linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" 
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 7/7] efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch() [ver #7]
Date: Fri, 03 Feb 2017 16:27:36 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <13531.1486139256@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKv+Gu-=-piH7FQF92T6Yn4KUHLQ-C4CtexWe8D27Tuc3h8KdA@mail.gmail.com>

Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:

> Yes, but only if you are booting via UEFI, no?

Why limit it so?  Even if you don't boot via UEFI, the bootloader/kexec can
always set the secure-boot state on.

> So perhaps use efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT) instead?

I've no objection to that, given it incorporates a test of CONFIG_EFI.

David

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-02-03 16:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-01-31 15:13 [PATCH 0/7] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #7] David Howells
2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells
2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 2/7] arm/efi: " David Howells
2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 3/7] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions " David Howells
2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 4/7] efi: Get the secure boot status " David Howells
2017-01-31 17:37   ` kbuild test robot
2017-01-31 18:04   ` kbuild test robot
2017-02-02 21:34   ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 5/7] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode " David Howells
2017-01-31 15:14 ` [PATCH 6/7] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 " David Howells
2017-01-31 18:19   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-31 18:59   ` David Howells
2017-02-01 10:15     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-01 12:33     ` David Howells
2017-02-01 14:44       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-01 15:00       ` David Howells
2017-02-01 15:02         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-02 21:36           ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-02 21:45             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-01 10:02   ` David Howells
2017-01-31 15:14 ` [PATCH 7/7] efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch() " David Howells
2017-02-03 16:07   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-03 16:21   ` David Howells
2017-02-03 16:23     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-03 16:27     ` David Howells [this message]
2017-02-03 16:29     ` David Howells
2017-02-03 16:29       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-03 17:00         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-03 17:19         ` David Howells
2017-01-31 16:45 ` [PATCH 0/7] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel " Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-31 17:04 ` David Howells
2017-01-31 18:20   ` Ard Biesheuvel

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=13531.1486139256@warthog.procyon.org.uk \
    --to=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \
    --cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=matt@codeblueprint.co.uk \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).