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From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com, luto@amacapital.net, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: [PATCH v4 12/14] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 2021 09:28:35 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1630070917-9896-13-git-send-email-ross.philipson@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1630070917-9896-1-git-send-email-ross.philipson@oracle.com>

If the MLE kernel is being powered off, rebooted or halted,
then SEXIT must be called. Note that the SEXIT GETSEC leaf
can only be called after a machine_shutdown() has been done on
these paths. The machine_shutdown() is not called on a few paths
like when poweroff action does not have a poweroff callback (into
ACPI code) or when an emergency reset is done. In these cases,
just the TXT registers are finalized but SEXIT is skipped.

Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
index ebfb911..fe9d8cc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/objtool.h>
 #include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#include <linux/slaunch.h>
 #include <acpi/reboot.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
 #include <asm/apic.h>
@@ -731,6 +732,7 @@ static void native_machine_restart(char *__unused)
 
 	if (!reboot_force)
 		machine_shutdown();
+	slaunch_finalize(!reboot_force);
 	__machine_emergency_restart(0);
 }
 
@@ -741,6 +743,9 @@ static void native_machine_halt(void)
 
 	tboot_shutdown(TB_SHUTDOWN_HALT);
 
+	/* SEXIT done after machine_shutdown() to meet TXT requirements */
+	slaunch_finalize(1);
+
 	stop_this_cpu(NULL);
 }
 
@@ -749,8 +754,12 @@ static void native_machine_power_off(void)
 	if (pm_power_off) {
 		if (!reboot_force)
 			machine_shutdown();
+		slaunch_finalize(!reboot_force);
 		pm_power_off();
+	} else {
+		slaunch_finalize(0);
 	}
+
 	/* A fallback in case there is no PM info available */
 	tboot_shutdown(TB_SHUTDOWN_HALT);
 }
@@ -778,6 +787,7 @@ void machine_shutdown(void)
 
 void machine_emergency_restart(void)
 {
+	slaunch_finalize(0);
 	__machine_emergency_restart(1);
 }
 
-- 
1.8.3.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-08-27 13:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-08-27 13:28 [PATCH v4 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 01/14] x86/boot: Fix memremap of setup_indirect structures Ross Philipson
2021-09-22 12:01   ` Daniel Kiper
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 02/14] x86/boot: Add setup_indirect support in early_memremap_is_setup_data Ross Philipson
2021-09-22 12:03   ` Daniel Kiper
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 03/14] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 04/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2021-12-02 17:26   ` Robin Murphy
2021-12-03 15:47     ` Ross Philipson
2021-12-03 16:03       ` Robin Murphy
2021-12-03 17:48         ` Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 05/14] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 06/14] x86: Secure Launch main header file Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 07/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 08/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 09/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 10/14] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 11/14] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` Ross Philipson [this message]
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 13/14] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 14/14] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:30   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2021-08-30 19:45     ` Daniel P. Smith
2021-12-01  1:06 ` [PATCH v4 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Paul Moore
2021-12-02 16:09   ` Daniel P. Smith
2021-12-06 20:56     ` Paul Moore
2022-01-21 21:39       ` Paul Moore
2022-02-15 15:50         ` Daniel P. Smith

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