linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
To: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
	Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com, luto@amacapital.net, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 14/14] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 2021 15:45:21 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e40a22d6-22f3-3374-01dc-75f14f310c7d@apertussolutions.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210827133011.GJ1200268@ziepe.ca>

On 8/27/21 9:30 AM, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 27, 2021 at 09:28:37AM -0400, Ross Philipson wrote:
>> The Secure Launch MLE environment uses PCRs that are only accessible from
>> the DRTM locality 2. By default the TPM drivers always initialize the
>> locality to 0. When a Secure Launch is in progress, initialize the
>> locality to 2.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
>> ---
>>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 9 ++++++++-
>>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> Global state like this seems quite dangerous, shouldn't the locality
> be selected based on the PCR being accessed, or passed down from
> higher up in the call chain?
> 
> Jason
> 

Hey Jason,

While locality does control which PCRs are accessible, it is meant to
reflect what component that a TPM command is originating. To quote the
TCG Spec, "“Locality” is an assertion to the TPM that a command’s source
is associated with a particular component. Locality can be thought of as
a hardware-based authorization."

Thus when the SRTM chain, to include the Static OS, is in control, the
hardware is required to restrict access to only Locality 0. Once a
Dynamic Launch has occurred, the hardware grants access to Locality 1
and 2. Again to refer to the TCG spec, the definition of Locality 2 is,
the "Dynamically Launched OS (Dynamic OS) “runtime” environment".

When Linux is started from the SRTM, it is correct for the TPM driver to
set the locality to Locality 0 to denote that the source is the Static
OS. Now when Linux is started from the DRTM, the TPM driver should set
the locality to Locality 2 to denote that it is the "runtime" Dynamic
OS. As for the differences in access, with Locality 0 Linux (being the
Static OS) is restricted to the Static PCRs (0-15), the Debug PCR (16),
and the Application PCR (23). Whereas with Locality 2 Linux now being
the Dynamic OS will have access to all PCRs.

To summarize, TPM locality really is a global state that reflects the
component in control of the platform. Considering the definition of
locality, setting the locality to Locality 0 is saying that the Static
Environment is now in control. Doing so after the Dynamic Environment
has started would be an inaccurate setting of the platform state. The
correct time at which the locality should change back to Locality 0 is
after the Dynamic Environment has been exited. On Intel this can be done
by invoking the instruction GETSEC[SEXIT]. It should be noted that
Secure Launch adds the call to the GETSEC[SEXIT] instruction in the
kexec, reboot, and shutdown paths.

v/r,
dps

  reply	other threads:[~2021-08-30 19:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-08-27 13:28 [PATCH v4 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 01/14] x86/boot: Fix memremap of setup_indirect structures Ross Philipson
2021-09-22 12:01   ` Daniel Kiper
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 02/14] x86/boot: Add setup_indirect support in early_memremap_is_setup_data Ross Philipson
2021-09-22 12:03   ` Daniel Kiper
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 03/14] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 04/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2021-12-02 17:26   ` Robin Murphy
2021-12-03 15:47     ` Ross Philipson
2021-12-03 16:03       ` Robin Murphy
2021-12-03 17:48         ` Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 05/14] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 06/14] x86: Secure Launch main header file Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 07/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 08/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 09/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 10/14] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 11/14] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 12/14] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 13/14] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 14/14] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:30   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2021-08-30 19:45     ` Daniel P. Smith [this message]
2021-12-01  1:06 ` [PATCH v4 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Paul Moore
2021-12-02 16:09   ` Daniel P. Smith
2021-12-06 20:56     ` Paul Moore
2022-01-21 21:39       ` Paul Moore
2022-02-15 15:50         ` Daniel P. Smith

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=e40a22d6-22f3-3374-01dc-75f14f310c7d@apertussolutions.com \
    --to=dpsmith@apertussolutions.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=jgg@ziepe.ca \
    --cc=kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@amacapital.net \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=ross.philipson@oracle.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).