ima_ns;
+
+ if (WARN_ON(ns == &init_ima_ns))
+ return;
+
+ destroy_ima_ns(ns);
+}
+
+static int __init imans_cache_init(void)
+{
+ imans_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(ima_namespace, SLAB_PANIC);
+ return 0;
+}
+subsys_initcall(imans_cache_init)
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 02/14] ima: Define ns_status for storing namespaced iint data
2021-12-16 5:43 [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 01/14] ima: Add IMA namespace support Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-16 5:43 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 03/14] ima: Namespace audit status flags Stefan Berger
` (12 subsequent siblings)
14 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2021-12-16 5:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: zohar, serge, christian.brauner, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Mehmet Kayaalp, Stefan Berger
From: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch adds an rbtree to the IMA namespace structure that stores a
namespaced version of iint->flags in ns_status struct. Similar to the
integrity_iint_cache, both the iint ns_struct are looked up using the
inode pointer value. The lookup, allocate, and insertion code is also
similar, except ns_struct is not free'd when the inode is free'd.
Instead, the lookup verifies the i_ino and i_generation fields are also a
match.
Signed-off-by: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Changelog:
v2:
* fixed tree traversal in __ima_ns_status_find()
---
security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 28 +++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c | 6 ++
security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c | 127 +++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 163 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index b86a35fbed60..78c84214e109 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o ima_init_ima_ns.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) += ima_modsig.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_NS) += ima_ns.o ima_ns_status.o
ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += ima_asymmetric_keys.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 4606d3b1493f..cd73e4092037 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -121,6 +121,10 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr {
struct ima_namespace {
int avoid_zero_size;
+
+ struct rb_root ns_status_tree;
+ rwlock_t ns_status_lock;
+ struct kmem_cache *ns_status_cache;
} __randomize_layout;
extern const int read_idmap[];
@@ -137,6 +141,14 @@ static inline void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) {}
*/
extern bool ima_canonical_fmt;
+struct ns_status {
+ struct rb_node rb_node;
+ struct inode *inode;
+ ino_t i_ino;
+ u32 i_generation;
+ unsigned long flags;
+};
+
/* Internal IMA function definitions */
int ima_init(void);
int ima_fs_init(void);
@@ -426,6 +438,22 @@ int ima_ns_init(void);
struct ima_namespace;
int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns);
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct inode *inode);
+
+void free_ns_status_cache(struct ima_namespace *ns);
+
+#else
+
+static inline struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
+
/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
index 46d8cb2113a1..446beea36cd3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
@@ -10,11 +10,17 @@
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
#include "ima.h"
int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns)
{
+ ns->ns_status_tree = RB_ROOT;
+ rwlock_init(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+ /* Use KMEM_CACHE for simplicity ? */
+ ns->ns_status_cache = KMEM_CACHE(ns_status, SLAB_PANIC);
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
index bc9a2c11d70a..92f9424ba1b0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ int create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
static void destroy_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
{
pr_debug("DESTROY ima_ns: 0x%p\n", ns);
+ free_ns_status_cache(ns);
kmem_cache_free(imans_cachep, ns);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f5b183b62894
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2021 IBM Corporation
+ * Author:
+ * Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
+ * Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+void free_ns_status_cache(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+ struct ns_status *status, *next;
+
+ write_lock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+ rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(status, next,
+ &ns->ns_status_tree, rb_node)
+ kmem_cache_free(ns->ns_status_cache, status);
+ ns->ns_status_tree = RB_ROOT;
+ write_unlock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+ kmem_cache_destroy(ns->ns_status_cache);
+}
+
+/*
+ * __ima_ns_status_find - return the ns_status associated with an inode
+ */
+static struct ns_status *__ima_ns_status_find(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct ns_status *status;
+ struct rb_node *n = ns->ns_status_tree.rb_node;
+
+ while (n) {
+ status = rb_entry(n, struct ns_status, rb_node);
+
+ if (inode < status->inode)
+ n = n->rb_left;
+ else if (inode > status->inode)
+ n = n->rb_right;
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!n)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_ns_status_find - return the ns_status associated with an inode
+ */
+static struct ns_status *ima_ns_status_find(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct ns_status *status;
+
+ read_lock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+ status = __ima_ns_status_find(ns, inode);
+ read_unlock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+static void insert_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns, struct inode *inode,
+ struct ns_status *status)
+{
+ struct rb_node **p;
+ struct rb_node *node, *parent = NULL;
+ struct ns_status *test_status;
+
+ p = &ns->ns_status_tree.rb_node;
+ while (*p) {
+ parent = *p;
+ test_status = rb_entry(parent, struct ns_status, rb_node);
+ if (inode < test_status->inode)
+ p = &(*p)->rb_left;
+ else
+ p = &(*p)->rb_right;
+ }
+ node = &status->rb_node;
+ rb_link_node(node, parent, p);
+ rb_insert_color(node, &ns->ns_status_tree);
+}
+
+struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct ns_status *status;
+ int skip_insert = 0;
+
+ status = ima_ns_status_find(ns, inode);
+ if (status) {
+ /*
+ * Unlike integrity_iint_cache we are not free'ing the
+ * ns_status data when the inode is free'd. So, in addition to
+ * checking the inode pointer, we need to make sure the
+ * (i_generation, i_ino) pair matches as well.
+ */
+ if (inode->i_ino == status->i_ino &&
+ inode->i_generation == status->i_generation)
+ return status;
+
+ /* Same inode number is reused, overwrite the ns_status */
+ skip_insert = 1;
+ } else {
+ status = kmem_cache_alloc(ns->ns_status_cache, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!status)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ }
+
+ write_lock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+
+ if (!skip_insert)
+ insert_ns_status(ns, inode, status);
+
+ status->inode = inode;
+ status->i_ino = inode->i_ino;
+ status->i_generation = inode->i_generation;
+ status->flags = 0UL;
+
+ write_unlock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+
+ return status;
+}
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 03/14] ima: Namespace audit status flags
2021-12-16 5:43 [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 01/14] ima: Add IMA namespace support Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 02/14] ima: Define ns_status for storing namespaced iint data Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-16 5:43 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 04/14] ima: Move policy related variables into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
` (11 subsequent siblings)
14 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2021-12-16 5:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: zohar, serge, christian.brauner, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Mehmet Kayaalp
From: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The iint cache stores whether the file is measured, appraised, audited
etc. This patch moves the IMA_AUDITED flag into the per-namespace
ns_status, enabling IMA audit mechanism to audit the same file each time
it is accessed in a new namespace.
The ns_status is not looked up if the CONFIG_IMA_NS is disabled or if
none of the IMA_NS_STATUS_ACTIONS (currently only IMA_AUDIT) are enabled.
Read and write operations on the iint flags is replaced with function
calls. For reading, iint_flags() returns the bitwise AND of iint->flags
and ns_status->flags. The ns_status flags are masked with
IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS (currently only IMA_AUDITED). Similarly
set_iint_flags() only writes the masked portion to the ns_status flags,
while the iint flags is set as before. The ns_status parameter added to
ima_audit_measurement() is used with the above functions to query and
set the ns_status flags.
Signed-off-by: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Changelog:
v2:
* fixed flag calculation in iint_flags()
---
init/Kconfig | 3 +++
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 8 +++++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++-------
security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 27890607e8cb..1e1c49f1d129 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1251,6 +1251,9 @@ config IMA_NS
Allow the creation of IMA namespaces for each user namespace.
Namespaced IMA enables having IMA features work separately
in each IMA namespace.
+ Currently, only the audit status flags are stored in the namespace,
+ which allows the same file to be audited each time it is accessed
+ in a new namespace.
endif # NAMESPACES
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index cd73e4092037..e46cf6b5ca6b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -290,7 +290,8 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
int pcr, const char *func_data,
bool buf_hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len);
void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- const unsigned char *filename);
+ const unsigned char *filename,
+ struct ns_status *status);
int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_template_entry **entry,
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
@@ -434,6 +435,9 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */
+#define IMA_NS_STATUS_ACTIONS IMA_AUDIT
+#define IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS IMA_AUDITED
+
int ima_ns_init(void);
struct ima_namespace;
int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns);
@@ -444,6 +448,10 @@ struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
void free_ns_status_cache(struct ima_namespace *ns);
+unsigned long iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct ns_status *status);
+unsigned long set_iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct ns_status *status, unsigned long flags);
#else
static inline struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
@@ -452,6 +460,19 @@ static inline struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
return NULL;
}
+static inline unsigned long iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct ns_status *status)
+{
+ return iint->flags;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long set_iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct ns_status *status,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ iint->flags = flags;
+ return flags;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index a64fb0130b01..8f7bab17b784 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -342,14 +342,16 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
}
void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- const unsigned char *filename)
+ const unsigned char *filename,
+ struct ns_status *status)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char *hash;
const char *algo_name = hash_algo_name[iint->ima_hash->algo];
int i;
+ unsigned long flags = iint_flags(iint, status);
- if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED)
+ if (flags & IMA_AUDITED)
return;
hash = kzalloc((iint->ima_hash->length * 2) + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -372,7 +374,7 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
audit_log_task_info(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
- iint->flags |= IMA_AUDITED;
+ set_iint_flags(iint, status, flags | IMA_AUDITED);
out:
kfree(hash);
return;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 465865412100..4386010a480e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -202,8 +202,10 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
enum ima_hooks func)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns();
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
+ struct ns_status *status = NULL;
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL;
char *pathbuf = NULL;
char filename[NAME_MAX];
@@ -216,6 +218,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
bool violation_check;
enum hash_algo hash_algo;
unsigned int allowed_algos = 0;
+ unsigned long flags;
if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return 0;
@@ -244,6 +247,12 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
if (!iint)
rc = -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (!rc && (action & IMA_NS_STATUS_ACTIONS)) {
+ status = ima_get_ns_status(ns, inode);
+ if (IS_ERR(status))
+ rc = PTR_ERR(status);
+ }
}
if (!rc && violation_check)
@@ -259,11 +268,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+ flags = iint_flags(iint, status);
+
if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags))
/* reset appraisal flags if ima_inode_post_setattr was called */
- iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED |
- IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK |
- IMA_ACTION_FLAGS);
+ flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED |
+ IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK |
+ IMA_ACTION_FLAGS);
/*
* Re-evaulate the file if either the xattr has changed or the
@@ -274,7 +285,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
((inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE) &&
!(inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER) &&
!(action & IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS))) {
- iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
+ flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
}
@@ -282,9 +293,9 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
* (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
* IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED)
*/
- iint->flags |= action;
+ flags = set_iint_flags(iint, status, flags | action);
action &= IMA_DO_MASK;
- action &= ~((iint->flags & (IMA_DONE_MASK ^ IMA_MEASURED)) >> 1);
+ action &= ~((flags & (IMA_DONE_MASK ^ IMA_MEASURED)) >> 1);
/* If target pcr is already measured, unset IMA_MEASURE action */
if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) && (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr)))
@@ -359,7 +370,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
&pathname, filename);
}
if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
- ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
+ ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname, status);
if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
rc = 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
index 92f9424ba1b0..279a23975588 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
@@ -58,6 +58,26 @@ void free_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
destroy_ima_ns(ns);
}
+unsigned long iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct ns_status *status)
+{
+ if (!status)
+ return iint->flags;
+
+ return (iint->flags & ~IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS) |
+ (status->flags & IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS);
+}
+
+unsigned long set_iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct ns_status *status, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ iint->flags = flags;
+ if (status)
+ status->flags = flags & IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS;
+
+ return flags;
+}
+
static int __init imans_cache_init(void)
{
imans_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(ima_namespace, SLAB_PANIC);
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 04/14] ima: Move policy related variables into ima_namespace
2021-12-16 5:43 [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 03/14] ima: Namespace audit status flags Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-16 5:43 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 14:26 ` kernel test robot
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 05/14] ima: Move ima_htable " Stefan Berger
` (10 subsequent siblings)
14 siblings, 1 reply; 36+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2021-12-16 5:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: zohar, serge, christian.brauner, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Stefan Berger
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Move variables related to the IMA policy into the ima_namespace. This way
the IMA policy of an IMA namespace can be set and displayed using a
front-end like SecurityFS.
Implement ima_free_policy_rules() that frees the policy rules on
ima_namespace deletion.
Implement ima_ns_from_file() to get the IMA namespace via the user
namespace of the SecurityFS superblock that a file belongs to.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 60 +++++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 8 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 28 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 4 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 16 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 8 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c | 6 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 84 ++++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 158 +++++++++++--------
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 11 +-
11 files changed, 242 insertions(+), 142 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index e46cf6b5ca6b..a4e945c22fa3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <linux/hash.h>
#include <linux/tpm.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include "../integrity.h"
@@ -43,9 +44,6 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8, TPM_PCR10 = 10 };
#define NR_BANKS(chip) ((chip != NULL) ? chip->nr_allocated_banks : 0)
-/* current content of the policy */
-extern int ima_policy_flag;
-
/* bitset of digests algorithms allowed in the setxattr hook */
extern atomic_t ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms;
@@ -125,6 +123,15 @@ struct ima_namespace {
struct rb_root ns_status_tree;
rwlock_t ns_status_lock;
struct kmem_cache *ns_status_cache;
+
+ struct list_head ima_default_rules;
+ /* ns's policy rules */
+ struct list_head ima_policy_rules;
+ struct list_head ima_temp_rules;
+ /* Pointer to ns's current policy */
+ struct list_head __rcu *ima_rules;
+ /* current content of the policy */
+ int ima_policy_flag;
} __randomize_layout;
extern const int read_idmap[];
@@ -259,7 +266,7 @@ void ima_init_key_queue(void);
bool ima_should_queue_key(void);
bool ima_queue_key(struct key *keyring, const void *payload,
size_t payload_len);
-void ima_process_queued_keys(void);
+void ima_process_queued_keys(struct ima_namespace *ns);
#else
static inline void ima_init_key_queue(void) {}
static inline bool ima_should_queue_key(void) { return false; }
@@ -270,7 +277,8 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS */
/* LIM API function definitions */
-int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
+int ima_get_action(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
@@ -284,7 +292,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
-int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+int process_buffer_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
int pcr, const char *func_data,
@@ -302,17 +311,19 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
/* IMA policy related functions */
-int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
+int ima_match_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
-void ima_init_policy(void);
-void ima_update_policy(void);
-void ima_update_policy_flags(void);
-ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *);
-void ima_delete_rules(void);
-int ima_check_policy(void);
+void ima_init_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns);
+void ima_update_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns);
+void ima_update_policy_flags(struct ima_namespace *ns);
+ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(struct ima_namespace *ns, char *rule);
+void ima_delete_rules(struct ima_namespace *ns);
+int ima_check_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns);
+void ima_free_policy_rules(struct ima_namespace *ns);
void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos);
void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos);
void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
@@ -328,14 +339,16 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
#define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC 0x40
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
-int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr);
int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig);
-int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
+int ima_must_appraise(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -346,7 +359,8 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value);
#else
-static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr)
{
return 0;
@@ -363,7 +377,8 @@ static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
}
-static inline int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+static inline int ima_must_appraise(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct inode *inode, int mask,
enum ima_hooks func)
{
@@ -507,4 +522,15 @@ static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS S_IWUSR
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */
+static inline
+struct user_namespace *ima_user_ns_from_file(const struct file *filp)
+{
+ return file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_user_ns;
+}
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *ima_ns_from_file(const struct file *filp)
+{
+ return ima_user_ns_from_file(filp)->ima_ns;
+}
+
#endif /* __LINUX_IMA_H */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 8f7bab17b784..8577bdb5e94c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
/**
* ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
+ * @ns: IMA namespace that has the policy
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
* @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated
* @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
@@ -185,7 +186,8 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
*
*/
-int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
+int ima_get_action(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
@@ -193,9 +195,9 @@ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
{
int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
- flags &= ima_policy_flag;
+ flags &= ns->ima_policy_flag;
- return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, cred, secid, func, mask,
+ return ima_match_policy(ns, mnt_userns, inode, cred, secid, func, mask,
flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data,
allowed_algos);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index dbba51583e7c..3461025f671b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -68,7 +68,8 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
*
* Return 1 to appraise or hash
*/
-int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
+int ima_must_appraise(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
u32 secid;
@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
return 0;
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
- return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid,
+ return ima_match_policy(ns, mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid,
func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
@@ -341,7 +342,8 @@ static int modsig_verify(enum ima_hooks func, const struct modsig *modsig,
*
* Returns -EPERM if the hash is blacklisted.
*/
-int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr)
{
enum hash_algo hash_algo;
@@ -357,7 +359,8 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
rc = is_binary_blacklisted(digest, digestsize);
if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
- process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, digest, digestsize,
+ process_buffer_measurement(ns, &init_user_ns, NULL,
+ digest, digestsize,
"blacklisted-hash", NONE,
pcr, NULL, false, NULL, 0);
}
@@ -527,14 +530,16 @@ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns;
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
int action;
- if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)
+ if (!(ns->ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)
|| !(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
return;
- action = ima_must_appraise(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR);
+ action = ima_must_appraise(ns, mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS,
+ POST_SETATTR);
iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
if (iint) {
set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
@@ -559,11 +564,12 @@ static int ima_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
return 0;
}
-static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig)
+static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct inode *inode, int digsig)
{
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
- if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ if (!(ns->ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return;
iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
@@ -641,6 +647,7 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
{
const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xvalue = xattr_value;
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns;
int digsig = 0;
int result;
@@ -658,18 +665,19 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
if (result)
return result;
- ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig);
+ ima_reset_appraise_flags(ns, d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig);
}
return result;
}
int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns;
int result;
result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) {
- ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0);
+ ima_reset_appraise_flags(ns, d_backing_inode(dentry), 0);
if (result == 1)
result = 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
index f6aa0b47a772..bc95f9ae4214 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
const void *payload, size_t payload_len,
unsigned long flags, bool create)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns();
bool queued = false;
/* Only asymmetric keys are handled by this hook. */
@@ -60,7 +61,8 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
* if the IMA policy is configured to measure a key linked
* to the given keyring.
*/
- process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, payload, payload_len,
+ process_buffer_measurement(ns, &init_user_ns, NULL,
+ payload, payload_len,
keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0,
keyring->description, false, NULL, 0);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 3d8e9d5db5aa..b2ebe9d928e1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = {
.release = seq_release,
};
-static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
+static ssize_t ima_read_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns, char *path)
{
void *data = NULL;
char *datap;
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
datap = data;
while (size > 0 && (p = strsep(&datap, "\n"))) {
pr_debug("rule: %s\n", p);
- rc = ima_parse_add_rule(p);
+ rc = ima_parse_add_rule(ns, p);
if (rc < 0)
break;
size -= rc;
@@ -314,6 +314,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(file);
char *data;
ssize_t result;
@@ -336,7 +337,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
goto out_free;
if (data[0] == '/') {
- result = ima_read_policy(data);
+ result = ima_read_policy(ns, data);
} else if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY) {
pr_err("signed policy file (specified as an absolute pathname) required\n");
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
@@ -344,7 +345,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
1, 0);
result = -EACCES;
} else {
- result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
+ result = ima_parse_add_rule(ns, data);
}
mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex);
out_free:
@@ -410,11 +411,12 @@ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed";
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(file);
if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY)
return seq_release(inode, file);
- if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy() < 0) {
+ if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy(ns) < 0) {
cause = "failed";
valid_policy = 0;
}
@@ -424,13 +426,13 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
"policy_update", cause, !valid_policy, 0);
if (!valid_policy) {
- ima_delete_rules();
+ ima_delete_rules(ns);
valid_policy = 1;
clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags);
return 0;
}
- ima_update_policy();
+ ima_update_policy(ns);
#if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
ima_policy = NULL;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index f6ae4557a0da..d6b829c360d7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -104,15 +104,15 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509
void __init ima_load_x509(void)
{
- int unset_flags = ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE;
+ int unset_flags = init_ima_ns.ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE;
- ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags;
+ init_ima_ns.ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags;
integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH);
/* load also EVM key to avoid appraisal */
evm_load_x509();
- ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags;
+ init_ima_ns.ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags;
}
#endif
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- ima_init_policy();
+ ima_init_policy(&init_ima_ns);
rc = ima_fs_init();
if (rc != 0)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
index 446beea36cd3..e7a1400e1d0f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns)
/* Use KMEM_CACHE for simplicity ? */
ns->ns_status_cache = KMEM_CACHE(ns_status, SLAB_PANIC);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->ima_default_rules);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->ima_policy_rules);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->ima_temp_rules);
+ ns->ima_rules = (struct list_head __rcu *)(&ns->ima_default_rules);
+ ns->ima_policy_flag = 0;
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 4386010a480e..f9bc4d0e8c10 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -185,10 +185,11 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
*/
void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
- if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ if (!ns->ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return;
iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
@@ -198,11 +199,11 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
}
-static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
+static int process_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
enum ima_hooks func)
{
- struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns();
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
struct ns_status *status = NULL;
@@ -220,18 +221,18 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned int allowed_algos = 0;
unsigned long flags;
- if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ if (!ns->ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return 0;
/* Return an IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT action
* bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
* Included is the appraise submask.
*/
- action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(file), inode, cred, secid,
+ action = ima_get_action(ns, file_mnt_user_ns(file), inode, cred, secid,
mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL,
&allowed_algos);
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
- (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
+ (ns->ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
if (!action && !violation_check)
return 0;
@@ -357,7 +358,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr,
template_desc);
if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) {
- rc = ima_check_blacklist(iint, modsig, pcr);
+ rc = ima_check_blacklist(ns, iint, modsig, pcr);
if (rc != -EPERM) {
inode_lock(inode);
rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file,
@@ -416,12 +417,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
*/
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns();
u32 secid;
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
- 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
+ return process_measurement(ns, file, current_cred(), secid,
+ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
}
return 0;
@@ -441,6 +443,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
*/
int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns();
struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL;
struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
char filename[NAME_MAX];
@@ -453,13 +456,13 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
int pcr;
/* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */
- if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !vma->vm_file ||
+ if (!(ns->ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !vma->vm_file ||
!(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
return 0;
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
- action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
+ action = ima_get_action(ns, file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
&pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
@@ -495,17 +498,18 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
*/
int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns();
int ret;
u32 secid;
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
- MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ ret = process_measurement(ns, bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+ 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
return ret;
security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
- return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
+ return process_measurement(ns, bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
}
@@ -521,21 +525,23 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns();
u32 secid;
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+ return process_measurement(ns, file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
-static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
+static int __ima_inode_hash(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
{
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
int hash_algo;
- if (!ima_policy_flag)
+ if (!ns->ima_policy_flag)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
@@ -585,10 +591,12 @@ static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
*/
int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns();
+
if (!file)
return -EINVAL;
- return __ima_inode_hash(file_inode(file), buf, buf_size);
+ return __ima_inode_hash(ns, file_inode(file), buf, buf_size);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_hash);
@@ -612,10 +620,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_hash);
*/
int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns();
+
if (!inode)
return -EINVAL;
- return __ima_inode_hash(inode, buf, buf_size);
+ return __ima_inode_hash(ns, inode, buf, buf_size);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_inode_hash);
@@ -631,13 +641,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_inode_hash);
void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct inode *inode)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns();
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
int must_appraise;
- if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ if (!ns->ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return;
- must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS,
+ must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(ns, mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS,
FILE_CHECK);
if (!must_appraise)
return;
@@ -663,14 +674,15 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
void ima_post_path_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct dentry *dentry)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns();
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
int must_appraise;
- if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ if (!ns->ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return;
- must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS,
+ must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(ns, mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS,
FILE_CHECK);
if (!must_appraise)
return;
@@ -699,6 +711,7 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
bool contents)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns();
enum ima_hooks func;
u32 secid;
@@ -721,7 +734,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+ return process_measurement(ns, file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
0, MAY_READ, func);
}
@@ -749,6 +762,7 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns();
enum ima_hooks func;
u32 secid;
@@ -764,7 +778,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
+ return process_measurement(ns, file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
MAY_READ, func);
}
@@ -852,6 +866,7 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
/**
* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer or the buffer data hash
+ * @ns: IMA namespace that has the policy
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
* @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK)
* @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log.
@@ -870,7 +885,8 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
* has been written to the passed location but not added to a measurement entry,
* a negative value otherwise.
*/
-int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+int process_buffer_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
int pcr, const char *func_data,
@@ -898,7 +914,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len)
return -EINVAL;
- if (!ima_policy_flag && !digest)
+ if (!ns->ima_policy_flag && !digest)
return -ENOENT;
template = ima_template_desc_buf();
@@ -917,7 +933,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
*/
if (func) {
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
- action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
+ action = ima_get_action(ns, mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
func_data, NULL);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest)
@@ -954,7 +970,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
if (digest)
memcpy(digest, iint.ima_hash->digest, digest_hash_len);
- if (!ima_policy_flag || (func && !(action & IMA_MEASURE)))
+ if (!ns->ima_policy_flag || (func && !(action & IMA_MEASURE)))
return 1;
ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template);
@@ -988,6 +1004,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
*/
void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns();
struct fd f;
if (!buf || !size)
@@ -997,7 +1014,8 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
if (!f.file)
return;
- process_buffer_measurement(file_mnt_user_ns(f.file), file_inode(f.file),
+ process_buffer_measurement(ns,
+ file_mnt_user_ns(f.file), file_inode(f.file),
buf, size, "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0,
NULL, false, NULL, 0);
fdput(f);
@@ -1027,10 +1045,12 @@ int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
bool hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns();
+
if (!event_name || !event_label || !buf || !buf_len)
return -ENOPARAM;
- return process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, buf, buf_len,
+ return process_buffer_measurement(ns, &init_user_ns, NULL, buf, buf_len,
event_name, CRITICAL_DATA, 0,
event_label, hash, digest,
digest_len);
@@ -1063,7 +1083,7 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
pr_warn("Couldn't register LSM notifier, error %d\n", error);
if (!error)
- ima_update_policy_flags();
+ ima_update_policy_flags(&init_ima_ns);
return error;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
index 279a23975588..4b7f179ea8b9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ int create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
static void destroy_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
{
pr_debug("DESTROY ima_ns: 0x%p\n", ns);
+ ima_free_policy_rules(ns);
free_ns_status_cache(ns);
kmem_cache_free(imans_cachep, ns);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 320ca80aacab..786e4fd81ba9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@
#define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \
(a) >= (sizeof_field(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8))
-int ima_policy_flag;
static int temp_ima_appraise;
static int build_ima_appraise __ro_after_init;
@@ -233,11 +232,6 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry critical_data_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
/* An array of architecture specific rules */
static struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init;
-static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
-static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
-static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules);
-static struct list_head __rcu *ima_rules = (struct list_head __rcu *)(&ima_default_rules);
-
static int ima_policy __initdata;
static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
@@ -454,12 +448,12 @@ static bool ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
* to the old, stale LSM policy. Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect
* the reloaded LSM policy.
*/
-static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
+static void ima_lsm_update_rules(struct ima_namespace *ns)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *e;
int result;
- list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, e, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, e, &ns->ima_policy_rules, list) {
if (!ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
continue;
@@ -474,10 +468,12 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,
void *lsm_data)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns;
+
if (event != LSM_POLICY_CHANGE)
return NOTIFY_DONE;
- ima_lsm_update_rules();
+ ima_lsm_update_rules(ns);
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
@@ -669,6 +665,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
/**
* ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
+ * @ns: IMA namespace that has the policy
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
* @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
* @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
@@ -688,7 +685,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
* than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
*/
-int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
+int ima_match_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
@@ -702,7 +700,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
*template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
rcu_read_lock();
- ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules);
+ ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ns->ima_rules);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) {
if (!(entry->action & actmask))
@@ -746,8 +744,8 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
}
/**
- * ima_update_policy_flags() - Update global IMA variables
- *
+ * ima_update_policy_flags() - Update namespaced IMA variables
+ * @ns: IMA namespace that has the policy
* Update ima_policy_flag and ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms
* based on the currently loaded policy.
*
@@ -760,14 +758,14 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
*
* Context: called after a policy update and at system initialization.
*/
-void ima_update_policy_flags(void)
+void ima_update_policy_flags(struct ima_namespace *ns)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
int new_policy_flag = 0;
struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp;
rcu_read_lock();
- ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules);
+ ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ns->ima_rules);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) {
/*
* SETXATTR_CHECK rules do not implement a full policy check
@@ -797,7 +795,7 @@ void ima_update_policy_flags(void)
if (!ima_appraise)
new_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
- ima_policy_flag = new_policy_flag;
+ ns->ima_policy_flag = new_policy_flag;
}
static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func)
@@ -813,7 +811,8 @@ static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func)
return 0;
}
-static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count,
+static void add_rules(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count,
enum policy_rule_list policy_rule)
{
int i = 0;
@@ -822,7 +821,7 @@ static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count,
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
if (policy_rule & IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY)
- list_add_tail(&entries[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
+ list_add_tail(&entries[i].list, &ns->ima_default_rules);
if (policy_rule & IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY) {
entry = kmemdup(&entries[i], sizeof(*entry),
@@ -830,7 +829,7 @@ static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count,
if (!entry)
continue;
- list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);
+ list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ns->ima_policy_rules);
}
if (entries[i].action == APPRAISE) {
if (entries != build_appraise_rules)
@@ -843,9 +842,10 @@ static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count,
}
}
-static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry);
+static int ima_parse_rule(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry);
-static int __init ima_init_arch_policy(void)
+static int __init ima_init_arch_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns)
{
const char * const *arch_rules;
const char * const *rules;
@@ -873,7 +873,7 @@ static int __init ima_init_arch_policy(void)
result = strscpy(rule, *rules, sizeof(rule));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&arch_policy_entry[i].list);
- result = ima_parse_rule(rule, &arch_policy_entry[i]);
+ result = ima_parse_rule(ns, rule, &arch_policy_entry[i]);
if (result) {
pr_warn("Skipping unknown architecture policy rule: %s\n",
rule);
@@ -888,26 +888,27 @@ static int __init ima_init_arch_policy(void)
/**
* ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
- *
+ * @ns: IMA namespace to which the policy belongs to
* ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the new ima_policy_rules.
*/
-void __init ima_init_policy(void)
+void __init ima_init_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns)
{
int build_appraise_entries, arch_entries;
/* if !ima_policy, we load NO default rules */
if (ima_policy)
- add_rules(dont_measure_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules),
+ add_rules(ns, dont_measure_rules,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules),
IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
switch (ima_policy) {
case ORIGINAL_TCB:
- add_rules(original_measurement_rules,
+ add_rules(ns, original_measurement_rules,
ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules),
IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
break;
case DEFAULT_TCB:
- add_rules(default_measurement_rules,
+ add_rules(ns, default_measurement_rules,
ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules),
IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
break;
@@ -921,11 +922,11 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
* and custom policies, prior to other appraise rules.
* (Highest priority)
*/
- arch_entries = ima_init_arch_policy();
+ arch_entries = ima_init_arch_policy(ns);
if (!arch_entries)
pr_info("No architecture policies found\n");
else
- add_rules(arch_policy_entry, arch_entries,
+ add_rules(ns, arch_policy_entry, arch_entries,
IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY);
/*
@@ -933,7 +934,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
* signatures, prior to other appraise rules.
*/
if (ima_use_secure_boot)
- add_rules(secure_boot_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules),
+ add_rules(ns, secure_boot_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules),
IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
/*
@@ -945,39 +946,41 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
build_appraise_entries = ARRAY_SIZE(build_appraise_rules);
if (build_appraise_entries) {
if (ima_use_secure_boot)
- add_rules(build_appraise_rules, build_appraise_entries,
+ add_rules(ns, build_appraise_rules,
+ build_appraise_entries,
IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY);
else
- add_rules(build_appraise_rules, build_appraise_entries,
+ add_rules(ns, build_appraise_rules,
+ build_appraise_entries,
IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY);
}
if (ima_use_appraise_tcb)
- add_rules(default_appraise_rules,
+ add_rules(ns, default_appraise_rules,
ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules),
IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
if (ima_use_critical_data)
- add_rules(critical_data_rules,
+ add_rules(ns, critical_data_rules,
ARRAY_SIZE(critical_data_rules),
IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
atomic_set(&ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms, 0);
- ima_update_policy_flags();
+ ima_update_policy_flags(ns);
}
/* Make sure we have a valid policy, at least containing some rules. */
-int ima_check_policy(void)
+int ima_check_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns)
{
- if (list_empty(&ima_temp_rules))
+ if (list_empty(&ns->ima_temp_rules))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
/**
* ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
- *
+ * @ns: IMA namespace that has the policy
* Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
* policy. What we do here is to splice ima_policy_rules and ima_temp_rules so
* they make a queue. The policy may be updated multiple times and this is the
@@ -986,16 +989,17 @@ int ima_check_policy(void)
* Policy rules are never deleted so ima_policy_flag gets zeroed only once when
* we switch from the default policy to user defined.
*/
-void ima_update_policy(void)
+void ima_update_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns)
{
- struct list_head *policy = &ima_policy_rules;
+ struct list_head *policy = &ns->ima_policy_rules;
- list_splice_tail_init_rcu(&ima_temp_rules, policy, synchronize_rcu);
+ list_splice_tail_init_rcu(&ns->ima_temp_rules, policy,
+ synchronize_rcu);
- if (ima_rules != (struct list_head __rcu *)policy) {
- ima_policy_flag = 0;
+ if (ns->ima_rules != (struct list_head __rcu *)policy) {
+ ns->ima_policy_flag = 0;
- rcu_assign_pointer(ima_rules, policy);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ns->ima_rules, policy);
/*
* IMA architecture specific policy rules are specified
* as strings and converted to an array of ima_entry_rules
@@ -1004,10 +1008,10 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
*/
kfree(arch_policy_entry);
}
- ima_update_policy_flags();
+ ima_update_policy_flags(ns);
/* Custom IMA policy has been loaded */
- ima_process_queued_keys();
+ ima_process_queued_keys(ns);
}
/* Keep the enumeration in sync with the policy_tokens! */
@@ -1077,7 +1081,8 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_err, NULL}
};
-static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
+static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
substring_t *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
{
int result;
@@ -1097,7 +1102,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
- if (ima_rules == (struct list_head __rcu *)(&ima_default_rules)) {
+ if (ns->ima_rules ==
+ (struct list_head __rcu *)(&ns->ima_default_rules)) {
kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = NULL;
result = -EINVAL;
@@ -1324,7 +1330,8 @@ static unsigned int ima_parse_appraise_algos(char *arg)
return res;
}
-static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+static int ima_parse_rule(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char *from;
@@ -1674,37 +1681,37 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
break;
case Opt_obj_user:
ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
- result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
+ result = ima_lsm_rule_init(ns, entry, args,
LSM_OBJ_USER,
AUDIT_OBJ_USER);
break;
case Opt_obj_role:
ima_log_string(ab, "obj_role", args[0].from);
- result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
+ result = ima_lsm_rule_init(ns, entry, args,
LSM_OBJ_ROLE,
AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE);
break;
case Opt_obj_type:
ima_log_string(ab, "obj_type", args[0].from);
- result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
+ result = ima_lsm_rule_init(ns, entry, args,
LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE);
break;
case Opt_subj_user:
ima_log_string(ab, "subj_user", args[0].from);
- result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
+ result = ima_lsm_rule_init(ns, entry, args,
LSM_SUBJ_USER,
AUDIT_SUBJ_USER);
break;
case Opt_subj_role:
ima_log_string(ab, "subj_role", args[0].from);
- result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
+ result = ima_lsm_rule_init(ns, entry, args,
LSM_SUBJ_ROLE,
AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE);
break;
case Opt_subj_type:
ima_log_string(ab, "subj_type", args[0].from);
- result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
+ result = ima_lsm_rule_init(ns, entry, args,
LSM_SUBJ_TYPE,
AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
break;
@@ -1805,12 +1812,13 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
/**
* ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules
+ * @ns: IMA namespace that has the policy
* @rule - ima measurement policy rule
*
* Avoid locking by allowing just one writer at a time in ima_write_policy()
* Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure
*/
-ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
+ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(struct ima_namespace *ns, char *rule)
{
static const char op[] = "update_policy";
char *p;
@@ -1834,7 +1842,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
- result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
+ result = ima_parse_rule(ns, p, entry);
if (result) {
ima_free_rule(entry);
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
@@ -1843,23 +1851,40 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
return result;
}
- list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_temp_rules);
+ list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ns->ima_temp_rules);
return len;
}
/**
- * ima_delete_rules() called to cleanup invalid in-flight policy.
+ * ima_delete_rules - called to cleanup invalid in-flight policy.
+ * @ns: IMA namespace that has the policy
* We don't need locking as we operate on the temp list, which is
* different from the active one. There is also only one user of
* ima_delete_rules() at a time.
*/
-void ima_delete_rules(void)
+void ima_delete_rules(struct ima_namespace *ns)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
temp_ima_appraise = 0;
- list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) {
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ns->ima_temp_rules, list) {
+ list_del(&entry->list);
+ ima_free_rule(entry);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_free_policy_rules - free all policy rules
+ * @ns: IMA namespace that has the policy
+ */
+void ima_free_policy_rules(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+ struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
+
+ ima_delete_rules(ns);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ns->ima_policy_rules, list) {
list_del(&entry->list);
ima_free_rule(entry);
}
@@ -1885,12 +1910,13 @@ static const char *const mask_tokens[] = {
void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(m->file);
loff_t l = *pos;
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp;
rcu_read_lock();
- ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules);
+ ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ns->ima_rules);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) {
if (!l--) {
rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -1903,6 +1929,7 @@ void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(m->file);
struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -1910,8 +1937,8 @@ void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
rcu_read_unlock();
(*pos)++;
- return (&entry->list == &ima_default_rules ||
- &entry->list == &ima_policy_rules) ? NULL : entry;
+ return (&entry->list == &ns->ima_default_rules ||
+ &entry->list == &ns->ima_policy_rules) ? NULL : entry;
}
void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
@@ -2166,6 +2193,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
*/
bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns;
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
bool found = false;
enum ima_hooks func;
@@ -2177,7 +2205,7 @@ bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
rcu_read_lock();
- ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules);
+ ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ns->ima_rules);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) {
if (entry->action != APPRAISE)
continue;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
index 93056c03bf5a..e366a21dd8be 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include "ima.h"
@@ -42,7 +43,7 @@ static bool timer_expired;
static void ima_keys_handler(struct work_struct *work)
{
timer_expired = true;
- ima_process_queued_keys();
+ ima_process_queued_keys(&init_ima_ns);
}
/*
@@ -130,11 +131,15 @@ bool ima_queue_key(struct key *keyring, const void *payload,
* This function sets ima_process_keys to true and processes queued keys.
* From here on keys will be processed right away (not queued).
*/
-void ima_process_queued_keys(void)
+void ima_process_queued_keys(struct ima_namespace *ns)
{
struct ima_key_entry *entry, *tmp;
bool process = false;
+ /* only applies to init_ima_ns */
+ if (ns != &init_ima_ns)
+ return;
+
if (ima_process_keys)
return;
@@ -159,7 +164,7 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void)
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_keys, list) {
if (!timer_expired)
- process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL,
+ process_buffer_measurement(ns, &init_user_ns, NULL,
entry->payload,
entry->payload_len,
entry->keyring_name,
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 05/14] ima: Move ima_htable into ima_namespace
2021-12-16 5:43 [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 04/14] ima: Move policy related variables into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-16 5:43 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 06/14] ima: Move measurement list related variables " Stefan Berger
` (9 subsequent siblings)
14 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2021-12-16 5:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: zohar, serge, christian.brauner, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Stefan Berger
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Move ima_htable into ima_namespace. This way a front-end like
SecurityFS can show the number of violations of an IMA namespace.
Move ima_hash_key() into ima_queue.c since it's only used there.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 45 ++++++++++++------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 18 ++++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 8 +++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 7 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c | 4 +++
security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c | 3 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 14 ++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 44 +++++++++++++----------
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 5 +--
9 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index a4e945c22fa3..83f53e33d6bc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -33,9 +33,6 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8, TPM_PCR10 = 10 };
#define IMA_DIGEST_SIZE SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
#define IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX 255
-#define IMA_HASH_BITS 10
-#define IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE (1 << IMA_HASH_BITS)
-
#define IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN 16
#define IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX 15
@@ -117,6 +114,15 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr {
u64 count;
};
+#define IMA_HASH_BITS 10
+#define IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE (1 << IMA_HASH_BITS)
+
+struct ima_h_table {
+ atomic_long_t len; /* number of stored measurements in the list */
+ atomic_long_t violations;
+ struct hlist_head queue[IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE];
+};
+
struct ima_namespace {
int avoid_zero_size;
@@ -132,6 +138,8 @@ struct ima_namespace {
struct list_head __rcu *ima_rules;
/* current content of the policy */
int ima_policy_flag;
+
+ struct ima_h_table ima_htable;
} __randomize_layout;
extern const int read_idmap[];
@@ -159,7 +167,8 @@ struct ns_status {
/* Internal IMA function definitions */
int ima_init(void);
int ima_fs_init(void);
-int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
+int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
const char *op, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *filename);
int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash);
@@ -168,7 +177,8 @@ int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, loff_t len,
int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
struct ima_template_entry *entry);
int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash);
-void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+void ima_add_violation(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
const char *op, const char *cause);
int ima_init_crypto(void);
@@ -181,8 +191,10 @@ struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void);
struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_buf(void);
struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name);
bool ima_template_has_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc *ima_template);
-int ima_restore_measurement_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
-int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t bufsize, void *buf);
+int ima_restore_measurement_entry(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct ima_template_entry *entry);
+int ima_restore_measurement_list(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ loff_t bufsize, void *buf);
int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
unsigned long ima_get_binary_runtime_size(void);
int ima_init_template(void);
@@ -196,19 +208,6 @@ int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,
*/
extern spinlock_t ima_queue_lock;
-struct ima_h_table {
- atomic_long_t len; /* number of stored measurements in the list */
- atomic_long_t violations;
- struct hlist_head queue[IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE];
-};
-extern struct ima_h_table ima_htable;
-
-static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
-{
- /* there is no point in taking a hash of part of a digest */
- return (digest[0] | digest[1] << 8) % IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE;
-}
-
#define __ima_hooks(hook) \
hook(NONE, none) \
hook(FILE_CHECK, file) \
@@ -287,7 +286,8 @@ int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig);
-void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
@@ -304,7 +304,8 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_template_entry **entry,
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
-int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
+int ima_store_template(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *filename, int pcr);
void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 8577bdb5e94c..25163d64c057 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -99,7 +99,8 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
*
* Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise
*/
-int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
+int ima_store_template(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct ima_template_entry *entry,
int violation, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *filename, int pcr)
{
@@ -119,7 +120,8 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
}
}
entry->pcr = pcr;
- result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode, filename);
+ result = ima_add_template_entry(ns, entry, violation, op, inode,
+ filename);
return result;
}
@@ -130,7 +132,8 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
* By extending the PCR with 0xFF's instead of with zeroes, the PCR
* value is invalidated.
*/
-void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+void ima_add_violation(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
const char *op, const char *cause)
{
@@ -144,14 +147,14 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
int result;
/* can overflow, only indicator */
- atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.violations);
+ atomic_long_inc(&ns->ima_htable.violations);
result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, NULL);
if (result < 0) {
result = -ENOMEM;
goto err_out;
}
- result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode,
+ result = ima_store_template(ns, entry, violation, inode,
filename, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
if (result < 0)
ima_free_template_entry(entry);
@@ -299,7 +302,8 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
*
* Must be called with iint->mutex held.
*/
-void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
@@ -334,7 +338,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
return;
}
- result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr);
+ result = ima_store_template(ns, entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr);
if ((!result || result == -EEXIST) && !(file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)) {
iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED;
iint->measured_pcrs |= (0x1 << pcr);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index b2ebe9d928e1..97517830ed62 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -52,7 +52,10 @@ static ssize_t ima_show_htable_violations(struct file *filp,
char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ima_htable.violations);
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(filp);
+
+ return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos,
+ &ns->ima_htable.violations);
}
static const struct file_operations ima_htable_violations_ops = {
@@ -64,8 +67,9 @@ static ssize_t ima_show_measurements_count(struct file *filp,
char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ima_htable.len);
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(filp);
+ return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ns->ima_htable.len);
}
static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_count_ops = {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index d6b829c360d7..22ca5d872be0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip;
* a different value.) Violations add a zero entry to the measurement
* list and extend the aggregate PCR value with ff...ff's.
*/
-static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
+static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(struct ima_namespace *ns)
{
static const char op[] = "add_boot_aggregate";
const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
goto err_out;
}
- result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL,
+ result = ima_store_template(ns, entry, violation, NULL,
boot_aggregate_name,
CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
if (result < 0) {
@@ -145,7 +145,8 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
rc = ima_init_digests();
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- rc = ima_add_boot_aggregate(); /* boot aggregate must be first entry */
+ /* boot aggregate must be first entry */
+ rc = ima_add_boot_aggregate(&init_ima_ns);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
index e7a1400e1d0f..23c14a684d90 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns)
ns->ima_rules = (struct list_head __rcu *)(&ns->ima_default_rules);
ns->ima_policy_flag = 0;
+ atomic_long_set(&ns->ima_htable.len, 0);
+ atomic_long_set(&ns->ima_htable.violations, 0);
+ memset(&ns->ima_htable.queue, 0, sizeof(ns->ima_htable.queue));
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
index f799cc278a9a..f3ef8a0df992 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
@@ -146,7 +146,8 @@ void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void)
rc = ima_get_kexec_buffer(&kexec_buffer, &kexec_buffer_size);
switch (rc) {
case 0:
- rc = ima_restore_measurement_list(kexec_buffer_size,
+ rc = ima_restore_measurement_list(&init_ima_ns,
+ kexec_buffer_size,
kexec_buffer);
if (rc != 0)
pr_err("Failed to restore the measurement list: %d\n",
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index f9bc4d0e8c10..98be891c2621 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -112,7 +112,8 @@ static int mmap_violation_check(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file,
* could result in a file measurement error.
*
*/
-static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
+static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct file *file,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
int must_measure,
char **pathbuf,
@@ -145,10 +146,10 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
*pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, filename);
if (send_tomtou)
- ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint,
+ ima_add_violation(ns, file, *pathname, iint,
"invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
if (send_writers)
- ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint,
+ ima_add_violation(ns, file, *pathname, iint,
"invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
}
@@ -257,7 +258,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns,
}
if (!rc && violation_check)
- ima_rdwr_violation_check(file, iint, action & IMA_MEASURE,
+ ima_rdwr_violation_check(ns, file, iint, action & IMA_MEASURE,
&pathbuf, &pathname, filename);
inode_unlock(inode);
@@ -354,7 +355,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns,
pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename);
if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
- ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
+ ima_store_measurement(ns, iint, file, pathname,
xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr,
template_desc);
if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) {
@@ -979,7 +980,8 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns,
goto out;
}
- ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, event_data.buf, pcr);
+ ret = ima_store_template(ns, entry, violation, NULL, event_data.buf,
+ pcr);
if (ret < 0) {
audit_cause = "store_entry";
ima_free_template_entry(entry);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
index 532da87ce519..1e1edaeb3ebd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -31,22 +31,24 @@ static unsigned long binary_runtime_size;
static unsigned long binary_runtime_size = ULONG_MAX;
#endif
-/* key: inode (before secure-hashing a file) */
-struct ima_h_table ima_htable = {
- .len = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0),
- .violations = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0),
- .queue[0 ... IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE - 1] = HLIST_HEAD_INIT
-};
-
/* mutex protects atomicity of extending measurement list
* and extending the TPM PCR aggregate. Since tpm_extend can take
* long (and the tpm driver uses a mutex), we can't use the spinlock.
*/
static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_extend_list_mutex);
+
+static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
+{
+ /* there is no point in taking a hash of part of a digest */
+ return (digest[0] | digest[1] << 8) % IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE;
+}
+
/* lookup up the digest value in the hash table, and return the entry */
-static struct ima_queue_entry *ima_lookup_digest_entry(u8 *digest_value,
- int pcr)
+static struct ima_queue_entry *ima_lookup_digest_entry(
+ struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ u8 *digest_value,
+ int pcr)
{
struct ima_queue_entry *qe, *ret = NULL;
unsigned int key;
@@ -54,7 +56,7 @@ static struct ima_queue_entry *ima_lookup_digest_entry(u8 *digest_value,
key = ima_hash_key(digest_value);
rcu_read_lock();
- hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ima_htable.queue[key], hnext) {
+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ns->ima_htable.queue[key], hnext) {
rc = memcmp(qe->entry->digests[ima_hash_algo_idx].digest,
digest_value, hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo]);
if ((rc == 0) && (qe->entry->pcr == pcr)) {
@@ -90,7 +92,8 @@ static int get_binary_runtime_size(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
*
* (Called with ima_extend_list_mutex held.)
*/
-static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
+static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct ima_template_entry *entry,
bool update_htable)
{
struct ima_queue_entry *qe;
@@ -106,11 +109,12 @@ static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&qe->later);
list_add_tail_rcu(&qe->later, &ima_measurements);
- atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.len);
+ atomic_long_inc(&ns->ima_htable.len);
if (update_htable) {
key = ima_hash_key(entry->digests[ima_hash_algo_idx].digest);
- hlist_add_head_rcu(&qe->hnext, &ima_htable.queue[key]);
- }
+ hlist_add_head_rcu(&qe->hnext, &ns->ima_htable.queue[key]);
+ } else
+ INIT_HLIST_NODE(&qe->hnext);
if (binary_runtime_size != ULONG_MAX) {
int size;
@@ -156,7 +160,8 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(struct tpm_digest *digests_arg, int pcr)
* kexec, maintain the total memory size required for serializing the
* binary_runtime_measurements.
*/
-int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
+int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
const char *op, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *filename)
{
@@ -169,14 +174,14 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
if (!violation && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE)) {
- if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest, entry->pcr)) {
+ if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(ns, digest, entry->pcr)) {
audit_cause = "hash_exists";
result = -EEXIST;
goto out;
}
}
- result = ima_add_digest_entry(entry,
+ result = ima_add_digest_entry(ns, entry,
!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE));
if (result < 0) {
audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
@@ -201,12 +206,13 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
return result;
}
-int ima_restore_measurement_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
+int ima_restore_measurement_entry(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct ima_template_entry *entry)
{
int result = 0;
mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
- result = ima_add_digest_entry(entry, 0);
+ result = ima_add_digest_entry(ns, entry, 0);
mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
return result;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 694560396be0..0f8aa10b56fc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -400,7 +400,8 @@ static int ima_restore_template_data(struct ima_template_desc *template_desc,
}
/* Restore the serialized binary measurement list without extending PCRs. */
-int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t size, void *buf)
+int ima_restore_measurement_list(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ loff_t size, void *buf)
{
char template_name[MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN];
unsigned char zero[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
@@ -516,7 +517,7 @@ int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t size, void *buf)
entry->pcr = !ima_canonical_fmt ? *(u32 *)(hdr[HDR_PCR].data) :
le32_to_cpu(*(__le32 *)(hdr[HDR_PCR].data));
- ret = ima_restore_measurement_entry(entry);
+ ret = ima_restore_measurement_entry(ns, entry);
if (ret < 0)
break;
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 06/14] ima: Move measurement list related variables into ima_namespace
2021-12-16 5:43 [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 05/14] ima: Move ima_htable " Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-16 5:43 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 07/14] ima: Only accept AUDIT rules for IMA non-init_ima_ns namespaces for now Stefan Berger
` (8 subsequent siblings)
14 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2021-12-16 5:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: zohar, serge, christian.brauner, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Stefan Berger
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Move measurement list related variables into the ima_namespace. This way a
front-end like SecurityFS can show the measurement list inside an IMA
namespace.
Implement ima_free_measurements() to free a list of measurements
and call it when an IMA namespace is deleted.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 6 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c | 5 ++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c | 12 ++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 36 +++++++++++++++---------
6 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 83f53e33d6bc..25d58269adeb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -103,7 +103,6 @@ struct ima_queue_entry {
struct list_head later; /* place in ima_measurements list */
struct ima_template_entry *entry;
};
-extern struct list_head ima_measurements; /* list of all measurements */
/* Some details preceding the binary serialized measurement list */
struct ima_kexec_hdr {
@@ -140,6 +139,8 @@ struct ima_namespace {
int ima_policy_flag;
struct ima_h_table ima_htable;
+ struct list_head ima_measurements;
+ unsigned long binary_runtime_size;
} __randomize_layout;
extern const int read_idmap[];
@@ -195,8 +196,9 @@ int ima_restore_measurement_entry(struct ima_namespace *ns,
struct ima_template_entry *entry);
int ima_restore_measurement_list(struct ima_namespace *ns,
loff_t bufsize, void *buf);
+void ima_free_measurements(struct ima_namespace *ns);
int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
-unsigned long ima_get_binary_runtime_size(void);
+unsigned long ima_get_binary_runtime_size(struct ima_namespace *ns);
int ima_init_template(void);
void ima_init_template_list(void);
int __init ima_init_digests(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 97517830ed62..55b6a4ebef3a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -80,12 +80,13 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_count_ops = {
/* returns pointer to hlist_node */
static void *ima_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(m->file);
loff_t l = *pos;
struct ima_queue_entry *qe;
/* we need a lock since pos could point beyond last element */
rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ima_measurements, later) {
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ns->ima_measurements, later) {
if (!l--) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return qe;
@@ -97,6 +98,7 @@ static void *ima_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
static void *ima_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(m->file);
struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
/* lock protects when reading beyond last element
@@ -107,7 +109,7 @@ static void *ima_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
rcu_read_unlock();
(*pos)++;
- return (&qe->later == &ima_measurements) ? NULL : qe;
+ return (&qe->later == &ns->ima_measurements) ? NULL : qe;
}
static void ima_measurements_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
index 23c14a684d90..10a7a0606de8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
@@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns)
atomic_long_set(&ns->ima_htable.len, 0);
atomic_long_set(&ns->ima_htable.violations, 0);
memset(&ns->ima_htable.queue, 0, sizeof(ns->ima_htable.queue));
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->ima_measurements);
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC) && ns == &init_ima_ns)
+ ns->binary_runtime_size = 0;
+ else
+ ns->binary_runtime_size = ULONG_MAX;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
index f3ef8a0df992..c07149228013 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@
#include "ima.h"
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
-static int ima_dump_measurement_list(unsigned long *buffer_size, void **buffer,
+static int ima_dump_measurement_list(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ unsigned long *buffer_size, void **buffer,
unsigned long segment_size)
{
struct ima_queue_entry *qe;
@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ static int ima_dump_measurement_list(unsigned long *buffer_size, void **buffer,
memset(&khdr, 0, sizeof(khdr));
khdr.version = 1;
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ima_measurements, later) {
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ns->ima_measurements, later) {
if (file.count < file.size) {
khdr.count++;
ima_measurements_show(&file, qe);
@@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image)
struct kexec_buf kbuf = { .image = image, .buf_align = PAGE_SIZE,
.buf_min = 0, .buf_max = ULONG_MAX,
.top_down = true };
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns;
unsigned long binary_runtime_size;
/* use more understandable variable names than defined in kbuf */
@@ -96,11 +98,11 @@ void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image)
* Reserve an extra half page of memory for additional measurements
* added during the kexec load.
*/
- binary_runtime_size = ima_get_binary_runtime_size();
+ binary_runtime_size = ima_get_binary_runtime_size(ns);
if (binary_runtime_size >= ULONG_MAX - PAGE_SIZE)
kexec_segment_size = ULONG_MAX;
else
- kexec_segment_size = ALIGN(ima_get_binary_runtime_size() +
+ kexec_segment_size = ALIGN(ima_get_binary_runtime_size(ns) +
PAGE_SIZE / 2, PAGE_SIZE);
if ((kexec_segment_size == ULONG_MAX) ||
((kexec_segment_size >> PAGE_SHIFT) > totalram_pages() / 2)) {
@@ -108,7 +110,7 @@ void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image)
return;
}
- ima_dump_measurement_list(&kexec_buffer_size, &kexec_buffer,
+ ima_dump_measurement_list(ns, &kexec_buffer_size, &kexec_buffer,
kexec_segment_size);
if (!kexec_buffer) {
pr_err("Not enough memory for the kexec measurement buffer.\n");
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
index 4b7f179ea8b9..d192a80c927f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ static void destroy_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
pr_debug("DESTROY ima_ns: 0x%p\n", ns);
ima_free_policy_rules(ns);
free_ns_status_cache(ns);
+ ima_free_measurements(ns);
kmem_cache_free(imans_cachep, ns);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
index 1e1edaeb3ebd..ca225d76357f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -24,13 +24,6 @@
/* pre-allocated array of tpm_digest structures to extend a PCR */
static struct tpm_digest *digests;
-LIST_HEAD(ima_measurements); /* list of all measurements */
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
-static unsigned long binary_runtime_size;
-#else
-static unsigned long binary_runtime_size = ULONG_MAX;
-#endif
-
/* mutex protects atomicity of extending measurement list
* and extending the TPM PCR aggregate. Since tpm_extend can take
* long (and the tpm driver uses a mutex), we can't use the spinlock.
@@ -107,7 +100,7 @@ static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_namespace *ns,
qe->entry = entry;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&qe->later);
- list_add_tail_rcu(&qe->later, &ima_measurements);
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&qe->later, &ns->ima_measurements);
atomic_long_inc(&ns->ima_htable.len);
if (update_htable) {
@@ -116,12 +109,14 @@ static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_namespace *ns,
} else
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&qe->hnext);
- if (binary_runtime_size != ULONG_MAX) {
+ if (ns->binary_runtime_size != ULONG_MAX) {
int size;
size = get_binary_runtime_size(entry);
- binary_runtime_size = (binary_runtime_size < ULONG_MAX - size) ?
- binary_runtime_size + size : ULONG_MAX;
+ ns->binary_runtime_size =
+ (ns->binary_runtime_size < ULONG_MAX - size)
+ ? ns->binary_runtime_size + size
+ : ULONG_MAX;
}
return 0;
}
@@ -131,12 +126,13 @@ static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_namespace *ns,
* entire binary_runtime_measurement list, including the ima_kexec_hdr
* structure.
*/
-unsigned long ima_get_binary_runtime_size(void)
+unsigned long ima_get_binary_runtime_size(struct ima_namespace *ns)
{
- if (binary_runtime_size >= (ULONG_MAX - sizeof(struct ima_kexec_hdr)))
+ if (ns->binary_runtime_size >=
+ (ULONG_MAX - sizeof(struct ima_kexec_hdr)))
return ULONG_MAX;
else
- return binary_runtime_size + sizeof(struct ima_kexec_hdr);
+ return ns->binary_runtime_size + sizeof(struct ima_kexec_hdr);
}
static int ima_pcr_extend(struct tpm_digest *digests_arg, int pcr)
@@ -217,6 +213,18 @@ int ima_restore_measurement_entry(struct ima_namespace *ns,
return result;
}
+void ima_free_measurements(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+ struct ima_queue_entry *qe, *tmp;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(qe, tmp, &ns->ima_measurements, later) {
+ list_del(&qe->later);
+ if (!hlist_unhashed(&qe->hnext))
+ hlist_del(&qe->hnext);
+ kfree(qe);
+ }
+}
+
int __init ima_init_digests(void)
{
u16 digest_size;
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 07/14] ima: Only accept AUDIT rules for IMA non-init_ima_ns namespaces for now
2021-12-16 5:43 [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 06/14] ima: Move measurement list related variables " Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-16 5:43 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 08/14] ima: Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses Stefan Berger
` (7 subsequent siblings)
14 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2021-12-16 5:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: zohar, serge, christian.brauner, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Stefan Berger
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Only accept AUDIT rules for non-init_ima_ns namespaces rejecting all rules
that require support for measuring, appraisal, and hashing.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 786e4fd81ba9..3191979235fc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1793,6 +1793,16 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(struct ima_namespace *ns,
result = -EINVAL;
break;
}
+
+ /* IMA namespace only accepts AUDIT rules */
+ if (ns != &init_ima_ns) {
+ switch (entry->action) {
+ case MEASURE:
+ case APPRAISE:
+ case HASH:
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
}
if (!result && !ima_validate_rule(entry))
result = -EINVAL;
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 08/14] ima: Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses
2021-12-16 5:43 [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 07/14] ima: Only accept AUDIT rules for IMA non-init_ima_ns namespaces for now Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-16 5:43 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 09/14] securityfs: Only use simple_pin_fs/simple_release_fs for init_user_ns Stefan Berger
` (6 subsequent siblings)
14 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2021-12-16 5:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: zohar, serge, christian.brauner, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Stefan Berger
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses in IMA namespaces by
walking the list of IMA namespaces towards the init_ima_ns. This way
file accesses can be audited in an IMA namespace and also be evaluated
against the IMA policies of parent IMA namespaces.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
include/linux/ima.h | 9 +++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 61461ee5b208..f9e592bb9560 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -66,6 +66,15 @@ static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
}
#endif
+static inline struct user_namespace *ima_user_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns;
+
+ user_ns = current_user_ns();
+ WARN_ON(user_ns->ima_ns != ns);
+ return user_ns;
+}
+
#else
static inline enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void)
{
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 98be891c2621..4c85a8df3c86 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -200,10 +200,10 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
}
-static int process_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns,
- struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
- u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
- enum ima_hooks func)
+static int __process_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
+ u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
+ enum ima_hooks func)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -405,6 +405,28 @@ static int process_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns,
return 0;
}
+static int process_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+ struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
+ u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
+ enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns = ima_user_ns(ns);
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ while (user_ns) {
+ ns = user_ns->ima_ns;
+
+ ret = __process_measurement(ns, file, cred, secid, buf, size,
+ mask, func);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+
+ user_ns = user_ns->parent;
+ };
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/**
* ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
* @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 09/14] securityfs: Only use simple_pin_fs/simple_release_fs for init_user_ns
2021-12-16 5:43 [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 08/14] ima: Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-16 5:43 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 10/14] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support Stefan Berger
` (5 subsequent siblings)
14 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2021-12-16 5:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: zohar, serge, christian.brauner, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Stefan Berger, James Bottomley
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
To prepare for virtualization of SecurityFS, use simple_pin_fs and
simpe_release_fs only when init_user_ns is active.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
---
security/inode.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index 6c326939750d..fee01ff4d831 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -21,9 +21,10 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
-static struct vfsmount *mount;
-static int mount_count;
+static struct vfsmount *init_securityfs_mount;
+static int init_securityfs_mount_count;
static void securityfs_free_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
@@ -109,6 +110,7 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode,
const struct file_operations *fops,
const struct inode_operations *iops)
{
+ struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
struct dentry *dentry;
struct inode *dir, *inode;
int error;
@@ -118,12 +120,19 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode,
pr_debug("securityfs: creating file '%s'\n",name);
- error = simple_pin_fs(&fs_type, &mount, &mount_count);
- if (error)
- return ERR_PTR(error);
+ if (ns == &init_user_ns) {
+ error = simple_pin_fs(&fs_type, &init_securityfs_mount,
+ &init_securityfs_mount_count);
+ if (error)
+ return ERR_PTR(error);
+ }
- if (!parent)
- parent = mount->mnt_root;
+ if (!parent) {
+ if (ns == &init_user_ns)
+ parent = init_securityfs_mount->mnt_root;
+ else
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ }
dir = d_inode(parent);
@@ -168,7 +177,9 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode,
dentry = ERR_PTR(error);
out:
inode_unlock(dir);
- simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count);
+ if (ns == &init_user_ns)
+ simple_release_fs(&init_securityfs_mount,
+ &init_securityfs_mount_count);
return dentry;
}
@@ -294,11 +305,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_create_symlink);
*/
void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
{
+ struct user_namespace *ns;
struct inode *dir;
if (!dentry || IS_ERR(dentry))
return;
+ ns = dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns;
+
dir = d_inode(dentry->d_parent);
inode_lock(dir);
if (simple_positive(dentry)) {
@@ -309,7 +323,9 @@ void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
dput(dentry);
}
inode_unlock(dir);
- simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count);
+ if (ns == &init_user_ns)
+ simple_release_fs(&init_securityfs_mount,
+ &init_securityfs_mount_count);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_remove);
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 10/14] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support
2021-12-16 5:43 [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 09/14] securityfs: Only use simple_pin_fs/simple_release_fs for init_user_ns Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-16 5:43 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 13:40 ` Christian Brauner
` (2 more replies)
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 11/14] ima: Move some IMA policy and filesystem related variables into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
` (4 subsequent siblings)
14 siblings, 3 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2021-12-16 5:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: zohar, serge, christian.brauner, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Stefan Berger, James Bottomley
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Extend 'securityfs' for support of IMA namespacing so that each
IMA (user) namespace can have its own front-end for showing the currently
active policy, the measurement list, number of violations and so on.
Drop the addition dentry reference to enable simple cleanup of dentries
upon umount.
Prevent mounting of an instance of securityfs in another user namespace
than it belongs to. Also, prevent accesses to directories when another
user namespace is active than the one that the instance of securityfs
belongs to.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
---
security/inode.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index fee01ff4d831..a0d9f086e3d5 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -26,6 +26,29 @@
static struct vfsmount *init_securityfs_mount;
static int init_securityfs_mount_count;
+static int securityfs_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ err = generic_permission(&init_user_ns, inode, mask);
+ if (!err) {
+ if (inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != current_user_ns())
+ err = -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+const struct inode_operations securityfs_dir_inode_operations = {
+ .permission = securityfs_permission,
+ .lookup = simple_lookup,
+};
+
+const struct inode_operations securityfs_file_inode_operations = {
+ .permission = securityfs_permission,
+};
+
static void securityfs_free_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
@@ -41,20 +64,25 @@ static const struct super_operations securityfs_super_operations = {
static int securityfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
{
static const struct tree_descr files[] = {{""}};
+ struct user_namespace *ns = fc->user_ns;
int error;
+ if (WARN_ON(ns != current_user_ns()))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
error = simple_fill_super(sb, SECURITYFS_MAGIC, files);
if (error)
return error;
sb->s_op = &securityfs_super_operations;
+ sb->s_root->d_inode->i_op = &securityfs_dir_inode_operations;
return 0;
}
static int securityfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
{
- return get_tree_single(fc, securityfs_fill_super);
+ return get_tree_keyed(fc, securityfs_fill_super, fc->user_ns);
}
static const struct fs_context_operations securityfs_context_ops = {
@@ -72,6 +100,7 @@ static struct file_system_type fs_type = {
.name = "securityfs",
.init_fs_context = securityfs_init_fs_context,
.kill_sb = kill_litter_super,
+ .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
};
/**
@@ -157,7 +186,7 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode,
inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
inode->i_private = data;
if (S_ISDIR(mode)) {
- inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
+ inode->i_op = &securityfs_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
inc_nlink(inode);
inc_nlink(dir);
@@ -165,10 +194,10 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode,
inode->i_op = iops ? iops : &simple_symlink_inode_operations;
inode->i_link = data;
} else {
+ inode->i_op = &securityfs_file_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = fops;
}
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
- dget(dentry);
inode_unlock(dir);
return dentry;
@@ -316,10 +345,12 @@ void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
dir = d_inode(dentry->d_parent);
inode_lock(dir);
if (simple_positive(dentry)) {
+ dget(dentry);
if (d_is_dir(dentry))
simple_rmdir(dir, dentry);
else
simple_unlink(dir, dentry);
+ d_delete(dentry);
dput(dentry);
}
inode_unlock(dir);
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 11/14] ima: Move some IMA policy and filesystem related variables into ima_namespace
2021-12-16 5:43 [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 10/14] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-16 5:43 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 12/14] ima: Use mac_admin_ns_capable() to check corresponding capability Stefan Berger
` (3 subsequent siblings)
14 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2021-12-16 5:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: zohar, serge, christian.brauner, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Stefan Berger
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Move the ima_write_mutex, ima_fs_flag, and valid_policy variables into
ima_namespace. This way each IMA namespace can set those variables
independently.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 5 ++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 32 +++++++++++-------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c | 4 +++
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 25d58269adeb..cb6c92a67ff9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -141,6 +141,11 @@ struct ima_namespace {
struct ima_h_table ima_htable;
struct list_head ima_measurements;
unsigned long binary_runtime_size;
+
+ /* IMA's filesystem */
+ struct mutex ima_write_mutex;
+ unsigned long ima_fs_flags;
+ int valid_policy;
} __randomize_layout;
extern const int read_idmap[];
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 55b6a4ebef3a..b2ca9bcd185f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -24,8 +24,6 @@
#include "ima.h"
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_write_mutex);
-
bool ima_canonical_fmt;
static int __init default_canonical_fmt_setup(char *str)
{
@@ -36,8 +34,6 @@ static int __init default_canonical_fmt_setup(char *str)
}
__setup("ima_canonical_fmt", default_canonical_fmt_setup);
-static int valid_policy = 1;
-
static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(char __user *buf, size_t count,
loff_t *ppos, atomic_long_t *val)
{
@@ -338,7 +334,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
goto out;
}
- result = mutex_lock_interruptible(&ima_write_mutex);
+ result = mutex_lock_interruptible(&ns->ima_write_mutex);
if (result < 0)
goto out_free;
@@ -353,12 +349,12 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
} else {
result = ima_parse_add_rule(ns, data);
}
- mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&ns->ima_write_mutex);
out_free:
kfree(data);
out:
if (result < 0)
- valid_policy = 0;
+ ns->valid_policy = 0;
return result;
}
@@ -375,8 +371,6 @@ enum ima_fs_flags {
IMA_FS_BUSY,
};
-static unsigned long ima_fs_flags;
-
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = {
.start = ima_policy_start,
@@ -391,6 +385,8 @@ static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = {
*/
static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(filp);
+
if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) {
#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
return -EACCES;
@@ -402,7 +398,7 @@ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
return seq_open(filp, &ima_policy_seqops);
#endif
}
- if (test_and_set_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags))
+ if (test_and_set_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ns->ima_fs_flags))
return -EBUSY;
return 0;
}
@@ -416,25 +412,25 @@ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
*/
static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
- const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed";
struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(file);
+ const char *cause = ns->valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed";
if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY)
return seq_release(inode, file);
- if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy(ns) < 0) {
+ if (ns->valid_policy && ima_check_policy(ns) < 0) {
cause = "failed";
- valid_policy = 0;
+ ns->valid_policy = 0;
}
pr_info("policy update %s\n", cause);
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
- "policy_update", cause, !valid_policy, 0);
+ "policy_update", cause, !ns->valid_policy, 0);
- if (!valid_policy) {
+ if (!ns->valid_policy) {
ima_delete_rules(ns);
- valid_policy = 1;
- clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags);
+ ns->valid_policy = 1;
+ clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ns->ima_fs_flags);
return 0;
}
@@ -443,7 +439,7 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
ima_policy = NULL;
#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY)
- clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags);
+ clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ns->ima_fs_flags);
#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
inode->i_mode &= ~S_IWUSR;
#endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
index 10a7a0606de8..0972167a4af1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns)
else
ns->binary_runtime_size = ULONG_MAX;
+ mutex_init(&ns->ima_write_mutex);
+ ns->valid_policy = 1;
+ ns->ima_fs_flags = 0;
+
return 0;
}
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 12/14] ima: Use mac_admin_ns_capable() to check corresponding capability
2021-12-16 5:43 [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 11/14] ima: Move some IMA policy and filesystem related variables into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-16 5:43 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 13/14] ima: Move dentry into ima_namespace and others onto stack Stefan Berger
` (2 subsequent siblings)
14 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2021-12-16 5:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: zohar, serge, christian.brauner, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Stefan Berger, Denis Semakin
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Use mac_admin_ns_capable() to check corresponding capability to allow
read/write IMA policy without CAP_SYS_ADMIN but with CAP_MAC_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Denis Semakin <denis.semakin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
include/linux/capability.h | 6 ++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 5 +++--
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 65efb74c3585..991579178f32 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -270,6 +270,12 @@ static inline bool checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns)
ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
}
+static inline bool mac_admin_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+ return ns_capable(ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN) ||
+ ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+}
+
/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
const struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index b2ca9bcd185f..611c4271d474 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -385,7 +385,8 @@ static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = {
*/
static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
- struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(filp);
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns = ima_user_ns_from_file(filp);
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = user_ns->ima_ns;
if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) {
#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
@@ -393,7 +394,7 @@ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
#else
if ((filp->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY)
return -EACCES;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!mac_admin_ns_capable(user_ns))
return -EPERM;
return seq_open(filp, &ima_policy_seqops);
#endif
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 13/14] ima: Move dentry into ima_namespace and others onto stack
2021-12-16 5:43 [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 12/14] ima: Use mac_admin_ns_capable() to check corresponding capability Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-16 5:43 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 14/14] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 12:50 ` [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Christian Brauner
14 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2021-12-16 5:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: zohar, serge, christian.brauner, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Stefan Berger
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Move the policy file dentry into the ima_namespace for reuse by
virtualized SecurityFS and for being able to remove it from
the filesystem. Move the other dentries onto the stack.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++--------------
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index cb6c92a67ff9..d51703290e25 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -146,6 +146,8 @@ struct ima_namespace {
struct mutex ima_write_mutex;
unsigned long ima_fs_flags;
int valid_policy;
+
+ struct dentry *policy_dentry;
} __randomize_layout;
extern const int read_idmap[];
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 611c4271d474..7c5a721f4f3d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -359,14 +359,6 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
return result;
}
-static struct dentry *ima_dir;
-static struct dentry *ima_symlink;
-static struct dentry *binary_runtime_measurements;
-static struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements;
-static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count;
-static struct dentry *violations;
-static struct dentry *ima_policy;
-
enum ima_fs_flags {
IMA_FS_BUSY,
};
@@ -437,8 +429,8 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
ima_update_policy(ns);
#if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
- securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
- ima_policy = NULL;
+ securityfs_remove(ns->policy_dentry);
+ ns->policy_dentry = NULL;
#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY)
clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ns->ima_fs_flags);
#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
@@ -455,8 +447,16 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = {
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
-int __init ima_fs_init(void)
+static int __init ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = user_ns->ima_ns;
+ struct dentry *ima_dir;
+ struct dentry *ima_symlink = NULL;
+ struct dentry *binary_runtime_measurements = NULL;
+ struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements = NULL;
+ struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count = NULL;
+ struct dentry *violations = NULL;
+
ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", integrity_dir);
if (IS_ERR(ima_dir))
return -1;
@@ -493,20 +493,25 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)
if (IS_ERR(violations))
goto out;
- ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS,
+ ns->policy_dentry = securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS,
ima_dir, NULL,
&ima_measure_policy_ops);
- if (IS_ERR(ima_policy))
+ if (IS_ERR(ns->policy_dentry))
goto out;
return 0;
out:
+ securityfs_remove(ns->policy_dentry);
securityfs_remove(violations);
securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count);
securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements);
securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
securityfs_remove(ima_symlink);
securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
- securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
return -1;
}
+
+int __init ima_fs_init(void)
+{
+ return ima_fs_ns_init(&init_user_ns);
+}
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 14/14] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace
2021-12-16 5:43 [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 13/14] ima: Move dentry into ima_namespace and others onto stack Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-16 5:43 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 10:59 ` kernel test robot
` (2 more replies)
2021-12-16 12:50 ` [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Christian Brauner
14 siblings, 3 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2021-12-16 5:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: zohar, serge, christian.brauner, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Stefan Berger, James Bottomley
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Setup securityfs with symlinks, directories, and files for IMA
namespacing support. The same directory structure that IMA uses on the
host is also created for the namespacing case.
The securityfs file and directory ownerships cannot be set when the
IMA namespace is initialized. Therefore, delay the setup of the file
system to a later point when securityfs is in securityfs_fill_super.
This filesystem can now be mounted as follows:
mount -t securityfs /sys/kernel/security/ /sys/kernel/security/
The following directories, symlinks, and files are then available.
$ ls -l sys/kernel/security/
total 0
lr--r--r--. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 ima -> integrity/ima
drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 integrity
$ ls -l sys/kernel/security/ima/
total 0
-r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 ascii_runtime_measurements
-r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 binary_runtime_measurements
-rw-------. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 policy
-r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 runtime_measurements_count
-r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 violations
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
---
include/linux/ima.h | 14 ++++++++++++
security/inode.c | 6 ++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
4 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index f9e592bb9560..a2705aa5242a 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ extern int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
const char *event_name,
const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
bool hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len);
+extern int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root);
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
extern void ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(void);
@@ -232,6 +233,12 @@ static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
return current_user_ns()->ima_ns;
}
+static inline int ima_securityfs_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+ struct dentry *root)
+{
+ return ima_fs_ns_init(user_ns, root);
+}
+
#else
static inline void free_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
@@ -250,6 +257,13 @@ static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
{
return &init_ima_ns;
}
+
+static inline int ima_securityfs_init(struct user_namespace *ns,
+ struct dentry *root)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index a0d9f086e3d5..ad9395d121f2 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/fs_context.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
@@ -77,7 +78,10 @@ static int securityfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
sb->s_op = &securityfs_super_operations;
sb->s_root->d_inode->i_op = &securityfs_dir_inode_operations;
- return 0;
+ if (ns != &init_user_ns)
+ error = ima_securityfs_init(ns, sb->s_root);
+
+ return error;
}
static int securityfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index d51703290e25..9b0f6a3763f9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ struct ima_namespace {
int valid_policy;
struct dentry *policy_dentry;
+ bool policy_dentry_removed;
} __randomize_layout;
extern const int read_idmap[];
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 7c5a721f4f3d..3b8001ba62e3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -431,6 +431,7 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
#if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
securityfs_remove(ns->policy_dentry);
ns->policy_dentry = NULL;
+ ns->policy_dentry_removed = true;
#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY)
clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ns->ima_fs_flags);
#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
@@ -447,21 +448,31 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = {
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
-static int __init ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
+int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root)
{
struct ima_namespace *ns = user_ns->ima_ns;
- struct dentry *ima_dir;
+ struct dentry *int_dir;
+ struct dentry *ima_dir = NULL;
struct dentry *ima_symlink = NULL;
struct dentry *binary_runtime_measurements = NULL;
struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements = NULL;
struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count = NULL;
struct dentry *violations = NULL;
- ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", integrity_dir);
+ /* FIXME: update when evm and integrity are namespaced */
+ if (user_ns != &init_user_ns) {
+ int_dir =
+ securityfs_create_dir("integrity", root);
+ if (IS_ERR(int_dir))
+ return -1;
+ } else
+ int_dir = integrity_dir;
+
+ ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", int_dir);
if (IS_ERR(ima_dir))
- return -1;
+ goto out;
- ima_symlink = securityfs_create_symlink("ima", NULL, "integrity/ima",
+ ima_symlink = securityfs_create_symlink("ima", root, "integrity/ima",
NULL);
if (IS_ERR(ima_symlink))
goto out;
@@ -493,11 +504,15 @@ static int __init ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
if (IS_ERR(violations))
goto out;
- ns->policy_dentry = securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS,
- ima_dir, NULL,
- &ima_measure_policy_ops);
- if (IS_ERR(ns->policy_dentry))
- goto out;
+
+ if (!ns->policy_dentry_removed) {
+ ns->policy_dentry =
+ securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS,
+ ima_dir, NULL,
+ &ima_measure_policy_ops);
+ if (IS_ERR(ns->policy_dentry))
+ goto out;
+ }
return 0;
out:
@@ -508,10 +523,13 @@ static int __init ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
securityfs_remove(ima_symlink);
securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
+ if (user_ns != &init_user_ns)
+ securityfs_remove(integrity_dir);
+
return -1;
}
int __init ima_fs_init(void)
{
- return ima_fs_ns_init(&init_user_ns);
+ return ima_fs_ns_init(&init_user_ns, NULL);
}
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 14/14] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 14/14] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-16 10:59 ` kernel test robot
2021-12-16 12:02 ` kernel test robot
2021-12-16 13:51 ` Christian Brauner
2 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2021-12-16 10:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger, linux-integrity
Cc: kbuild-all, zohar, serge, christian.brauner, containers,
dmitry.kasatkin, ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu,
mpeters
Hi Stefan,
Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:
[auto build test WARNING on zohar-integrity/next-integrity]
[also build test WARNING on linux/master linus/master v5.16-rc5]
[cannot apply to jmorris-security/next-testing next-20211215]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Stefan-Berger/ima-Namespace-IMA-with-audit-support-in-IMA-ns/20211216-134611
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git next-integrity
config: sh-allmodconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20211216/202112161827.mbpxbf1k-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: sh4-linux-gcc (GCC) 11.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/bc2f1f683efbf2ad7b955fd4afc78861609eff4b
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Stefan-Berger/ima-Namespace-IMA-with-audit-support-in-IMA-ns/20211216-134611
git checkout bc2f1f683efbf2ad7b955fd4afc78861609eff4b
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-11.2.0 make.cross O=build_dir ARCH=sh SHELL=/bin/bash security/integrity/ima/
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c:451:5: warning: no previous prototype for 'ima_fs_ns_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
451 | int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
vim +/ima_fs_ns_init +451 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
450
> 451 int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root)
452 {
453 struct ima_namespace *ns = user_ns->ima_ns;
454 struct dentry *int_dir;
455 struct dentry *ima_dir = NULL;
456 struct dentry *ima_symlink = NULL;
457 struct dentry *binary_runtime_measurements = NULL;
458 struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements = NULL;
459 struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count = NULL;
460 struct dentry *violations = NULL;
461
462 /* FIXME: update when evm and integrity are namespaced */
463 if (user_ns != &init_user_ns) {
464 int_dir =
465 securityfs_create_dir("integrity", root);
466 if (IS_ERR(int_dir))
467 return -1;
468 } else
469 int_dir = integrity_dir;
470
471 ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", int_dir);
472 if (IS_ERR(ima_dir))
473 goto out;
474
475 ima_symlink = securityfs_create_symlink("ima", root, "integrity/ima",
476 NULL);
477 if (IS_ERR(ima_symlink))
478 goto out;
479
480 binary_runtime_measurements =
481 securityfs_create_file("binary_runtime_measurements",
482 S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
483 &ima_measurements_ops);
484 if (IS_ERR(binary_runtime_measurements))
485 goto out;
486
487 ascii_runtime_measurements =
488 securityfs_create_file("ascii_runtime_measurements",
489 S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
490 &ima_ascii_measurements_ops);
491 if (IS_ERR(ascii_runtime_measurements))
492 goto out;
493
494 runtime_measurements_count =
495 securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count",
496 S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
497 &ima_measurements_count_ops);
498 if (IS_ERR(runtime_measurements_count))
499 goto out;
500
501 violations =
502 securityfs_create_file("violations", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP,
503 ima_dir, NULL, &ima_htable_violations_ops);
504 if (IS_ERR(violations))
505 goto out;
506
507
508 if (!ns->policy_dentry_removed) {
509 ns->policy_dentry =
510 securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS,
511 ima_dir, NULL,
512 &ima_measure_policy_ops);
513 if (IS_ERR(ns->policy_dentry))
514 goto out;
515 }
516
517 return 0;
518 out:
519 securityfs_remove(ns->policy_dentry);
520 securityfs_remove(violations);
521 securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count);
522 securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements);
523 securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
524 securityfs_remove(ima_symlink);
525 securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
526 if (user_ns != &init_user_ns)
527 securityfs_remove(integrity_dir);
528
529 return -1;
530 }
531
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 14/14] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 14/14] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 10:59 ` kernel test robot
@ 2021-12-16 12:02 ` kernel test robot
2021-12-16 13:51 ` Christian Brauner
2 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2021-12-16 12:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger, linux-integrity
Cc: llvm, kbuild-all, zohar, serge, christian.brauner, containers,
dmitry.kasatkin, ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu,
mpeters
Hi Stefan,
Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:
[auto build test WARNING on zohar-integrity/next-integrity]
[also build test WARNING on linux/master linus/master v5.16-rc5]
[cannot apply to jmorris-security/next-testing next-20211215]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Stefan-Berger/ima-Namespace-IMA-with-audit-support-in-IMA-ns/20211216-134611
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git next-integrity
config: mips-buildonly-randconfig-r006-20211216 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20211216/202112161948.NK58RGVT-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 14.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project dd245bab9fbb364faa1581e4f92ba3119a872fba)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# install mips cross compiling tool for clang build
# apt-get install binutils-mips-linux-gnu
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/bc2f1f683efbf2ad7b955fd4afc78861609eff4b
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Stefan-Berger/ima-Namespace-IMA-with-audit-support-in-IMA-ns/20211216-134611
git checkout bc2f1f683efbf2ad7b955fd4afc78861609eff4b
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=mips SHELL=/bin/bash security/integrity/ima/
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c:451:5: warning: no previous prototype for function 'ima_fs_ns_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root)
^
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c:451:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root)
^
static
1 warning generated.
vim +/ima_fs_ns_init +451 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
450
> 451 int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root)
452 {
453 struct ima_namespace *ns = user_ns->ima_ns;
454 struct dentry *int_dir;
455 struct dentry *ima_dir = NULL;
456 struct dentry *ima_symlink = NULL;
457 struct dentry *binary_runtime_measurements = NULL;
458 struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements = NULL;
459 struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count = NULL;
460 struct dentry *violations = NULL;
461
462 /* FIXME: update when evm and integrity are namespaced */
463 if (user_ns != &init_user_ns) {
464 int_dir =
465 securityfs_create_dir("integrity", root);
466 if (IS_ERR(int_dir))
467 return -1;
468 } else
469 int_dir = integrity_dir;
470
471 ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", int_dir);
472 if (IS_ERR(ima_dir))
473 goto out;
474
475 ima_symlink = securityfs_create_symlink("ima", root, "integrity/ima",
476 NULL);
477 if (IS_ERR(ima_symlink))
478 goto out;
479
480 binary_runtime_measurements =
481 securityfs_create_file("binary_runtime_measurements",
482 S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
483 &ima_measurements_ops);
484 if (IS_ERR(binary_runtime_measurements))
485 goto out;
486
487 ascii_runtime_measurements =
488 securityfs_create_file("ascii_runtime_measurements",
489 S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
490 &ima_ascii_measurements_ops);
491 if (IS_ERR(ascii_runtime_measurements))
492 goto out;
493
494 runtime_measurements_count =
495 securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count",
496 S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
497 &ima_measurements_count_ops);
498 if (IS_ERR(runtime_measurements_count))
499 goto out;
500
501 violations =
502 securityfs_create_file("violations", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP,
503 ima_dir, NULL, &ima_htable_violations_ops);
504 if (IS_ERR(violations))
505 goto out;
506
507
508 if (!ns->policy_dentry_removed) {
509 ns->policy_dentry =
510 securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS,
511 ima_dir, NULL,
512 &ima_measure_policy_ops);
513 if (IS_ERR(ns->policy_dentry))
514 goto out;
515 }
516
517 return 0;
518 out:
519 securityfs_remove(ns->policy_dentry);
520 securityfs_remove(violations);
521 securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count);
522 securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements);
523 securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
524 securityfs_remove(ima_symlink);
525 securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
526 if (user_ns != &init_user_ns)
527 securityfs_remove(integrity_dir);
528
529 return -1;
530 }
531
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns
2021-12-16 5:43 [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 14/14] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-16 12:50 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-16 13:31 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-16 21:00 ` Stefan Berger
14 siblings, 2 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Christian Brauner @ 2021-12-16 12:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger
Cc: linux-integrity, zohar, serge, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Stefan Berger
On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 12:43:09AM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
> From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
>
> The goal of this series of patches is to start with the namespacing of
> IMA and support auditing within an IMA namespace (IMA-ns) as the first
> step.
>
> In this series the IMA namespace is piggy backing on the user namespace
> and therefore an IMA namespace gets created when a user namespace is
> created. The advantage of this is that the user namespace can provide
> the keys infrastructure that IMA appraisal support will need later on.
>
> We chose the goal of supporting auditing within an IMA namespace since it
> requires the least changes to IMA. Following this series, auditing within
> an IMA namespace can be activated by a user running the following lines
> that rely on a statically linked busybox to be installed on the host for
> execution within the minimal container environment:
>
> mkdir -p rootfs/{bin,mnt,proc}
> cp /sbin/busybox rootfs/bin
> cp /sbin/busybox rootfs/bin/busybox2
> echo >> rootfs/bin/busybox2
> PATH=/bin unshare --user --map-root-user --mount-proc --pid --fork \
> --root rootfs busybox sh -c \
> "busybox mount -t securityfs /mnt /mnt; \
> busybox echo 'audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC' > /mnt/ima/policy; \
> busybox2 cat /mnt/ima/policy"
>
> [busybox2 is used to demonstrate 2 measurements; see below]
>
> Following the audit log on the host the last line cat'ing the IMA policy
> inside the namespace would have been audited. Unfortunately the auditing
> line is not distinguishable from one stemming from actions on the host.
> The hope here is that Richard Brigg's container id support for auditing
> would help resolve the problem.
>
> The following lines added to a suitable IMA policy on the host would
> cause the execution of the commands inside the container (by uid 1000)
> to be measured and audited as well on the host, thus leading to two
> auditing messages for the 'busybox2 cat' above and log entries in IMA's
> system log.
>
> echo -e "measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC uid=1000\n" \
> "audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC uid=1000\n" \
> > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
>
> The goal of supporting measurement and auditing by the host, of actions
> occurring within IMA namespaces, is that users, particularly root,
> should not be able to evade the host's IMA policy just by spawning
> new IMA namespaces, running programs there, and discarding the namespaces
> again. This is achieved through 'hierarchical processing' of file
> accesses that are evaluated against the policy of the namespace where
> the action occurred and against all namespaces' and their policies leading
> back to the root IMA namespace (init_ima_ns).
Note that your worst-case is 32 levels (maximum supported userns
nesting) where each ima namespace defines a separate policy.
So make sure you don't run into locking issues when hierarchically
processing rules. So far I think it's fine since the locks aren't held
across the hierarchial walk but are dropped and reaqcuired for each
level.
But that could still mean a lot of contention on iint->mutex since this
lock is global, i.e. in this context: for all ima namespaces. You might
want to consider coming up with some rough ideas for how to solve this
_if_ this becomes a problem in the future.
>
> The patch series adds support for a virtualized SecurityFS with a few
> new API calls that are used by IMA namespacing. Only the data relevant
> to the IMA namespace are shown. The files and directories of other
> security subsystems (TPM, evm, Tomoyo, safesetid) are not showing
> up when secruityfs is mounted inside a user namespace.
>
> Much of the code leading up to the virtualization of SecurityFS deals
> with moving IMA's variables from various files into the IMA namespace
> structure called 'ima_namespace'. When it comes to determining the
> current IMA namespace I took the approach to get the current IMA
> namespace (get_current_ns()) on the top level and pass the pointer all
> the way down to those functions that now need access to the ima_namespace
> to get to their variables. This later on comes in handy once hierarchical
> processing is implemented in this series where we walk the list of
> namespaces backwards and again need to pass the pointer into functions.
Just to repeat the point from earlier reviews, all those functions need
to be guaranteed to call from syscall context. Functions that operate on
files have different semantics.
>
> This patch also introduces usage of CAP_MAC_ADMIN to allow access to the
> IMA policy via reduced capabilities. We would again later on use this
> capability to allow users to set file extended attributes for IMA appraisal
> support.
>
> My tree with these patches is here:
>
> git fetch https://github.com/stefanberger/linux-ima-namespaces v5.15+imans.v7.posted
>
> Regards,
> Stefan
>
> v7:
> - Dropped 2 patches related to key queues; using &init_ima_ns for all calls
> from functions related to key queues where calls need ima_namespace
> - Moved ima_namespace to security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> - Extended API descriptions with ns parameter where needed
> - Using init_ima_ns in functions related to appraisal and xattrs
> - SecurityFS: Using ima_ns_from_file() to get ns pointer
> - Reformatted to 80 columns per line
Since we're starting to be fairly along I would ask you to please write
detailed commit messages for the next revision.
I would also like to see all links for prior versions of this patchset
in the commit message since the discussion has been fairly extensive so
for this series it makes a lot of sense. So something like:
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v1)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v2)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v3)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v4)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v5)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v6)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v7)
Signed-off-by: meh
Signed-off-by: mih
Signed-off-by: muh
I find that extremely pleasant in case we need to revisit things later.
(Technically you can get the same by searching lore via the final link
but I find it be pretty pleasing to just copy+paste directly from the
commit message to the discussion for the earlier patch.)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns
2021-12-16 12:50 ` [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Christian Brauner
@ 2021-12-16 13:31 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-16 21:27 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-18 2:38 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 21:00 ` Stefan Berger
1 sibling, 2 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Christian Brauner @ 2021-12-16 13:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger
Cc: linux-integrity, zohar, serge, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Stefan Berger
On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 01:50:27PM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 12:43:09AM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> >
> > The goal of this series of patches is to start with the namespacing of
> > IMA and support auditing within an IMA namespace (IMA-ns) as the first
> > step.
> >
> > In this series the IMA namespace is piggy backing on the user namespace
> > and therefore an IMA namespace gets created when a user namespace is
> > created. The advantage of this is that the user namespace can provide
> > the keys infrastructure that IMA appraisal support will need later on.
> >
> > We chose the goal of supporting auditing within an IMA namespace since it
> > requires the least changes to IMA. Following this series, auditing within
> > an IMA namespace can be activated by a user running the following lines
> > that rely on a statically linked busybox to be installed on the host for
> > execution within the minimal container environment:
> >
> > mkdir -p rootfs/{bin,mnt,proc}
> > cp /sbin/busybox rootfs/bin
> > cp /sbin/busybox rootfs/bin/busybox2
> > echo >> rootfs/bin/busybox2
> > PATH=/bin unshare --user --map-root-user --mount-proc --pid --fork \
> > --root rootfs busybox sh -c \
> > "busybox mount -t securityfs /mnt /mnt; \
> > busybox echo 'audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC' > /mnt/ima/policy; \
> > busybox2 cat /mnt/ima/policy"
> >
> > [busybox2 is used to demonstrate 2 measurements; see below]
> >
> > Following the audit log on the host the last line cat'ing the IMA policy
> > inside the namespace would have been audited. Unfortunately the auditing
> > line is not distinguishable from one stemming from actions on the host.
> > The hope here is that Richard Brigg's container id support for auditing
> > would help resolve the problem.
> >
> > The following lines added to a suitable IMA policy on the host would
> > cause the execution of the commands inside the container (by uid 1000)
> > to be measured and audited as well on the host, thus leading to two
> > auditing messages for the 'busybox2 cat' above and log entries in IMA's
> > system log.
> >
> > echo -e "measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC uid=1000\n" \
> > "audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC uid=1000\n" \
> > > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
> >
> > The goal of supporting measurement and auditing by the host, of actions
> > occurring within IMA namespaces, is that users, particularly root,
> > should not be able to evade the host's IMA policy just by spawning
> > new IMA namespaces, running programs there, and discarding the namespaces
> > again. This is achieved through 'hierarchical processing' of file
> > accesses that are evaluated against the policy of the namespace where
> > the action occurred and against all namespaces' and their policies leading
> > back to the root IMA namespace (init_ima_ns).
>
> Note that your worst-case is 32 levels (maximum supported userns
> nesting) where each ima namespace defines a separate policy.
>
> So make sure you don't run into locking issues when hierarchically
> processing rules. So far I think it's fine since the locks aren't held
> across the hierarchial walk but are dropped and reaqcuired for each
> level.
>
> But that could still mean a lot of contention on iint->mutex since this
> lock is global, i.e. in this context: for all ima namespaces. You might
> want to consider coming up with some rough ideas for how to solve this
> _if_ this becomes a problem in the future.
>
> >
> > The patch series adds support for a virtualized SecurityFS with a few
> > new API calls that are used by IMA namespacing. Only the data relevant
> > to the IMA namespace are shown. The files and directories of other
> > security subsystems (TPM, evm, Tomoyo, safesetid) are not showing
> > up when secruityfs is mounted inside a user namespace.
> >
> > Much of the code leading up to the virtualization of SecurityFS deals
> > with moving IMA's variables from various files into the IMA namespace
> > structure called 'ima_namespace'. When it comes to determining the
> > current IMA namespace I took the approach to get the current IMA
> > namespace (get_current_ns()) on the top level and pass the pointer all
> > the way down to those functions that now need access to the ima_namespace
> > to get to their variables. This later on comes in handy once hierarchical
> > processing is implemented in this series where we walk the list of
> > namespaces backwards and again need to pass the pointer into functions.
>
> Just to repeat the point from earlier reviews, all those functions need
> to be guaranteed to call from syscall context. Functions that operate on
> files have different semantics.
>
> >
> > This patch also introduces usage of CAP_MAC_ADMIN to allow access to the
> > IMA policy via reduced capabilities. We would again later on use this
> > capability to allow users to set file extended attributes for IMA appraisal
> > support.
> >
> > My tree with these patches is here:
> >
> > git fetch https://github.com/stefanberger/linux-ima-namespaces v5.15+imans.v7.posted
> >
> > Regards,
> > Stefan
> >
> > v7:
> > - Dropped 2 patches related to key queues; using &init_ima_ns for all calls
> > from functions related to key queues where calls need ima_namespace
> > - Moved ima_namespace to security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> > - Extended API descriptions with ns parameter where needed
> > - Using init_ima_ns in functions related to appraisal and xattrs
> > - SecurityFS: Using ima_ns_from_file() to get ns pointer
> > - Reformatted to 80 columns per line
>
> Since we're starting to be fairly along I would ask you to please write
> detailed commit messages for the next revision.
>
> I would also like to see all links for prior versions of this patchset
> in the commit message since the discussion has been fairly extensive so
> for this series it makes a lot of sense. So something like:
>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v1)
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v2)
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v3)
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v4)
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v5)
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v6)
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v7)
> Signed-off-by: meh
> Signed-off-by: mih
> Signed-off-by: muh
>
> I find that extremely pleasant in case we need to revisit things later.
> (Technically you can get the same by searching lore via the final link
> but I find it be pretty pleasing to just copy+paste directly from the
> commit message to the discussion for the earlier patch.)
So I looked through the series from a high-level view for once and I
would like to change how it is currently structured.
Currently, it looks a lot like you end up with a half-namespaced ima if
you compile and run a kernel in the middle of this patch series. Not
just is this asking for semantic chaos if we need to debug something it
also makes bisection a giant pain later.
In addition, the fact that you need a hack like
> +struct ima_namespace {
> + int avoid_zero_size;
in the first patch is another good sign that this should be restructured.
Here's how I would prefer to see this done. I think we should organize
this in three big chunks (bullet points are not meant to signify
individual patches):
1. namespace securityfs
This patch is thematically standalone and should move to the
beginning of the series.
I would strongly recommend to fold patch 9 and 10 into a single patch
and add a lengthy explanation. You should be able to recycle a lof of
stuff I wrote in earlier reviews.
2. Introduce struct ima_namespace and pass it through to all callers:
- introduce struct ima_namespace
- move all the relevant things into this structure (this also avoids
the "avoid_zero_size" hack).
- define, setup, and expose init_ima_ns
- introduce get_current_ns() and always have it return &init_ima_ns for now
- replace all accesses to global variables to go through &init_ima_ns
- add new infrastructure you'll need later on
Bonus is that you can extend all the functions that later need access
to a specific ima namespace to take a struct ima_namespace * argument
and pass down &init_ima_ns down (retrieved via get_current_ns()). This
will make the actual namespace patch very easy to follow.
3. namespace ima
- add a new entry for struct ima_namespace to struct user_namespace
- add creation helpers, kmem cache etc.
- create files in securityfs per ns
This way at all points in the series we have clearly defined semantics
where ima namespacing is either fully working or fully not working and
the switch is atomic in the patch(es) part of 3.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 10/14] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 10/14] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-16 13:40 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-16 16:28 ` Christian Brauner
2022-01-03 14:09 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-17 16:21 ` [RFC PATCH] securityfs: securityfs_dir_inode_operations can be static kernel test robot
2021-12-17 16:29 ` [PATCH v7 10/14] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support kernel test robot
2 siblings, 2 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Christian Brauner @ 2021-12-16 13:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger
Cc: linux-integrity, zohar, serge, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Stefan Berger, James Bottomley
On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 12:43:19AM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
> From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
>
> Extend 'securityfs' for support of IMA namespacing so that each
> IMA (user) namespace can have its own front-end for showing the currently
> active policy, the measurement list, number of violations and so on.
>
> Drop the addition dentry reference to enable simple cleanup of dentries
> upon umount.
>
> Prevent mounting of an instance of securityfs in another user namespace
> than it belongs to. Also, prevent accesses to directories when another
> user namespace is active than the one that the instance of securityfs
> belongs to.
>
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
> ---
> security/inode.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
> index fee01ff4d831..a0d9f086e3d5 100644
> --- a/security/inode.c
> +++ b/security/inode.c
> @@ -26,6 +26,29 @@
> static struct vfsmount *init_securityfs_mount;
> static int init_securityfs_mount_count;
>
> +static int securityfs_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
> + struct inode *inode, int mask)
> +{
> + int err;
> +
> + err = generic_permission(&init_user_ns, inode, mask);
> + if (!err) {
> + if (inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != current_user_ns())
> + err = -EACCES;
I really think the correct semantics is to grant all callers access
whose user namespace is the same as or an ancestor of the securityfs
userns. It's weird to deny access to callers who are located in an
ancestor userns.
For example, a privileged process on the host should be allowed to setns
to the userns of an unprivileged container and inspect its securityfs
instance.
We're mostly interested to block such as scenarios where two sibling
unprivileged containers are created in the initial userns and an fd
proxy or something funnels a file descriptor from one sibling container
to the another one and the receiving sibling container can use readdir()
or openat() on this fd. (I'm not even convinced that this is actually a
problem but stricter semantics at the beginning can't hurt. We can
always relax this later.)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 14/14] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 14/14] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 10:59 ` kernel test robot
2021-12-16 12:02 ` kernel test robot
@ 2021-12-16 13:51 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-16 21:38 ` Stefan Berger
2 siblings, 1 reply; 36+ messages in thread
From: Christian Brauner @ 2021-12-16 13:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger
Cc: linux-integrity, zohar, serge, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Stefan Berger, James Bottomley
On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 12:43:23AM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
> From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
>
> Setup securityfs with symlinks, directories, and files for IMA
> namespacing support. The same directory structure that IMA uses on the
> host is also created for the namespacing case.
>
> The securityfs file and directory ownerships cannot be set when the
> IMA namespace is initialized. Therefore, delay the setup of the file
> system to a later point when securityfs is in securityfs_fill_super.
>
> This filesystem can now be mounted as follows:
>
> mount -t securityfs /sys/kernel/security/ /sys/kernel/security/
>
> The following directories, symlinks, and files are then available.
>
> $ ls -l sys/kernel/security/
> total 0
> lr--r--r--. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 ima -> integrity/ima
> drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 integrity
>
> $ ls -l sys/kernel/security/ima/
> total 0
> -r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 ascii_runtime_measurements
> -r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 binary_runtime_measurements
> -rw-------. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 policy
> -r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 runtime_measurements_count
> -r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 violations
>
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
> ---
> include/linux/ima.h | 14 ++++++++++++
> security/inode.c | 6 ++++-
> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 +
> security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
> 4 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> index f9e592bb9560..a2705aa5242a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ extern int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
> const char *event_name,
> const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
> bool hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len);
> +extern int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root);
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
> extern void ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(void);
> @@ -232,6 +233,12 @@ static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
> return current_user_ns()->ima_ns;
> }
>
> +static inline int ima_securityfs_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
> + struct dentry *root)
> +{
> + return ima_fs_ns_init(user_ns, root);
> +}
> +
> #else
>
> static inline void free_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
> @@ -250,6 +257,13 @@ static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
> {
> return &init_ima_ns;
> }
> +
> +static inline int ima_securityfs_init(struct user_namespace *ns,
> + struct dentry *root)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
>
> #if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
> diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
> index a0d9f086e3d5..ad9395d121f2 100644
> --- a/security/inode.c
> +++ b/security/inode.c
> @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
> #include <linux/fs_context.h>
> #include <linux/mount.h>
> #include <linux/pagemap.h>
> +#include <linux/ima.h>
> #include <linux/init.h>
> #include <linux/namei.h>
> #include <linux/security.h>
> @@ -77,7 +78,10 @@ static int securityfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
> sb->s_op = &securityfs_super_operations;
> sb->s_root->d_inode->i_op = &securityfs_dir_inode_operations;
>
> - return 0;
> + if (ns != &init_user_ns)
> + error = ima_securityfs_init(ns, sb->s_root);
> +
> + return error;
> }
>
> static int securityfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index d51703290e25..9b0f6a3763f9 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ struct ima_namespace {
> int valid_policy;
>
> struct dentry *policy_dentry;
> + bool policy_dentry_removed;
> } __randomize_layout;
>
> extern const int read_idmap[];
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> index 7c5a721f4f3d..3b8001ba62e3 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> @@ -431,6 +431,7 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> #if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
> securityfs_remove(ns->policy_dentry);
> ns->policy_dentry = NULL;
> + ns->policy_dentry_removed = true;
> #elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY)
> clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ns->ima_fs_flags);
> #elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
> @@ -447,21 +448,31 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = {
> .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
> };
>
> -static int __init ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
> +int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root)
> {
> struct ima_namespace *ns = user_ns->ima_ns;
> - struct dentry *ima_dir;
> + struct dentry *int_dir;
> + struct dentry *ima_dir = NULL;
> struct dentry *ima_symlink = NULL;
> struct dentry *binary_runtime_measurements = NULL;
> struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements = NULL;
> struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count = NULL;
> struct dentry *violations = NULL;
>
> - ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", integrity_dir);
> + /* FIXME: update when evm and integrity are namespaced */
> + if (user_ns != &init_user_ns) {
> + int_dir =
> + securityfs_create_dir("integrity", root);
> + if (IS_ERR(int_dir))
> + return -1;
That should probably be return PTR_ERR(int_dir)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 01/14] ima: Add IMA namespace support
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 01/14] ima: Add IMA namespace support Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-16 14:08 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-16 21:52 ` James Bottomley
0 siblings, 1 reply; 36+ messages in thread
From: Christian Brauner @ 2021-12-16 14:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger
Cc: linux-integrity, zohar, serge, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Stefan Berger, James Bottomley
On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 12:43:10AM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
> From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
>
> Implement an IMA namespace data structure that gets created alongside a
> user namespace with CLONE_NEWUSER. This lays down the foundation for
> namespacing the different aspects of IMA (eg. IMA-audit, IMA-measurement,
> IMA-appraisal).
>
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> Suggested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
> ---
> include/linux/ima.h | 33 ++++++++++++
> include/linux/user_namespace.h | 4 ++
> init/Kconfig | 10 ++++
> kernel/user.c | 7 +++
> kernel/user_namespace.c | 8 +++
> security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 3 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 8 +++
> security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 4 ++
> security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c | 28 ++++++++++
> security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 10 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
> create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> index b6ab66a546ae..61461ee5b208 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
> #include <linux/fs.h>
> #include <linux/security.h>
> #include <linux/kexec.h>
> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
> #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
> struct linux_binprm;
>
> @@ -210,6 +211,38 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
>
> +extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns;
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
> +
> +void free_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *ns);
> +int create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns);
> +
> +static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
> +{
> + return current_user_ns()->ima_ns;
> +}
> +
> +#else
> +
> +static inline void free_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
> +{
> +}
> +
> +static inline int create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
> +{
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
> + user_ns->ima_ns = &init_ima_ns;
> +#endif
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
> +{
> + return &init_ima_ns;
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
> +
> #if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
> extern bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func);
> #else
> diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> index 33a4240e6a6f..5249db04d62b 100644
> --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ struct uid_gid_map { /* 64 bytes -- 1 cache line */
> #define USERNS_INIT_FLAGS USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED
>
> struct ucounts;
> +struct ima_namespace;
>
> enum ucount_type {
> UCOUNT_USER_NAMESPACES,
> @@ -99,6 +100,9 @@ struct user_namespace {
> #endif
> struct ucounts *ucounts;
> long ucount_max[UCOUNT_COUNTS];
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
> + struct ima_namespace *ima_ns;
> +#endif
> } __randomize_layout;
>
> struct ucounts {
> diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
> index 11f8a845f259..27890607e8cb 100644
> --- a/init/Kconfig
> +++ b/init/Kconfig
> @@ -1242,6 +1242,16 @@ config NET_NS
> Allow user space to create what appear to be multiple instances
> of the network stack.
>
> +config IMA_NS
> + bool "IMA namespace"
> + depends on USER_NS
> + depends on IMA
> + default y
> + help
> + Allow the creation of IMA namespaces for each user namespace.
> + Namespaced IMA enables having IMA features work separately
> + in each IMA namespace.
> +
> endif # NAMESPACES
>
> config CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
> diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c
> index e2cf8c22b539..287751d89b44 100644
> --- a/kernel/user.c
> +++ b/kernel/user.c
> @@ -20,6 +20,10 @@
> #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
> #include <linux/proc_ns.h>
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
> +extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns;
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * userns count is 1 for root user, 1 for init_uts_ns,
> * and 1 for... ?
> @@ -67,6 +71,9 @@ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
> .keyring_name_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_user_ns.keyring_name_list),
> .keyring_sem = __RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_user_ns.keyring_sem),
> #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
> + .ima_ns = &init_ima_ns,
> +#endif
> };
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_user_ns);
>
> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> index 6b2e3ca7ee99..6fa01323aac9 100644
> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
> #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
> #include <linux/bsearch.h>
> #include <linux/sort.h>
> +#include <linux/ima.h>
>
> static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
> static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
> @@ -141,8 +142,14 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
> if (!setup_userns_sysctls(ns))
> goto fail_keyring;
>
> + ret = create_ima_ns(ns);
Instead of greedily allocating a new ima namespace for each new user
namespace creation and wasting memory that is likely wasted since most
containers won't use ima (for a long time at least) have you considered
lazily allocating it like I suggested in one of my first reviews?
So under the assumption that the only way for a container to get its own
ima policy it needs to have mounted a new securityfs instance you can
move the ima namespace allocation into fill_super/ima_fs_ns_init():
From 46fd4f19e1360bee167fccb11e793a3a3331ccc2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2021 14:57:30 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] !!!! HERE BE DRAGONS - COMPLETELY UNTESTED !!!!
Lazily initialize ima_ns. This avoids pointlessly wasting memory that is never
needed or used which I think will be the case for most containers.
---
include/linux/ima.h | 2 +-
kernel/user_namespace.c | 6 ------
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 5 ++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 7 ++++++-
5 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index a2705aa5242a..cb1b94df11a1 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns);
static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
{
- return current_user_ns()->ima_ns;
+ return smp_load_acquire(¤t_user_ns()->ima_ns);
}
static inline int ima_securityfs_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index 6fa01323aac9..653f8fa83b69 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -142,14 +142,8 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
if (!setup_userns_sysctls(ns))
goto fail_keyring;
- ret = create_ima_ns(ns);
- if (ret)
- goto fail_sysctls;
-
set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
return 0;
-fail_sysctls:
- retire_userns_sysctls(ns);
fail_keyring:
#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
key_put(ns->persistent_keyring_register);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 3b8001ba62e3..971620a22dab 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = {
static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns = ima_user_ns_from_file(filp);
- struct ima_namespace *ns = user_ns->ima_ns;
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = user_ns->ima_ns; /* no need to use acquire semantics it's guaranteed to be initialized */
if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) {
#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
@@ -450,7 +450,8 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = {
int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root)
{
- struct ima_namespace *ns = user_ns->ima_ns;
+ int ret;
+ struct ima_namespace *ns = user_ns->ima_ns; /* no need to use acquire semantics it's guaranteed to be initialized */
struct dentry *int_dir;
struct dentry *ima_dir = NULL;
struct dentry *ima_symlink = NULL;
@@ -459,6 +460,21 @@ int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root)
struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count = NULL;
struct dentry *violations = NULL;
+ /*
+ * While multiple superblocks can exist they are keyed by userns in
+ * s_fs_info for securityfs. The first time a userns mounts a
+ * securityfs instance we lazily allocate the ima_namespace for the
+ * userns since that's the only way a userns can meaningfully use ima.
+ * The vfs ensure we're the only one to call fill_super() and hence
+ * ima_fs_ns_init() so we don't need any memory barriers here, i.e.
+ * user_ns->ima_ns can't change while we're in here.
+ */
+ if (!ns) {
+ ret = create_ima_ns(user_ns);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
/* FIXME: update when evm and integrity are namespaced */
if (user_ns != &init_user_ns) {
int_dir =
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 4c85a8df3c86..a0e71416561d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -414,7 +414,10 @@ static int process_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns,
int ret = 0;
while (user_ns) {
- ns = user_ns->ima_ns;
+ /* the container has not loaded a separate policy (yet) */
+ ns = smp_load_acquire(&user_ns->ima_ns);
+ if (!ns)
+ continue;
ret = __process_measurement(ns, file, cred, secid, buf, size,
mask, func);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
index d192a80c927f..5c7177b07344 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ int create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
if (err)
goto fail_free;
- user_ns->ima_ns = ns;
+ /* Pairs with smp_load_acquire() in get_current_ns() and process_measurement(). */
+ smp_store_release(&user_ns->ima_ns, ns);
return 0;
@@ -52,6 +53,10 @@ static void destroy_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
void free_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
+ /* No need to use acquire semantics as the userns can't be reached
+ * anymore from userspace so either ima_ns has been initialized or it
+ * never has.
+ */
struct ima_namespace *ns = user_ns->ima_ns;
if (WARN_ON(ns == &init_ima_ns))
--
2.30.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 04/14] ima: Move policy related variables into ima_namespace
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 04/14] ima: Move policy related variables into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-16 14:26 ` kernel test robot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2021-12-16 14:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger, linux-integrity
Cc: kbuild-all, zohar, serge, christian.brauner, containers,
dmitry.kasatkin, ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu,
mpeters
Hi Stefan,
Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on zohar-integrity/next-integrity]
[also build test ERROR on linux/master linus/master v5.16-rc5]
[cannot apply to jmorris-security/next-testing next-20211215]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Stefan-Berger/ima-Namespace-IMA-with-audit-support-in-IMA-ns/20211216-134611
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git next-integrity
config: alpha-buildonly-randconfig-r004-20211216 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20211216/202112162247.XcCvdc6L-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: alpha-linux-gcc (GCC) 11.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/4927ddb1c276a9aa164fced45c2614ec93b5b425
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Stefan-Berger/ima-Namespace-IMA-with-audit-support-in-IMA-ns/20211216-134611
git checkout 4927ddb1c276a9aa164fced45c2614ec93b5b425
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-11.2.0 make.cross O=build_dir ARCH=alpha SHELL=/bin/bash security/integrity/ima/
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c: In function 'ima_update_policy':
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:1014:9: error: too many arguments to function 'ima_process_queued_keys'
1014 | ima_process_queued_keys(ns);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:23:
security/integrity/ima/ima.h:276:20: note: declared here
276 | static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
vim +/ima_process_queued_keys +1014 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
980
981 /**
982 * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
983 * @ns: IMA namespace that has the policy
984 * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
985 * policy. What we do here is to splice ima_policy_rules and ima_temp_rules so
986 * they make a queue. The policy may be updated multiple times and this is the
987 * RCU updater.
988 *
989 * Policy rules are never deleted so ima_policy_flag gets zeroed only once when
990 * we switch from the default policy to user defined.
991 */
992 void ima_update_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns)
993 {
994 struct list_head *policy = &ns->ima_policy_rules;
995
996 list_splice_tail_init_rcu(&ns->ima_temp_rules, policy,
997 synchronize_rcu);
998
999 if (ns->ima_rules != (struct list_head __rcu *)policy) {
1000 ns->ima_policy_flag = 0;
1001
1002 rcu_assign_pointer(ns->ima_rules, policy);
1003 /*
1004 * IMA architecture specific policy rules are specified
1005 * as strings and converted to an array of ima_entry_rules
1006 * on boot. After loading a custom policy, free the
1007 * architecture specific rules stored as an array.
1008 */
1009 kfree(arch_policy_entry);
1010 }
1011 ima_update_policy_flags(ns);
1012
1013 /* Custom IMA policy has been loaded */
> 1014 ima_process_queued_keys(ns);
1015 }
1016
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 10/14] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support
2021-12-16 13:40 ` Christian Brauner
@ 2021-12-16 16:28 ` Christian Brauner
2022-01-03 14:09 ` Stefan Berger
1 sibling, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Christian Brauner @ 2021-12-16 16:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger
Cc: linux-integrity, zohar, serge, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Stefan Berger, James Bottomley
On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 02:40:27PM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 12:43:19AM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> >
> > Extend 'securityfs' for support of IMA namespacing so that each
> > IMA (user) namespace can have its own front-end for showing the currently
> > active policy, the measurement list, number of violations and so on.
> >
> > Drop the addition dentry reference to enable simple cleanup of dentries
> > upon umount.
> >
> > Prevent mounting of an instance of securityfs in another user namespace
> > than it belongs to. Also, prevent accesses to directories when another
> > user namespace is active than the one that the instance of securityfs
> > belongs to.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> > Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
> > ---
> > security/inode.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> > 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
> > index fee01ff4d831..a0d9f086e3d5 100644
> > --- a/security/inode.c
> > +++ b/security/inode.c
> > @@ -26,6 +26,29 @@
> > static struct vfsmount *init_securityfs_mount;
> > static int init_securityfs_mount_count;
> >
> > +static int securityfs_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
> > + struct inode *inode, int mask)
> > +{
> > + int err;
> > +
> > + err = generic_permission(&init_user_ns, inode, mask);
> > + if (!err) {
> > + if (inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != current_user_ns())
> > + err = -EACCES;
>
> I really think the correct semantics is to grant all callers access
> whose user namespace is the same as or an ancestor of the securityfs
> userns. It's weird to deny access to callers who are located in an
> ancestor userns.
>
> For example, a privileged process on the host should be allowed to setns
> to the userns of an unprivileged container and inspect its securityfs
s/userns/mntns/
> instance.
>
> We're mostly interested to block such as scenarios where two sibling
> unprivileged containers are created in the initial userns and an fd
> proxy or something funnels a file descriptor from one sibling container
> to the another one and the receiving sibling container can use readdir()
> or openat() on this fd. (I'm not even convinced that this is actually a
> problem but stricter semantics at the beginning can't hurt. We can
> always relax this later.)
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns
2021-12-16 12:50 ` [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Christian Brauner
2021-12-16 13:31 ` Christian Brauner
@ 2021-12-16 21:00 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-17 10:06 ` Christian Brauner
1 sibling, 1 reply; 36+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2021-12-16 21:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christian Brauner, Stefan Berger
Cc: linux-integrity, zohar, serge, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris
On 12/16/21 07:50, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 12:43:09AM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
>> From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
>>
>> The goal of this series of patches is to start with the namespacing of
>> IMA and support auditing within an IMA namespace (IMA-ns) as the first
>> step.
>>
>> In this series the IMA namespace is piggy backing on the user namespace
>> and therefore an IMA namespace gets created when a user namespace is
>> created. The advantage of this is that the user namespace can provide
>> the keys infrastructure that IMA appraisal support will need later on.
>>
>> We chose the goal of supporting auditing within an IMA namespace since it
>> requires the least changes to IMA. Following this series, auditing within
>> an IMA namespace can be activated by a user running the following lines
>> that rely on a statically linked busybox to be installed on the host for
>> execution within the minimal container environment:
>>
>> mkdir -p rootfs/{bin,mnt,proc}
>> cp /sbin/busybox rootfs/bin
>> cp /sbin/busybox rootfs/bin/busybox2
>> echo >> rootfs/bin/busybox2
>> PATH=/bin unshare --user --map-root-user --mount-proc --pid --fork \
>> --root rootfs busybox sh -c \
>> "busybox mount -t securityfs /mnt /mnt; \
>> busybox echo 'audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC' > /mnt/ima/policy; \
>> busybox2 cat /mnt/ima/policy"
>>
>> [busybox2 is used to demonstrate 2 measurements; see below]
>>
>> Following the audit log on the host the last line cat'ing the IMA policy
>> inside the namespace would have been audited. Unfortunately the auditing
>> line is not distinguishable from one stemming from actions on the host.
>> The hope here is that Richard Brigg's container id support for auditing
>> would help resolve the problem.
>>
>> The following lines added to a suitable IMA policy on the host would
>> cause the execution of the commands inside the container (by uid 1000)
>> to be measured and audited as well on the host, thus leading to two
>> auditing messages for the 'busybox2 cat' above and log entries in IMA's
>> system log.
>>
>> echo -e "measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC uid=1000\n" \
>> "audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC uid=1000\n" \
>> > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
>>
>> The goal of supporting measurement and auditing by the host, of actions
>> occurring within IMA namespaces, is that users, particularly root,
>> should not be able to evade the host's IMA policy just by spawning
>> new IMA namespaces, running programs there, and discarding the namespaces
>> again. This is achieved through 'hierarchical processing' of file
>> accesses that are evaluated against the policy of the namespace where
>> the action occurred and against all namespaces' and their policies leading
>> back to the root IMA namespace (init_ima_ns).
> Note that your worst-case is 32 levels (maximum supported userns
> nesting) where each ima namespace defines a separate policy.
>
> So make sure you don't run into locking issues when hierarchically
> processing rules. So far I think it's fine since the locks aren't held
> across the hierarchial walk but are dropped and reaqcuired for each
> level.
>
> But that could still mean a lot of contention on iint->mutex since this
> lock is global, i.e. in this context: for all ima namespaces. You might
> want to consider coming up with some rough ideas for how to solve this
> _if_ this becomes a problem in the future.
The plan is that each IMA namespace will have its own rbtree with its
own set of iints. We cannot do it all at the same time, so this will
take while until things can be completely moved over into a per-IMA
namespace rbtree and each IMA namespace becomes fully independent.
>
>> The patch series adds support for a virtualized SecurityFS with a few
>> new API calls that are used by IMA namespacing. Only the data relevant
>> to the IMA namespace are shown. The files and directories of other
>> security subsystems (TPM, evm, Tomoyo, safesetid) are not showing
>> up when secruityfs is mounted inside a user namespace.
>>
>> Much of the code leading up to the virtualization of SecurityFS deals
>> with moving IMA's variables from various files into the IMA namespace
>> structure called 'ima_namespace'. When it comes to determining the
>> current IMA namespace I took the approach to get the current IMA
>> namespace (get_current_ns()) on the top level and pass the pointer all
>> the way down to those functions that now need access to the ima_namespace
>> to get to their variables. This later on comes in handy once hierarchical
>> processing is implemented in this series where we walk the list of
>> namespaces backwards and again need to pass the pointer into functions.
> Just to repeat the point from earlier reviews, all those functions need
> to be guaranteed to call from syscall context. Functions that operate on
> files have different semantics.
You mean files in general or SecurityFS files in particular?
>
>> This patch also introduces usage of CAP_MAC_ADMIN to allow access to the
>> IMA policy via reduced capabilities. We would again later on use this
>> capability to allow users to set file extended attributes for IMA appraisal
>> support.
>>
>> My tree with these patches is here:
>>
>> git fetch https://github.com/stefanberger/linux-ima-namespaces v5.15+imans.v7.posted
>>
>> Regards,
>> Stefan
>>
>> v7:
>> - Dropped 2 patches related to key queues; using &init_ima_ns for all calls
>> from functions related to key queues where calls need ima_namespace
>> - Moved ima_namespace to security/integrity/ima/ima.h
>> - Extended API descriptions with ns parameter where needed
>> - Using init_ima_ns in functions related to appraisal and xattrs
>> - SecurityFS: Using ima_ns_from_file() to get ns pointer
>> - Reformatted to 80 columns per line
> Since we're starting to be fairly along I would ask you to please write
> detailed commit messages for the next revision.
Expand the existing commit texts, is that what you suggest that I do?
>
> I would also like to see all links for prior versions of this patchset
> in the commit message since the discussion has been fairly extensive so
> for this series it makes a lot of sense. So something like:
>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v1)
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v2)
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v3)
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v4)
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v5)
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v6)
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v7)
> Signed-off-by: meh
> Signed-off-by: mih
> Signed-off-by: muh
So that's a link per patch to all its previous versions?
> I find that extremely pleasant in case we need to revisit things later.
> (Technically you can get the same by searching lore via the final link
> but I find it be pretty pleasing to just copy+paste directly from the
> commit message to the discussion for the earlier patch.)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns
2021-12-16 13:31 ` Christian Brauner
@ 2021-12-16 21:27 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-17 10:25 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-18 2:38 ` Stefan Berger
1 sibling, 1 reply; 36+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2021-12-16 21:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christian Brauner, Stefan Berger
Cc: linux-integrity, zohar, serge, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris
On 12/16/21 08:31, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 01:50:27PM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
>> On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 12:43:09AM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
>>
>>> This patch also introduces usage of CAP_MAC_ADMIN to allow access to the
>>> IMA policy via reduced capabilities. We would again later on use this
>>> capability to allow users to set file extended attributes for IMA appraisal
>>> support.
>>>
>>> My tree with these patches is here:
>>>
>>> git fetch https://github.com/stefanberger/linux-ima-namespaces v5.15+imans.v7.posted
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>> Stefan
>>>
>>> v7:
>>> - Dropped 2 patches related to key queues; using &init_ima_ns for all calls
>>> from functions related to key queues where calls need ima_namespace
>>> - Moved ima_namespace to security/integrity/ima/ima.h
>>> - Extended API descriptions with ns parameter where needed
>>> - Using init_ima_ns in functions related to appraisal and xattrs
>>> - SecurityFS: Using ima_ns_from_file() to get ns pointer
>>> - Reformatted to 80 columns per line
>> Since we're starting to be fairly along I would ask you to please write
>> detailed commit messages for the next revision.
>>
>> I would also like to see all links for prior versions of this patchset
>> in the commit message since the discussion has been fairly extensive so
>> for this series it makes a lot of sense. So something like:
>>
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v1)
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v2)
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v3)
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v4)
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v5)
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v6)
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v7)
>> Signed-off-by: meh
>> Signed-off-by: mih
>> Signed-off-by: muh
>>
>> I find that extremely pleasant in case we need to revisit things later.
>> (Technically you can get the same by searching lore via the final link
>> but I find it be pretty pleasing to just copy+paste directly from the
>> commit message to the discussion for the earlier patch.)
> So I looked through the series from a high-level view for once and I
> would like to change how it is currently structured.
>
> Currently, it looks a lot like you end up with a half-namespaced ima if
> you compile and run a kernel in the middle of this patch series. Not
> just is this asking for semantic chaos if we need to debug something it
> also makes bisection a giant pain later.
>
> In addition, the fact that you need a hack like
>
>> +struct ima_namespace {
>> + int avoid_zero_size;
> in the first patch is another good sign that this should be restructured.
>
> Here's how I would prefer to see this done. I think we should organize
> this in three big chunks (bullet points are not meant to signify
> individual patches):
>
> 1. namespace securityfs
> This patch is thematically standalone and should move to the
> beginning of the series.
> I would strongly recommend to fold patch 9 and 10 into a single patch
> and add a lengthy explanation. You should be able to recycle a lof of
> stuff I wrote in earlier reviews.
>
> 2. Introduce struct ima_namespace and pass it through to all callers:
> - introduce struct ima_namespace
> - move all the relevant things into this structure (this also avoids
> the "avoid_zero_size" hack).
Before I start any move and don't get it right:
Is this to be done like in the current set of patches in those steps
where one thing is moved after another?
> - define, setup, and expose init_ima_ns
We do this alongside the move of the individual pieces into
ima_namesapce as is done across the patches now? Most of those 'move'
patches haven't received much feedback so far.
> - introduce get_current_ns() and always have it return &init_ima_ns for now
> - replace all accesses to global variables to go through &init_ima_ns
And not pass get_current_ns() down from the top level and access the
right away via ns->foobar but use init_ima_ns.foobar instead?
> - add new infrastructure you'll need later on
> Bonus is that you can extend all the functions that later need access
> to a specific ima namespace to take a struct ima_namespace * argument
> and pass down &init_ima_ns down (retrieved via get_current_ns()). This
> will make the actual namespace patch very easy to follow.
I am wondering how this new series is going to relate to the existing
series and the links you suggest be added on a per patch basis? How much
of the existing patches can be preserved?
>
> 3. namespace ima
> - add a new entry for struct ima_namespace to struct user_namespace
> - add creation helpers, kmem cache etc.
> - create files in securityfs per ns
>
> This way at all points in the series we have clearly defined semantics
> where ima namespacing is either fully working or fully not working and
> the switch is atomic in the patch(es) part of 3.
The existing series tried this by enabling IMA namespacing support when
SecurityFS is enabled... Is that also the last step then in what you
suggest?
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 14/14] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace
2021-12-16 13:51 ` Christian Brauner
@ 2021-12-16 21:38 ` Stefan Berger
0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2021-12-16 21:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christian Brauner, Stefan Berger
Cc: linux-integrity, zohar, serge, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, James Bottomley
On 12/16/21 08:51, Christian Brauner wrote:
>
>> +int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root)
>> {
>> struct ima_namespace *ns = user_ns->ima_ns;
>> - struct dentry *ima_dir;
>> + struct dentry *int_dir;
>> + struct dentry *ima_dir = NULL;
>> struct dentry *ima_symlink = NULL;
>> struct dentry *binary_runtime_measurements = NULL;
>> struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements = NULL;
>> struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count = NULL;
>> struct dentry *violations = NULL;
>>
>> - ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", integrity_dir);
>> + /* FIXME: update when evm and integrity are namespaced */
>> + if (user_ns != &init_user_ns) {
>> + int_dir =
>> + securityfs_create_dir("integrity", root);
>> + if (IS_ERR(int_dir))
>> + return -1;
> That should probably be return PTR_ERR(int_dir)
That's actually from current usptream (
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c#L457
) The question is then whether at the end it should also return
something else than what it currently returns:
out:
securityfs_remove(violations);
[...]
securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
return -1;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 01/14] ima: Add IMA namespace support
2021-12-16 14:08 ` Christian Brauner
@ 2021-12-16 21:52 ` James Bottomley
2021-12-17 9:55 ` Christian Brauner
0 siblings, 1 reply; 36+ messages in thread
From: James Bottomley @ 2021-12-16 21:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christian Brauner, Stefan Berger
Cc: linux-integrity, zohar, serge, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, Stefan Berger
On Thu, 2021-12-16 at 15:08 +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 12:43:10AM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
[...]
> > diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> > index 6b2e3ca7ee99..6fa01323aac9 100644
> > --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> > +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> > @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
> > #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
> > #include <linux/bsearch.h>
> > #include <linux/sort.h>
> > +#include <linux/ima.h>
> >
> > static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
> > static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
> > @@ -141,8 +142,14 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
> > if (!setup_userns_sysctls(ns))
> > goto fail_keyring;
> >
> > + ret = create_ima_ns(ns);
>
> Instead of greedily allocating a new ima namespace for each new user
> namespace creation and wasting memory that is likely wasted since
> most containers won't use ima (for a long time at least) have you
> considered lazily allocating it like I suggested in one of my first
> reviews?
>
> So under the assumption that the only way for a container to get its
> own ima policy it needs to have mounted a new securityfs instance you
> can move the ima namespace allocation into
> fill_super/ima_fs_ns_init():
The current patch set has the ima namespace born with an empty policy,
meaning it can never do anything until a new policy is inserted via a
write to the securityfs, and therefore the IMA namespace could be
lazily allocated. However, that's not quite how the initial IMA
namespace behaves because a policy can be passed in on the kernel
command line (or built into the kernel). If the ima NS were born with
a default policy (say taken from the initial IMA default policy, or
simply inherited from the parent at creation time) then we wouldn't be
able to do lazy allocation. Before we tie ourselves to never being
able to have a default policy for an IMA namespace, perhaps we should
discuss if this is the correct behaviour we want to nail into the
system.
James
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 01/14] ima: Add IMA namespace support
2021-12-16 21:52 ` James Bottomley
@ 2021-12-17 9:55 ` Christian Brauner
0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Christian Brauner @ 2021-12-17 9:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: James Bottomley
Cc: Stefan Berger, linux-integrity, zohar, serge, containers,
dmitry.kasatkin, ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu,
mpeters, lhinds, lsturman, puiterwi, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul,
rgb, linux-security-module, jmorris, Stefan Berger
On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 04:52:47PM -0500, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Thu, 2021-12-16 at 15:08 +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 12:43:10AM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
> [...]
> > > diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> > > index 6b2e3ca7ee99..6fa01323aac9 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> > > @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
> > > #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
> > > #include <linux/bsearch.h>
> > > #include <linux/sort.h>
> > > +#include <linux/ima.h>
> > >
> > > static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
> > > static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
> > > @@ -141,8 +142,14 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
> > > if (!setup_userns_sysctls(ns))
> > > goto fail_keyring;
> > >
> > > + ret = create_ima_ns(ns);
> >
> > Instead of greedily allocating a new ima namespace for each new user
> > namespace creation and wasting memory that is likely wasted since
> > most containers won't use ima (for a long time at least) have you
> > considered lazily allocating it like I suggested in one of my first
> > reviews?
> >
> > So under the assumption that the only way for a container to get its
> > own ima policy it needs to have mounted a new securityfs instance you
> > can move the ima namespace allocation into
> > fill_super/ima_fs_ns_init():
>
> The current patch set has the ima namespace born with an empty policy,
> meaning it can never do anything until a new policy is inserted via a
> write to the securityfs, and therefore the IMA namespace could be
> lazily allocated. However, that's not quite how the initial IMA
> namespace behaves because a policy can be passed in on the kernel
> command line (or built into the kernel). If the ima NS were born with
> a default policy (say taken from the initial IMA default policy, or
> simply inherited from the parent at creation time) then we wouldn't be
> able to do lazy allocation. Before we tie ourselves to never being
> able to have a default policy for an IMA namespace, perhaps we should
> discuss if this is the correct behaviour we want to nail into the
> system.
If ima in the future decides to do policy inheritance it can simply
switch from delayed allocation at mount time to allocation at userns
creation time. So we can proceed with lazy allocation without much
problem for now.
In addition what is happening now is in effect policy inheritance, i.e.
each container is bound by the parent ima_ns policy until it decides to
setup its own.
Aside from that the container manager can and should be responsible for
the default ima policy to apply to containers. The default ima policy
can be passed through the spec file, configuration file, or - for the
hardcore people - compiled into the container manager itself. This is
not different from LSMs (e.g. AppArmor, seccomp) where the policy for
each container is generated from a fixed template that was built into
the container manager binary and then written via
/proc/<pid>/attr/current during container setup.
During container setup the process that ultimately calls exec to execute
the payload does all of the required setup work. The setup process
should not be automatically bound by a default policy that gets created
when the userns is created. That will just cause problems during
container setup.
Until the setup process has decided that all preliminary setup steps are
done only the ancestor policy should restrict it.
This is exactly the same for all LSMs and seccomp. They all are usually
setup closely before calling exec. I see no reason for ima to diverge
from this model.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns
2021-12-16 21:00 ` Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-17 10:06 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-27 17:29 ` Stefan Berger
0 siblings, 1 reply; 36+ messages in thread
From: Christian Brauner @ 2021-12-17 10:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger
Cc: Stefan Berger, linux-integrity, zohar, serge, containers,
dmitry.kasatkin, ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu,
mpeters, lhinds, lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel,
paul, rgb, linux-security-module, jmorris
On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 04:00:40PM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
>
> On 12/16/21 07:50, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 12:43:09AM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > > From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> > >
> > > The goal of this series of patches is to start with the namespacing of
> > > IMA and support auditing within an IMA namespace (IMA-ns) as the first
> > > step.
> > >
> > > In this series the IMA namespace is piggy backing on the user namespace
> > > and therefore an IMA namespace gets created when a user namespace is
> > > created. The advantage of this is that the user namespace can provide
> > > the keys infrastructure that IMA appraisal support will need later on.
> > >
> > > We chose the goal of supporting auditing within an IMA namespace since it
> > > requires the least changes to IMA. Following this series, auditing within
> > > an IMA namespace can be activated by a user running the following lines
> > > that rely on a statically linked busybox to be installed on the host for
> > > execution within the minimal container environment:
> > >
> > > mkdir -p rootfs/{bin,mnt,proc}
> > > cp /sbin/busybox rootfs/bin
> > > cp /sbin/busybox rootfs/bin/busybox2
> > > echo >> rootfs/bin/busybox2
> > > PATH=/bin unshare --user --map-root-user --mount-proc --pid --fork \
> > > --root rootfs busybox sh -c \
> > > "busybox mount -t securityfs /mnt /mnt; \
> > > busybox echo 'audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC' > /mnt/ima/policy; \
> > > busybox2 cat /mnt/ima/policy"
> > >
> > > [busybox2 is used to demonstrate 2 measurements; see below]
> > >
> > > Following the audit log on the host the last line cat'ing the IMA policy
> > > inside the namespace would have been audited. Unfortunately the auditing
> > > line is not distinguishable from one stemming from actions on the host.
> > > The hope here is that Richard Brigg's container id support for auditing
> > > would help resolve the problem.
> > >
> > > The following lines added to a suitable IMA policy on the host would
> > > cause the execution of the commands inside the container (by uid 1000)
> > > to be measured and audited as well on the host, thus leading to two
> > > auditing messages for the 'busybox2 cat' above and log entries in IMA's
> > > system log.
> > >
> > > echo -e "measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC uid=1000\n" \
> > > "audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC uid=1000\n" \
> > > > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
> > >
> > > The goal of supporting measurement and auditing by the host, of actions
> > > occurring within IMA namespaces, is that users, particularly root,
> > > should not be able to evade the host's IMA policy just by spawning
> > > new IMA namespaces, running programs there, and discarding the namespaces
> > > again. This is achieved through 'hierarchical processing' of file
> > > accesses that are evaluated against the policy of the namespace where
> > > the action occurred and against all namespaces' and their policies leading
> > > back to the root IMA namespace (init_ima_ns).
> > Note that your worst-case is 32 levels (maximum supported userns
> > nesting) where each ima namespace defines a separate policy.
> >
> > So make sure you don't run into locking issues when hierarchically
> > processing rules. So far I think it's fine since the locks aren't held
> > across the hierarchial walk but are dropped and reaqcuired for each
> > level.
> >
> > But that could still mean a lot of contention on iint->mutex since this
> > lock is global, i.e. in this context: for all ima namespaces. You might
> > want to consider coming up with some rough ideas for how to solve this
> > _if_ this becomes a problem in the future.
>
>
> The plan is that each IMA namespace will have its own rbtree with its own
> set of iints. We cannot do it all at the same time, so this will take while
> until things can be completely moved over into a per-IMA namespace rbtree
> and each IMA namespace becomes fully independent.
Ok, good to hear that you have already thought about that.
>
>
> >
> > > The patch series adds support for a virtualized SecurityFS with a few
> > > new API calls that are used by IMA namespacing. Only the data relevant
> > > to the IMA namespace are shown. The files and directories of other
> > > security subsystems (TPM, evm, Tomoyo, safesetid) are not showing
> > > up when secruityfs is mounted inside a user namespace.
> > >
> > > Much of the code leading up to the virtualization of SecurityFS deals
> > > with moving IMA's variables from various files into the IMA namespace
> > > structure called 'ima_namespace'. When it comes to determining the
> > > current IMA namespace I took the approach to get the current IMA
> > > namespace (get_current_ns()) on the top level and pass the pointer all
> > > the way down to those functions that now need access to the ima_namespace
> > > to get to their variables. This later on comes in handy once hierarchical
> > > processing is implemented in this series where we walk the list of
> > > namespaces backwards and again need to pass the pointer into functions.
> > Just to repeat the point from earlier reviews, all those functions need
> > to be guaranteed to call from syscall context. Functions that operate on
> > files have different semantics.
>
>
> You mean files in general or SecurityFS files in particular?
Files in general but I was specifically referring to securityfs here as
that's the relevant bit here.
>
>
> >
> > > This patch also introduces usage of CAP_MAC_ADMIN to allow access to the
> > > IMA policy via reduced capabilities. We would again later on use this
> > > capability to allow users to set file extended attributes for IMA appraisal
> > > support.
> > >
> > > My tree with these patches is here:
> > >
> > > git fetch https://github.com/stefanberger/linux-ima-namespaces v5.15+imans.v7.posted
> > >
> > > Regards,
> > > Stefan
> > >
> > > v7:
> > > - Dropped 2 patches related to key queues; using &init_ima_ns for all calls
> > > from functions related to key queues where calls need ima_namespace
> > > - Moved ima_namespace to security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> > > - Extended API descriptions with ns parameter where needed
> > > - Using init_ima_ns in functions related to appraisal and xattrs
> > > - SecurityFS: Using ima_ns_from_file() to get ns pointer
> > > - Reformatted to 80 columns per line
> > Since we're starting to be fairly along I would ask you to please write
> > detailed commit messages for the next revision.
>
> Expand the existing commit texts, is that what you suggest that I do?
Yeah, right now they don't really explain the how and why. What I'm
saying is that the commit messages - at least for the namespace part and
the securityfs part - aren't detailed enough.
>
>
> >
> > I would also like to see all links for prior versions of this patchset
> > in the commit message since the discussion has been fairly extensive so
> > for this series it makes a lot of sense. So something like:
> >
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v1)
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v2)
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v3)
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v4)
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v5)
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v6)
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v7)
> > Signed-off-by: meh
> > Signed-off-by: mih
> > Signed-off-by: muh
>
> So that's a link per patch to all its previous versions?
When Mimi ends up sending the PR for this she can then put links to all
previous versions in the pull request mail or in the tag. I'm only
suggesting you do it that way. Since this will be Mimi's PR it'll be her
decision.
So for now it would just be nice to put links to previous versions at
the end of your cover letter. Because if you rework the series as I
suggested you won't have a 1:1 correspondence between patches anymore as
you did vor v1 to v7.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns
2021-12-16 21:27 ` Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-17 10:25 ` Christian Brauner
0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Christian Brauner @ 2021-12-17 10:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger
Cc: Stefan Berger, linux-integrity, zohar, serge, containers,
dmitry.kasatkin, ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu,
mpeters, lhinds, lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel,
paul, rgb, linux-security-module, jmorris
On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 04:27:24PM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
>
> On 12/16/21 08:31, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 01:50:27PM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > > On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 12:43:09AM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > >
> > > > This patch also introduces usage of CAP_MAC_ADMIN to allow access to the
> > > > IMA policy via reduced capabilities. We would again later on use this
> > > > capability to allow users to set file extended attributes for IMA appraisal
> > > > support.
> > > >
> > > > My tree with these patches is here:
> > > >
> > > > git fetch https://github.com/stefanberger/linux-ima-namespaces v5.15+imans.v7.posted
> > > >
> > > > Regards,
> > > > Stefan
> > > >
> > > > v7:
> > > > - Dropped 2 patches related to key queues; using &init_ima_ns for all calls
> > > > from functions related to key queues where calls need ima_namespace
> > > > - Moved ima_namespace to security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> > > > - Extended API descriptions with ns parameter where needed
> > > > - Using init_ima_ns in functions related to appraisal and xattrs
> > > > - SecurityFS: Using ima_ns_from_file() to get ns pointer
> > > > - Reformatted to 80 columns per line
> > > Since we're starting to be fairly along I would ask you to please write
> > > detailed commit messages for the next revision.
> > >
> > > I would also like to see all links for prior versions of this patchset
> > > in the commit message since the discussion has been fairly extensive so
> > > for this series it makes a lot of sense. So something like:
> > >
> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v1)
> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v2)
> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v3)
> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v4)
> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v5)
> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v6)
> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/$MSGID (v7)
> > > Signed-off-by: meh
> > > Signed-off-by: mih
> > > Signed-off-by: muh
> > >
> > > I find that extremely pleasant in case we need to revisit things later.
> > > (Technically you can get the same by searching lore via the final link
> > > but I find it be pretty pleasing to just copy+paste directly from the
> > > commit message to the discussion for the earlier patch.)
> > So I looked through the series from a high-level view for once and I
> > would like to change how it is currently structured.
> >
> > Currently, it looks a lot like you end up with a half-namespaced ima if
> > you compile and run a kernel in the middle of this patch series. Not
> > just is this asking for semantic chaos if we need to debug something it
> > also makes bisection a giant pain later.
> >
> > In addition, the fact that you need a hack like
> >
> > > +struct ima_namespace {
> > > + int avoid_zero_size;
> > in the first patch is another good sign that this should be restructured.
> >
> > Here's how I would prefer to see this done. I think we should organize
> > this in three big chunks (bullet points are not meant to signify
> > individual patches):
> >
> > 1. namespace securityfs
> > This patch is thematically standalone and should move to the
> > beginning of the series.
> > I would strongly recommend to fold patch 9 and 10 into a single patch
> > and add a lengthy explanation. You should be able to recycle a lof of
> > stuff I wrote in earlier reviews.
> >
> > 2. Introduce struct ima_namespace and pass it through to all callers:
> > - introduce struct ima_namespace
> > - move all the relevant things into this structure (this also avoids
> > the "avoid_zero_size" hack).
>
> Before I start any move and don't get it right:
>
> Is this to be done like in the current set of patches in those steps where
> one thing is moved after another?
Yeah, I think that's perfectly fine and I liked that part of your
series.
I would introduce struct ima_namespace together with a first or
multiple easy member(s) to move into as one patch. And then individual
patches for other, larger members as you did.
>
>
> > - define, setup, and expose init_ima_ns
>
>
> We do this alongside the move of the individual pieces into ima_namesapce as
> is done across the patches now? Most of those 'move' patches haven't
- One patch to introduce struct ima_namespace including init_ima_ns and
a single member that can be moved into it converting all accesses to
that member to access it via struct ima_namespace.
- Individual patches for other members as you did now.
> received much feedback so far.
>
>
> > - introduce get_current_ns() and always have it return &init_ima_ns for now
> > - replace all accesses to global variables to go through &init_ima_ns
>
> And not pass get_current_ns() down from the top level and access the right
> away via ns->foobar but use init_ima_ns.foobar instead?
I would recommend starting to pass down the ima_namespace down right
away so you don't need to do it later when you actually introduce the
ima namespace proper. This could probably be done as part of the first
patch that introduces struct ima_namespace.
If I'm right this will make the actual semantic changes to enable ima
namespaces proper easier to review as they don't contain the jitter that
comes with introducing a new argument into functions.
>
>
> > - add new infrastructure you'll need later on
> > Bonus is that you can extend all the functions that later need access
> > to a specific ima namespace to take a struct ima_namespace * argument
> > and pass down &init_ima_ns down (retrieved via get_current_ns()). This
> > will make the actual namespace patch very easy to follow.
>
>
> I am wondering how this new series is going to relate to the existing series
> and the links you suggest be added on a per patch basis? How much of the
> existing patches can be preserved?
I answered that in the other mail. Just put them in the cover letter. :)
>
>
> >
> > 3. namespace ima
> > - add a new entry for struct ima_namespace to struct user_namespace
> > - add creation helpers, kmem cache etc.
> > - create files in securityfs per ns
> >
> > This way at all points in the series we have clearly defined semantics
> > where ima namespacing is either fully working or fully not working and
> > the switch is atomic in the patch(es) part of 3.
>
>
> The existing series tried this by enabling IMA namespacing support when
> SecurityFS is enabled... Is that also the last step then in what you
It did enable ima namespace support before that. It only wasn't
reachable from userspace since securityfs couldn't be mounted and a
custom policy applied.
But from a pure implementation/development perspective namespacing had
already taken place in the first patch.
Say, if I wanted to debug something in the patch series and compiled in
the middle of the previous patch series then I would have already had to
deal with per-userns ima namespaces before userspace could do anything
with them. So the regression and bug potential that comes with that had
already been fully realized so to speak.
What I want is to have this be one step: namespacing is fully
implemented and turned on at the same time.
> suggest?
No, securityfs can be mounted and just stay empty until ima starts
creating files in there in the last patch. I see no harm in that at all.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH] securityfs: securityfs_dir_inode_operations can be static
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 10/14] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 13:40 ` Christian Brauner
@ 2021-12-17 16:21 ` kernel test robot
2021-12-17 16:29 ` [PATCH v7 10/14] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support kernel test robot
2 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2021-12-17 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger, linux-integrity
Cc: kbuild-all, zohar, serge, christian.brauner, containers,
dmitry.kasatkin, ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu,
mpeters
security/inode.c:43:31: warning: symbol 'securityfs_dir_inode_operations' was not declared. Should it be static?
security/inode.c:48:31: warning: symbol 'securityfs_file_inode_operations' was not declared. Should it be static?
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
---
inode.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index a0d9f086e3d54..ff720c6bedb0a 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -40,12 +40,12 @@ static int securityfs_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
return err;
}
-const struct inode_operations securityfs_dir_inode_operations = {
+static const struct inode_operations securityfs_dir_inode_operations = {
.permission = securityfs_permission,
.lookup = simple_lookup,
};
-const struct inode_operations securityfs_file_inode_operations = {
+static const struct inode_operations securityfs_file_inode_operations = {
.permission = securityfs_permission,
};
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 10/14] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 10/14] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 13:40 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-17 16:21 ` [RFC PATCH] securityfs: securityfs_dir_inode_operations can be static kernel test robot
@ 2021-12-17 16:29 ` kernel test robot
2 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2021-12-17 16:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger, linux-integrity
Cc: kbuild-all, zohar, serge, christian.brauner, containers,
dmitry.kasatkin, ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu,
mpeters
Hi Stefan,
Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:
[auto build test WARNING on zohar-integrity/next-integrity]
[also build test WARNING on linux/master linus/master v5.16-rc5]
[cannot apply to jmorris-security/next-testing next-20211217]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Stefan-Berger/ima-Namespace-IMA-with-audit-support-in-IMA-ns/20211216-134611
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git next-integrity
config: i386-randconfig-s002-20211216 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20211218/202112180002.CNO8riQv-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-9 (Debian 9.3.0-22) 9.3.0
reproduce:
# apt-get install sparse
# sparse version: v0.6.4-dirty
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/fac0e082272f4058a9a9b27762fbf9cecca8772b
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Stefan-Berger/ima-Namespace-IMA-with-audit-support-in-IMA-ns/20211216-134611
git checkout fac0e082272f4058a9a9b27762fbf9cecca8772b
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
make W=1 C=1 CF='-fdiagnostic-prefix -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__' O=build_dir ARCH=i386 SHELL=/bin/bash
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
>> security/inode.c:43:31: sparse: sparse: symbol 'securityfs_dir_inode_operations' was not declared. Should it be static?
>> security/inode.c:48:31: sparse: sparse: symbol 'securityfs_file_inode_operations' was not declared. Should it be static?
Please review and possibly fold the followup patch.
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns
2021-12-16 13:31 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-16 21:27 ` Stefan Berger
@ 2021-12-18 2:38 ` Stefan Berger
1 sibling, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2021-12-18 2:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christian Brauner, Stefan Berger
Cc: linux-integrity, zohar, serge, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris
On 12/16/21 08:31, Christian Brauner wrote:
>
> 1. namespace securityfs
> This patch is thematically standalone and should move to the
> beginning of the series.
> I would strongly recommend to fold patch 9 and 10 into a single patch
> and add a lengthy explanation. You should be able to recycle a lof of
> stuff I wrote in earlier reviews.
>
> 2. Introduce struct ima_namespace and pass it through to all callers:
> - introduce struct ima_namespace
> - move all the relevant things into this structure (this also avoids
> the "avoid_zero_size" hack).
We could defer the kmalloc() that doesn't work on a zero-sized request.
I would say this is minor.
> - define, setup, and expose init_ima_ns
> - introduce get_current_ns() and always have it return &init_ima_ns for now
> - replace all accesses to global variables to go through &init_ima_ns
> - add new infrastructure you'll need later on
> Bonus is that you can extend all the functions that later need access
> to a specific ima namespace to take a struct ima_namespace * argument
> and pass down &init_ima_ns down (retrieved via get_current_ns()). This
> will make the actual namespace patch very easy to follow.
>
> 3. namespace ima
> - add a new entry for struct ima_namespace to struct user_namespace
> - add creation helpers, kmem cache etc.
> - create files in securityfs per ns
I have tried this now and I am looking at 4 remaining patches that need
to somehow find its way into v8 without causing too many disturbances.
At what point (over how many patches) can I introduce CONFIG_IMA_NS
without anything related to IMA namespacing happening? I need it early
in 'your 3rd part' since it is also used for conditional compilation
(Makefile) and #ifdef's where Makefile content and what the #ifdefs are
doing probably shouldn't be squeezed into a single patch just so it's
all enabled in one patch, but it should probably still remain logically
separated into different patches. Enablement of IMA namespace would be
in the very last patch. But there may be several patches between the
very last one and CONFIG_IMA_NS is introduced...
v7 at least, before the requirement to do late/lazy initialization,
enabled CONFIG_IMA_NS right away and built ever step on top of it, even
if the IMA namespace only became **configurable** in the last patch when
securityfs was enbled and one could set a policy. From that perspective
it would be easier to switch to late initialization in a patch on top of
v7 but .. ok, we cannot do that.
> This way at all points in the series we have clearly defined semantics
> where ima namespacing is either fully working or fully not working and
> the switch is atomic in the patch(es) part of 3.
Atomic over multiple patches? So introducing CONFIG_IMA_NS that doesn't
do anything for several patches is still considered 'atomic' then ?
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns
2021-12-17 10:06 ` Christian Brauner
@ 2021-12-27 17:29 ` Stefan Berger
0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2021-12-27 17:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christian Brauner
Cc: Stefan Berger, linux-integrity, zohar, serge, containers,
dmitry.kasatkin, ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu,
mpeters, lhinds, lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel,
paul, rgb, linux-security-module, jmorris
On 12/17/21 05:06, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 04:00:40PM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
>>
>> But that could still mean a lot of contention on iint->mutex since this
>> lock is global, i.e. in this context: for all ima namespaces. You might
>> want to consider coming up with some rough ideas for how to solve this
>> _if_ this becomes a problem in the future.
>>
>> The plan is that each IMA namespace will have its own rbtree with its own
>> set of iints. We cannot do it all at the same time, so this will take while
>> until things can be completely moved over into a per-IMA namespace rbtree
>> and each IMA namespace becomes fully independent.
> Ok, good to hear that you have already thought about that.
Well, yes, we thought about it. However, as far as I can look ahead we
cannot get rid of the iint->mutex:
Obviously we have to organize the data structures where IMA is recording
what it has done with a file/inode in such a way that each namespace can
efficiently determine whether it needs to audit/measure/appraise a file
or re-audit/re-measure/re-appraise it after file modification. The
organization of these data structures also has to reflect the fact that
files can be shared between IMA namespaces via setns() on mount
namespaces or shared files or shared mount namespaces between containers
etc.. So, the first thing we do already is move audit-related flags into
what is called the ns_status (namespace status) structure that are kept
in a per-IMA namespace rbtree. This allows IMA to remember that a file
was already audited and it doesn't need to audit it again. The lookup
via rbtree is quick: O(log(n).
Unfortunately the previous series had a bug so that files were not
re-audited after they were modified. I fixed this now in the new series
(upcoming v8) by connecting each ns_status also to a list. This list
starts in the global inode integrity cache (the iint rbtree) where each
inode that any IMA namespace accessed has an iint entry today. The lists
start on the iint entries representing inodes. When files are deleted
or modified or xattrs are modified then all IMA namespaces need to
re-audit/re-measure/re-appraise the file (depending on policy) and for
this we have to reset flags across all the IMA namespaces by walking the
list of ns_status entries. The organization via iint rbtree and
ns_status list allows for quick lookup of the inode where the
modification happened and quick reset of the flags: O(log(n)) + O(n).
This is better than having to search all namespaces to reset the flags
(O(log(n) * n) if there was no list.
Stefan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 10/14] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support
2021-12-16 13:40 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-16 16:28 ` Christian Brauner
@ 2022-01-03 14:09 ` Stefan Berger
1 sibling, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2022-01-03 14:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christian Brauner, Stefan Berger
Cc: linux-integrity, zohar, serge, containers, dmitry.kasatkin,
ebiederm, krzysztof.struczynski, roberto.sassu, mpeters, lhinds,
lsturman, puiterwi, jejb, jamjoom, linux-kernel, paul, rgb,
linux-security-module, jmorris, James Bottomley
On 12/16/21 08:40, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 12:43:19AM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
>> From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
>>
>> Extend 'securityfs' for support of IMA namespacing so that each
>> IMA (user) namespace can have its own front-end for showing the currently
>> active policy, the measurement list, number of violations and so on.
>>
>> Drop the addition dentry reference to enable simple cleanup of dentries
>> upon umount.
>>
>> Prevent mounting of an instance of securityfs in another user namespace
>> than it belongs to. Also, prevent accesses to directories when another
>> user namespace is active than the one that the instance of securityfs
>> belongs to.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
>> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
>> ---
>> security/inode.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>> 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
>> index fee01ff4d831..a0d9f086e3d5 100644
>> --- a/security/inode.c
>> +++ b/security/inode.c
>> @@ -26,6 +26,29 @@
>> static struct vfsmount *init_securityfs_mount;
>> static int init_securityfs_mount_count;
>>
>> +static int securityfs_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
>> + struct inode *inode, int mask)
>> +{
>> + int err;
>> +
>> + err = generic_permission(&init_user_ns, inode, mask);
>> + if (!err) {
>> + if (inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != current_user_ns())
>> + err = -EACCES;
> I really think the correct semantics is to grant all callers access
> whose user namespace is the same as or an ancestor of the securityfs
> userns. It's weird to deny access to callers who are located in an
> ancestor userns.
Ok, will be using current_in_userns() or the more explicit in_userns()
for the check.
>
> For example, a privileged process on the host should be allowed to setns
> to the userns of an unprivileged container and inspect its securityfs
> instance.
>
> We're mostly interested to block such as scenarios where two sibling
> unprivileged containers are created in the initial userns and an fd
> proxy or something funnels a file descriptor from one sibling container
> to the another one and the receiving sibling container can use readdir()
> or openat() on this fd. (I'm not even convinced that this is actually a
> problem but stricter semantics at the beginning can't hurt. We can
> always relax this later.)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2022-01-03 14:10 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2021-12-16 5:43 [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 01/14] ima: Add IMA namespace support Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 14:08 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-16 21:52 ` James Bottomley
2021-12-17 9:55 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 02/14] ima: Define ns_status for storing namespaced iint data Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 03/14] ima: Namespace audit status flags Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 04/14] ima: Move policy related variables into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 14:26 ` kernel test robot
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 05/14] ima: Move ima_htable " Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 06/14] ima: Move measurement list related variables " Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 07/14] ima: Only accept AUDIT rules for IMA non-init_ima_ns namespaces for now Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 08/14] ima: Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 09/14] securityfs: Only use simple_pin_fs/simple_release_fs for init_user_ns Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 10/14] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 13:40 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-16 16:28 ` Christian Brauner
2022-01-03 14:09 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-17 16:21 ` [RFC PATCH] securityfs: securityfs_dir_inode_operations can be static kernel test robot
2021-12-17 16:29 ` [PATCH v7 10/14] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support kernel test robot
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 11/14] ima: Move some IMA policy and filesystem related variables into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 12/14] ima: Use mac_admin_ns_capable() to check corresponding capability Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 13/14] ima: Move dentry into ima_namespace and others onto stack Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 5:43 ` [PATCH v7 14/14] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 10:59 ` kernel test robot
2021-12-16 12:02 ` kernel test robot
2021-12-16 13:51 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-16 21:38 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 12:50 ` [PATCH v7 00/14] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Christian Brauner
2021-12-16 13:31 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-16 21:27 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-17 10:25 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-18 2:38 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-16 21:00 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-17 10:06 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-27 17:29 ` Stefan Berger
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