From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
Date: Fri, 19 May 2017 16:07:24 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5ef96f3a-6ebd-1d4d-7ac9-05dbed45d998@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170519205836.3wvl3nztqyyouje3@pd.tnic>
On 5/19/2017 3:58 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 03:45:28PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> Actually there is. The above will result in data in the cache because
>> halt() turns into a function call if CONFIG_PARAVIRT is defined (refer
>> to the comment above where do_wbinvd_halt is set to true). I could make
>> this a native_wbinvd() and native_halt()
>
> That's why we have the native_* versions - to bypass paravirt crap.
As long as those never change from static inline everything will be
fine. I can change it, but I really like how it explicitly indicates
what is needed in this case. Even if the function gets changed from
static inline the fact that the instructions are sequential in the
function covers that case.
Thanks,
Tom
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-05-19 21:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 126+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-04-18 21:16 [PATCH v5 00/32] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-04-19 9:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-19 14:23 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-19 15:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-19 9:52 ` David Howells
2017-04-18 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 02/32] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 03/32] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 04/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-04-20 16:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-20 17:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-20 18:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-04-27 15:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:24 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 19:28 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-17 7:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 07/32] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 14:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-21 21:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 08/32] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 21:52 ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-24 15:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-24 15:57 ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-24 16:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-27 16:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 17:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 10/32] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 11/32] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 12/32] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 10:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 13/32] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-05-05 17:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-06 7:48 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 14/32] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-05-15 18:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 21:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 15/32] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-05-07 17:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-08 13:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 16/32] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-05-15 18:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-17 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18 9:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-21 7:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 16:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 11:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-18 19:50 ` Matt Fleming
2017-05-26 16:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 16:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 17:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 18/32] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 8:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-17 20:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18 9:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 19/32] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 14:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 19:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 20/32] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 21/32] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 22/32] x86, swiotlb: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 14:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 19:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 23/32] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 14:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 19:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 24/32] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 25/32] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 26/32] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 17:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 20:07 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21 ` [PATCH v5 27/32] kvm: x86: svm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21 ` [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-05-17 19:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 20:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 21:07 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-05-19 21:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 21:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 4:17 ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-27 2:17 ` Dave Young
2017-05-30 17:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 10:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 15:03 ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-31 15:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:21 ` [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18 12:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-25 22:24 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 16:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 16:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 9:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 13:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 30/32] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 21:55 ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-27 7:25 ` Dave Young
2017-04-27 15:52 ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-28 5:32 ` Dave Young
2017-05-04 14:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:13 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18 17:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-26 2:49 ` Dave Young
2017-05-26 5:04 ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-26 15:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of " Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 11:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:16 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2017-05-19 20:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 15:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 9:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 15:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 11:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 14:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 14:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 15:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 8:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 13:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 14:12 ` Borislav Petkov
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