From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
luto@amacapital.net, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 01/14] x86/boot: Fix memremap of setup_indirect structures
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 2021 14:01:37 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210922120137.3smvvedpxroi7bkw@tomti.i.net-space.pl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1630070917-9896-2-git-send-email-ross.philipson@oracle.com>
On Fri, Aug 27, 2021 at 09:28:24AM -0400, Ross Philipson wrote:
> As documented, the setup_indirect structure is nested inside
> the setup_data structures in the setup_data list. The code currently
> accesses the fields inside the setup_indirect structure but only
> the sizeof(struct setup_data) is being memremapped. No crash
> occured but this is just due to how the area is remapped under the
> covers.
>
> The fix is to properly memremap both the setup_data and setup_indirect
> structures in these cases before accessing them.
>
> Fixes: b3c72fc9a78e ("x86/boot: Introduce setup_indirect")
>
> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This is the fix. So, I think it should be taken now, regardless of the
fate of the other patches in the series.
Daniel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-09-22 12:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-08-27 13:28 [PATCH v4 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 01/14] x86/boot: Fix memremap of setup_indirect structures Ross Philipson
2021-09-22 12:01 ` Daniel Kiper [this message]
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 02/14] x86/boot: Add setup_indirect support in early_memremap_is_setup_data Ross Philipson
2021-09-22 12:03 ` Daniel Kiper
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 03/14] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 04/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2021-12-02 17:26 ` Robin Murphy
2021-12-03 15:47 ` Ross Philipson
2021-12-03 16:03 ` Robin Murphy
2021-12-03 17:48 ` Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 05/14] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 06/14] x86: Secure Launch main header file Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 07/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 08/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 09/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 10/14] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 11/14] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 12/14] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 13/14] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 14/14] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:30 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2021-08-30 19:45 ` Daniel P. Smith
2021-12-01 1:06 ` [PATCH v4 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Paul Moore
2021-12-02 16:09 ` Daniel P. Smith
2021-12-06 20:56 ` Paul Moore
2022-01-21 21:39 ` Paul Moore
2022-02-15 15:50 ` Daniel P. Smith
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