linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
To: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, luto@amacapital.net,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
	kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 04/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2021 12:48:43 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <b2fd060d-0ac8-b00e-cebb-46015dfea14c@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <7ee55288-209f-8f19-ef69-27e2a5448473@arm.com>

On 12/3/21 11:03, Robin Murphy wrote:
> On 2021-12-03 15:47, Ross Philipson wrote:
>> On 12/2/21 12:26, Robin Murphy wrote:
>>> On 2021-08-27 14:28, Ross Philipson wrote:
>>> [...]
>>>> +IOMMU Configuration
>>>> +-------------------
>>>> +
>>>> +When doing a Secure Launch, the IOMMU should always be enabled and
>>>> the drivers
>>>> +loaded. However, IOMMU passthrough mode should never be used. This
>>>> leaves the
>>>> +MLE completely exposed to DMA after the PMR's [2]_ are disabled.
>>>> First, IOMMU
>>>> +passthrough should be disabled by default in the build configuration::
>>>> +
>>>> +  "Device Drivers" -->
>>>> +      "IOMMU Hardware Support" -->
>>>> +          "IOMMU passthrough by default [ ]"
>>>> +
>>>> +This unset the Kconfig value CONFIG_IOMMU_DEFAULT_PASSTHROUGH.
>>>
>>> Note that the config structure has now changed, and if set, passthrough
>>> is deselected by choosing a different default domain type.
>>
>> Thanks for the heads up. We will have to modify this for how things
>> exist today.
>>
>>>
>>>> +In addition, passthrough must be disabled on the kernel command line
>>>> when doing
>>>> +a Secure Launch as follows::
>>>> +
>>>> +  iommu=nopt iommu.passthrough=0
>>>
>>> This part is a bit silly - those options are literally aliases for the
>>> exact same thing, and furthermore if the config is already set as
>>> required then the sole effect either of them will have is to cause "(set
>>> by kernel command line)" to be printed. There is no value in explicitly
>>> overriding the default value with the default value - if anyone can
>>> append an additional "iommu.passthrough=1" (or "iommu=pt") to the end of
>>> the command line they'll still win.
>>
>> I feel like when we worked on this, it was still important to set those
>> values. This could have been in an older kernel version. We will go back
>> and verify what you are saying here and adjust the documentation
>> accordingly.
>>
>> As to anyone just adding values to the command line, that is why the
>> command line is part of the DRTM measurements.
> 
> Yeah, I had a vague memory that that was the case - basically if you can
> trust the command line as much as the config then it's definitely
> redundant to pass an option for this (see iommu_subsys_init() - it's now
> all plumbed through iommu_def_domain_type), and if you can't then
> passing them is futile anyway.

Thanks you for your feedback.

Ross

> 
> Cheers,
> Robin.


  reply	other threads:[~2021-12-03 17:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-08-27 13:28 [PATCH v4 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 01/14] x86/boot: Fix memremap of setup_indirect structures Ross Philipson
2021-09-22 12:01   ` Daniel Kiper
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 02/14] x86/boot: Add setup_indirect support in early_memremap_is_setup_data Ross Philipson
2021-09-22 12:03   ` Daniel Kiper
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 03/14] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 04/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2021-12-02 17:26   ` Robin Murphy
2021-12-03 15:47     ` Ross Philipson
2021-12-03 16:03       ` Robin Murphy
2021-12-03 17:48         ` Ross Philipson [this message]
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 05/14] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 06/14] x86: Secure Launch main header file Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 07/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 08/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 09/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 10/14] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 11/14] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 12/14] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 13/14] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 14/14] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:30   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2021-08-30 19:45     ` Daniel P. Smith
2021-12-01  1:06 ` [PATCH v4 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Paul Moore
2021-12-02 16:09   ` Daniel P. Smith
2021-12-06 20:56     ` Paul Moore
2022-01-21 21:39       ` Paul Moore
2022-02-15 15:50         ` Daniel P. Smith

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=b2fd060d-0ac8-b00e-cebb-46015dfea14c@oracle.com \
    --to=ross.philipson@oracle.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dpsmith@apertussolutions.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@amacapital.net \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=robin.murphy@arm.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).