Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module

[Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>]

On 7/9/19 8:55 PM, Xing, Cedric wrote:
> On 7/9/2019 5:10 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 7/9/2019 3:13 PM, Xing, Cedric wrote:
>>> On 7/8/2019 4:53 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>> On 7/8/2019 10:16 AM, Xing, Cedric wrote:
>>>>> On 7/8/2019 9:26 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>>>> In this scheme you use an ema LSM to manage your ema data.
>>>>>> A quick sketch looks like:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>       sgx_something_in() calls
>>>>>>           security_enclave_load() calls
>>>>>>               ema_enclave_load()
>>>>>>               selinux_enclave_load()
>>>>>>               otherlsm_enclave_load()
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Why is this better than:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>       sgx_something_in() calls
>>>>>>           ema_enclave_load()
>>>>>>           security_enclave_load() calls
>>>>>>               selinux_enclave_load()
>>>>>>               otherlsm_enclave_load()
>>>>>
>>>>> Are you talking about moving EMA somewhere outside LSM?
>>>>
>>>> Yes. That's what I've been saying all along.
>>>>
>>>>> If so, where?
>>>>
>>>> I tried to make it obvious. Put the call to your EMA code
>>>> on the line before you call security_enclave_load().
>>>
>>> Sorry but I'm still confused.
>>>
>>> EMA code is used by LSMs only. Making it callable from other parts of 
>>> the kernel IMHO is probably not a good idea. And more importantly I 
>>> don't understand the motivation behind it. Would you please elaborate?
>>
>> LSM modules implement additional access control restrictions.
>> The EMA code does not do that, it provides management of data
>> that is used by security modules. It is not one itself. VFS
>> also performs this role, but no one would consider making VFS
>> a security module.
> 
> You are right. EMA is more like a helper library than a real LSM. But 
> the practical problem is, it has a piece of initialization code, to 
> basically request some space in the file blob from the LSM 
> infrastructure. That cannot be done by any LSMs at runtime. So it has to 
> either be done in LSM infrastructure directly, or make itself an LSM to 
> make its initialization function invoked by LSM infrastructure 
> automatically. You have objected to the former, so I switched to the 
> latter. Are you now objecting to the latter as well? Then what are you 
> suggesting, really?
> 
> VFS is a completely different story. It's the file system abstraction so 
> it has a natural place to live in the kernel, and its initialization 
> doesn't depend on the LSM infrastructure. EMA on the other hand, shall 
> belong to LSM because it is both produced and consumed within LSM.
> 
> And, Stephen, do you have an opinion on this?

I don't really understand Casey's position.  I also wouldn't necessarily 
view his opinion on the matter as necessarily authoritative since he is 
not the LSM maintainer as far as I know although he has contributed a 
lot of changes in recent years.

I understood the architecture of the original EMA implementation (i.e. a 
support library to be used by the security modules to help them in 
implementing their own access control policies), although I do have some 
concerns about the complexity and lifecycle issues, and wonder if a 
simpler model as suggested by Dr. Greg isn't feasible.

I'd also feel better if there was clear consensus among all of the 
@intel.com participants that this is the right approach. To date that 
has seemed elusive.

If there were consensus that the EMA approach was the right one and that 
a simpler model is not feasible, and if the only obstacle to adopting 
EMA was Casey's objections, then I'd say just put it directly into 
SELinux and be done with it.  I originally thought that was a mistake 
but if other security modules don't want the support, so be it.

> 
>>>>>>> +/**
>>>>>>> + * ema - Enclave Memory Area structure for LSM modules
>>>>>>
>>>>>> LSM modules is redundant. "LSM" or "LSMs" would be better.
>>>>>
>>>>> Noted
>>>>>
>>>>>>> diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
>>>>>>> index c598b904938f..b66d03a94853 100644
>>>>>>> --- a/security/Makefile
>>>>>>> +++ b/security/Makefile
>>>>>>> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)        += yama/
>>>>>>>     obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN)        += loadpin/
>>>>>>>     obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID)       += safesetid/
>>>>>>>     obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)        += device_cgroup.o
>>>>>>> +obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_SGX)            += commonema.o
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The config option and the file name ought to match,
>>>>>> or at least be closer.
>>>>>
>>>>> Just trying to match file names as "capability" uses commoncap.c.
>>>>
>>>> Fine, then you should be using CONFIG_SECURITY_EMA.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Like I said, this feature could potentially be used by TEEs other 
>>>>> than SGX. For now, SGX is the only user so it is tied to 
>>>>> CONFIG_INTEL_SGX. I can rename it to ema.c or enclave.c. Do you 
>>>>> have a preference?
>>>>
>>>> Make
>>>>      CONFIG_SECURITY_EMA
>>>>      depends on CONFIG_INTEL_SGX
>>>>
>>>> When another TEE (maybe MIPS_SSRPQ) comes along you can have
>>>>
>>>>      CONFIG_SECURITY_EMA
>>>>      depends on CONFIG_INTEL_SGX || CONFIG_MIPS_SSRPQ
>>>
>>> Your suggestions are reasonable. Given such config change wouldn't 
>>> affect any code, can we do it later,
>>
>> That doesn't make the current options any less confusing,
>> and it will be easier to make the change now than at some
>> point in the future.
>>
>>> e.g., when additional TEEs come online and make use of these new 
>>> hooks? After all, security_enclave_init() will need amendment anyway 
>>> as one of its current parameters is of type 'struct sgx_sigstruct', 
>>> which will need to be replaced with something more generic. At the 
>>> time being, I'd like to keep things intuitive so as not to confuse 
>>> reviewers.
>>
>> Reviewers (including me) are already confused by the inconsistency.
> 
> OK. Let me make this change.
> 
>>>>>
>>>>>>> diff --git a/security/commonema.c b/security/commonema.c
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Put this in a subdirectory. Please.
>>>>>
>>>>> Then why is commoncap.c located in this directory? I'm just trying 
>>>>> to match the existing convention.
>>>>
>>>> commoncap is not optional. It is a base part of the
>>>> security subsystem. ema is optional.
>>>
>>> Alright. I'd move it into a sub-folder and rename it to ema.c. Would 
>>> you be ok with that?
>>
>> Sounds fine.
> 
> This is another part that confuses me. Per you comment here, I think you 
> are OK with EMA being part of LSM (I mean, living somewhere under 
> security/). But your other comment of calling ema_enclave_load() 
> alongside security_enclave_load() made me think EMA and LSM were 
> separate. What do you want really?