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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
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	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
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	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 19/32] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
Date: Fri, 19 May 2017 14:52:58 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <adce040c-66ba-55ad-4431-780b9c8d1d72@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170516140449.zmp3sm4krro55bbi@pd.tnic>

On 5/16/2017 9:04 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 04:19:42PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> Persistent memory is expected to persist across reboots. The encryption
>> key used by SME will change across reboots which will result in corrupted
>> persistent memory.  Persistent memory is handed out by block devices
>> through memory remapping functions, so be sure not to map this memory as
>> encrypted.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c |   31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>  1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>> index bce0604..55317ba 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>> @@ -425,17 +425,46 @@ void unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr)
>>   * Examine the physical address to determine if it is an area of memory
>>   * that should be mapped decrypted.  If the memory is not part of the
>>   * kernel usable area it was accessed and created decrypted, so these
>> - * areas should be mapped decrypted.
>> + * areas should be mapped decrypted. And since the encryption key can
>> + * change across reboots, persistent memory should also be mapped
>> + * decrypted.
>>   */
>>  static bool memremap_should_map_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
>>  					  unsigned long size)
>>  {
>> +	int is_pmem;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Check if the address is part of a persistent memory region.
>> +	 * This check covers areas added by E820, EFI and ACPI.
>> +	 */
>> +	is_pmem = region_intersects(phys_addr, size, IORESOURCE_MEM,
>> +				    IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
>> +	if (is_pmem != REGION_DISJOINT)
>> +		return true;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Check if the non-volatile attribute is set for an EFI
>> +	 * reserved area.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
>> +		switch (efi_mem_type(phys_addr)) {
>> +		case EFI_RESERVED_TYPE:
>> +			if (efi_mem_attributes(phys_addr) & EFI_MEMORY_NV)
>> +				return true;
>> +			break;
>> +		default:
>> +			break;
>> +		}
>> +	}
>> +
>>  	/* Check if the address is outside kernel usable area */
>>  	switch (e820__get_entry_type(phys_addr, phys_addr + size - 1)) {
>>  	case E820_TYPE_RESERVED:
>>  	case E820_TYPE_ACPI:
>>  	case E820_TYPE_NVS:
>>  	case E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE:
>> +	case E820_TYPE_PRAM:
>
> Can't you simply add:
>
> 	case E820_TYPE_PMEM:
>
> here too and thus get rid of the region_intersects() thing above?
>
> Because, for example, e820_type_to_iores_desc() maps E820_TYPE_PMEM to
> IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY so those should be equivalent...

I'll have to double-check this, but I believe that when persistent
memory is identified through the NFIT table it adds it as a resource
but doesn't add it as an e820 entry so I can't rely on the type being
returned as E820_TYPE_PMEM by e820__get_entry_type().

Thanks,
Tom

>

  reply	other threads:[~2017-05-19 19:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 126+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-04-18 21:16 [PATCH v5 00/32] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-04-19  9:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-19 14:23     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-19 15:38       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-19  9:52   ` David Howells
2017-04-18 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 02/32] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 03/32] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 04/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-04-20 16:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-20 17:29     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-20 18:52       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-04-27 15:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:24     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:36       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 19:28         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-17  7:05           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 07/32] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 14:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-21 21:40     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 08/32] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 21:52   ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-24 15:53     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-24 15:57       ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-24 16:10         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-27 16:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:34     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 17:01       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 10/32] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 11/32] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 12/32] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 10:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:39     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 13/32] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-05-05 17:11   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-06  7:48     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 14/32] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-05-15 18:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 21:53     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 15/32] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-05-07 17:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-08 13:20     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 16/32] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-05-15 18:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-17 18:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18  9:02       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:50         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-21  7:16           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 16:46             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 11:31               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-18 19:50     ` Matt Fleming
2017-05-26 16:22       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 16:35         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 17:47           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 18/32] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16  8:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-17 20:26     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18  9:03       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 19/32] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 14:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 19:52     ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 20/32] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 21/32] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 22/32] x86, swiotlb: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 14:27   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 19:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 23/32] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 14:52   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 19:55     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 24/32] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 25/32] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 26/32] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 17:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 20:07     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21 ` [PATCH v5 27/32] kvm: x86: svm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21 ` [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-05-17 19:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:45     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 20:58       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 21:07         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 21:28           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 21:38             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26  4:17   ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-27  2:17     ` Dave Young
2017-05-30 17:46     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 10:01       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 15:03       ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-31 15:48         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:21 ` [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18 12:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-25 22:24     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 16:25       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 16:39         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31  9:51           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 13:12             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 30/32] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 21:55   ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-27  7:25     ` Dave Young
2017-04-27 15:52       ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-28  5:32         ` Dave Young
2017-05-04 14:17         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:13       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18 17:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-26  2:49     ` Dave Young
2017-05-26  5:04       ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-26 15:47         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of " Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 11:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:16       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2017-05-19 20:29         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 15:48         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31  9:15           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 15:46       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 11:27   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 14:38     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 14:55       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 15:37         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31  8:49           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 13:37             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 14:12               ` Borislav Petkov

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