From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>, "Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>, "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>, "Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo" <acme@kernel.org>, "Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, "Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>, "David Drysdale" <drysdale@google.com>, "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>, "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>, "James Morris" <james.l.morris@oracle.com>, "Jann Horn" <jann@thejh.net>, "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>, "Matthew Garrett" <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>, "Michael Kerrisk" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>, "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>, "Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>, "Sargun Dhillon" <sargun@sargun.me>, "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, "Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>, "Tejun Heo" <tj@kernel.org>, "Thomas Graf" <tgraf@suug.ch>, "Will Drewry" <wad@chromium.org>, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH net-next v6 05/11] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp() Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 01:46:44 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20170328234650.19695-6-mic@digikod.net> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20170328234650.19695-1-mic@digikod.net> The semantic is unchanged. This will be useful for the Landlock integration with seccomp (next commit). Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> --- include/linux/seccomp.h | 4 ++-- kernel/fork.c | 2 +- kernel/seccomp.c | 18 +++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h index ecc296c137cd..e25aee2cdfc0 100644 --- a/include/linux/seccomp.h +++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h @@ -77,10 +77,10 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s) #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER -extern void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk); +extern void put_seccomp(struct task_struct *tsk); extern void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk); #else /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */ -static inline void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk) +static inline void put_seccomp(struct task_struct *tsk) { return; } diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 6c463c80e93d..a27d8e67ce33 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ void free_task(struct task_struct *tsk) #endif rt_mutex_debug_task_free(tsk); ftrace_graph_exit_task(tsk); - put_seccomp_filter(tsk); + put_seccomp(tsk); arch_release_task_struct(tsk); if (tsk->flags & PF_KTHREAD) free_kthread_struct(tsk); diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 65f61077ad50..326f79e32127 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ struct seccomp_filter { /* Limit any path through the tree to 256KB worth of instructions. */ #define MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH ((1 << 18) / sizeof(struct sock_filter)) +static void put_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *filter); + /* * Endianness is explicitly ignored and left for BPF program authors to manage * as per the specific architecture. @@ -314,7 +316,7 @@ static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(void) * current's path will hold a reference. (This also * allows a put before the assignment.) */ - put_seccomp_filter(thread); + put_seccomp_filter(thread->seccomp.filter); smp_store_release(&thread->seccomp.filter, caller->seccomp.filter); @@ -476,10 +478,11 @@ static inline void seccomp_filter_free(struct seccomp_filter *filter) } } -/* put_seccomp_filter - decrements the ref count of tsk->seccomp.filter */ -void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk) +/* put_seccomp_filter - decrements the ref count of a filter */ +static void put_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *filter) { - struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter; + struct seccomp_filter *orig = filter; + /* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */ while (orig && atomic_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) { struct seccomp_filter *freeme = orig; @@ -488,6 +491,11 @@ void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk) } } +void put_seccomp(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + put_seccomp_filter(tsk->seccomp.filter); +} + static void seccomp_init_siginfo(siginfo_t *info, int syscall, int reason) { memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info)); @@ -914,7 +922,7 @@ long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long filter_off, if (copy_to_user(data, fprog->filter, bpf_classic_proglen(fprog))) ret = -EFAULT; - put_seccomp_filter(task); + put_seccomp_filter(task->seccomp.filter); return ret; out: -- 2.11.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-03-28 23:49 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-03-28 23:46 [PATCH net-next v6 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing Mickaël Salaün 2017-03-28 23:46 ` [PATCH net-next v6 01/11] bpf: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier Mickaël Salaün 2017-03-29 13:48 ` kbuild test robot 2017-04-18 21:48 ` Kees Cook 2017-03-28 23:46 ` [PATCH net-next v6 02/11] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock Mickaël Salaün 2017-04-16 21:57 ` Mickaël Salaün 2017-04-18 21:58 ` Kees Cook 2017-03-28 23:46 ` [PATCH net-next v6 03/11] bpf: Define handle_fs and add a new helper bpf_handle_fs_get_mode() Mickaël Salaün 2017-03-28 23:46 ` [PATCH net-next v6 04/11] landlock: Add LSM hooks related to filesystem Mickaël Salaün 2017-03-29 15:18 ` kbuild test robot 2017-04-18 22:17 ` Kees Cook 2017-04-18 22:44 ` Mickaël Salaün 2017-04-18 23:16 ` Casey Schaufler 2017-04-18 23:40 ` Kees Cook 2017-04-19 22:03 ` Mickaël Salaün 2017-04-19 23:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Casey Schaufler 2017-04-20 1:48 ` Kees Cook 2017-04-18 23:39 ` Kees Cook 2017-03-28 23:46 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message] 2017-04-18 22:23 ` [PATCH net-next v6 05/11] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp() Kees Cook 2017-04-18 22:47 ` Mickaël Salaün 2017-04-19 22:18 ` Mickaël Salaün 2017-04-20 1:54 ` Kees Cook 2017-03-28 23:46 ` [PATCH net-next v6 06/11] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock events per process hierarchy Mickaël Salaün 2017-03-29 10:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2017-03-31 21:15 ` Mickaël Salaün 2017-04-18 22:54 ` Kees Cook 2017-04-18 22:53 ` Kees Cook 2017-04-18 23:24 ` Mickaël Salaün 2017-04-18 23:48 ` Kees Cook 2017-03-28 23:46 ` [PATCH net-next v6 07/11] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions Mickaël Salaün 2017-04-10 6:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2017-04-11 7:19 ` Mickaël Salaün 2017-03-28 23:46 ` [PATCH net-next v6 08/11] bpf: Add a Landlock sandbox example Mickaël Salaün 2017-04-18 23:06 ` Kees Cook 2017-04-18 23:35 ` Mickaël Salaün 2017-03-28 23:46 ` [PATCH net-next v6 09/11] seccomp: Enhance test_harness with an assert step mechanism Mickaël Salaün 2017-04-19 0:02 ` Kees Cook 2017-04-19 21:51 ` Mickaël Salaün 2017-04-19 22:02 ` Kees Cook 2017-04-19 22:05 ` Mickaël Salaün 2017-04-20 1:50 ` Kees Cook 2017-03-28 23:46 ` [PATCH net-next v6 10/11] bpf,landlock: Add tests for Landlock Mickaël Salaün 2017-04-18 23:16 ` Kees Cook 2017-04-18 23:53 ` Mickaël Salaün 2017-04-18 23:59 ` Kees Cook 2017-03-28 23:46 ` [PATCH net-next v6 11/11] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation " Mickaël Salaün 2017-03-29 15:58 ` kbuild test robot 2017-04-18 23:26 ` [PATCH net-next v6 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing Kees Cook 2017-04-19 0:12 ` Mickaël Salaün
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