linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	<x86@kernel.org>, <kexec@lists.infradead.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
	<linux-mm@kvack.org>, <iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v5 12/32] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2017 16:18:22 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170418211822.10190.67435.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170418211612.10190.82788.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

The boot data and command line data are present in memory in a decrypted
state and are copied early in the boot process.  The early page fault
support will map these areas as encrypted, so before attempting to copy
them, add decrypted mappings so the data is accessed properly when copied.

For the initrd, encrypt this data in place. Since the future mapping of the
initrd area will be mapped as encrypted the data will be accessed properly.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |   11 +++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h     |    3 +
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c           |   30 ++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c            |   10 +++++
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          |   77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 4021203..130d7fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 			      unsigned long size);
 
+void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data);
+void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data);
+
 void __init sme_early_init(void);
 
 #else	/* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
@@ -54,6 +57,14 @@ static inline void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 {
 }
 
+static inline void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
+{
+}
+
 static inline void __init sme_early_init(void)
 {
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 1f9a2c4..1611bb5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 #include <asm/x86_init.h>
 
+extern pgd_t early_level4_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
+int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd);
+
 void ptdump_walk_pgd_level(struct seq_file *m, pgd_t *pgd);
 void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx(void);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 9056cf9..e789e14 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@
 /*
  * Manage page tables very early on.
  */
-extern pgd_t early_level4_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
 extern pmd_t early_dynamic_pgts[EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES][PTRS_PER_PMD];
 static unsigned int __initdata next_early_pgt = 2;
 pmdval_t early_pmd_flags = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE & ~(_PAGE_GLOBAL | _PAGE_NX);
@@ -48,12 +47,12 @@ static void __init reset_early_page_tables(void)
 }
 
 /* Create a new PMD entry */
-int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
+int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd)
 {
 	unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
 	pgdval_t pgd, *pgd_p;
 	pudval_t pud, *pud_p;
-	pmdval_t pmd, *pmd_p;
+	pmdval_t *pmd_p;
 
 	/* Invalid address or early pgt is done ?  */
 	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3() != __sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt))
@@ -95,12 +94,21 @@ int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
 		memset(pmd_p, 0, sizeof(*pmd_p) * PTRS_PER_PMD);
 		*pud_p = (pudval_t)pmd_p - __START_KERNEL_map + phys_base + _KERNPG_TABLE;
 	}
-	pmd = (physaddr & PMD_MASK) + early_pmd_flags;
 	pmd_p[pmd_index(address)] = pmd;
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
+{
+	unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
+	pmdval_t pmd;
+
+	pmd = (physaddr & PMD_MASK) + early_pmd_flags;
+
+	return __early_make_pgtable(address, pmd);
+}
+
 /* Don't add a printk in there. printk relies on the PDA which is not initialized 
    yet. */
 static void __init clear_bss(void)
@@ -123,6 +131,12 @@ static void __init copy_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
 	char * command_line;
 	unsigned long cmd_line_ptr;
 
+	/*
+	 * If SME is active, this will create decrypted mappings of the
+	 * boot data in advance of the copy operations.
+	 */
+	sme_map_bootdata(real_mode_data);
+
 	memcpy(&boot_params, real_mode_data, sizeof boot_params);
 	sanitize_boot_params(&boot_params);
 	cmd_line_ptr = get_cmd_line_ptr();
@@ -130,6 +144,14 @@ static void __init copy_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
 		command_line = __va(cmd_line_ptr);
 		memcpy(boot_command_line, command_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The old boot data is no longer needed and won't be reserved,
+	 * freeing up that memory for use by the system. If SME is active,
+	 * we need to remove the mappings that were created so that the
+	 * memory doesn't remain mapped as decrypted.
+	 */
+	sme_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data);
 }
 
 asmlinkage __visible void __init x86_64_start_kernel(char * real_mode_data)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 603a166..a95800b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@
 #include <asm/microcode.h>
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/kaslr.h>
+#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
 
 /*
  * max_low_pfn_mapped: highest direct mapped pfn under 4GB
@@ -374,6 +375,15 @@ static void __init reserve_initrd(void)
 	    !ramdisk_image || !ramdisk_size)
 		return;		/* No initrd provided by bootloader */
 
+	/*
+	 * If SME is active, this memory will be marked encrypted by the
+	 * kernel when it is accessed (including relocation). However, the
+	 * ramdisk image was loaded decrypted by the bootloader, so make
+	 * sure that it is encrypted before accessing it.
+	 */
+	if (sme_active())
+		sme_early_encrypt(ramdisk_image, ramdisk_end - ramdisk_image);
+
 	initrd_start = 0;
 
 	mapped_size = memblock_mem_size(max_pfn_mapped);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 18c0887..2321f05 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
 
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/fixmap.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
 
 /*
  * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
@@ -101,6 +103,81 @@ void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
 	__sme_early_enc_dec(paddr, size, false);
 }
 
+static void __init sme_early_pgtable_flush(void)
+{
+	write_cr3(__sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
+}
+
+static void __init __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(void *vaddr, unsigned long size,
+					     bool map)
+{
+	unsigned long paddr = (unsigned long)vaddr - __PAGE_OFFSET;
+	pmdval_t pmd_flags, pmd;
+
+	/* Use early_pmd_flags but remove the encryption mask */
+	pmd_flags = __sme_clr(early_pmd_flags);
+
+	do {
+		pmd = map ? (paddr & PMD_MASK) + pmd_flags : 0;
+		__early_make_pgtable((unsigned long)vaddr, pmd);
+
+		vaddr += PMD_SIZE;
+		paddr += PMD_SIZE;
+		size = (size <= PMD_SIZE) ? 0 : size - PMD_SIZE;
+	} while (size);
+}
+
+static void __init __sme_map_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data, bool map)
+{
+	struct boot_params *boot_data;
+	unsigned long cmdline_paddr;
+
+	__sme_early_map_unmap_mem(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params), map);
+	boot_data = (struct boot_params *)real_mode_data;
+
+	/*
+	 * Determine the command line address only after having established
+	 * the decrypted mapping.
+	 */
+	cmdline_paddr = boot_data->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
+			((u64)boot_data->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32);
+
+	if (cmdline_paddr)
+		__sme_early_map_unmap_mem(__va(cmdline_paddr),
+					  COMMAND_LINE_SIZE, map);
+}
+
+void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
+{
+	/* If SME is not active, the bootdata is in the correct state */
+	if (!sme_active())
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * The bootdata and command line aren't needed anymore so clear
+	 * any mapping of them.
+	 */
+	__sme_map_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data, false);
+
+	sme_early_pgtable_flush();
+}
+
+void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
+{
+	/* If SME is not active, the bootdata is in the correct state */
+	if (!sme_active())
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * The bootdata and command line will not be encrypted, so they
+	 * need to be mapped as decrypted memory so they can be copied
+	 * properly.
+	 */
+	__sme_map_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data, true);
+
+	sme_early_pgtable_flush();
+}
+
 void __init sme_early_init(void)
 {
 	unsigned int i;

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-04-18 21:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 126+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-04-18 21:16 [PATCH v5 00/32] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-04-19  9:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-19 14:23     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-19 15:38       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-19  9:52   ` David Howells
2017-04-18 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 02/32] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 03/32] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 04/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-04-20 16:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-20 17:29     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-20 18:52       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-04-27 15:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:24     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:36       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 19:28         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-17  7:05           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 07/32] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 14:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-21 21:40     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 08/32] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 21:52   ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-24 15:53     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-24 15:57       ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-24 16:10         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-27 16:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:34     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 17:01       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 10/32] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 11/32] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-05-04 10:16   ` [PATCH v5 12/32] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:39     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 13/32] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-05-05 17:11   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-06  7:48     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 14/32] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-05-15 18:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 21:53     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 15/32] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-05-07 17:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-08 13:20     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 16/32] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-05-15 18:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-17 18:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18  9:02       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:50         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-21  7:16           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 16:46             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 11:31               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-18 19:50     ` Matt Fleming
2017-05-26 16:22       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 16:35         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 17:47           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 18/32] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16  8:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-17 20:26     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18  9:03       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 19/32] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 14:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 19:52     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 20/32] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 21/32] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 22/32] x86, swiotlb: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 14:27   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 19:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 23/32] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 14:52   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 19:55     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 24/32] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 25/32] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 26/32] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 17:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 20:07     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21 ` [PATCH v5 27/32] kvm: x86: svm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21 ` [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-05-17 19:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:45     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 20:58       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 21:07         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 21:28           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 21:38             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26  4:17   ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-27  2:17     ` Dave Young
2017-05-30 17:46     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 10:01       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 15:03       ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-31 15:48         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:21 ` [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18 12:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-25 22:24     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 16:25       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 16:39         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31  9:51           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 13:12             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 30/32] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 21:55   ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-27  7:25     ` Dave Young
2017-04-27 15:52       ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-28  5:32         ` Dave Young
2017-05-04 14:17         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:13       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18 17:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-26  2:49     ` Dave Young
2017-05-26  5:04       ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-26 15:47         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of " Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 11:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:16       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2017-05-19 20:29         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 15:48         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31  9:15           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 15:46       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 11:27   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 14:38     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 14:55       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 15:37         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31  8:49           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 13:37             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 14:12               ` Borislav Petkov

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20170418211822.10190.67435.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net \
    --to=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=aryabinin@virtuozzo.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=brijesh.singh@amd.com \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dvyukov@google.com \
    --cc=dyoung@redhat.com \
    --cc=glider@google.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=joro@8bytes.org \
    --cc=kasan-dev@googlegroups.com \
    --cc=kexec@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=konrad.wilk@oracle.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=lwoodman@redhat.com \
    --cc=matt@codeblueprint.co.uk \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=mst@redhat.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=riel@redhat.com \
    --cc=rkrcmar@redhat.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=toshi.kani@hpe.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).