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From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" 
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #7]
Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2017 16:45:13 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAKv+Gu9cTtmV+9-kWSzvFui7KHxrG6MsUfz0VET=714m2cGhbQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <148587558696.4026.16034622623568539004.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

Hello David,

On 31 January 2017 at 15:13, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> Here's a set of patches that can determine the secure boot state of the
> UEFI BIOS and pass that along to the main kernel image.  This involves
> generalising ARM's efi_get_secureboot() function and making it mixed-mode
> safe.
>

Could you please resend with the [ver #7] removed from the subject
lines? It is a bit tedious to have to manually modify each patch when
applying.

Thanks,
Ard.

> Changes:
>
>  Ver 7:
>
>   - Rebased on efi/next.
>   - Remove the EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag bit and defer it for later.  Don't
>   - Preclear boot_params->secure_boot and don't clear it in
>     sanitize_boot_params()[*]
>   - Don't probe for the secure-boot mode if the boot loader gives us this
>     mode (ie. if boot_params->secure_boot is non-zero).
>
>     [*] There's a bug in grub2 whereby it copies too much, sets the sentinel
>         byte and triggers the sanitisation.
>
>  Ver 6:
>
>   - Removed unnecessary variable init and trimmed comment.
>   - Return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled directly rather than going to a
>     place that just returns it.
>   - Switched the last two patches.
>
>  Ver 5:
>
>   - Fix i386 compilation error (rsi should've been changed to esi).
>   - Fix arm64 compilation error ('sys_table_arg' is a hidden macro parameter).
>
>  Ver 4:
>
>   - Use an enum to tell the kernel whether secure boot mode is enabled,
>     disabled, couldn't be determined or wasn't even tried due to not being
>     in EFI mode.
>   - Support the UEFI-2.6 DeployedMode flag.
>   - Don't clear boot_params->secure_boot in x86 sanitize_boot_params().
>   - Preclear the boot_params->secure_boot on x86 head_*.S entry if we may
>     not go through efi_main().
>
> The patches can be found here also:
>
>         http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=efi-secure-boot
>
> at tag:
>
>         efi-secure-boot-20170131
>
> David
> ---
> David Howells (6):
>       x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
>       arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
>       efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
>       efi: Get the secure boot status
>       efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6
>       efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch()
>
> Josh Boyer (1):
>       efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
>
>
>  Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt           |    2 +
>  arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h                |    1
>  arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h              |    1
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c          |    7 ++
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S        |    6 +-
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S        |    8 +-
>  arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h                |    5 +
>  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h     |    3 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c             |    1
>  arch/x86/kernel/setup.c                   |   14 ++++
>  drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile     |    2 -
>  drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c   |   63 ++----------------
>  drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c |   99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/linux/efi.h                       |   15 ++++
>  14 files changed, 161 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
>

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-01-31 16:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-01-31 15:13 [PATCH 0/7] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #7] David Howells
2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells
2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 2/7] arm/efi: " David Howells
2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 3/7] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions " David Howells
2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 4/7] efi: Get the secure boot status " David Howells
2017-01-31 17:37   ` kbuild test robot
2017-01-31 18:04   ` kbuild test robot
2017-02-02 21:34   ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 5/7] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode " David Howells
2017-01-31 15:14 ` [PATCH 6/7] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 " David Howells
2017-01-31 18:19   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-31 18:59   ` David Howells
2017-02-01 10:15     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-01 12:33     ` David Howells
2017-02-01 14:44       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-01 15:00       ` David Howells
2017-02-01 15:02         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-02 21:36           ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-02 21:45             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-01 10:02   ` David Howells
2017-01-31 15:14 ` [PATCH 7/7] efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch() " David Howells
2017-02-03 16:07   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-03 16:21   ` David Howells
2017-02-03 16:23     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-03 16:27     ` David Howells
2017-02-03 16:29     ` David Howells
2017-02-03 16:29       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-03 17:00         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-03 17:19         ` David Howells
2017-01-31 16:45 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2017-01-31 17:04 ` [PATCH 0/7] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel " David Howells
2017-01-31 18:20   ` Ard Biesheuvel

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