From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
Date: Thu, 4 May 2017 09:34:09 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0b6e4055-8e07-3a71-3d52-12b0395c8f04@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170427161227.c57dkvghz63pvmu2@pd.tnic>
On 4/27/2017 11:12 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 04:17:54PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> Changes to the existing page table macros will allow the SME support to
>> be enabled in a simple fashion with minimal changes to files that use these
>> macros. Since the memory encryption mask will now be part of the regular
>> pagetable macros, we introduce two new macros (_PAGE_TABLE_NOENC and
>> _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC) to allow for early pagetable creation/initialization
>> without the encryption mask before SME becomes active. Two new pgprot()
>> macros are defined to allow setting or clearing the page encryption mask.
>
> ...
>
>> @@ -55,7 +57,7 @@ static inline void copy_user_page(void *to, void *from, unsigned long vaddr,
>> __phys_addr_symbol(__phys_reloc_hide((unsigned long)(x)))
>>
>> #ifndef __va
>> -#define __va(x) ((void *)((unsigned long)(x)+PAGE_OFFSET))
>> +#define __va(x) ((void *)(__sme_clr(x) + PAGE_OFFSET))
>> #endif
>>
>> #define __boot_va(x) __va(x)
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h
>> index 7bd0099..fead0a5 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h
>> @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
>> #define PUD_PAGE_SIZE (_AC(1, UL) << PUD_SHIFT)
>> #define PUD_PAGE_MASK (~(PUD_PAGE_SIZE-1))
>>
>> -#define __PHYSICAL_MASK ((phys_addr_t)((1ULL << __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT) - 1))
>> +#define __PHYSICAL_MASK ((phys_addr_t)(__sme_clr((1ULL << __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT) - 1)))
>
> That looks strange: poking SME mask hole into a mask...?
I masked it out here based on a previous comment from Dave Hansen:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=148778719826905&w=2
I could move the __sme_clr into the individual defines of:
PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK, PHYSICAL_PMD_PAGE_MASK and PHYSICAL_PUD_PAGE_MASK
Either way works for me.
Thanks,
Tom
>
>> #define __VIRTUAL_MASK ((1UL << __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT) - 1)
>>
>> /* Cast *PAGE_MASK to a signed type so that it is sign-extended if
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-05-04 14:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 126+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-04-18 21:16 [PATCH v5 00/32] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-04-19 9:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-19 14:23 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-19 15:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-19 9:52 ` David Howells
2017-04-18 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 02/32] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 03/32] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 04/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-04-20 16:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-20 17:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-20 18:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-04-27 15:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:24 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 19:28 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-17 7:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 07/32] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 14:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-21 21:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 08/32] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 21:52 ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-24 15:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-24 15:57 ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-24 16:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-27 16:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:34 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-05-04 17:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 10/32] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 11/32] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 12/32] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 10:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 13/32] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-05-05 17:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-06 7:48 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 14/32] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-05-15 18:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 21:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 15/32] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-05-07 17:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-08 13:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 16/32] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-05-15 18:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-17 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18 9:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-21 7:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 16:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 11:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-18 19:50 ` Matt Fleming
2017-05-26 16:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 16:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 17:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 18/32] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 8:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-17 20:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18 9:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 19/32] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 14:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 19:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 20/32] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 21/32] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 22/32] x86, swiotlb: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 14:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 19:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 23/32] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 14:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 19:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 24/32] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 25/32] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 26/32] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 17:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 20:07 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21 ` [PATCH v5 27/32] kvm: x86: svm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21 ` [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-05-17 19:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 20:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 21:07 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 21:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 21:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 4:17 ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-27 2:17 ` Dave Young
2017-05-30 17:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 10:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 15:03 ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-31 15:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:21 ` [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18 12:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-25 22:24 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 16:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 16:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 9:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 13:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 30/32] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 21:55 ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-27 7:25 ` Dave Young
2017-04-27 15:52 ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-28 5:32 ` Dave Young
2017-05-04 14:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:13 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18 17:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-26 2:49 ` Dave Young
2017-05-26 5:04 ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-26 15:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of " Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 11:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:16 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2017-05-19 20:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 15:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 9:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 15:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 11:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 14:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 14:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 15:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 8:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 13:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 14:12 ` Borislav Petkov
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