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From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" 
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/7] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 [ver #7]
Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2017 14:44:48 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAKv+Gu8FOcMx0UXXdd3nhE+PUPzbEn9X=kBQDfkLOZBvVu-8fg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20578.1485952425@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On 1 February 2017 at 12:33, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
> Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
>
>> So this patch should take AuditMode into account, but not DeployedMode, i.e.,
>>
>> SecureBoot == 0x1
>> SetupMode == 0x0
>> AuditMode == 0x0 (or non-existent)
>
> If we're in audit mode or setup mode SecureBoot==0 and SetupMode==1 according
> to the flowchart, so the check of AuditMode would seem redundant.
>
> Further, the checks above don't seem to differentiate deployed mode from user
> mode.  Should they?
>

>From the OS pov, UserMode and DeployedMode are the same, the only
difference being that AuditMode may be entered from UserMode simply by
setting the variable to 0x1 (which can only be done before
ExitBootServices()). And since AuditMode implies SetupMode (according
to the diagram), you are right that we don't need to care about
AuditMode either. AFAICT, that makes the entire patch unnecessary, so
let's drop it for now.

  reply	other threads:[~2017-02-01 14:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-01-31 15:13 [PATCH 0/7] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #7] David Howells
2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells
2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 2/7] arm/efi: " David Howells
2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 3/7] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions " David Howells
2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 4/7] efi: Get the secure boot status " David Howells
2017-01-31 17:37   ` kbuild test robot
2017-01-31 18:04   ` kbuild test robot
2017-02-02 21:34   ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 5/7] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode " David Howells
2017-01-31 15:14 ` [PATCH 6/7] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 " David Howells
2017-01-31 18:19   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-31 18:59   ` David Howells
2017-02-01 10:15     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-01 12:33     ` David Howells
2017-02-01 14:44       ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2017-02-01 15:00       ` David Howells
2017-02-01 15:02         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-02 21:36           ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-02 21:45             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-01 10:02   ` David Howells
2017-01-31 15:14 ` [PATCH 7/7] efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch() " David Howells
2017-02-03 16:07   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-03 16:21   ` David Howells
2017-02-03 16:23     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-03 16:27     ` David Howells
2017-02-03 16:29     ` David Howells
2017-02-03 16:29       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-03 17:00         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-03 17:19         ` David Howells
2017-01-31 16:45 ` [PATCH 0/7] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel " Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-31 17:04 ` David Howells
2017-01-31 18:20   ` Ard Biesheuvel

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