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* [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
@ 2018-10-11 15:14 Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (27 more replies)
  0 siblings, 28 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

The previous version of CET Shadow Stack patches is at the following
link:

  https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/9/21/776

Summary of changes from v4:

  Clean up XSAVES system states patches.
  Update control protection fault handler to provide error code to user.
  Add CONFIG_VM_AREA_GUARD.
  Clean up arch_prctl.
  Fix some typos and macros.

Yu-cheng Yu (27):
  x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control Flow Enforcement Technology
    (CET)
  x86/fpu/xstate: Change names to separate XSAVES system and user states
  x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states
  x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  Documentation/x86: Add CET description
  x86/cet: Control protection exception handler
  mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs
  x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack
  mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory
  mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges
  x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW
  x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW
  drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS
  x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for
    _PAGE_DIRTY_SW
  x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking
  mm: Handle shadow stack page fault
  mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB shadow stack page fault
  mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack
  mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked()
  x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support
  x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction
  x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack
  x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack
  x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
  mm/mmap: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting
  x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack
  x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map

 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |   6 +
 Documentation/index.rst                       |   1 +
 Documentation/x86/index.rst                   |  11 +
 Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst               | 266 ++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                              |  30 ++
 arch/x86/Makefile                             |   7 +
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S                     |   2 +-
 arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c                   |  13 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h                    |  46 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h            |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h      |   8 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h                    |   5 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h           |   5 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h              |  22 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h             |  26 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h            |   3 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h              |  14 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h                | 191 ++++++++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h          |  38 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h              |   5 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/sighandling.h            |   5 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h          |  32 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h                  |   5 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/elf_property.h      |  15 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h             |   5 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h   |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h        |  15 +
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile                      |   4 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c                         | 298 +++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c                   |  86 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                  |  25 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/elf.c                         | 341 ++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c                    |  10 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c                    |  10 -
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c                  |   6 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c                  | 146 +++++---
 arch/x86/kernel/idt.c                         |   4 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c                     |   7 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c                  |   7 +
 arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S          |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c                      |  97 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c               |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c                       |  64 ++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                            |   2 +-
 arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt               |  26 +-
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c                           |  27 ++
 arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c                         |  41 +++
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c                |   2 +-
 fs/binfmt_elf.c                               |  15 +
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c                            |   3 +
 include/asm-generic/pgtable.h                 |  14 +
 include/linux/mm.h                            |  56 ++-
 include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h            |   3 +-
 include/uapi/linux/elf.h                      |   1 +
 mm/Kconfig                                    |   7 +
 mm/gup.c                                      |   8 +-
 mm/huge_memory.c                              |  12 +-
 mm/memory.c                                   |   7 +-
 mm/mmap.c                                     |  11 +
 tools/objtool/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt |  26 +-
 60 files changed, 1986 insertions(+), 164 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/index.rst
 create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/elf_property.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/elf.c

-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET)
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 16:43   ` Borislav Petkov
  2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (26 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

Add CPUIDs for Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET).

CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 7] Shadow stack
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX[bit 20] Indirect branch tracking

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 89a048c2faec..142b15da06fd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -321,6 +321,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_PKU			(16*32+ 3) /* Protection Keys for Userspace */
 #define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE		(16*32+ 4) /* OS Protection Keys Enable */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VBMI2	(16*32+ 6) /* Additional AVX512 Vector Bit Manipulation Instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SHSTK		(16*32+ 7) /* Shadow Stack */
 #define X86_FEATURE_GFNI		(16*32+ 8) /* Galois Field New Instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_VAES		(16*32+ 9) /* Vector AES */
 #define X86_FEATURE_VPCLMULQDQ		(16*32+10) /* Carry-Less Multiplication Double Quadword */
@@ -341,6 +342,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW	(18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS	(18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG		(18*32+18) /* Intel PCONFIG */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBT			(18*32+20) /* Indirect Branch Tracking */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP		(18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D		(18*32+28) /* Flush L1D cache */
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change names to separate XSAVES system and user states
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-15 17:03   ` Borislav Petkov
  2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (25 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

Control Flow Enforcement (CET) MSRs are XSAVES system/supervisor
states.  To support CET, we introduce XSAVES system states first.

XSAVES is a "supervisor" instruction and, comparing to XSAVE, saves
additional "supervisor" states that can be modified only from CPL 0.
However, these states are per-task and not kernel's own.  Rename
"supervisor" states to "system" states to clearly separate them from
"user" states.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h |  4 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h   | 20 +++----
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c          |  4 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c          |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c        |  6 +--
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c        | 82 ++++++++++++++---------------
 6 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
index a38bf5a1e37a..02c4296478c8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static inline void fpstate_init_xstate(struct xregs_state *xsave)
 	 * XRSTORS requires these bits set in xcomp_bv, or it will
 	 * trigger #GP:
 	 */
-	xsave->header.xcomp_bv = XCOMP_BV_COMPACTED_FORMAT | xfeatures_mask;
+	xsave->header.xcomp_bv = XCOMP_BV_COMPACTED_FORMAT | xfeatures_mask_user;
 }
 
 static inline void fpstate_init_fxstate(struct fxregs_state *fx)
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static inline void copy_fxregs_to_kernel(struct fpu *fpu)
 
 /*
  * If XSAVES is enabled, it replaces XSAVEOPT because it supports a compact
- * format and supervisor states in addition to modified optimization in
+ * format and system states in addition to modified optimization in
  * XSAVEOPT.
  *
  * Otherwise, if XSAVEOPT is enabled, XSAVEOPT replaces XSAVE because XSAVEOPT
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
index 48581988d78c..76f83d2ac10e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
@@ -23,15 +23,15 @@
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR (XFEATURE_MASK_PT)
 
 /* All currently supported features */
-#define XCNTXT_MASK		(XFEATURE_MASK_FP | \
-				 XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | \
-				 XFEATURE_MASK_YMM | \
-				 XFEATURE_MASK_OPMASK | \
-				 XFEATURE_MASK_ZMM_Hi256 | \
-				 XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM	 | \
-				 XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU | \
-				 XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS | \
-				 XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR)
+#define SUPPORTED_XFEATURES_MASK (XFEATURE_MASK_FP | \
+				  XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | \
+				  XFEATURE_MASK_YMM | \
+				  XFEATURE_MASK_OPMASK | \
+				  XFEATURE_MASK_ZMM_Hi256 | \
+				  XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM | \
+				  XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU | \
+				  XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS | \
+				  XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 #define REX_PREFIX	"0x48, "
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
 #define REX_PREFIX
 #endif
 
-extern u64 xfeatures_mask;
+extern u64 xfeatures_mask_user;
 extern u64 xstate_fx_sw_bytes[USER_XSTATE_FX_SW_WORDS];
 
 extern void __init update_regset_xstate_info(unsigned int size,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
index 2ea85b32421a..4bd56079048f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ void fpu__drop(struct fpu *fpu)
  * Clear FPU registers by setting them up from
  * the init fpstate:
  */
-static inline void copy_init_fpstate_to_fpregs(void)
+static inline void copy_init_user_fpstate_to_fpregs(void)
 {
 	if (use_xsave())
 		copy_kernel_to_xregs(&init_fpstate.xsave, -1);
@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ void fpu__clear(struct fpu *fpu)
 		preempt_disable();
 		fpu__initialize(fpu);
 		user_fpu_begin();
-		copy_init_fpstate_to_fpregs();
+		copy_init_user_fpstate_to_fpregs();
 		preempt_enable();
 	}
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c
index 6abd83572b01..761c3a5a9e07 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ static void __init fpu__init_system_xstate_size_legacy(void)
  */
 u64 __init fpu__get_supported_xfeatures_mask(void)
 {
-	return XCNTXT_MASK;
+	return SUPPORTED_XFEATURES_MASK;
 }
 
 /* Legacy code to initialize eager fpu mode. */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
index 23f1691670b6..f77aa76ba675 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
@@ -249,11 +249,11 @@ static inline int copy_user_to_fpregs_zeroing(void __user *buf, u64 xbv, int fx_
 {
 	if (use_xsave()) {
 		if ((unsigned long)buf % 64 || fx_only) {
-			u64 init_bv = xfeatures_mask & ~XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE;
+			u64 init_bv = xfeatures_mask_user & ~XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE;
 			copy_kernel_to_xregs(&init_fpstate.xsave, init_bv);
 			return copy_user_to_fxregs(buf);
 		} else {
-			u64 init_bv = xfeatures_mask & ~xbv;
+			u64 init_bv = xfeatures_mask_user & ~xbv;
 			if (unlikely(init_bv))
 				copy_kernel_to_xregs(&init_fpstate.xsave, init_bv);
 			return copy_user_to_xregs(buf, xbv);
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ void fpu__init_prepare_fx_sw_frame(void)
 
 	fx_sw_reserved.magic1 = FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1;
 	fx_sw_reserved.extended_size = size;
-	fx_sw_reserved.xfeatures = xfeatures_mask;
+	fx_sw_reserved.xfeatures = xfeatures_mask_user;
 	fx_sw_reserved.xstate_size = fpu_user_xstate_size;
 
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) ||
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
index 87a57b7642d3..e7cbaed12ef1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -51,13 +51,14 @@ static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {
 };
 
 /*
- * Mask of xstate features supported by the CPU and the kernel:
+ * Mask of supported 'user' xstate features derived from boot_cpu_has() and
+ * SUPPORTED_XFEATURES_MASK.
  */
-u64 xfeatures_mask __read_mostly;
+u64 xfeatures_mask_user __read_mostly;
 
 static unsigned int xstate_offsets[XFEATURE_MAX] = { [ 0 ... XFEATURE_MAX - 1] = -1};
 static unsigned int xstate_sizes[XFEATURE_MAX]   = { [ 0 ... XFEATURE_MAX - 1] = -1};
-static unsigned int xstate_comp_offsets[sizeof(xfeatures_mask)*8];
+static unsigned int xstate_comp_offsets[sizeof(xfeatures_mask_user)*8];
 
 /*
  * The XSAVE area of kernel can be in standard or compacted format;
@@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ void fpu__xstate_clear_all_cpu_caps(void)
  */
 int cpu_has_xfeatures(u64 xfeatures_needed, const char **feature_name)
 {
-	u64 xfeatures_missing = xfeatures_needed & ~xfeatures_mask;
+	u64 xfeatures_missing = xfeatures_needed & ~xfeatures_mask_user;
 
 	if (unlikely(feature_name)) {
 		long xfeature_idx, max_idx;
@@ -113,14 +114,11 @@ int cpu_has_xfeatures(u64 xfeatures_needed, const char **feature_name)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_has_xfeatures);
 
-static int xfeature_is_supervisor(int xfeature_nr)
+static int xfeature_is_system(int xfeature_nr)
 {
 	/*
-	 * We currently do not support supervisor states, but if
-	 * we did, we could find out like this.
-	 *
 	 * SDM says: If state component 'i' is a user state component,
-	 * ECX[0] return 0; if state component i is a supervisor
+	 * ECX[0] return 0; if state component i is a system
 	 * state component, ECX[0] returns 1.
 	 */
 	u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
@@ -131,7 +129,7 @@ static int xfeature_is_supervisor(int xfeature_nr)
 
 static int xfeature_is_user(int xfeature_nr)
 {
-	return !xfeature_is_supervisor(xfeature_nr);
+	return !xfeature_is_system(xfeature_nr);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -164,7 +162,7 @@ void fpstate_sanitize_xstate(struct fpu *fpu)
 	 * None of the feature bits are in init state. So nothing else
 	 * to do for us, as the memory layout is up to date.
 	 */
-	if ((xfeatures & xfeatures_mask) == xfeatures_mask)
+	if ((xfeatures & xfeatures_mask_user) == xfeatures_mask_user)
 		return;
 
 	/*
@@ -191,7 +189,7 @@ void fpstate_sanitize_xstate(struct fpu *fpu)
 	 * in a special way already:
 	 */
 	feature_bit = 0x2;
-	xfeatures = (xfeatures_mask & ~xfeatures) >> 2;
+	xfeatures = (xfeatures_mask_user & ~xfeatures) >> 2;
 
 	/*
 	 * Update all the remaining memory layouts according to their
@@ -219,20 +217,18 @@ void fpstate_sanitize_xstate(struct fpu *fpu)
  */
 void fpu__init_cpu_xstate(void)
 {
-	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) || !xfeatures_mask)
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) || !xfeatures_mask_user)
 		return;
 	/*
-	 * Make it clear that XSAVES supervisor states are not yet
-	 * implemented should anyone expect it to work by changing
-	 * bits in XFEATURE_MASK_* macros and XCR0.
+	 * XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK sets the features that are managed
+	 * by XSAVE{C, OPT} and XRSTOR.  Only XSAVE user states can be
+	 * set here.
 	 */
-	WARN_ONCE((xfeatures_mask & XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR),
-		"x86/fpu: XSAVES supervisor states are not yet implemented.\n");
 
-	xfeatures_mask &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR;
+	xfeatures_mask_user &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR;
 
 	cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_OSXSAVE);
-	xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, xfeatures_mask);
+	xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, xfeatures_mask_user);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -242,7 +238,7 @@ void fpu__init_cpu_xstate(void)
  */
 static int xfeature_enabled(enum xfeature xfeature)
 {
-	return !!(xfeatures_mask & (1UL << xfeature));
+	return !!(xfeatures_mask_user & BIT_ULL(xfeature));
 }
 
 /*
@@ -272,7 +268,7 @@ static void __init setup_xstate_features(void)
 		cpuid_count(XSTATE_CPUID, i, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
 
 		/*
-		 * If an xfeature is supervisor state, the offset
+		 * If an xfeature is system state, the offset
 		 * in EBX is invalid. We leave it to -1.
 		 */
 		if (xfeature_is_user(i))
@@ -348,7 +344,7 @@ static int xfeature_is_aligned(int xfeature_nr)
  */
 static void __init setup_xstate_comp(void)
 {
-	unsigned int xstate_comp_sizes[sizeof(xfeatures_mask)*8];
+	unsigned int xstate_comp_sizes[sizeof(xfeatures_mask_user)*8];
 	int i;
 
 	/*
@@ -421,7 +417,7 @@ static void __init setup_init_fpu_buf(void)
 	print_xstate_features();
 
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
-		init_fpstate.xsave.header.xcomp_bv = (u64)1 << 63 | xfeatures_mask;
+		init_fpstate.xsave.header.xcomp_bv = BIT_ULL(63) | xfeatures_mask_user;
 
 	/*
 	 * Init all the features state with header.xfeatures being 0x0
@@ -440,8 +436,8 @@ static int xfeature_uncompacted_offset(int xfeature_nr)
 	u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
 
 	/*
-	 * Only XSAVES supports supervisor states and it uses compacted
-	 * format. Checking a supervisor state's uncompacted offset is
+	 * Only XSAVES supports system states and it uses compacted
+	 * format. Checking a system state's uncompacted offset is
 	 * an error.
 	 */
 	if (XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR & (1 << xfeature_nr)) {
@@ -465,7 +461,7 @@ static int xfeature_size(int xfeature_nr)
 
 /*
  * 'XSAVES' implies two different things:
- * 1. saving of supervisor/system state
+ * 1. saving of system state
  * 2. using the compacted format
  *
  * Use this function when dealing with the compacted format so
@@ -480,8 +476,8 @@ int using_compacted_format(void)
 /* Validate an xstate header supplied by userspace (ptrace or sigreturn) */
 int validate_xstate_header(const struct xstate_header *hdr)
 {
-	/* No unknown or supervisor features may be set */
-	if (hdr->xfeatures & (~xfeatures_mask | XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR))
+	/* No unknown or system features may be set */
+	if (hdr->xfeatures & ~xfeatures_mask_user)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* Userspace must use the uncompacted format */
@@ -588,11 +584,11 @@ static void do_extra_xstate_size_checks(void)
 
 		check_xstate_against_struct(i);
 		/*
-		 * Supervisor state components can be managed only by
+		 * System state components can be managed only by
 		 * XSAVES, which is compacted-format only.
 		 */
 		if (!using_compacted_format())
-			XSTATE_WARN_ON(xfeature_is_supervisor(i));
+			XSTATE_WARN_ON(xfeature_is_system(i));
 
 		/* Align from the end of the previous feature */
 		if (xfeature_is_aligned(i))
@@ -616,7 +612,7 @@ static void do_extra_xstate_size_checks(void)
 
 
 /*
- * Get total size of enabled xstates in XCR0/xfeatures_mask.
+ * Get total size of enabled xstates in XCR0/xfeatures_mask_user.
  *
  * Note the SDM's wording here.  "sub-function 0" only enumerates
  * the size of the *user* states.  If we use it to size a buffer
@@ -706,7 +702,7 @@ static int init_xstate_size(void)
  */
 static void fpu__init_disable_system_xstate(void)
 {
-	xfeatures_mask = 0;
+	xfeatures_mask_user = 0;
 	cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_OSXSAVE);
 	fpu__xstate_clear_all_cpu_caps();
 }
@@ -742,15 +738,15 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void)
 	}
 
 	cpuid_count(XSTATE_CPUID, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
-	xfeatures_mask = eax + ((u64)edx << 32);
+	xfeatures_mask_user = eax + ((u64)edx << 32);
 
-	if ((xfeatures_mask & XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE) != XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE) {
+	if ((xfeatures_mask_user & XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE) != XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE) {
 		/*
 		 * This indicates that something really unexpected happened
 		 * with the enumeration.  Disable XSAVE and try to continue
 		 * booting without it.  This is too early to BUG().
 		 */
-		pr_err("x86/fpu: FP/SSE not present amongst the CPU's xstate features: 0x%llx.\n", xfeatures_mask);
+		pr_err("x86/fpu: FP/SSE not present amongst the CPU's xstate features: 0x%llx.\n", xfeatures_mask_user);
 		goto out_disable;
 	}
 
@@ -759,10 +755,10 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void)
 	 */
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xsave_cpuid_features); i++) {
 		if (!boot_cpu_has(xsave_cpuid_features[i]))
-			xfeatures_mask &= ~BIT(i);
+			xfeatures_mask_user &= ~BIT_ULL(i);
 	}
 
-	xfeatures_mask &= fpu__get_supported_xfeatures_mask();
+	xfeatures_mask_user &= fpu__get_supported_xfeatures_mask();
 
 	/* Enable xstate instructions to be able to continue with initialization: */
 	fpu__init_cpu_xstate();
@@ -772,9 +768,9 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void)
 
 	/*
 	 * Update info used for ptrace frames; use standard-format size and no
-	 * supervisor xstates:
+	 * system xstates:
 	 */
-	update_regset_xstate_info(fpu_user_xstate_size,	xfeatures_mask & ~XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR);
+	update_regset_xstate_info(fpu_user_xstate_size, xfeatures_mask_user & ~XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR);
 
 	fpu__init_prepare_fx_sw_frame();
 	setup_init_fpu_buf();
@@ -782,7 +778,7 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void)
 	print_xstate_offset_size();
 
 	pr_info("x86/fpu: Enabled xstate features 0x%llx, context size is %d bytes, using '%s' format.\n",
-		xfeatures_mask,
+		xfeatures_mask_user,
 		fpu_kernel_xstate_size,
 		boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) ? "compacted" : "standard");
 	return;
@@ -801,7 +797,7 @@ void fpu__resume_cpu(void)
 	 * Restore XCR0 on xsave capable CPUs:
 	 */
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
-		xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, xfeatures_mask);
+		xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, xfeatures_mask_user);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -853,7 +849,7 @@ void *get_xsave_addr(struct xregs_state *xsave, int xstate_feature)
 	 * have not enabled.  Remember that pcntxt_mask is
 	 * what we write to the XCR0 register.
 	 */
-	WARN_ONCE(!(xfeatures_mask & xstate_feature),
+	WARN_ONCE(!(xfeatures_mask_user & xstate_feature),
 		  "get of unsupported state");
 	/*
 	 * This assumes the last 'xsave*' instruction to
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-17 10:41   ` Borislav Petkov
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (24 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

Control Flow Enforcement (CET) MSRs are XSAVES system states.  To
support CET, we introduce XSAVES system states first.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h |  3 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h   |  4 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c          |  6 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c          | 10 ----
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c        | 86 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
 5 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
index 02c4296478c8..9a5db5a63f60 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ extern void fpu__init_cpu_xstate(void);
 extern void fpu__init_system(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 extern void fpu__init_check_bugs(void);
 extern void fpu__resume_cpu(void);
-extern u64 fpu__get_supported_xfeatures_mask(void);
 
 /*
  * Debugging facility:
@@ -93,7 +92,7 @@ static inline void fpstate_init_xstate(struct xregs_state *xsave)
 	 * XRSTORS requires these bits set in xcomp_bv, or it will
 	 * trigger #GP:
 	 */
-	xsave->header.xcomp_bv = XCOMP_BV_COMPACTED_FORMAT | xfeatures_mask_user;
+	xsave->header.xcomp_bv = XCOMP_BV_COMPACTED_FORMAT | xfeatures_mask_all;
 }
 
 static inline void fpstate_init_fxstate(struct fxregs_state *fx)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
index 76f83d2ac10e..d8e2ec99f635 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
@@ -19,9 +19,6 @@
 #define XSAVE_YMM_SIZE	    256
 #define XSAVE_YMM_OFFSET    (XSAVE_HDR_SIZE + XSAVE_HDR_OFFSET)
 
-/* Supervisor features */
-#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR (XFEATURE_MASK_PT)
-
 /* All currently supported features */
 #define SUPPORTED_XFEATURES_MASK (XFEATURE_MASK_FP | \
 				  XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | \
@@ -40,6 +37,7 @@
 #endif
 
 extern u64 xfeatures_mask_user;
+extern u64 xfeatures_mask_all;
 extern u64 xstate_fx_sw_bytes[USER_XSTATE_FX_SW_WORDS];
 
 extern void __init update_regset_xstate_info(unsigned int size,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
index 4bd56079048f..5f076f593fa9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
@@ -365,8 +365,12 @@ void fpu__drop(struct fpu *fpu)
  */
 static inline void copy_init_user_fpstate_to_fpregs(void)
 {
+	/*
+	 * Only XSAVES user states are copied.
+	 * System states are preserved.
+	 */
 	if (use_xsave())
-		copy_kernel_to_xregs(&init_fpstate.xsave, -1);
+		copy_kernel_to_xregs(&init_fpstate.xsave, xfeatures_mask_user);
 	else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FXSR))
 		copy_kernel_to_fxregs(&init_fpstate.fxsave);
 	else
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c
index 761c3a5a9e07..eaf9d9d479a5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c
@@ -222,16 +222,6 @@ static void __init fpu__init_system_xstate_size_legacy(void)
 	fpu_user_xstate_size = fpu_kernel_xstate_size;
 }
 
-/*
- * Find supported xfeatures based on cpu features and command-line input.
- * This must be called after fpu__init_parse_early_param() is called and
- * xfeatures_mask is enumerated.
- */
-u64 __init fpu__get_supported_xfeatures_mask(void)
-{
-	return SUPPORTED_XFEATURES_MASK;
-}
-
 /* Legacy code to initialize eager fpu mode. */
 static void __init fpu__init_system_ctx_switch(void)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
index e7cbaed12ef1..605ec6decf3e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -56,9 +56,14 @@ static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {
  */
 u64 xfeatures_mask_user __read_mostly;
 
+/*
+ * Combined XSAVES system and user states.
+ */
+u64 xfeatures_mask_all __read_mostly;
+
 static unsigned int xstate_offsets[XFEATURE_MAX] = { [ 0 ... XFEATURE_MAX - 1] = -1};
 static unsigned int xstate_sizes[XFEATURE_MAX]   = { [ 0 ... XFEATURE_MAX - 1] = -1};
-static unsigned int xstate_comp_offsets[sizeof(xfeatures_mask_user)*8];
+static unsigned int xstate_comp_offsets[sizeof(xfeatures_mask_all)*8];
 
 /*
  * The XSAVE area of kernel can be in standard or compacted format;
@@ -83,7 +88,7 @@ void fpu__xstate_clear_all_cpu_caps(void)
  */
 int cpu_has_xfeatures(u64 xfeatures_needed, const char **feature_name)
 {
-	u64 xfeatures_missing = xfeatures_needed & ~xfeatures_mask_user;
+	u64 xfeatures_missing = xfeatures_needed & ~xfeatures_mask_all;
 
 	if (unlikely(feature_name)) {
 		long xfeature_idx, max_idx;
@@ -162,7 +167,7 @@ void fpstate_sanitize_xstate(struct fpu *fpu)
 	 * None of the feature bits are in init state. So nothing else
 	 * to do for us, as the memory layout is up to date.
 	 */
-	if ((xfeatures & xfeatures_mask_user) == xfeatures_mask_user)
+	if ((xfeatures & xfeatures_mask_all) == xfeatures_mask_all)
 		return;
 
 	/*
@@ -217,7 +222,7 @@ void fpstate_sanitize_xstate(struct fpu *fpu)
  */
 void fpu__init_cpu_xstate(void)
 {
-	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) || !xfeatures_mask_user)
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) || !xfeatures_mask_all)
 		return;
 	/*
 	 * XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK sets the features that are managed
@@ -225,20 +230,19 @@ void fpu__init_cpu_xstate(void)
 	 * set here.
 	 */
 
-	xfeatures_mask_user &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR;
-
 	cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_OSXSAVE);
 	xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, xfeatures_mask_user);
+	/*
+	 * MSR_IA32_XSS sets which XSAVES system states to be managed by
+	 * XSAVES.  Only XSAVES system states can be set here.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, xfeatures_mask_all & ~xfeatures_mask_user);
 }
 
-/*
- * Note that in the future we will likely need a pair of
- * functions here: one for user xstates and the other for
- * system xstates.  For now, they are the same.
- */
 static int xfeature_enabled(enum xfeature xfeature)
 {
-	return !!(xfeatures_mask_user & BIT_ULL(xfeature));
+	return !!(xfeatures_mask_all & BIT_ULL(xfeature));
 }
 
 /*
@@ -344,7 +348,7 @@ static int xfeature_is_aligned(int xfeature_nr)
  */
 static void __init setup_xstate_comp(void)
 {
-	unsigned int xstate_comp_sizes[sizeof(xfeatures_mask_user)*8];
+	unsigned int xstate_comp_sizes[sizeof(xfeatures_mask_all)*8];
 	int i;
 
 	/*
@@ -417,7 +421,7 @@ static void __init setup_init_fpu_buf(void)
 	print_xstate_features();
 
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
-		init_fpstate.xsave.header.xcomp_bv = BIT_ULL(63) | xfeatures_mask_user;
+		init_fpstate.xsave.header.xcomp_bv = BIT_ULL(63) | xfeatures_mask_all;
 
 	/*
 	 * Init all the features state with header.xfeatures being 0x0
@@ -440,7 +444,7 @@ static int xfeature_uncompacted_offset(int xfeature_nr)
 	 * format. Checking a system state's uncompacted offset is
 	 * an error.
 	 */
-	if (XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR & (1 << xfeature_nr)) {
+	if (~xfeatures_mask_user & BIT_ULL(xfeature_nr)) {
 		WARN_ONCE(1, "No fixed offset for xstate %d\n", xfeature_nr);
 		return -1;
 	}
@@ -612,15 +616,12 @@ static void do_extra_xstate_size_checks(void)
 
 
 /*
- * Get total size of enabled xstates in XCR0/xfeatures_mask_user.
+ * Get total size of enabled xstates in XCR0 | IA32_XSS.
  *
  * Note the SDM's wording here.  "sub-function 0" only enumerates
  * the size of the *user* states.  If we use it to size a buffer
  * that we use 'XSAVES' on, we could potentially overflow the
  * buffer because 'XSAVES' saves system states too.
- *
- * Note that we do not currently set any bits on IA32_XSS so
- * 'XCR0 | IA32_XSS == XCR0' for now.
  */
 static unsigned int __init get_xsaves_size(void)
 {
@@ -702,6 +703,7 @@ static int init_xstate_size(void)
  */
 static void fpu__init_disable_system_xstate(void)
 {
+	xfeatures_mask_all = 0;
 	xfeatures_mask_user = 0;
 	cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_OSXSAVE);
 	fpu__xstate_clear_all_cpu_caps();
@@ -717,6 +719,8 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void)
 	static int on_boot_cpu __initdata = 1;
 	int err;
 	int i;
+	u64 cpu_user_xfeatures_mask;
+	u64 cpu_system_xfeatures_mask;
 
 	WARN_ON_FPU(!on_boot_cpu);
 	on_boot_cpu = 0;
@@ -737,10 +741,23 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Find user states supported by the processor.
+	 * Only these bits can be set in XCR0.
+	 */
 	cpuid_count(XSTATE_CPUID, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
-	xfeatures_mask_user = eax + ((u64)edx << 32);
+	cpu_user_xfeatures_mask = eax + ((u64)edx << 32);
+
+	/*
+	 * Find system states supported by the processor.
+	 * Only these bits can be set in IA32_XSS MSR.
+	 */
+	cpuid_count(XSTATE_CPUID, 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+	cpu_system_xfeatures_mask = ecx + ((u64)edx << 32);
 
-	if ((xfeatures_mask_user & XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE) != XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE) {
+	xfeatures_mask_all = cpu_user_xfeatures_mask | cpu_system_xfeatures_mask;
+
+	if ((xfeatures_mask_all & XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE) != XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE) {
 		/*
 		 * This indicates that something really unexpected happened
 		 * with the enumeration.  Disable XSAVE and try to continue
@@ -755,10 +772,11 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void)
 	 */
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xsave_cpuid_features); i++) {
 		if (!boot_cpu_has(xsave_cpuid_features[i]))
-			xfeatures_mask_user &= ~BIT_ULL(i);
+			xfeatures_mask_all &= ~BIT_ULL(i);
 	}
 
-	xfeatures_mask_user &= fpu__get_supported_xfeatures_mask();
+	xfeatures_mask_all &= SUPPORTED_XFEATURES_MASK;
+	xfeatures_mask_user = xfeatures_mask_all & cpu_user_xfeatures_mask;
 
 	/* Enable xstate instructions to be able to continue with initialization: */
 	fpu__init_cpu_xstate();
@@ -770,7 +788,7 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void)
 	 * Update info used for ptrace frames; use standard-format size and no
 	 * system xstates:
 	 */
-	update_regset_xstate_info(fpu_user_xstate_size, xfeatures_mask_user & ~XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR);
+	update_regset_xstate_info(fpu_user_xstate_size, xfeatures_mask_user);
 
 	fpu__init_prepare_fx_sw_frame();
 	setup_init_fpu_buf();
@@ -778,7 +796,7 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void)
 	print_xstate_offset_size();
 
 	pr_info("x86/fpu: Enabled xstate features 0x%llx, context size is %d bytes, using '%s' format.\n",
-		xfeatures_mask_user,
+		xfeatures_mask_all,
 		fpu_kernel_xstate_size,
 		boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) ? "compacted" : "standard");
 	return;
@@ -798,6 +816,12 @@ void fpu__resume_cpu(void)
 	 */
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
 		xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, xfeatures_mask_user);
+
+	/*
+	 * Restore IA32_XSS
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, xfeatures_mask_all & ~xfeatures_mask_user);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -847,9 +871,9 @@ void *get_xsave_addr(struct xregs_state *xsave, int xstate_feature)
 	/*
 	 * We should not ever be requesting features that we
 	 * have not enabled.  Remember that pcntxt_mask is
-	 * what we write to the XCR0 register.
+	 * what we write to the XCR0 | IA32_XSS registers.
 	 */
-	WARN_ONCE(!(xfeatures_mask_user & xstate_feature),
+	WARN_ONCE(!(xfeatures_mask_all & xstate_feature),
 		  "get of unsupported state");
 	/*
 	 * This assumes the last 'xsave*' instruction to
@@ -999,7 +1023,7 @@ int copy_xstate_to_kernel(void *kbuf, struct xregs_state *xsave, unsigned int of
 	 */
 	memset(&header, 0, sizeof(header));
 	header.xfeatures = xsave->header.xfeatures;
-	header.xfeatures &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR;
+	header.xfeatures &= xfeatures_mask_user;
 
 	/*
 	 * Copy xregs_state->header:
@@ -1083,7 +1107,7 @@ int copy_xstate_to_user(void __user *ubuf, struct xregs_state *xsave, unsigned i
 	 */
 	memset(&header, 0, sizeof(header));
 	header.xfeatures = xsave->header.xfeatures;
-	header.xfeatures &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR;
+	header.xfeatures &= xfeatures_mask_user;
 
 	/*
 	 * Copy xregs_state->header:
@@ -1176,7 +1200,7 @@ int copy_kernel_to_xstate(struct xregs_state *xsave, const void *kbuf)
 	 * The state that came in from userspace was user-state only.
 	 * Mask all the user states out of 'xfeatures':
 	 */
-	xsave->header.xfeatures &= XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR;
+	xsave->header.xfeatures &= (xfeatures_mask_all & ~xfeatures_mask_user);
 
 	/*
 	 * Add back in the features that came in from userspace:
@@ -1232,7 +1256,7 @@ int copy_user_to_xstate(struct xregs_state *xsave, const void __user *ubuf)
 	 * The state that came in from userspace was user-state only.
 	 * Mask all the user states out of 'xfeatures':
 	 */
-	xsave->header.xfeatures &= XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR;
+	xsave->header.xfeatures &= (xfeatures_mask_all & ~xfeatures_mask_user);
 
 	/*
 	 * Add back in the features that came in from userspace:
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-11-08 18:40   ` Borislav Petkov
  2018-11-08 20:46   ` Andy Lutomirski
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (23 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 2 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

Intel Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) introduces the
following MSRs into the XSAVES system states.

    IA32_U_CET (user-mode CET settings),
    IA32_PL3_SSP (user-mode shadow stack),
    IA32_PL0_SSP (kernel-mode shadow stack),
    IA32_PL1_SSP (ring-1 shadow stack),
    IA32_PL2_SSP (ring-2 shadow stack).

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h            | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h           |  4 +++-
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c                | 10 ++++++++++
 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
index 202c53918ecf..e55d51d172f1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
@@ -114,6 +114,9 @@ enum xfeature {
 	XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM,
 	XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR,
 	XFEATURE_PKRU,
+	XFEATURE_RESERVED,
+	XFEATURE_SHSTK_USER,
+	XFEATURE_SHSTK_KERNEL,
 
 	XFEATURE_MAX,
 };
@@ -128,6 +131,8 @@ enum xfeature {
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM		(1 << XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM)
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_PT		(1 << XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR)
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU		(1 << XFEATURE_PKRU)
+#define XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER	(1 << XFEATURE_SHSTK_USER)
+#define XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_KERNEL	(1 << XFEATURE_SHSTK_KERNEL)
 
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE		(XFEATURE_MASK_FP | XFEATURE_MASK_SSE)
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512		(XFEATURE_MASK_OPMASK \
@@ -229,6 +234,23 @@ struct pkru_state {
 	u32				pad;
 } __packed;
 
+/*
+ * State component 11 is Control flow Enforcement user states
+ */
+struct cet_user_state {
+	u64 u_cet;	/* user control flow settings */
+	u64 user_ssp;	/* user shadow stack pointer */
+} __packed;
+
+/*
+ * State component 12 is Control flow Enforcement kernel states
+ */
+struct cet_kernel_state {
+	u64 kernel_ssp;	/* kernel shadow stack */
+	u64 pl1_ssp;	/* ring-1 shadow stack */
+	u64 pl2_ssp;	/* ring-2 shadow stack */
+} __packed;
+
 struct xstate_header {
 	u64				xfeatures;
 	u64				xcomp_bv;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
index d8e2ec99f635..18b60748a34d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
@@ -28,7 +28,9 @@
 				  XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM | \
 				  XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU | \
 				  XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS | \
-				  XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR)
+				  XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR | \
+				  XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER | \
+				  XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_KERNEL)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 #define REX_PREFIX	"0x48, "
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
index bcba3c643e63..25311ec4b731 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
@@ -130,6 +130,8 @@
 #define X86_CR4_SMAP		_BITUL(X86_CR4_SMAP_BIT)
 #define X86_CR4_PKE_BIT		22 /* enable Protection Keys support */
 #define X86_CR4_PKE		_BITUL(X86_CR4_PKE_BIT)
+#define X86_CR4_CET_BIT		23 /* enable Control flow Enforcement */
+#define X86_CR4_CET		_BITUL(X86_CR4_CET_BIT)
 
 /*
  * x86-64 Task Priority Register, CR8
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
index 605ec6decf3e..ad36ea28bfd1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ static const char *xfeature_names[] =
 	"Processor Trace (unused)"	,
 	"Protection Keys User registers",
 	"unknown xstate feature"	,
+	"Control flow User registers"	,
+	"Control flow Kernel registers"	,
+	"unknown xstate feature"	,
 };
 
 static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {
@@ -48,6 +51,9 @@ static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {
 	X86_FEATURE_AVX512F,
 	X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT,
 	X86_FEATURE_PKU,
+	0,		   /* Unused */
+	X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, /* XFEATURE_SHSTK_USER */
+	X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, /* XFEATURE_SHSTK_KERNEL */
 };
 
 /*
@@ -312,6 +318,8 @@ static void __init print_xstate_features(void)
 	print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_ZMM_Hi256);
 	print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM);
 	print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU);
+	print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER);
+	print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_KERNEL);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -558,6 +566,8 @@ static void check_xstate_against_struct(int nr)
 	XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_ZMM_Hi256, struct avx_512_zmm_uppers_state);
 	XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM,  struct avx_512_hi16_state);
 	XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_PKRU,      struct pkru_state);
+	XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_SHSTK_USER,   struct cet_user_state);
+	XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_SHSTK_KERNEL, struct cet_kernel_state);
 
 	/*
 	 * Make *SURE* to add any feature numbers in below if
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (3 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-11-13 18:43   ` Borislav Petkov
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (22 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

Explain how CET works and the no_cet_shstk/no_cet_ibt kernel
parameters.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |   6 +
 Documentation/index.rst                       |   1 +
 Documentation/x86/index.rst                   |  11 +
 Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst               | 266 ++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 284 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/index.rst
 create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 92eb1f42240d..3854423f7c86 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2764,6 +2764,12 @@
 			noexec=on: enable non-executable mappings (default)
 			noexec=off: disable non-executable mappings
 
+	no_cet_ibt	[X86-64] Disable indirect branch tracking for user-mode
+			applications
+
+	no_cet_shstk	[X86-64] Disable shadow stack support for user-mode
+			applications
+
 	nosmap		[X86]
 			Disable SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention)
 			even if it is supported by processor.
diff --git a/Documentation/index.rst b/Documentation/index.rst
index 5db7e87c7cb1..1cdc139adb40 100644
--- a/Documentation/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/index.rst
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ implementation.
    :maxdepth: 2
 
    sh/index
+   x86/index
 
 Filesystem Documentation
 ------------------------
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/index.rst b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9c34d8cbc8f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+=======================
+X86 Documentation
+=======================
+
+Control Flow Enforcement
+========================
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 1
+
+   intel_cet
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst b/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..946f4802a51f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+=========================================
+Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET)
+=========================================
+
+[1] Overview
+============
+
+Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET) provides protection against
+return/jump-oriented programming (ROP) attacks.  It can be implemented
+to protect both the kernel and applications.  In the first phase,
+only the user-mode protection is implemented on the 64-bit kernel.
+However, 32-bit applications are supported under the compatibility
+mode.
+
+CET includes shadow stack (SHSTK) and indirect branch tracking (IBT).
+The SHSTK is a secondary stack allocated from memory.  The processor
+automatically pushes/pops a secure copy to the SHSTK every return
+address and, by comparing the secure copy to the program stack copy,
+verifies function returns are as intended.  The IBT verifies all
+indirect CALL/JMP targets are intended and marked by the compiler with
+'ENDBR' op codes.
+
+There are two kernel configuration options:
+
+    INTEL_X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER, and
+    INTEL_X86_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER.
+
+To build a CET-enabled kernel, Binutils v2.31 and GCC v8.1 or later
+are required.  To build a CET-enabled application, GLIBC v2.28 or
+later is also required.
+
+There are two command-line options for disabling CET features:
+
+    no_cet_shstk - disables SHSTK, and
+    no_cet_ibt - disables IBT.
+
+At run time, /proc/cpuinfo shows the availability of SHSTK and IBT.
+
+[2] CET assembly instructions
+=============================
+
+RDSSP %r
+    Read the SHSTK pointer into %r.
+
+INCSSP %r
+    Unwind (increment) the SHSTK pointer (0 ~ 255) steps as indicated
+    in the operand register.  The GLIBC longjmp uses INCSSP to unwind
+    the SHSTK until that matches the program stack.  When it is
+    necessary to unwind beyond 255 steps, longjmp divides and repeats
+    the process.
+
+RSTORSSP (%r)
+    Switch to the SHSTK indicated in the 'restore token' pointed by
+    the operand register and replace the 'restore token' with a new
+    token to be saved (with SAVEPREVSSP) for the outgoing SHSTK.
+
+::
+
+                               Before RSTORSSP
+
+             Incoming SHSTK                   Current/Outgoing SHSTK
+
+        |----------------------|             |----------------------|
+ addr=x |                      |       ssp-> |                      |
+        |----------------------|             |----------------------|
+ (%r)-> | rstor_token=(x|Lg)   |    addr=y-8 |                      |
+        |----------------------|             |----------------------|
+
+                               After RSTORSSP
+
+        |----------------------|             |----------------------|
+        |                      |             |                      |
+        |----------------------|             |----------------------|
+  ssp-> | rstor_token=(y|Bz|Lg)|    addr=y-8 |                      |
+        |----------------------|             |----------------------|
+
+    note:
+        1. Only valid addresses and restore tokens can be on the
+           user-mode SHSTK.
+        2. A token is always of type u64 and must align to u64.
+        3. The incoming SHSTK pointer in a rstor_token must point to
+           immediately above the token.
+        4. 'Lg' is bit[0] of a rstor_token indicating a 64-bit SHSTK.
+        5. 'Bz' is bit[1] of a rstor_token indicating the token is to
+           be used only for the next SAVEPREVSSP and invalid for the
+           RSTORSSP.
+
+SAVEPREVSSP
+    Store the SHSTK 'restore token' pointed by
+        (current_SHSTK_pointer + 8).
+
+::
+
+                             After SAVEPREVSSP
+
+        |----------------------|             |----------------------|
+  ssp-> |                      |             |                      |
+        |----------------------|             |----------------------|
+        | rstor_token=(y|Bz|Lg)|    addr=y-8 | rstor_token(y|Lg)    |
+        |----------------------|             |----------------------|
+
+WRUSS %r0, (%r1)
+    Write the value in %r0 to the SHSTK address pointed by (%r1).
+    This is a kernel-mode only instruction.
+
+ENDBR
+    The compiler inserts an ENDBR at all valid branch targets.  Any
+    CALL/JMP to a target without an ENDBR triggers a control
+    protection fault.
+
+[3] Application Enabling
+========================
+
+An application's CET capability is marked in its ELF header and can
+be verified from the following command output, in the
+NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0 field:
+
+    readelf -n <application>
+
+If an application supports CET and is statically linked, it will run
+with CET protection.  If the application needs any shared libraries,
+the loader checks all dependencies and enables CET only when all
+requirements are met.
+
+[4] Legacy Libraries
+====================
+
+GLIBC provides a few tunables for backward compatibility.
+
+GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.tune.hwcaps=-SHSTK,-IBT
+    Turn off SHSTK/IBT for the current shell.
+
+GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.tune.x86_shstk=<on, permissive>
+    This controls how dlopen() handles SHSTK legacy libraries:
+        on: continue with SHSTK enabled;
+        permissive: continue with SHSTK off.
+
+[5] CET system calls
+====================
+
+The following arch_prctl() system calls are added for CET:
+
+arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS, unsigned long *addr)
+    Return CET feature status.
+
+    The parameter 'addr' is a pointer to a user buffer.
+    On returning to the caller, the kernel fills the following
+    information:
+
+    *addr = SHSTK/IBT status
+    *(addr + 1) = SHSTK base address
+    *(addr + 2) = SHSTK size
+
+arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE, unsigned long features)
+    Disable SHSTK and/or IBT specified in 'features'.  Return -EPERM
+    if CET is locked.
+
+arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK)
+    Lock in CET feature.
+
+arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK, unsigned long *addr)
+    Allocate a new SHSTK and put a restore token at top.
+
+    The parameter 'addr' is a pointer to a user buffer and indicates
+    the desired SHSTK size to allocate.  On returning to the caller,
+    the kernel fills *addr with the base address of the new SHSTK.
+
+arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_GET_LEGACY_BITMAP, unsigned long *addr)
+    Allocate an IBT legacy code bitmap if the current task does not
+    have one.
+
+    The parameter 'addr' is a pointer to a user buffer.
+    On returning to the caller, the kernel fills the following
+    information:
+
+    *addr = IBT bitmap base address
+    *(addr + 1) = IBT bitmap size
+
+Note:
+  There is no CET enabling arch_prctl function.  By design, CET is
+  enabled automatically if the binary and the system can support it.
+
+  The parameters passed are always unsigned 64-bit.  When an ia32
+  application passing pointers, it should only use the lower 32 bits.
+
+[6] The implementation of the SHSTK
+===================================
+
+SHSTK size
+----------
+
+A task's SHSTK is allocated from memory to a fixed size of
+RLIMIT_STACK.
+
+Signal
+------
+
+The main program and its signal handlers use the same SHSTK.  Because
+the SHSTK stores only return addresses, we can use a large SHSTK to
+cover the condition that both the program stack and the sigaltstack
+run out.
+
+The kernel creates a restore token at the SHSTK restoring address and
+verifies that token when restoring from the signal handler.
+
+Fork
+----
+
+The SHSTK's vma has VM_SHSTK flag set; its PTEs are required to be
+read-only and dirty.  When a SHSTK PTE is not present, RO, and dirty,
+a SHSTK access triggers a page fault with an additional SHSTK bit set
+in the page fault error code.
+
+When a task forks a child, its SHSTK PTEs are copied and both the
+parent's and the child's SHSTK PTEs are cleared of the dirty bit.
+Upon the next SHSTK access, the resulting SHSTK page fault is handled
+by page copy/re-use.
+
+When a pthread child is created, the kernel allocates a new SHSTK for
+the new thread.
+
+Setjmp/Longjmp
+--------------
+
+Longjmp unwinds SHSTK until it matches the program stack.
+
+Ucontext
+--------
+
+In GLIBC, getcontext/setcontext is implemented in similar way as
+setjmp/longjmp.
+
+When makecontext creates a new ucontext, a new SHSTK is allocated for
+that context with ARCH_X86_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK the syscall.  The kernel
+creates a restore token at the top of the new SHSTK and the user-mode
+code switches to the new SHSTK with the RSTORSSP instruction.
+
+[7] The management of read-only & dirty PTEs for SHSTK
+======================================================
+
+A RO and dirty PTE exists in the following cases:
+
+(a) A page is modified and then shared with a fork()'ed child;
+(b) A R/O page that has been COW'ed;
+(c) A SHSTK page.
+
+The processor only checks the dirty bit for (c).  To prevent the use
+of non-SHSTK memory as SHSTK, we use a spare bit of the 64-bit PTE as
+DIRTY_SW for (a) and (b) above.  This results to the following PTE
+settings:
+
+Modified PTE:             (R/W + DIRTY_HW)
+Modified and shared PTE:  (R/O + DIRTY_SW)
+R/O PTE, COW'ed:          (R/O + DIRTY_SW)
+SHSTK PTE:                (R/O + DIRTY_HW)
+SHSTK PTE, COW'ed:        (R/O + DIRTY_HW)
+SHSTK PTE, shared:        (R/O + DIRTY_SW)
+
+Note that DIRTY_SW is only used in R/O PTEs but not R/W PTEs.
+
+[8] The implementation of IBT
+=============================
+
+The kernel provides IBT support in mmap() of the legacy code bit map.
+However, the management of the bitmap is done in the GLIBC or the
+application.
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (4 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-11-14 18:44   ` Borislav Petkov
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 07/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (21 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

A control protection exception is triggered when a control flow transfer
attempt violated shadow stack or indirect branch tracking constraints.
For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the
safe copy on the shadow stack; or a JMP instruction arrives at a non-
ENDBR instruction.

The control protection exception handler works in a similar way as the
general protection fault handler.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S          |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h       |  3 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/idt.c              |  4 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c    |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c            | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h |  3 +-
 6 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 957dfb693ecc..5f4914e988df 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -1000,7 +1000,7 @@ idtentry spurious_interrupt_bug		do_spurious_interrupt_bug	has_error_code=0
 idtentry coprocessor_error		do_coprocessor_error		has_error_code=0
 idtentry alignment_check		do_alignment_check		has_error_code=1
 idtentry simd_coprocessor_error		do_simd_coprocessor_error	has_error_code=0
-
+idtentry control_protection		do_control_protection		has_error_code=1
 
 	/*
 	 * Reload gs selector with exception handling
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
index 3de69330e6c5..5196050ff3d5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ asmlinkage void invalid_TSS(void);
 asmlinkage void segment_not_present(void);
 asmlinkage void stack_segment(void);
 asmlinkage void general_protection(void);
+asmlinkage void control_protection(void);
 asmlinkage void page_fault(void);
 asmlinkage void async_page_fault(void);
 asmlinkage void spurious_interrupt_bug(void);
@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ dotraplinkage void do_stack_segment(struct pt_regs *, long);
 dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *, long);
 #endif
 dotraplinkage void do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *, long);
+dotraplinkage void do_control_protection(struct pt_regs *, long);
 dotraplinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *, unsigned long);
 dotraplinkage void do_spurious_interrupt_bug(struct pt_regs *, long);
 dotraplinkage void do_coprocessor_error(struct pt_regs *, long);
@@ -142,6 +144,7 @@ enum {
 	X86_TRAP_AC,		/* 17, Alignment Check */
 	X86_TRAP_MC,		/* 18, Machine Check */
 	X86_TRAP_XF,		/* 19, SIMD Floating-Point Exception */
+	X86_TRAP_CP = 21,	/* 21 Control Protection Fault */
 	X86_TRAP_IRET = 32,	/* 32, IRET Exception */
 };
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
index 01adea278a71..66ebc8cb16e2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
@@ -104,6 +104,10 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = {
 #elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
 	SYSG(IA32_SYSCALL_VECTOR,	entry_INT80_32),
 #endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	INTG(X86_TRAP_CP,		control_protection),
+#endif
 };
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
index 9ccbf0576cd0..c572a3de1037 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline void signal_compat_build_tests(void)
 	 */
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGILL  != 11);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGFPE  != 15);
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 7);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 8);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGBUS  != 5);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGTRAP != 5);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGCHLD != 6);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index e6db475164ed..4188775681cf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -578,6 +578,70 @@ do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_general_protection);
 
+static const char *control_protection_err[] =
+{
+	"unknown",
+	"near-ret",
+	"far-ret/iret",
+	"endbranch",
+	"rstorssp",
+	"setssbsy",
+};
+
+/*
+ * When a control protection exception occurs, send a signal
+ * to the responsible application.  Currently, control
+ * protection is only enabled for the user mode.  This
+ * exception should not come from the kernel mode.
+ */
+dotraplinkage void
+do_control_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
+{
+	struct task_struct *tsk;
+	siginfo_t info;
+
+	RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_is_watching(), "entry code didn't wake RCU");
+	if (notify_die(DIE_TRAP, "control protection fault", regs,
+		       error_code, X86_TRAP_CP, SIGSEGV) == NOTIFY_STOP)
+		return;
+	cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
+
+	if (!user_mode(regs))
+		die("kernel control protection fault", regs, error_code);
+
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
+	    !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "CET is disabled but got control "
+			  "protection fault\n");
+
+	tsk = current;
+	tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
+	tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_CP;
+
+	if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV) &&
+	    printk_ratelimit()) {
+		unsigned int max_err;
+
+		max_err = ARRAY_SIZE(control_protection_err) - 1;
+		if ((error_code < 0) || (error_code > max_err))
+			error_code = 0;
+		pr_info("%s[%d] control protection ip:%lx sp:%lx error:%lx(%s)",
+			tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),
+			regs->ip, regs->sp, error_code,
+			control_protection_err[error_code]);
+		print_vma_addr(KERN_CONT " in ", regs->ip);
+		pr_cont("\n");
+	}
+
+	clear_siginfo(&info);
+	info.si_signo	= SIGSEGV;
+	info.si_errno	= error_code;
+	info.si_code	= SEGV_CPERR;
+	info.si_addr	= (void __user*)uprobe_get_trap_addr(regs);
+	force_sig_info(SIGSEGV, &info, tsk);
+}
+NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_control_protection);
+
 dotraplinkage void notrace do_int3(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
index 80e2a7227205..264d8e03270f 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
@@ -228,7 +228,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
 #define SEGV_ACCADI	5	/* ADI not enabled for mapped object */
 #define SEGV_ADIDERR	6	/* Disrupting MCD error */
 #define SEGV_ADIPERR	7	/* Precise MCD exception */
-#define NSIGSEGV	7
+#define SEGV_CPERR	8
+#define NSIGSEGV	8
 
 /*
  * SIGBUS si_codes
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 07/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (5 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 20:39   ` Jann Horn
  2018-10-11 20:49   ` Dave Hansen
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 08/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (20 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 2 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

Create a guard area between VMAs to detect memory corruption.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 include/linux/mm.h | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++----------
 mm/Kconfig         |  7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 0416a7204be3..53cfc104c0fb 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2417,24 +2417,34 @@ static inline struct vm_area_struct * find_vma_intersection(struct mm_struct * m
 static inline unsigned long vm_start_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	unsigned long vm_start = vma->vm_start;
+	unsigned long gap = 0;
+
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN)
+		gap = stack_guard_gap;
+	else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VM_AREA_GUARD))
+		gap = PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	vm_start -= gap;
+	if (vm_start > vma->vm_start)
+		vm_start = 0;
 
-	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN) {
-		vm_start -= stack_guard_gap;
-		if (vm_start > vma->vm_start)
-			vm_start = 0;
-	}
 	return vm_start;
 }
 
 static inline unsigned long vm_end_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	unsigned long vm_end = vma->vm_end;
+	unsigned long gap = 0;
+
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP)
+		gap = stack_guard_gap;
+	else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VM_AREA_GUARD))
+		gap = PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	vm_end += gap;
+	if (vm_end < vma->vm_end)
+		vm_end = -PAGE_SIZE;
 
-	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP) {
-		vm_end += stack_guard_gap;
-		if (vm_end < vma->vm_end)
-			vm_end = -PAGE_SIZE;
-	}
 	return vm_end;
 }
 
diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
index de64ea658716..0cdcad65640d 100644
--- a/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/mm/Kconfig
@@ -764,4 +764,11 @@ config GUP_BENCHMARK
 config ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL
 	bool
 
+config VM_AREA_GUARD
+	bool "VM area guard"
+	default n
+	help
+	  Create a guard area between VM areas so that access beyond
+	  limit can be detected.
+
 endmenu
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 08/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (6 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 07/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 09/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (19 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

Introduce Kconfig option X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER.

An application has shadow stack protection when all the following are
true:

  (1) The kernel has X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER enabled,
  (2) The running processor supports the shadow stack,
  (3) The application is built with shadow stack enabled tools & libs
      and, and at runtime, all dependent shared libs can support shadow
      stack.

If this kernel config option is enabled, but (2) or (3) above is not
true, the application runs without the shadow stack protection.
Existing legacy applications will continue to work without the shadow
stack protection.

The user-mode shadow stack protection is only implemented for the
64-bit kernel.  Thirty-two bit applications are supported under the
compatibility mode.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig  | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/Makefile |  7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 1a0be022f91d..5f73335b7a3a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1913,6 +1913,32 @@ config X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
 
 	  If unsure, say y.
 
+config X86_INTEL_CET
+	def_bool n
+
+config ARCH_HAS_SHSTK
+	def_bool n
+
+config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+	prompt "Intel Shadow Stack for user-mode"
+	def_bool n
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
+	select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+	select X86_INTEL_CET
+	select ARCH_HAS_SHSTK
+	select VM_AREA_GUARD
+	---help---
+	  Shadow stack provides hardware protection against program stack
+	  corruption.  Only when all the following are true will an application
+	  have the shadow stack protection: the kernel supports it (i.e. this
+	  feature is enabled), the application is compiled and linked with
+	  shadow stack enabled, and the processor supports this feature.
+	  When the kernel has this configuration enabled, existing non shadow
+	  stack applications will continue to work, but without shadow stack
+	  protection.
+
+	  If unsure, say y.
+
 config EFI
 	bool "EFI runtime service support"
 	depends on ACPI
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index 8f6e7eb8ae9f..b28842b80295 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -152,6 +152,13 @@ ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32
 endif
 export CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI
 
+# Check assembler shadow stack suppot
+ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+  ifeq ($(call as-instr, saveprevssp, y),)
+      $(error CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER not supported by the assembler)
+  endif
+endif
+
 #
 # If the function graph tracer is used with mcount instead of fentry,
 # '-maccumulate-outgoing-args' is needed to prevent a GCC bug
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 09/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (7 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 08/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 10/27] mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (18 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

VM_SHSTK indicates a shadow stack memory area.
The shadow stack is implemented only for the 64-bit kernel.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 +++
 include/linux/mm.h | 8 ++++++++
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
index 5ea1d64cb0b4..b20450dde5b7 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -652,6 +652,9 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT4)]	= "",
 #endif
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+		[ilog2(VM_SHSTK)]	= "ss"
+#endif
 	};
 	size_t i;
 
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 53cfc104c0fb..f658923e76ad 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -224,11 +224,13 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2	34	/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3	35	/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4	36	/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5	37	/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_0	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0)
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_1	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1)
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_2	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2)
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_3	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3)
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_4	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4)
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_5	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5)
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
@@ -266,6 +268,12 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
 # define VM_MPX		VM_NONE
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+# define VM_SHSTK	VM_HIGH_ARCH_5
+#else
+# define VM_SHSTK	VM_NONE
+#endif
+
 #ifndef VM_GROWSUP
 # define VM_GROWSUP	VM_NONE
 #endif
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 10/27] mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (8 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 09/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 11/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (17 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

To prevent function call/return spills into the next shadow stack
area, we do not merge shadow stack areas.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 mm/mmap.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 5f2b2b184c60..b85292014ec9 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1123,6 +1123,12 @@ struct vm_area_struct *vma_merge(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	if (vm_flags & VM_SPECIAL)
 		return NULL;
 
+	/*
+	 * Do not merge shadow stack areas.
+	 */
+	if (vm_flags & VM_SHSTK)
+		return NULL;
+
 	if (prev)
 		next = prev->vm_next;
 	else
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 11/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (9 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 10/27] mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 12/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (16 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

We are going to create _PAGE_DIRTY_SW for non-hardware, memory
management purposes.  Rename _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW and
_PAGE_BIT_DIRTY to _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HW to make these PTE dirty
bits more clear.  There are no functional changes in this
patch.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h       |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 17 +++++++++--------
 arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                   |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 690c0307afed..95c918ad84ed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkexec(pte_t pte)
 
 static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty(pte_t pte)
 {
-	return pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
+	return pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
 }
 
 static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung(pte_t pte)
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_wrprotect(pmd_t pmd)
 
 static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdirty(pmd_t pmd)
 {
-	return pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
+	return pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
 }
 
 static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdevmap(pmd_t pmd)
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ static inline pud_t pud_wrprotect(pud_t pud)
 
 static inline pud_t pud_mkdirty(pud_t pud)
 {
-	return pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
+	return pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
 }
 
 static inline pud_t pud_mkdevmap(pud_t pud)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
index b64acb08a62b..0657a22d5216 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 #define _PAGE_BIT_PWT		3	/* page write through */
 #define _PAGE_BIT_PCD		4	/* page cache disabled */
 #define _PAGE_BIT_ACCESSED	5	/* was accessed (raised by CPU) */
-#define _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY		6	/* was written to (raised by CPU) */
+#define _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HW	6	/* was written to (raised by CPU) */
 #define _PAGE_BIT_PSE		7	/* 4 MB (or 2MB) page */
 #define _PAGE_BIT_PAT		7	/* on 4KB pages */
 #define _PAGE_BIT_GLOBAL	8	/* Global TLB entry PPro+ */
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
 #define _PAGE_PWT	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PWT)
 #define _PAGE_PCD	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PCD)
 #define _PAGE_ACCESSED	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_ACCESSED)
-#define _PAGE_DIRTY	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY)
+#define _PAGE_DIRTY_HW	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HW)
 #define _PAGE_PSE	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PSE)
 #define _PAGE_GLOBAL	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_GLOBAL)
 #define _PAGE_SOFTW1	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW1)
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@
 			 _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3)
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) || defined(CONFIG_X86_PAE)
-#define _PAGE_KNL_ERRATUM_MASK (_PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
+#define _PAGE_KNL_ERRATUM_MASK (_PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
 #else
 #define _PAGE_KNL_ERRATUM_MASK 0
 #endif
@@ -112,9 +112,9 @@
 #define _PAGE_PROTNONE	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PROTNONE)
 
 #define _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC	(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER |\
-				 _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY)
+				 _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY_HW)
 #define _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC	(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW |		\
-				 _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY)
+				 _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY_HW)
 
 /*
  * Set of bits not changed in pte_modify.  The pte's
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@
  * pte_modify() does modify it.
  */
 #define _PAGE_CHG_MASK	(PTE_PFN_MASK | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT |		\
-			 _PAGE_SPECIAL | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY |	\
+			 _PAGE_SPECIAL | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY_HW |	\
 			 _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY)
 #define _HPAGE_CHG_MASK (_PAGE_CHG_MASK | _PAGE_PSE)
 
@@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ enum page_cache_mode {
 					 _PAGE_ACCESSED)
 
 #define __PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC						\
-	(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_GLOBAL)
+	(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_ACCESSED | \
+	 _PAGE_GLOBAL)
 #define __PAGE_KERNEL		(__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC | _PAGE_NX)
 
 #define __PAGE_KERNEL_RO		(__PAGE_KERNEL & ~_PAGE_RW)
@@ -187,7 +188,7 @@ enum page_cache_mode {
 #define _PAGE_ENC	(_AT(pteval_t, sme_me_mask))
 
 #define _KERNPG_TABLE	(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ACCESSED |	\
-			 _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ENC)
+			 _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_ENC)
 #define _PAGE_TABLE	(_KERNPG_TABLE | _PAGE_USER)
 
 #define __PAGE_KERNEL_ENC	(__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_ENC)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
index 11eda21eb697..e7665a4767b3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
  */
 
 #define PTR(x) (x << 3)
-#define PAGE_ATTR (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY)
+#define PAGE_ATTR (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY_HW)
 
 /*
  * control_page + KEXEC_CONTROL_CODE_MAX_SIZE
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 612fd17be635..1b07080bd797 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -5833,7 +5833,7 @@ static int init_rmode_identity_map(struct kvm *kvm)
 	/* Set up identity-mapping pagetable for EPT in real mode */
 	for (i = 0; i < PT32_ENT_PER_PAGE; i++) {
 		tmp = (i << 22) + (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER |
-			_PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PSE);
+			_PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_PSE);
 		r = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, identity_map_pfn,
 				&tmp, i * sizeof(tmp), sizeof(tmp));
 		if (r < 0)
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 12/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (10 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 11/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 13/27] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (15 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

A RO and dirty PTE exists in the following cases:

(a) A page is modified and then shared with a fork()'ed child;
(b) A R/O page that has been COW'ed;
(c) A SHSTK page.

The processor does not read the dirty bit for (a) and (b), but
checks the dirty bit for (c).  To prevent the use of non-SHSTK
memory as SHSTK, we introduce a spare bit of the 64-bit PTE as
_PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_SW and use that for (a) and (b).  This results
to the following possible PTE settings:

Modified PTE:             (R/W + DIRTY_HW)
Modified and shared PTE:  (R/O + DIRTY_SW)
R/O PTE COW'ed:           (R/O + DIRTY_SW)
SHSTK PTE:                (R/O + DIRTY_HW)
SHSTK PTE COW'ed:         (R/O + DIRTY_HW)
SHSTK PTE shared:         (R/O + DIRTY_SW)

Note that _PAGE_BIT_DRITY_SW is only used in R/O PTEs but
not R/W PTEs.

When this patch is applied, there are six free bits left in
the 64-bit PTE.  There is no more free bit in the 32-bit
PTE (except for PAE) and shadow stack is not implemented
for the 32-bit kernel.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h       | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h |  21 ++++-
 2 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 95c918ad84ed..3ee554d81480 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -119,9 +119,9 @@ extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;
  * The following only work if pte_present() is true.
  * Undefined behaviour if not..
  */
-static inline int pte_dirty(pte_t pte)
+static inline bool pte_dirty(pte_t pte)
 {
-	return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY;
+	return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS;
 }
 
 
@@ -143,9 +143,9 @@ static inline int pte_young(pte_t pte)
 	return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_ACCESSED;
 }
 
-static inline int pmd_dirty(pmd_t pmd)
+static inline bool pmd_dirty(pmd_t pmd)
 {
-	return pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY;
+	return pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS;
 }
 
 static inline int pmd_young(pmd_t pmd)
@@ -153,9 +153,9 @@ static inline int pmd_young(pmd_t pmd)
 	return pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_ACCESSED;
 }
 
-static inline int pud_dirty(pud_t pud)
+static inline bool pud_dirty(pud_t pud)
 {
-	return pud_flags(pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY;
+	return pud_flags(pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS;
 }
 
 static inline int pud_young(pud_t pud)
@@ -294,9 +294,23 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_flags(pte_t pte, pteval_t clear)
 	return native_make_pte(v & ~clear);
 }
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER)
+static inline pte_t pte_move_flags(pte_t pte, pteval_t from, pteval_t to)
+{
+	if (pte_flags(pte) & from)
+		pte = pte_set_flags(pte_clear_flags(pte, from), to);
+	return pte;
+}
+#else
+static inline pte_t pte_move_flags(pte_t pte, pteval_t from, pteval_t to)
+{
+	return pte;
+}
+#endif
+
 static inline pte_t pte_mkclean(pte_t pte)
 {
-	return pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+	return pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS);
 }
 
 static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte)
@@ -306,6 +320,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte)
 
 static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect(pte_t pte)
 {
+	pte = pte_move_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW, _PAGE_DIRTY_SW);
 	return pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_RW);
 }
 
@@ -316,9 +331,24 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkexec(pte_t pte)
 
 static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty(pte_t pte)
 {
+	pteval_t dirty = (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER) ||
+			   pte_write(pte)) ? _PAGE_DIRTY_HW:_PAGE_DIRTY_SW;
+	return pte_set_flags(pte, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHSTK
+static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty_shstk(pte_t pte)
+{
+	pte = pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_SW);
 	return pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
 }
 
+static inline bool pte_dirty_hw(pte_t pte)
+{
+	return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW;
+}
+#endif
+
 static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung(pte_t pte)
 {
 	return pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_ACCESSED);
@@ -326,6 +356,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung(pte_t pte)
 
 static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite(pte_t pte)
 {
+	pte = pte_move_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_SW, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW);
 	return pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_RW);
 }
 
@@ -373,6 +404,20 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_clear_flags(pmd_t pmd, pmdval_t clear)
 	return native_make_pmd(v & ~clear);
 }
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER)
+static inline pmd_t pmd_move_flags(pmd_t pmd, pmdval_t from, pmdval_t to)
+{
+	if (pmd_flags(pmd) & from)
+		pmd = pmd_set_flags(pmd_clear_flags(pmd, from), to);
+	return pmd;
+}
+#else
+static inline pmd_t pmd_move_flags(pmd_t pmd, pmdval_t from, pmdval_t to)
+{
+	return pmd;
+}
+#endif
+
 static inline pmd_t pmd_mkold(pmd_t pmd)
 {
 	return pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_ACCESSED);
@@ -380,19 +425,36 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkold(pmd_t pmd)
 
 static inline pmd_t pmd_mkclean(pmd_t pmd)
 {
-	return pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+	return pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS);
 }
 
 static inline pmd_t pmd_wrprotect(pmd_t pmd)
 {
+	pmd = pmd_move_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW, _PAGE_DIRTY_SW);
 	return pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_RW);
 }
 
 static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdirty(pmd_t pmd)
 {
+	pmdval_t dirty = (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER) ||
+			  (pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_RW)) ?
+			  _PAGE_DIRTY_HW:_PAGE_DIRTY_SW;
+	return pmd_set_flags(pmd, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHSTK
+static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdirty_shstk(pmd_t pmd)
+{
+	pmd = pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_SW);
 	return pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
 }
 
+static inline bool pmd_dirty_hw(pmd_t pmd)
+{
+	return  pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW;
+}
+#endif
+
 static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdevmap(pmd_t pmd)
 {
 	return pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DEVMAP);
@@ -410,6 +472,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkyoung(pmd_t pmd)
 
 static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd)
 {
+	pmd = pmd_move_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_SW, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW);
 	return pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_RW);
 }
 
@@ -427,6 +490,20 @@ static inline pud_t pud_clear_flags(pud_t pud, pudval_t clear)
 	return native_make_pud(v & ~clear);
 }
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER)
+static inline pud_t pud_move_flags(pud_t pud, pudval_t from, pudval_t to)
+{
+	if (pud_flags(pud) & from)
+		pud = pud_set_flags(pud_clear_flags(pud, from), to);
+	return pud;
+}
+#else
+static inline pud_t pud_move_flags(pud_t pud, pudval_t from, pudval_t to)
+{
+	return pud;
+}
+#endif
+
 static inline pud_t pud_mkold(pud_t pud)
 {
 	return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_ACCESSED);
@@ -434,17 +511,22 @@ static inline pud_t pud_mkold(pud_t pud)
 
 static inline pud_t pud_mkclean(pud_t pud)
 {
-	return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+	return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS);
 }
 
 static inline pud_t pud_wrprotect(pud_t pud)
 {
+	pud = pud_move_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW, _PAGE_DIRTY_SW);
 	return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_RW);
 }
 
 static inline pud_t pud_mkdirty(pud_t pud)
 {
-	return pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
+	pudval_t dirty = (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER) ||
+			  (pud_flags(pud) & _PAGE_RW)) ?
+			  _PAGE_DIRTY_HW:_PAGE_DIRTY_SW;
+
+	return pud_set_flags(pud, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
 }
 
 static inline pud_t pud_mkdevmap(pud_t pud)
@@ -464,6 +546,7 @@ static inline pud_t pud_mkyoung(pud_t pud)
 
 static inline pud_t pud_mkwrite(pud_t pud)
 {
+	pud = pud_move_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_SW, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW);
 	return pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_RW);
 }
 
@@ -595,19 +678,12 @@ static inline pte_t pte_modify(pte_t pte, pgprot_t newprot)
 	val &= _PAGE_CHG_MASK;
 	val |= check_pgprot(newprot) & ~_PAGE_CHG_MASK;
 	val = flip_protnone_guard(oldval, val, PTE_PFN_MASK);
+	if ((pte_write(pte) && !(pgprot_val(newprot) & _PAGE_RW)))
+		return pte_move_flags(__pte(val), _PAGE_DIRTY_HW,
+				      _PAGE_DIRTY_SW);
 	return __pte(val);
 }
 
-static inline pmd_t pmd_modify(pmd_t pmd, pgprot_t newprot)
-{
-	pmdval_t val = pmd_val(pmd), oldval = val;
-
-	val &= _HPAGE_CHG_MASK;
-	val |= check_pgprot(newprot) & ~_HPAGE_CHG_MASK;
-	val = flip_protnone_guard(oldval, val, PHYSICAL_PMD_PAGE_MASK);
-	return __pmd(val);
-}
-
 /* mprotect needs to preserve PAT bits when updating vm_page_prot */
 #define pgprot_modify pgprot_modify
 static inline pgprot_t pgprot_modify(pgprot_t oldprot, pgprot_t newprot)
@@ -1159,6 +1235,19 @@ static inline int pmd_write(pmd_t pmd)
 	return pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_RW;
 }
 
+static inline pmd_t pmd_modify(pmd_t pmd, pgprot_t newprot)
+{
+	pmdval_t val = pmd_val(pmd), oldval = val;
+
+	val &= _HPAGE_CHG_MASK;
+	val |= check_pgprot(newprot) & ~_HPAGE_CHG_MASK;
+	val = flip_protnone_guard(oldval, val, PHYSICAL_PMD_PAGE_MASK);
+	if ((pmd_write(pmd) && !(pgprot_val(newprot) & _PAGE_RW)))
+		return pmd_move_flags(__pmd(val), _PAGE_DIRTY_HW,
+				      _PAGE_DIRTY_SW);
+	return __pmd(val);
+}
+
 #define __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_HUGE_GET_AND_CLEAR
 static inline pmd_t pmdp_huge_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
 				       pmd_t *pmdp)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
index 0657a22d5216..bd17e38d6a36 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW2	10	/* " */
 #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3	11	/* " */
 #define _PAGE_BIT_PAT_LARGE	12	/* On 2MB or 1GB pages */
+#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW5	57	/* available for programmer */
 #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4	58	/* available for programmer */
 #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT0	59	/* Protection Keys, bit 1/4 */
 #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT1	60	/* Protection Keys, bit 2/4 */
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@
 #define _PAGE_BIT_CPA_TEST	_PAGE_BIT_SOFTW1
 #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFT_DIRTY	_PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3 /* software dirty tracking */
 #define _PAGE_BIT_DEVMAP	_PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4
+#define _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_SW	_PAGE_BIT_SOFTW5 /* was written to */
 
 /* If _PAGE_BIT_PRESENT is clear, we use these: */
 /* - if the user mapped it with PROT_NONE; pte_present gives true */
@@ -109,6 +111,21 @@
 #define _PAGE_DEVMAP	(_AT(pteval_t, 0))
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * _PAGE_DIRTY_HW: set by the processor when a page is written.
+ * _PAGE_DIRTY_SW: a spare bit tracking a written, but now R/O page.
+ *   [R/W + _PAGE_DIRTY_HW] <-> [R/O + _PAGE_DIRTY_SW].
+ * _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY: a spare bit used to track written pages since a time point
+ * set by the system admin; see Documentation/admin-guide/mm/soft-dirty.rst.
+ */
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER)
+#define _PAGE_DIRTY_SW	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_SW)
+#else
+#define _PAGE_DIRTY_SW	(_AT(pteval_t, 0))
+#endif
+
+#define _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS (_PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_DIRTY_SW)
+
 #define _PAGE_PROTNONE	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PROTNONE)
 
 #define _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC	(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER |\
@@ -122,9 +139,9 @@
  * instance, and is *not* included in this mask since
  * pte_modify() does modify it.
  */
-#define _PAGE_CHG_MASK	(PTE_PFN_MASK | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT |		\
+#define _PAGE_CHG_MASK	(PTE_PFN_MASK | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT |			\
 			 _PAGE_SPECIAL | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY_HW |	\
-			 _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY)
+			 _PAGE_DIRTY_SW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY)
 #define _HPAGE_CHG_MASK (_PAGE_CHG_MASK | _PAGE_PSE)
 
 /*
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 13/27] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (11 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 12/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 14/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (14 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS in split_2MB_gtt_entry().

In order to support Control Flow Enforcement (CET), _PAGE_DIRTY
is now _PAGE_DIRTY_HW or _PAGE_DIRTY_SW.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c
index 00aad8164dec..2d6ba1462dd8 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c
@@ -1170,7 +1170,7 @@ static int split_2MB_gtt_entry(struct intel_vgpu *vgpu,
 	}
 
 	/* Clear dirty field. */
-	se->val64 &= ~_PAGE_DIRTY;
+	se->val64 &= ~_PAGE_DIRTY_BITS;
 
 	ops->clear_pse(se);
 	ops->clear_ips(se);
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 14/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (12 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 13/27] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 15/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (13 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

When Shadow Stack is enabled, the [R/O + PAGE_DIRTY_HW] setting is
reserved only for the Shadow Stack.  For non-Shadow Stack R/O PTEs,
we use [R/O + PAGE_DIRTY_SW].

When a PTE goes from [R/W + PAGE_DIRTY_HW] to [R/O + PAGE_DIRTY_SW],
it could become a transient Shadow Stack PTE in two cases.

The first case is that some processors can start a write but end up
seeing a read-only PTE by the time they get to the Dirty bit,
creating a transient Shadow Stack PTE.  However, this will not occur
on processors supporting Shadow Stack therefore we don't need a TLB
flush here.

The second case is that when the software, without atomic, tests &
replaces PAGE_DIRTY_HW with PAGE_DIRTY_SW, a transient Shadow Stack
PTE can exist.  This is prevented with cmpxchg.

Dave Hansen, Jann Horn, Andy Lutomirski, and Peter Zijlstra provided
many insights to the issue.  Jann Horn provided the cmpxchg solution.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 3ee554d81480..b6e0ee5c5503 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -1203,7 +1203,36 @@ static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear_full(struct mm_struct *mm,
 static inline void ptep_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				      unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+	pte_t new_pte, pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
+
+	/*
+	 * Some processors can start a write, but end up
+	 * seeing a read-only PTE by the time they get
+	 * to the Dirty bit.  In this case, they will
+	 * set the Dirty bit, leaving a read-only, Dirty
+	 * PTE which looks like a Shadow Stack PTE.
+	 *
+	 * However, this behavior has been improved and
+	 * will not occur on processors supporting
+	 * Shadow Stacks.  Without this guarantee, a
+	 * transition to a non-present PTE and flush the
+	 * TLB would be needed.
+	 *
+	 * When changing a writable PTE to read-only and
+	 * if the PTE has _PAGE_DIRTY_HW set, we move
+	 * that bit to _PAGE_DIRTY_SW so that the PTE is
+	 * not a valid Shadow Stack PTE.
+	 */
+	do {
+		new_pte = pte_wrprotect(pte);
+		new_pte.pte |= (new_pte.pte & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW) >>
+				_PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HW << _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_SW;
+		new_pte.pte &= ~_PAGE_DIRTY_HW;
+	} while (!try_cmpxchg(ptep, &pte, new_pte));
+#else
 	clear_bit(_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)&ptep->pte);
+#endif
 }
 
 #define flush_tlb_fix_spurious_fault(vma, address) do { } while (0)
@@ -1266,7 +1295,36 @@ static inline pud_t pudp_huge_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm,
 static inline void pmdp_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				      unsigned long addr, pmd_t *pmdp)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+	pmd_t new_pmd, pmd = READ_ONCE(*pmdp);
+
+	/*
+	 * Some processors can start a write, but end up
+	 * seeing a read-only PMD by the time they get
+	 * to the Dirty bit.  In this case, they will
+	 * set the Dirty bit, leaving a read-only, Dirty
+	 * PMD which looks like a Shadow Stack PMD.
+	 *
+	 * However, this behavior has been improved and
+	 * will not occur on processors supporting
+	 * Shadow Stacks.  Without this guarantee, a
+	 * transition to a non-present PMD and flush the
+	 * TLB would be needed.
+	 *
+	 * When changing a writable PMD to read-only and
+	 * if the PMD has _PAGE_DIRTY_HW set, we move
+	 * that bit to _PAGE_DIRTY_SW so that the PMD is
+	 * not a valid Shadow Stack PMD.
+	 */
+	do {
+		new_pmd = pmd_wrprotect(pmd);
+		new_pmd.pmd |= (new_pmd.pmd & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW) >>
+				_PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_HW << _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_SW;
+		new_pmd.pmd &= ~_PAGE_DIRTY_HW;
+	} while (!try_cmpxchg(pmdp, &pmd, new_pmd));
+#else
 	clear_bit(_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)pmdp);
+#endif
 }
 
 #define pud_write pud_write
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 15/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (13 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 14/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 16/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (12 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

If a page fault is triggered by a shadow stack access (e.g.
call/ret) or shadow stack management instructions (e.g.
wrussq), then bit[6] of the page fault error code is set.

In access_error(), we check if a shadow stack page fault
is within a shadow stack memory area.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c          | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
index 5196050ff3d5..58ea2f5722e9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ enum {
  *   bit 3 ==				1: use of reserved bit detected
  *   bit 4 ==				1: fault was an instruction fetch
  *   bit 5 ==				1: protection keys block access
+ *   bit 6 ==				1: shadow stack access fault
  */
 enum x86_pf_error_code {
 	X86_PF_PROT	=		1 << 0,
@@ -165,5 +166,6 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code {
 	X86_PF_RSVD	=		1 << 3,
 	X86_PF_INSTR	=		1 << 4,
 	X86_PF_PK	=		1 << 5,
+	X86_PF_SHSTK	=		1 << 6,
 };
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAPS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 47bebfe6efa7..7c3877a982f4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -1162,6 +1162,17 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 				       (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR), foreign))
 		return 1;
 
+	/*
+	 * Verify X86_PF_SHSTK is within a shadow stack VMA.
+	 * It is always an error if there is a shadow stack
+	 * fault outside a shadow stack VMA.
+	 */
+	if (error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK) {
+		if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK))
+			return 1;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) {
 		/* write, present and write, not present: */
 		if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)))
@@ -1300,6 +1311,13 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
 
 	perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, address);
 
+	/*
+	 * If the fault is caused by a shadow stack access,
+	 * i.e. CALL/RET/SAVEPREVSSP/RSTORSSP, then set
+	 * FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect copy-on-write.
+	 */
+	if (error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK)
+		flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
 	if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE)
 		flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
 	if (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR)
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 16/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (14 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 15/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 17/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (11 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

When a task does fork(), its shadow stack must be duplicated for
the child.  However, the child may not actually use all pages of
of the copied shadow stack.  This patch implements a flow that
is similar to copy-on-write of an anonymous page, but for shadow
stack memory.  A shadow stack PTE needs to be RO and dirty.  We
use this dirty bit requirement to effect the copying of shadow
stack pages.

In copy_one_pte(), we clear the dirty bit from the shadow stack
PTE.  On the next shadow stack access to the PTE, a page fault
occurs.  At that time, we then copy/re-use the page and fix the
PTE.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c         | 15 +++++++++++++++
 include/asm-generic/pgtable.h |  8 ++++++++
 mm/memory.c                   |  7 ++++++-
 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index 089e78c4effd..e9ee4c86a477 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -881,3 +881,18 @@ int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 #endif	/* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+inline pte_t pte_set_vma_features(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK)
+		return pte_mkdirty_shstk(pte);
+	else
+		return pte;
+}
+
+inline bool arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags)
+{
+	return (vm_flags & VM_SHSTK);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER */
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
index 88ebc6102c7c..015b769377a3 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
@@ -1127,4 +1127,12 @@ static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)
 #endif
 #endif
 
+#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHSTK
+#define pte_set_vma_features(pte, vma) pte
+#define arch_copy_pte_mapping(vma_flags) false
+#else
+pte_t pte_set_vma_features(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+bool arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags);
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _ASM_GENERIC_PGTABLE_H */
diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
index c467102a5cbc..1fb676ec7da2 100644
--- a/mm/memory.c
+++ b/mm/memory.c
@@ -1022,7 +1022,8 @@ copy_one_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, struct mm_struct *src_mm,
 	 * If it's a COW mapping, write protect it both
 	 * in the parent and the child
 	 */
-	if (is_cow_mapping(vm_flags) && pte_write(pte)) {
+	if ((is_cow_mapping(vm_flags) && pte_write(pte)) ||
+	    arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags)) {
 		ptep_set_wrprotect(src_mm, addr, src_pte);
 		pte = pte_wrprotect(pte);
 	}
@@ -2462,6 +2463,7 @@ static inline void wp_page_reuse(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	flush_cache_page(vma, vmf->address, pte_pfn(vmf->orig_pte));
 	entry = pte_mkyoung(vmf->orig_pte);
 	entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma);
+	entry = pte_set_vma_features(entry, vma);
 	if (ptep_set_access_flags(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte, entry, 1))
 		update_mmu_cache(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte);
 	pte_unmap_unlock(vmf->pte, vmf->ptl);
@@ -2535,6 +2537,7 @@ static vm_fault_t wp_page_copy(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 		flush_cache_page(vma, vmf->address, pte_pfn(vmf->orig_pte));
 		entry = mk_pte(new_page, vma->vm_page_prot);
 		entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma);
+		entry = pte_set_vma_features(entry, vma);
 		/*
 		 * Clear the pte entry and flush it first, before updating the
 		 * pte with the new entry. This will avoid a race condition
@@ -3045,6 +3048,7 @@ vm_fault_t do_swap_page(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	pte = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot);
 	if ((vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) && reuse_swap_page(page, NULL)) {
 		pte = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(pte), vma);
+		pte = pte_set_vma_features(pte, vma);
 		vmf->flags &= ~FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
 		ret |= VM_FAULT_WRITE;
 		exclusive = RMAP_EXCLUSIVE;
@@ -3187,6 +3191,7 @@ static vm_fault_t do_anonymous_page(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	entry = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot);
 	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
 		entry = pte_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry));
+	entry = pte_set_vma_features(entry, vma);
 
 	vmf->pte = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, vmf->pmd, vmf->address,
 			&vmf->ptl);
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 17/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB shadow stack page fault
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (15 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 16/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 18/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (10 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

This patch implements THP shadow stack memory copying in the same
way as the previous patch for regular PTE.

In copy_huge_pmd(), we clear the dirty bit from the PMD.  On the
next shadow stack access to the PMD, a page fault occurs.  At
that time, the page is copied/re-used and the PMD is fixed.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c         | 8 ++++++++
 include/asm-generic/pgtable.h | 2 ++
 mm/huge_memory.c              | 4 ++++
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index e9ee4c86a477..864954bda7fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -891,6 +891,14 @@ inline pte_t pte_set_vma_features(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 		return pte;
 }
 
+inline pmd_t pmd_set_vma_features(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK)
+		return pmd_mkdirty_shstk(pmd);
+	else
+		return pmd;
+}
+
 inline bool arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags)
 {
 	return (vm_flags & VM_SHSTK);
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
index 015b769377a3..7512e4dfd642 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
@@ -1129,9 +1129,11 @@ static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHSTK
 #define pte_set_vma_features(pte, vma) pte
+#define pmd_set_vma_features(pmd, vma) pmd
 #define arch_copy_pte_mapping(vma_flags) false
 #else
 pte_t pte_set_vma_features(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+pmd_t pmd_set_vma_features(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
 bool arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags);
 #endif
 
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index 00704060b7f7..6e03e26c1cec 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -597,6 +597,7 @@ static vm_fault_t __do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page(struct vm_fault *vmf,
 
 		entry = mk_huge_pmd(page, vma->vm_page_prot);
 		entry = maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_mkdirty(entry), vma);
+		entry = pmd_set_vma_features(entry, vma);
 		page_add_new_anon_rmap(page, vma, haddr, true);
 		mem_cgroup_commit_charge(page, memcg, false, true);
 		lru_cache_add_active_or_unevictable(page, vma);
@@ -1194,6 +1195,7 @@ static vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_wp_page_fallback(struct vm_fault *vmf,
 		pte_t entry;
 		entry = mk_pte(pages[i], vma->vm_page_prot);
 		entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma);
+		entry = pte_set_vma_features(entry, vma);
 		memcg = (void *)page_private(pages[i]);
 		set_page_private(pages[i], 0);
 		page_add_new_anon_rmap(pages[i], vmf->vma, haddr, false);
@@ -1278,6 +1280,7 @@ vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_wp_page(struct vm_fault *vmf, pmd_t orig_pmd)
 		pmd_t entry;
 		entry = pmd_mkyoung(orig_pmd);
 		entry = maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_mkdirty(entry), vma);
+		entry = pmd_set_vma_features(entry, vma);
 		if (pmdp_set_access_flags(vma, haddr, vmf->pmd, entry,  1))
 			update_mmu_cache_pmd(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pmd);
 		ret |= VM_FAULT_WRITE;
@@ -1349,6 +1352,7 @@ vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_wp_page(struct vm_fault *vmf, pmd_t orig_pmd)
 		pmd_t entry;
 		entry = mk_huge_pmd(new_page, vma->vm_page_prot);
 		entry = maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_mkdirty(entry), vma);
+		entry = pmd_set_vma_features(entry, vma);
 		pmdp_huge_clear_flush_notify(vma, haddr, vmf->pmd);
 		page_add_new_anon_rmap(new_page, vma, haddr, true);
 		mem_cgroup_commit_charge(new_page, memcg, false, true);
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 18/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (16 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 17/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 19/27] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (9 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

can_follow_write_pte/pmd look for the (RO & DIRTY) PTE/PMD to
verify an exclusive RO page still exists after a broken COW.

A shadow stack PTE is RO & PAGE_DIRTY_SW when it is shared,
otherwise RO & PAGE_DIRTY_HW.

Introduce pte_exclusive() and pmd_exclusive() to also verify a
shadow stack PTE is exclusive.

Also rename can_follow_write_pte/pmd() to can_follow_write() to
make their meaning clear; i.e. "Can we write to the page?", not
"Is the PTE writable?"

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c         | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 include/asm-generic/pgtable.h |  4 ++++
 mm/gup.c                      |  8 +++++---
 mm/huge_memory.c              |  8 +++++---
 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index 864954bda7fe..80876b2d03b7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -903,4 +903,22 @@ inline bool arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags)
 {
 	return (vm_flags & VM_SHSTK);
 }
+
+inline bool pte_exclusive(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK)
+		return pte_dirty_hw(pte);
+	else
+		return pte_dirty(pte);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
+inline bool pmd_exclusive(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK)
+		return pmd_dirty_hw(pmd);
+	else
+		return pmd_dirty(pmd);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER */
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
index 7512e4dfd642..09881698a566 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
@@ -1131,10 +1131,14 @@ static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)
 #define pte_set_vma_features(pte, vma) pte
 #define pmd_set_vma_features(pmd, vma) pmd
 #define arch_copy_pte_mapping(vma_flags) false
+#define pte_exclusive(pte, vma) pte_dirty(pte)
+#define pmd_exclusive(pmd, vma) pmd_dirty(pmd)
 #else
 pte_t pte_set_vma_features(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
 pmd_t pmd_set_vma_features(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
 bool arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags);
+bool pte_exclusive(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+bool pmd_exclusive(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
 #endif
 
 #endif /* _ASM_GENERIC_PGTABLE_H */
diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c
index 1abc8b4afff6..03cb2e331f80 100644
--- a/mm/gup.c
+++ b/mm/gup.c
@@ -64,10 +64,12 @@ static int follow_pfn_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
  * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pte's, but only
  * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
  */
-static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags)
+static inline bool can_follow_write(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags,
+				    struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	return pte_write(pte) ||
-		((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte));
+		((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) &&
+		 pte_exclusive(pte, vma));
 }
 
 static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -105,7 +107,7 @@ static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	}
 	if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pte_protnone(pte))
 		goto no_page;
-	if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags)) {
+	if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write(pte, flags, vma)) {
 		pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
 		return NULL;
 	}
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index 6e03e26c1cec..3b3e1026fb5b 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -1387,10 +1387,12 @@ vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_wp_page(struct vm_fault *vmf, pmd_t orig_pmd)
  * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pmd's, but only
  * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
  */
-static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags)
+static inline bool can_follow_write(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags,
+				    struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	return pmd_write(pmd) ||
-	       ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pmd_dirty(pmd));
+	       ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) &&
+		pmd_exclusive(pmd, vma));
 }
 
 struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -1403,7 +1405,7 @@ struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 
 	assert_spin_locked(pmd_lockptr(mm, pmd));
 
-	if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd(*pmd, flags))
+	if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write(*pmd, flags, vma))
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Avoid dumping huge zero page */
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 19/27] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked()
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (17 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 18/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (8 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

There are a few places that need do_mmap() with mm->mmap_sem held.
Create an in-line function for that.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 include/linux/mm.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index f658923e76ad..de55f367852e 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2318,6 +2318,24 @@ static inline void mm_populate(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
 static inline void mm_populate(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len) {}
 #endif
 
+static inline unsigned long do_mmap_locked(unsigned long addr,
+	unsigned long len, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
+	vm_flags_t vm_flags)
+{
+	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	unsigned long populate;
+
+	down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	addr = do_mmap(NULL, addr, len, prot, flags, vm_flags, 0,
+		       &populate, NULL);
+	up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+
+	if (populate)
+		mm_populate(addr, populate);
+
+	return addr;
+}
+
 /* These take the mm semaphore themselves */
 extern int __must_check vm_brk(unsigned long, unsigned long);
 extern int __must_check vm_brk_flags(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (18 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 19/27] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 21/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (7 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

This patch adds basic shadow stack enabling/disabling routines.
A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHSTK
flag set and read-only protection.  The shadow stack is
allocated to a fixed size of RLIMIT_STACK.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h               |  34 +++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h |   8 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h         |  14 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h         |   5 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile                 |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c                    | 109 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c             |  25 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c                |   2 +
 8 files changed, 198 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c952a2ec65fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_CET_H
+#define _ASM_X86_CET_H
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+struct task_struct;
+/*
+ * Per-thread CET status
+ */
+struct cet_status {
+	unsigned long	shstk_base;
+	unsigned long	shstk_size;
+	unsigned int	shstk_enabled:1;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
+int cet_setup_shstk(void);
+void cet_disable_shstk(void);
+void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
+#else
+static inline int cet_setup_shstk(void) { return -EINVAL; }
+static inline void cet_disable_shstk(void) {}
+static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {}
+#endif
+
+#define cpu_x86_cet_enabled() \
+	(cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || \
+	 cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_CET_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 33833d1909af..3624a11e5ba6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -56,6 +56,12 @@
 # define DISABLE_PTI		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+#define DISABLE_SHSTK	0
+#else
+#define DISABLE_SHSTK	(1<<(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Make sure to add features to the correct mask
  */
@@ -75,7 +81,7 @@
 #define DISABLED_MASK13	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK14	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK15	0
-#define DISABLED_MASK16	(DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP)
+#define DISABLED_MASK16	(DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP|DISABLE_SHSTK)
 #define DISABLED_MASK17	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK18	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 4731f0cf97c5..e073801a44e0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -777,4 +777,18 @@
 #define MSR_VM_IGNNE                    0xc0010115
 #define MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA                 0xc0010117
 
+/* Control-flow Enforcement Technology MSRs */
+#define MSR_IA32_U_CET		0x6a0 /* user mode cet setting */
+#define MSR_IA32_S_CET		0x6a2 /* kernel mode cet setting */
+#define MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP	0x6a4 /* kernel shstk pointer */
+#define MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP	0x6a7 /* user shstk pointer */
+#define MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB	0x6a8 /* exception shstk table */
+
+/* MSR_IA32_U_CET and MSR_IA32_S_CET bits */
+#define MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN		0x0000000000000001ULL
+#define MSR_IA32_CET_WRSS_EN		0x0000000000000002ULL
+#define MSR_IA32_CET_ENDBR_EN		0x0000000000000004ULL
+#define MSR_IA32_CET_LEG_IW_EN		0x0000000000000008ULL
+#define MSR_IA32_CET_NO_TRACK_EN	0x0000000000000010ULL
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index d53c54b842da..63918cecf367 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ struct vm86;
 #include <asm/special_insns.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/types.h>
 #include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
 
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/cache.h>
@@ -505,6 +506,10 @@ struct thread_struct {
 	unsigned int		sig_on_uaccess_err:1;
 	unsigned int		uaccess_err:1;	/* uaccess failed */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
+	struct cet_status	cet;
+#endif
+
 	/* Floating point and extended processor state */
 	struct fpu		fpu;
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 8824d01c0c35..fbb2d91fb756 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC)		+= unwind_orc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER)	+= unwind_frame.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS)		+= unwind_guess.o
 
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET)		+= cet.o
+
 ###
 # 64 bit specific files
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ec256ae27a31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * cet.c - Control Flow Enforcement (CET)
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2018, Intel Corporation.
+ * Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/user.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
+#include <asm/compat.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
+
+static int set_shstk_ptr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	u64 r;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		return -1;
+
+	if ((addr >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) || (!IS_ALIGNED(addr, 4)))
+		return -1;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r | MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static unsigned long get_shstk_addr(void)
+{
+	unsigned long ptr;
+
+	if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ptr);
+	return ptr;
+}
+
+int cet_setup_shstk(void)
+{
+	unsigned long addr, size;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	size = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK);
+	addr = do_mmap_locked(0, size, PROT_READ,
+			      MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, VM_SHSTK);
+
+	/*
+	 * Return actual error from do_mmap().
+	 */
+	if (addr >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
+		return addr;
+
+	set_shstk_ptr(addr + size - sizeof(u64));
+	current->thread.cet.shstk_base = addr;
+	current->thread.cet.shstk_size = size;
+	current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void cet_disable_shstk(void)
+{
+	u64 r;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		return;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
+	r &= ~(MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0);
+	current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0;
+}
+
+void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
+	    !tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	if (tsk == current)
+		cet_disable_shstk();
+
+	/*
+	 * Free only when tsk is current or shares mm
+	 * with current but has its own shstk.
+	 */
+	if (tsk->mm && (tsk->mm == current->mm) &&
+	    (tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base)) {
+		vm_munmap(tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base,
+			  tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size);
+		tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base = 0;
+		tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size = 0;
+	}
+
+	tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 44c4ef3d989b..c3960326b67f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
 #include <asm/microcode_intel.h>
 #include <asm/intel-family.h>
 #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
 #include <asm/uv/uv.h>
@@ -411,6 +412,29 @@ static __init int setup_disable_pku(char *arg)
 __setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku);
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 
+static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	if (cpu_x86_cet_enabled())
+		cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_CET);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+static __init int setup_disable_shstk(char *s)
+{
+	/* require an exact match without trailing characters */
+	if (s[0] != '\0')
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		return 1;
+
+	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
+	pr_info("x86: 'no_cet_shstk' specified, disabling Shadow Stack\n");
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("no_cet_shstk", setup_disable_shstk);
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always
  * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization
@@ -1376,6 +1400,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	x86_init_rdrand(c);
 	x86_init_cache_qos(c);
 	setup_pku(c);
+	setup_cet(c);
 
 	/*
 	 * Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, need do it
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index c93fcfdf1673..4a776da4c28c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include <asm/desc.h>
 #include <asm/prctl.h>
 #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
 
 /*
  * per-CPU TSS segments. Threads are completely 'soft' on Linux,
@@ -134,6 +135,7 @@ void flush_thread(void)
 	flush_ptrace_hw_breakpoint(tsk);
 	memset(tsk->thread.tls_array, 0, sizeof(tsk->thread.tls_array));
 
+	cet_disable_shstk();
 	fpu__clear(&tsk->thread.fpu);
 }
 
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 21/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (19 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-11-06 18:43   ` Dave Hansen
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 22/27] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (6 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

WRUSS is a new kernel-mode instruction but writes directly to user
shadow stack memory.  This is used to construct a return address on
the shadow stack for the signal handler.

This instruction can fault if the user shadow stack is invalid shadow
stack memory.  In that case, the kernel does a fixup.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c                  |  9 ++++++++
 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
index 317fc59b512c..37f16269747d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
@@ -237,6 +237,38 @@ static inline void clwb(volatile void *__p)
 		: [pax] "a" (p));
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
+#if defined(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) || defined(CONFIG_X86_X32)
+static inline int write_user_shstk_32(unsigned long addr, unsigned int val)
+{
+	asm_volatile_goto("1: wrussd %1, (%0)\n"
+			  _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fail])
+			  :: "r" (addr), "r" (val)
+			  :: fail);
+	return 0;
+fail:
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+#else
+static inline int write_user_shstk_32(unsigned long addr, unsigned int val)
+{
+	WARN_ONCE(1, "%s used but not supported.\n", __func__);
+	return -EFAULT;
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline int write_user_shstk_64(unsigned long addr, unsigned long val)
+{
+	asm_volatile_goto("1: wrussq %1, (%0)\n"
+			  _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fail])
+			  :: "r" (addr), "r" (val)
+			  :: fail);
+	return 0;
+fail:
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET */
+
 #define nop() asm volatile ("nop")
 
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 7c3877a982f4..b91fc008f33a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -1305,6 +1305,15 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
 		error_code |= X86_PF_USER;
 		flags |= FAULT_FLAG_USER;
 	} else {
+		/*
+		 * WRUSS is a kernel instruction and but writes
+		 * to user shadow stack.  When a fault occurs,
+		 * both X86_PF_USER and X86_PF_SHSTK are set.
+		 * Clear X86_PF_USER here.
+		 */
+		if ((error_code & (X86_PF_USER | X86_PF_SHSTK)) ==
+		    (X86_PF_USER | X86_PF_SHSTK))
+			error_code &= ~X86_PF_USER;
 		if (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF)
 			local_irq_enable();
 	}
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 22/27] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (20 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 21/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 23/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (5 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

When setting up a signal, the kernel creates a shadow stack
restore token at the current SHSTK address and then stores the
token's address in the signal frame, right after the FPU state.
Before restoring a signal, the kernel verifies and then uses the
restore token to set the SHSTK pointer.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c            |  13 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h             |   5 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/sighandling.h     |   5 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h |  15 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c                  | 126 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c               |  97 +++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 261 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
index 86b1341cba9a..cea28d2a946e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include <asm/sigframe.h>
 #include <asm/sighandling.h>
 #include <asm/smap.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
 
 /*
  * Do a signal return; undo the signal stack.
@@ -108,6 +109,9 @@ static int ia32_restore_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs,
 
 	err |= fpu__restore_sig(buf, 1);
 
+	if (!err)
+		err = restore_sigcontext_ext(buf);
+
 	force_iret();
 
 	return err;
@@ -234,6 +238,10 @@ static void __user *get_sigframe(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs,
 	if (fpu->initialized) {
 		unsigned long fx_aligned, math_size;
 
+		/* sigcontext extension */
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+			sp -= (sizeof(struct sc_ext) + 8);
+
 		sp = fpu__alloc_mathframe(sp, 1, &fx_aligned, &math_size);
 		*fpstate = (struct _fpstate_32 __user *) sp;
 		if (copy_fpstate_to_sigframe(*fpstate, (void __user *)fx_aligned,
@@ -277,6 +285,8 @@ int ia32_setup_frame(int sig, struct ksignal *ksig,
 
 	if (ia32_setup_sigcontext(&frame->sc, fpstate, regs, set->sig[0]))
 		return -EFAULT;
+	if (setup_sigcontext_ext(ksig, fpstate))
+		return -EFAULT;
 
 	if (_COMPAT_NSIG_WORDS > 1) {
 		if (__copy_to_user(frame->extramask, &set->sig[1],
@@ -384,6 +394,9 @@ int ia32_setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct ksignal *ksig,
 				     regs, set->sig[0]);
 	err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
 
+	if (!err)
+		err = setup_sigcontext_ext(ksig, fpstate);
+
 	if (err)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
index c952a2ec65fe..3af544aed800 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -19,10 +19,15 @@ struct cet_status {
 int cet_setup_shstk(void);
 void cet_disable_shstk(void);
 void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
+int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp);
+int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor, unsigned long *new_ssp);
 #else
 static inline int cet_setup_shstk(void) { return -EINVAL; }
 static inline void cet_disable_shstk(void) {}
 static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {}
+static inline int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp) { return -EINVAL; }
+static inline int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor,
+				   unsigned long *new_ssp) { return -EINVAL; }
 #endif
 
 #define cpu_x86_cet_enabled() \
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sighandling.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sighandling.h
index bd26834724e5..23014b4082de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sighandling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sighandling.h
@@ -17,4 +17,9 @@ void signal_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, void __user *frame, char *where);
 int setup_sigcontext(struct sigcontext __user *sc, void __user *fpstate,
 		     struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long mask);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+int setup_sigcontext_ext(struct ksignal *ksig, void __user *fpu);
+int restore_sigcontext_ext(void __user *fpu);
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_SIGHANDLING_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
index 844d60eb1882..e3b08d1c0d3b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
@@ -196,6 +196,21 @@ struct _xstate {
 	/* New processor state extensions go here: */
 };
 
+/*
+ * Sigcontext extension (struct sc_ext) is located after
+ * sigcontext->fpstate.  Because currently only the shadow
+ * stack pointer is saved there and the shadow stack depends
+ * on XSAVES, we can find sc_ext from sigcontext->fpstate.
+ *
+ * The 64-bit fpstate has a size of fpu_user_xstate_size, plus
+ * FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE when XSAVE* is used.  The struct sc_ext
+ * is located at the end of sigcontext->fpstate, aligned to 8.
+ */
+struct sc_ext {
+	unsigned long total_size;
+	unsigned long ssp;
+};
+
 /*
  * The 32-bit signal frame:
  */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
index ec256ae27a31..2000e5e87f8f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <asm/fpu/types.h>
 #include <asm/compat.h>
 #include <asm/cet.h>
+#include <asm/special_insns.h>
 
 static int set_shstk_ptr(unsigned long addr)
 {
@@ -46,6 +47,80 @@ static unsigned long get_shstk_addr(void)
 	return ptr;
 }
 
+#define TOKEN_MODE_MASK	3UL
+#define TOKEN_MODE_64	1UL
+#define IS_TOKEN_64(token) ((token & TOKEN_MODE_MASK) == TOKEN_MODE_64)
+#define IS_TOKEN_32(token) ((token & TOKEN_MODE_MASK) == 0)
+
+/*
+ * Verify the restore token at the address of 'ssp' is
+ * valid and then set shadow stack pointer according to the
+ * token.
+ */
+static int verify_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ssp,
+			      unsigned long *new_ssp)
+{
+	unsigned long token;
+
+	*new_ssp = 0;
+
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 8))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (get_user(token, (unsigned long __user *)ssp))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/* Is 64-bit mode flag correct? */
+	if (ia32 && !IS_TOKEN_32(token))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	else if (!IS_TOKEN_64(token))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	token &= ~TOKEN_MODE_MASK;
+
+	/*
+	 * Restore address properly aligned?
+	 */
+	if ((!ia32 && !IS_ALIGNED(token, 8)) || !IS_ALIGNED(token, 4))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Token was placed properly?
+	 */
+	if ((ALIGN_DOWN(token, 8) - 8) != ssp)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*new_ssp = token;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a restore token on the shadow stack.
+ * A token is always 8-byte and aligned to 8.
+ */
+static int create_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ssp,
+			      unsigned long *new_ssp)
+{
+	unsigned long addr;
+
+	*new_ssp = 0;
+
+	if ((!ia32 && !IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 8)) || !IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 4))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	addr = ALIGN_DOWN(ssp, 8) - 8;
+
+	/* Is the token for 64-bit? */
+	if (!ia32)
+		ssp |= TOKEN_MODE_64;
+
+	if (write_user_shstk_64(addr, ssp))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	*new_ssp = addr;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int cet_setup_shstk(void)
 {
 	unsigned long addr, size;
@@ -107,3 +182,54 @@ void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk)
 
 	tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0;
 }
+
+int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp)
+{
+	unsigned long new_ssp;
+	int err;
+
+	if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	err = verify_rstor_token(in_ia32_syscall(), ssp, &new_ssp);
+
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	return set_shstk_ptr(new_ssp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Setup the shadow stack for the signal handler: first,
+ * create a restore token to keep track of the current ssp,
+ * and then the return address of the signal handler.
+ */
+int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor_addr,
+		     unsigned long *new_ssp)
+{
+	unsigned long ssp;
+	int err;
+
+	if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	ssp = get_shstk_addr();
+	err = create_rstor_token(ia32, ssp, new_ssp);
+
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (ia32) {
+		ssp = *new_ssp - sizeof(u32);
+		err = write_user_shstk_32(ssp, (unsigned int)rstor_addr);
+	} else {
+		ssp = *new_ssp - sizeof(u64);
+		err = write_user_shstk_64(ssp, rstor_addr);
+	}
+
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	set_shstk_ptr(ssp);
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
index 92a3b312a53c..a0cee6ba99a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
 
 #include <asm/sigframe.h>
 #include <asm/signal.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
 
 #define COPY(x)			do {			\
 	get_user_ex(regs->x, &sc->x);			\
@@ -152,6 +153,10 @@ static int restore_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs,
 
 	err |= fpu__restore_sig(buf, IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32));
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	err |= restore_sigcontext_ext(buf);
+#endif
+
 	force_iret();
 
 	return err;
@@ -237,6 +242,17 @@ static unsigned long align_sigframe(unsigned long sp)
 	return sp;
 }
 
+static unsigned long alloc_sigcontext_ext(unsigned long sp)
+{
+	/*
+	 * sigcontext_ext is at: fpu + fpu_user_xstate_size +
+	 * FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE, then aligned to 8.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		sp -= (sizeof(struct sc_ext) + 8);
+	return sp;
+}
+
 static void __user *
 get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs, size_t frame_size,
 	     void __user **fpstate)
@@ -266,6 +282,7 @@ get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs, size_t frame_size,
 	}
 
 	if (fpu->initialized) {
+		sp = alloc_sigcontext_ext(sp);
 		sp = fpu__alloc_mathframe(sp, IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32),
 					  &buf_fx, &math_size);
 		*fpstate = (void __user *)sp;
@@ -493,6 +510,9 @@ static int __setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct ksignal *ksig,
 	err |= setup_sigcontext(&frame->uc.uc_mcontext, fp, regs, set->sig[0]);
 	err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
 
+	if (!err)
+		err = setup_sigcontext_ext(ksig, fp);
+
 	if (err)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -576,6 +596,9 @@ static int x32_setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig,
 				regs, set->sig[0]);
 	err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
 
+	if (!err)
+		err = setup_sigcontext_ext(ksig, fpstate);
+
 	if (err)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -707,6 +730,80 @@ setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs)
 	}
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static int copy_ext_from_user(struct sc_ext *ext, void __user *fpu)
+{
+	void __user *p;
+
+	if (!fpu)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	p = fpu + fpu_user_xstate_size + FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE;
+	p = (void __user *)ALIGN((unsigned long)p, 8);
+
+	if (copy_from_user(ext, p, sizeof(*ext)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (ext->total_size != sizeof(*ext))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int copy_ext_to_user(void __user *fpu, struct sc_ext *ext)
+{
+	void __user *p;
+
+	if (!fpu)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (ext->total_size != sizeof(*ext))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	p = fpu + fpu_user_xstate_size + FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE;
+	p = (void __user *)ALIGN((unsigned long)p, 8);
+
+	if (copy_to_user(p, ext, sizeof(*ext)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int restore_sigcontext_ext(void __user *fp)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && fp) {
+		struct sc_ext ext = {0, 0};
+
+		err = copy_ext_from_user(&ext, fp);
+
+		if (!err)
+			err = cet_restore_signal(ext.ssp);
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+int setup_sigcontext_ext(struct ksignal *ksig, void __user *fp)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && fp) {
+		struct sc_ext ext = {0, 0};
+		unsigned long rstor;
+
+		rstor = (unsigned long)ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer;
+		err = cet_setup_signal(is_ia32_frame(ksig), rstor, &ext.ssp);
+		if (!err) {
+			ext.total_size = sizeof(ext);
+			err = copy_ext_to_user(fp, &ext);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+#endif
+
 static void
 handle_signal(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 23/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (21 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 22/27] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (4 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

Look in .note.gnu.property of an ELF file and check if Shadow Stack needs
to be enabled for the task.

Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                         |   4 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h               |   5 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/elf_property.h |  15 +
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile                 |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/elf.c                    | 341 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/binfmt_elf.c                          |  15 +
 include/uapi/linux/elf.h                 |   1 +
 7 files changed, 383 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/elf_property.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/elf.c

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 5f73335b7a3a..ac2244896a18 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1919,6 +1919,9 @@ config X86_INTEL_CET
 config ARCH_HAS_SHSTK
 	def_bool n
 
+config ARCH_HAS_PROGRAM_PROPERTIES
+	def_bool n
+
 config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
 	prompt "Intel Shadow Stack for user-mode"
 	def_bool n
@@ -1927,6 +1930,7 @@ config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
 	select X86_INTEL_CET
 	select ARCH_HAS_SHSTK
 	select VM_AREA_GUARD
+	select ARCH_HAS_PROGRAM_PROPERTIES
 	---help---
 	  Shadow stack provides hardware protection against program stack
 	  corruption.  Only when all the following are true will an application
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
index 0d157d2a1e2a..5b5f169c5c07 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
@@ -382,4 +382,9 @@ struct va_alignment {
 
 extern struct va_alignment va_align;
 extern unsigned long align_vdso_addr(unsigned long);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PROGRAM_PROPERTIES
+extern int arch_setup_features(void *ehdr, void *phdr, struct file *file,
+			       bool interp);
+#endif
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_ELF_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/elf_property.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/elf_property.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..af361207718c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/elf_property.h
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _UAPI_ASM_X86_ELF_PROPERTY_H
+#define _UAPI_ASM_X86_ELF_PROPERTY_H
+
+/*
+ * pr_type
+ */
+#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND (0xc0000002)
+
+/*
+ * Bits for GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND
+ */
+#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK	(0x00000002)
+
+#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_ELF_PROPERTY_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index fbb2d91fb756..36b14ef410c8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -141,6 +141,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS)		+= unwind_guess.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET)		+= cet.o
 
+obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PROGRAM_PROPERTIES) += elf.o
+
 ###
 # 64 bit specific files
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/elf.c b/arch/x86/kernel/elf.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2e2030a0462b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/elf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Look at an ELF file's .note.gnu.property and determine if the file
+ * supports shadow stack and/or indirect branch tracking.
+ * The path from the ELF header to the note section is the following:
+ * elfhdr->elf_phdr->elf_note->property[].
+ */
+
+#include <asm/cet.h>
+#include <asm/elf_property.h>
+#include <asm/prctl.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/elf-em.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/elf.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+
+/*
+ * The .note.gnu.property layout:
+ *
+ *	struct elf_note {
+ *		u32 n_namesz; --> sizeof(n_name[]); always (4)
+ *		u32 n_ndescsz;--> sizeof(property[])
+ *		u32 n_type;   --> always NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0
+ *	};
+ *	char n_name[4]; --> always 'GNU\0'
+ *
+ *	struct {
+ *		struct property_x86 {
+ *			u32 pr_type;
+ *			u32 pr_datasz;
+ *		};
+ *		u8 pr_data[pr_datasz];
+ *	}[];
+ */
+
+#define BUF_SIZE (PAGE_SIZE / 4)
+
+struct property_x86 {
+	u32 pr_type;
+	u32 pr_datasz;
+};
+
+typedef bool (test_fn)(void *buf, u32 *arg);
+typedef void *(next_fn)(void *buf, u32 *arg);
+
+static inline bool test_note_type_0(void *buf, u32 *arg)
+{
+	struct elf_note *n = buf;
+
+	return ((n->n_namesz == 4) && (memcmp(n + 1, "GNU", 4) == 0) &&
+		(n->n_type == NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0));
+}
+
+static inline void *next_note(void *buf, u32 *arg)
+{
+	struct elf_note *n = buf;
+	u32 align = *arg;
+	int size;
+
+	size = round_up(sizeof(*n) + n->n_namesz, align);
+	size = round_up(size + n->n_descsz, align);
+
+	if (buf + size < buf)
+		return NULL;
+	else
+		return (buf + size);
+}
+
+static inline bool test_property_x86(void *buf, u32 *arg)
+{
+	struct property_x86 *pr = buf;
+	u32 max_type = *arg;
+
+	if (pr->pr_type > max_type)
+		*arg = pr->pr_type;
+
+	return (pr->pr_type == GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND);
+}
+
+static inline void *next_property(void *buf, u32 *arg)
+{
+	struct property_x86 *pr = buf;
+	u32 max_type = *arg;
+
+	if ((buf + sizeof(*pr) +  pr->pr_datasz < buf) ||
+	    (pr->pr_type > GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND) ||
+	    (pr->pr_type > max_type))
+		return NULL;
+	else
+		return (buf + sizeof(*pr) + pr->pr_datasz);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Scan 'buf' for a pattern; return true if found.
+ * *pos is the distance from the beginning of buf to where
+ * the searched item or the next item is located.
+ */
+static int scan(u8 *buf, u32 buf_size, int item_size,
+		 test_fn test, next_fn next, u32 *arg, u32 *pos)
+{
+	int found = 0;
+	u8 *p, *max;
+
+	max = buf + buf_size;
+	if (max < buf)
+		return 0;
+
+	p = buf;
+
+	while ((p + item_size < max) && (p + item_size > buf)) {
+		if (test(p, arg)) {
+			found = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		p = next(p, arg);
+	}
+
+	*pos = (p + item_size <= buf) ? 0 : (u32)(p - buf);
+	return found;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Search a NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0 for GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND.
+ */
+static int find_feature_x86(struct file *file, unsigned long desc_size,
+			    loff_t file_offset, u8 *buf, u32 *feature)
+{
+	u32 buf_pos;
+	unsigned long read_size;
+	unsigned long done;
+	int found = 0;
+	int ret = 0;
+	u32 last_pr = 0;
+
+	*feature = 0;
+	buf_pos = 0;
+
+	for (done = 0; done < desc_size; done += buf_pos) {
+		read_size = desc_size - done;
+		if (read_size > BUF_SIZE)
+			read_size = BUF_SIZE;
+
+		ret = kernel_read(file, buf, read_size, &file_offset);
+
+		if (ret != read_size)
+			return (ret < 0) ? ret : -EIO;
+
+		ret = 0;
+		found = scan(buf, read_size, sizeof(struct property_x86),
+			     test_property_x86, next_property,
+			     &last_pr, &buf_pos);
+
+		if ((!buf_pos) || found)
+			break;
+
+		file_offset += buf_pos - read_size;
+	}
+
+	if (found) {
+		struct property_x86 *pr =
+			(struct property_x86 *)(buf + buf_pos);
+
+		if (pr->pr_datasz == 4) {
+			u32 *max =  (u32 *)(buf + read_size);
+			u32 *data = (u32 *)((u8 *)pr + sizeof(*pr));
+
+			if (data + 1 <= max) {
+				*feature = *data;
+			} else {
+				file_offset += buf_pos - read_size;
+				file_offset += sizeof(*pr);
+				ret = kernel_read(file, feature, 4,
+						  &file_offset);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Search a PT_NOTE segment for NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0.
+ */
+static int find_note_type_0(struct file *file, unsigned long note_size,
+			    loff_t file_offset, u32 align, u32 *feature)
+{
+	u8 *buf;
+	u32 buf_pos;
+	unsigned long read_size;
+	unsigned long done;
+	int found = 0;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	buf = kmalloc(BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	*feature = 0;
+	buf_pos = 0;
+
+	for (done = 0; done < note_size; done += buf_pos) {
+		read_size = note_size - done;
+		if (read_size > BUF_SIZE)
+			read_size = BUF_SIZE;
+
+		ret = kernel_read(file, buf, read_size, &file_offset);
+
+		if (ret != read_size) {
+			ret = (ret < 0) ? ret : -EIO;
+			kfree(buf);
+			return ret;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * item_size = sizeof(struct elf_note) + elf_note.n_namesz.
+		 * n_namesz is 4 for the note type we look for.
+		 */
+		ret = scan(buf, read_size, sizeof(struct elf_note) + 4,
+			      test_note_type_0, next_note,
+			      &align, &buf_pos);
+
+		file_offset += buf_pos - read_size;
+
+		if (ret && !found) {
+			struct elf_note *n =
+				(struct elf_note *)(buf + buf_pos);
+			u32 start = round_up(sizeof(*n) + n->n_namesz, align);
+			u32 total = round_up(start + n->n_descsz, align);
+
+			ret = find_feature_x86(file, n->n_descsz,
+					       file_offset + start,
+					       buf, feature);
+			found++;
+			file_offset += total;
+			buf_pos += total;
+		} else if (!buf_pos || ret) {
+			ret = 0;
+			*feature = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	kfree(buf);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+static int check_notes_32(struct file *file, struct elf32_phdr *phdr,
+			  int phnum, u32 *feature)
+{
+	int i;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < phnum; i++, phdr++) {
+		if ((phdr->p_type != PT_NOTE) || (phdr->p_align != 4))
+			continue;
+
+		err = find_note_type_0(file, phdr->p_filesz, phdr->p_offset,
+				       phdr->p_align, feature);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static int check_notes_64(struct file *file, struct elf64_phdr *phdr,
+			  int phnum, u32 *feature)
+{
+	int i;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < phnum; i++, phdr++) {
+		if ((phdr->p_type != PT_NOTE) || (phdr->p_align != 8))
+			continue;
+
+		err = find_note_type_0(file, phdr->p_filesz, phdr->p_offset,
+				       phdr->p_align, feature);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+int arch_setup_features(void *ehdr_p, void *phdr_p,
+			struct file *file, bool interp)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+	u32 feature = 0;
+
+	struct elf64_hdr *ehdr64 = ehdr_p;
+
+	if (!cpu_x86_cet_enabled())
+		return 0;
+
+	if (ehdr64->e_ident[EI_CLASS] == ELFCLASS64) {
+		struct elf64_phdr *phdr64 = phdr_p;
+
+		err = check_notes_64(file, phdr64, ehdr64->e_phnum,
+				     &feature);
+		if (err < 0)
+			goto out;
+	} else {
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+		struct elf32_hdr *ehdr32 = ehdr_p;
+
+		if (ehdr32->e_ident[EI_CLASS] == ELFCLASS32) {
+			struct elf32_phdr *phdr32 = phdr_p;
+
+			err = check_notes_32(file, phdr32, ehdr32->e_phnum,
+					     &feature);
+			if (err < 0)
+				goto out;
+		}
+#endif
+	}
+
+	memset(&current->thread.cet, 0, sizeof(struct cet_status));
+
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+		if (feature & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK) {
+			err = cet_setup_shstk();
+			if (err < 0)
+				goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	return err;
+}
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
index efae2fb0930a..b891aa292b46 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
@@ -1081,6 +1081,21 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		goto out_free_dentry;
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PROGRAM_PROPERTIES
+	if (interpreter) {
+		retval = arch_setup_features(&loc->interp_elf_ex,
+					     interp_elf_phdata,
+					     interpreter, true);
+	} else {
+		retval = arch_setup_features(&loc->elf_ex,
+					     elf_phdata,
+					     bprm->file, false);
+	}
+
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto out_free_dentry;
+#endif
+
 	if (elf_interpreter) {
 		unsigned long interp_map_addr = 0;
 
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/elf.h b/include/uapi/linux/elf.h
index c5358e0ae7c5..5ef25a565e88 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/elf.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/elf.h
@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@ typedef struct elf64_shdr {
 #define NT_PRFPREG	2
 #define NT_PRPSINFO	3
 #define NT_TASKSTRUCT	4
+#define NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0 5
 #define NT_AUXV		6
 /*
  * Note to userspace developers: size of NT_SIGINFO note may increase
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (22 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 23/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 25/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (3 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

The shadow stack for clone/fork is handled as the following:

(1) If ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM)) == CLONE_VM),
    the kernel allocates (and frees on thread exit) a new SHSTK
    for the child.

    It is possible for the kernel to complete the clone syscall
    and set the child's SHSTK pointer to NULL and let the child
    thread allocate a SHSTK for itself.  There are two issues
    in this approach: It is not compatible with existing code
    that does inline syscall and it cannot handle signals before
    the child can successfully allocate a SHSTK.

(2) For (clone_flags & CLONE_VFORK), the child uses the existing
    SHSTK.

(3) For all other cases, the SHSTK is copied/reused whenever the
    parent or the child does a call/ret.

This patch handles cases (1) & (2).  Case (3) is handled in
the SHSTK page fault patches.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h         |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c              | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c          |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c       |  7 ++++++
 5 files changed, 47 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
index 3af544aed800..008b4651b5be 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -17,12 +17,14 @@ struct cet_status {
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
 int cet_setup_shstk(void);
+int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
 void cet_disable_shstk(void);
 void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
 int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp);
 int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor, unsigned long *new_ssp);
 #else
 static inline int cet_setup_shstk(void) { return -EINVAL; }
+static inline int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p) { return -EINVAL; }
 static inline void cet_disable_shstk(void) {}
 static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {}
 static inline int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp) { return -EINVAL; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index eeeb9289c764..8da7c999b7ee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/paravirt.h>
 #include <asm/mpx.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
 
 extern atomic64_t last_mm_ctx_id;
 
@@ -223,6 +224,8 @@ do {						\
 #else
 #define deactivate_mm(tsk, mm)			\
 do {						\
+	if (!tsk->vfork_done)			\
+		cet_disable_free_shstk(tsk);	\
 	load_gs_index(0);			\
 	loadsegment(fs, 0);			\
 } while (0)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
index 2000e5e87f8f..51b26616ac20 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
@@ -145,6 +145,40 @@ int cet_setup_shstk(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	unsigned long addr, size;
+	struct cet_user_state *state;
+
+	if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	state = get_xsave_addr(&tsk->thread.fpu.state.xsave,
+			       XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER);
+
+	if (!state)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	size = tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size;
+	if (size == 0)
+		size = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK);
+
+	addr = do_mmap_locked(0, size, PROT_READ,
+			      MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, VM_SHSTK);
+
+	if (addr >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) {
+		tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base = 0;
+		tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size = 0;
+		tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	state->user_ssp = (u64)(addr + size - sizeof(u64));
+	tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base = addr;
+	tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size = size;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 void cet_disable_shstk(void)
 {
 	u64 r;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 4a776da4c28c..440f012ef925 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ void exit_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
 
 	free_vm86(t);
 
+	cet_disable_free_shstk(tsk);
 	fpu__drop(fpu);
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index ea5ea850348d..9cdbd87bb908 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -325,6 +325,13 @@ int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp,
 	if (sp)
 		childregs->sp = sp;
 
+	/* Allocate a new shadow stack for pthread */
+	if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM)) == CLONE_VM) {
+		err = cet_setup_thread_shstk(p);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
 	err = -ENOMEM;
 	if (unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(me, TIF_IO_BITMAP))) {
 		p->thread.io_bitmap_ptr = kmemdup(me->thread.io_bitmap_ptr,
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 25/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (23 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  27 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 mm/mmap.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index b85292014ec9..fa581ced3f56 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1677,6 +1677,9 @@ static inline int accountable_mapping(struct file *file, vm_flags_t vm_flags)
 	if (file && is_file_hugepages(file))
 		return 0;
 
+	if (arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags))
+		return 1;
+
 	return (vm_flags & (VM_NORESERVE | VM_SHARED | VM_WRITE)) == VM_WRITE;
 }
 
@@ -3267,6 +3270,8 @@ void vm_stat_account(struct mm_struct *mm, vm_flags_t flags, long npages)
 		mm->stack_vm += npages;
 	else if (is_data_mapping(flags))
 		mm->data_vm += npages;
+	else if (arch_copy_pte_mapping(flags))
+		mm->data_vm += npages;
 }
 
 static vm_fault_t special_mapping_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf);
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (24 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 25/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 19:21 ` [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Dave Hansen
  27 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS, unsigned long *addr)
    Return CET feature status.

    The parameter 'addr' is a pointer to a user buffer.
    On returning to the caller, the kernel fills the following
    information:

    *addr = SHSTK/IBT status
    *(addr + 1) = SHSTK base address
    *(addr + 2) = SHSTK size

arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE, unsigned long features)
    Disable CET features specified in 'features'.  Return
    -EPERM if CET is locked.

arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK)
    Lock in CET feature.

arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK, unsigned long *addr)
    Allocate a new SHSTK.

    The parameter 'addr' is a pointer to a user buffer and indicates
    the desired SHSTK size to allocate.  On returning to the caller
    the buffer contains the address of the new SHSTK.

There is no CET enabling arch_prctl function.  By design, CET is
enabled automatically if the binary and the system can support it.

The parameters passed are always unsigned 64-bit.  When an ia32
application passing pointers, it should only use the lower 32 bits.

Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h        |  5 ++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h |  5 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile          |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c             | 29 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c       | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c         |  4 +-
 6 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
index 008b4651b5be..6fa23a41580c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -12,19 +12,24 @@ struct task_struct;
 struct cet_status {
 	unsigned long	shstk_base;
 	unsigned long	shstk_size;
+	unsigned int	locked:1;
 	unsigned int	shstk_enabled:1;
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
+int prctl_cet(int option, unsigned long arg2);
 int cet_setup_shstk(void);
 int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
+int cet_alloc_shstk(unsigned long *arg);
 void cet_disable_shstk(void);
 void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
 int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp);
 int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor, unsigned long *new_ssp);
 #else
+static inline int prctl_cet(int option, unsigned long arg2) { return -EINVAL; }
 static inline int cet_setup_shstk(void) { return -EINVAL; }
 static inline int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p) { return -EINVAL; }
+static inline int cet_alloc_shstk(unsigned long *arg) { return -EINVAL; }
 static inline void cet_disable_shstk(void) {}
 static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {}
 static inline int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp) { return -EINVAL; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
index 5a6aac9fa41f..d962f0ec9ccf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
@@ -14,4 +14,9 @@
 #define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_32	0x2002
 #define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_64	0x2003
 
+#define ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS		0x3001
+#define ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE		0x3002
+#define ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK		0x3003
+#define ARCH_X86_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK	0x3004
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 36b14ef410c8..b9e6cdc6b4f7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC)		+= unwind_orc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER)	+= unwind_frame.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS)		+= unwind_guess.o
 
-obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET)		+= cet.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET)		+= cet.o cet_prctl.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PROGRAM_PROPERTIES) += elf.o
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
index 51b26616ac20..17ad328586aa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
@@ -121,6 +121,35 @@ static int create_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ssp,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int cet_alloc_shstk(unsigned long *arg)
+{
+	unsigned long len = *arg;
+	unsigned long addr;
+	unsigned long token;
+	unsigned long ssp;
+
+	addr = do_mmap_locked(0, len, PROT_READ,
+			      MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, VM_SHSTK);
+	if (addr >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* Restore token is 8 bytes and aligned to 8 bytes */
+	ssp = addr + len;
+	token = ssp;
+
+	if (!in_ia32_syscall())
+		token |= TOKEN_MODE_64;
+	ssp -= 8;
+
+	if (write_user_shstk_64(ssp, token)) {
+		vm_munmap(addr, len);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	*arg = addr;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int cet_setup_shstk(void)
 {
 	unsigned long addr, size;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..320dbb620d61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/prctl.h>
+#include <asm/elf.h>
+#include <asm/elf_property.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
+
+/* See Documentation/x86/intel_cet.txt. */
+
+static int handle_get_status(unsigned long arg2)
+{
+	unsigned int features = 0;
+	unsigned long shstk_base, shstk_size;
+	unsigned long buf[3];
+
+	if (current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
+		features |= GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK;
+
+	shstk_base = current->thread.cet.shstk_base;
+	shstk_size = current->thread.cet.shstk_size;
+
+	buf[0] = (unsigned long)features;
+	buf[1] = shstk_base;
+	buf[2] = shstk_size;
+	return copy_to_user((unsigned long __user *)arg2, buf,
+			    sizeof(buf));
+}
+
+static int handle_alloc_shstk(unsigned long arg2)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+	unsigned long arg;
+	unsigned long addr = 0;
+	unsigned long size = 0;
+
+	if (get_user(arg, (unsigned long __user *)arg2))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	size = arg;
+	err = cet_alloc_shstk(&arg);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	addr = arg;
+	if (put_user(addr, (unsigned long __user *)arg2)) {
+		vm_munmap(addr, size);
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int prctl_cet(int option, unsigned long arg2)
+{
+	if (!cpu_x86_cet_enabled())
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	switch (option) {
+	case ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS:
+		return handle_get_status(arg2);
+
+	case ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE:
+		if (current->thread.cet.locked)
+			return -EPERM;
+		if (arg2 & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK)
+			cet_disable_free_shstk(current);
+
+		return 0;
+
+	case ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK:
+		current->thread.cet.locked = 1;
+		return 0;
+
+	case ARCH_X86_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK:
+		return handle_alloc_shstk(arg2);
+
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 440f012ef925..f240fce2b20f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -792,7 +792,7 @@ long do_arch_prctl_common(struct task_struct *task, int option,
 		return get_cpuid_mode();
 	case ARCH_SET_CPUID:
 		return set_cpuid_mode(task, cpuid_enabled);
+	default:
+		return prctl_cet(option, cpuid_enabled);
 	}
-
-	return -EINVAL;
 }
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (25 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 19:21 ` [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Dave Hansen
  27 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

Add the following shadow stack management instructions.

INCSSP:
    Increment shadow stack pointer by the steps specified.

RDSSP:
    Read SSP register into a GPR.

SAVEPREVSSP:
    Use "prev ssp" token at top of current shadow stack to
    create a "restore token" on previous shadow stack.

RSTORSSP:
    Restore from a "restore token" pointed by a GPR to SSP.

WRSS:
    Write to kernel-mode shadow stack (kernel-mode instruction).

WRUSS:
    Write to user-mode shadow stack (kernel-mode instruction).

SETSSBSY:
    Verify the "supervisor token" pointed by IA32_PL0_SSP MSR,
    if valid, set the token to busy, and set SSP to the value
    of IA32_PL0_SSP MSR.

CLRSSBSY:
    Verify the "supervisor token" pointed by a GPR, if valid,
    clear the busy bit from the token.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt               | 26 +++++++++++++------
 tools/objtool/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt | 26 +++++++++++++------
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt b/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt
index e0b85930dd77..c5e825d44766 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ AVXcode: 1
 1b: BNDCN Gv,Ev (F2) | BNDMOV Ev,Gv (66) | BNDMK Gv,Ev (F3) | BNDSTX Ev,Gv
 1c:
 1d:
-1e:
+1e: RDSSP Rd (F3),REX.W
 1f: NOP Ev
 # 0x0f 0x20-0x2f
 20: MOV Rd,Cd
@@ -610,7 +610,17 @@ fe: paddd Pq,Qq | vpaddd Vx,Hx,Wx (66),(v1)
 ff: UD0
 EndTable
 
-Table: 3-byte opcode 1 (0x0f 0x38)
+Table: 3-byte opcode 1 (0x0f 0x01)
+Referrer:
+AVXcode:
+# Skip 0x00-0xe7
+e8: SETSSBSY (f3)
+e9:
+ea: SAVEPREVSSP (f3)
+# Skip 0xeb-0xff
+EndTable
+
+Table: 3-byte opcode 2 (0x0f 0x38)
 Referrer: 3-byte escape 1
 AVXcode: 2
 # 0x0f 0x38 0x00-0x0f
@@ -789,12 +799,12 @@ f0: MOVBE Gy,My | MOVBE Gw,Mw (66) | CRC32 Gd,Eb (F2) | CRC32 Gd,Eb (66&F2)
 f1: MOVBE My,Gy | MOVBE Mw,Gw (66) | CRC32 Gd,Ey (F2) | CRC32 Gd,Ew (66&F2)
 f2: ANDN Gy,By,Ey (v)
 f3: Grp17 (1A)
-f5: BZHI Gy,Ey,By (v) | PEXT Gy,By,Ey (F3),(v) | PDEP Gy,By,Ey (F2),(v)
-f6: ADCX Gy,Ey (66) | ADOX Gy,Ey (F3) | MULX By,Gy,rDX,Ey (F2),(v)
+f5: BZHI Gy,Ey,By (v) | PEXT Gy,By,Ey (F3),(v) | PDEP Gy,By,Ey (F2),(v) | WRUSS Pq,Qq (66),REX.W
+f6: ADCX Gy,Ey (66) | ADOX Gy,Ey (F3) | MULX By,Gy,rDX,Ey (F2),(v) | WRSS Pq,Qq (66),REX.W
 f7: BEXTR Gy,Ey,By (v) | SHLX Gy,Ey,By (66),(v) | SARX Gy,Ey,By (F3),(v) | SHRX Gy,Ey,By (F2),(v)
 EndTable
 
-Table: 3-byte opcode 2 (0x0f 0x3a)
+Table: 3-byte opcode 3 (0x0f 0x3a)
 Referrer: 3-byte escape 2
 AVXcode: 3
 # 0x0f 0x3a 0x00-0xff
@@ -948,7 +958,7 @@ GrpTable: Grp7
 2: LGDT Ms | XGETBV (000),(11B) | XSETBV (001),(11B) | VMFUNC (100),(11B) | XEND (101)(11B) | XTEST (110)(11B)
 3: LIDT Ms
 4: SMSW Mw/Rv
-5: rdpkru (110),(11B) | wrpkru (111),(11B)
+5: rdpkru (110),(11B) | wrpkru (111),(11B) | RSTORSSP Mq (F3)
 6: LMSW Ew
 7: INVLPG Mb | SWAPGS (o64),(000),(11B) | RDTSCP (001),(11B)
 EndTable
@@ -1019,8 +1029,8 @@ GrpTable: Grp15
 2: vldmxcsr Md (v1) | WRFSBASE Ry (F3),(11B)
 3: vstmxcsr Md (v1) | WRGSBASE Ry (F3),(11B)
 4: XSAVE | ptwrite Ey (F3),(11B)
-5: XRSTOR | lfence (11B)
-6: XSAVEOPT | clwb (66) | mfence (11B)
+5: XRSTOR | lfence (11B) | INCSSP Rd (F3),REX.W
+6: XSAVEOPT | clwb (66) | mfence (11B) | CLRSSBSY Mq (F3)
 7: clflush | clflushopt (66) | sfence (11B)
 EndTable
 
diff --git a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt
index e0b85930dd77..c5e825d44766 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt
+++ b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ AVXcode: 1
 1b: BNDCN Gv,Ev (F2) | BNDMOV Ev,Gv (66) | BNDMK Gv,Ev (F3) | BNDSTX Ev,Gv
 1c:
 1d:
-1e:
+1e: RDSSP Rd (F3),REX.W
 1f: NOP Ev
 # 0x0f 0x20-0x2f
 20: MOV Rd,Cd
@@ -610,7 +610,17 @@ fe: paddd Pq,Qq | vpaddd Vx,Hx,Wx (66),(v1)
 ff: UD0
 EndTable
 
-Table: 3-byte opcode 1 (0x0f 0x38)
+Table: 3-byte opcode 1 (0x0f 0x01)
+Referrer:
+AVXcode:
+# Skip 0x00-0xe7
+e8: SETSSBSY (f3)
+e9:
+ea: SAVEPREVSSP (f3)
+# Skip 0xeb-0xff
+EndTable
+
+Table: 3-byte opcode 2 (0x0f 0x38)
 Referrer: 3-byte escape 1
 AVXcode: 2
 # 0x0f 0x38 0x00-0x0f
@@ -789,12 +799,12 @@ f0: MOVBE Gy,My | MOVBE Gw,Mw (66) | CRC32 Gd,Eb (F2) | CRC32 Gd,Eb (66&F2)
 f1: MOVBE My,Gy | MOVBE Mw,Gw (66) | CRC32 Gd,Ey (F2) | CRC32 Gd,Ew (66&F2)
 f2: ANDN Gy,By,Ey (v)
 f3: Grp17 (1A)
-f5: BZHI Gy,Ey,By (v) | PEXT Gy,By,Ey (F3),(v) | PDEP Gy,By,Ey (F2),(v)
-f6: ADCX Gy,Ey (66) | ADOX Gy,Ey (F3) | MULX By,Gy,rDX,Ey (F2),(v)
+f5: BZHI Gy,Ey,By (v) | PEXT Gy,By,Ey (F3),(v) | PDEP Gy,By,Ey (F2),(v) | WRUSS Pq,Qq (66),REX.W
+f6: ADCX Gy,Ey (66) | ADOX Gy,Ey (F3) | MULX By,Gy,rDX,Ey (F2),(v) | WRSS Pq,Qq (66),REX.W
 f7: BEXTR Gy,Ey,By (v) | SHLX Gy,Ey,By (66),(v) | SARX Gy,Ey,By (F3),(v) | SHRX Gy,Ey,By (F2),(v)
 EndTable
 
-Table: 3-byte opcode 2 (0x0f 0x3a)
+Table: 3-byte opcode 3 (0x0f 0x3a)
 Referrer: 3-byte escape 2
 AVXcode: 3
 # 0x0f 0x3a 0x00-0xff
@@ -948,7 +958,7 @@ GrpTable: Grp7
 2: LGDT Ms | XGETBV (000),(11B) | XSETBV (001),(11B) | VMFUNC (100),(11B) | XEND (101)(11B) | XTEST (110)(11B)
 3: LIDT Ms
 4: SMSW Mw/Rv
-5: rdpkru (110),(11B) | wrpkru (111),(11B)
+5: rdpkru (110),(11B) | wrpkru (111),(11B) | RSTORSSP Mq (F3)
 6: LMSW Ew
 7: INVLPG Mb | SWAPGS (o64),(000),(11B) | RDTSCP (001),(11B)
 EndTable
@@ -1019,8 +1029,8 @@ GrpTable: Grp15
 2: vldmxcsr Md (v1) | WRFSBASE Ry (F3),(11B)
 3: vstmxcsr Md (v1) | WRGSBASE Ry (F3),(11B)
 4: XSAVE | ptwrite Ey (F3),(11B)
-5: XRSTOR | lfence (11B)
-6: XSAVEOPT | clwb (66) | mfence (11B)
+5: XRSTOR | lfence (11B) | INCSSP Rd (F3),REX.W
+6: XSAVEOPT | clwb (66) | mfence (11B) | CLRSSBSY Mq (F3)
 7: clflush | clflushopt (66) | sfence (11B)
 EndTable
 
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET)
  2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 16:43   ` Borislav Petkov
  2018-10-11 16:45     ` Yu-cheng Yu
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2018-10-11 16:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu-cheng Yu
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 08:14:57AM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Add CPUIDs for Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET).

This is not "CPUIDs" but feature flags. Fix the subject too pls.

> CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 7] Shadow stack
> CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX[bit 20] Indirect branch tracking
> 
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index 89a048c2faec..142b15da06fd 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -321,6 +321,7 @@
>  #define X86_FEATURE_PKU			(16*32+ 3) /* Protection Keys for Userspace */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE		(16*32+ 4) /* OS Protection Keys Enable */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VBMI2	(16*32+ 6) /* Additional AVX512 Vector Bit Manipulation Instructions */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_SHSTK		(16*32+ 7) /* Shadow Stack */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_GFNI		(16*32+ 8) /* Galois Field New Instructions */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_VAES		(16*32+ 9) /* Vector AES */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_VPCLMULQDQ		(16*32+10) /* Carry-Less Multiplication Double Quadword */
> @@ -341,6 +342,7 @@
>  #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW	(18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS	(18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG		(18*32+18) /* Intel PCONFIG */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_IBT			(18*32+20) /* Indirect Branch Tracking */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP		(18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D		(18*32+28) /* Flush L1D cache */
> -- 

With that addressed:

Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET)
  2018-10-11 16:43   ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2018-10-11 16:45     ` Yu-cheng Yu
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 16:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Borislav Petkov
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On Thu, 2018-10-11 at 18:43 +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 08:14:57AM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> > Add CPUIDs for Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET).
> 
> This is not "CPUIDs" but feature flags. Fix the subject too pls.

I will fix it.

Thanks,
Yu-cheng


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
  2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (26 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 19:21 ` Dave Hansen
  2018-10-11 19:29   ` Yu-cheng Yu
  27 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2018-10-11 19:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu-cheng Yu, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	linux-kernel, linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api,
	Arnd Bergmann, Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On 10/11/2018 08:14 AM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> The previous version of CET Shadow Stack patches is at the following
> link:
> 
>   https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/9/21/776

Why are you posting these?  Do you want more review?  Do you simply want
the series applied?

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
  2018-10-11 19:21 ` [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Dave Hansen
@ 2018-10-11 19:29   ` Yu-cheng Yu
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 19:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	linux-kernel, linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api,
	Arnd Bergmann, Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On Thu, 2018-10-11 at 12:21 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 10/11/2018 08:14 AM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> > The previous version of CET Shadow Stack patches is at the following
> > link:
> > 
> >   https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/9/21/776
> 
> Why are you posting these?  Do you want more review?  Do you simply want
> the series applied?

Thanks, Dave!


Hi Maintainers,

If there are no more major issues, can we get these applied?

Currently the IBT bitmap allocation (in the IBT series) works with GLIBC.
If GLIBC developers agree to mmap() the bitmap in dlopen(), I will submit an
additional patch to change how the kernel handles it.

Thanks,
Yu-cheng

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 07/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 07/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 20:39   ` Jann Horn
  2018-10-11 20:49     ` Yu-cheng Yu
                       ` (2 more replies)
  2018-10-11 20:49   ` Dave Hansen
  1 sibling, 3 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Jann Horn @ 2018-10-11 20:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: yu-cheng.yu, Andy Lutomirski
  Cc: the arch/x86 maintainers, H . Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner,
	Ingo Molnar, kernel list, linux-doc, Linux-MM, linux-arch,
	Linux API, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, hjl.tools,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, rdunlap,
	ravi.v.shankar, vedvyas.shanbhogue, Daniel Micay

On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 5:20 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
> Create a guard area between VMAs to detect memory corruption.
[...]
> +config VM_AREA_GUARD
> +       bool "VM area guard"
> +       default n
> +       help
> +         Create a guard area between VM areas so that access beyond
> +         limit can be detected.
> +
>  endmenu

Sorry to bring this up so late, but Daniel Micay pointed out to me
that, given that VMA guards will raise the number of VMAs by
inhibiting vma_merge(), people are more likely to run into
/proc/sys/vm/max_map_count (which limits the number of VMAs to ~65k by
default, and can't easily be raised without risking an overflow of
page->_mapcount on systems with over ~800GiB of RAM, see
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180208021112.GB14918@bombadil.infradead.org/
and replies) with this change.

Playing with glibc's memory allocator, it looks like glibc will use
mmap() for 128KB allocations; so at 65530*128KB=8GB of memory usage in
128KB chunks, an application could run out of VMAs.

People already run into that limit sometimes when mapping files, and
recommend raising it:

https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/vm-max-map-count.html
http://docs.actian.com/vector/4.2/User/Increase_max_map_count_Kernel_Parameter_(Linux).htm
https://www.suse.com/de-de/support/kb/doc/?id=7000830 (they actually
ran into ENOMEM on **munmap**, because you can't split VMAs once the
limit is reached): "A custom application was failing on a SLES server
with ENOMEM errors when attempting to release memory using an munmap
call. This resulted in memory failing to be released, and the system
load and swap use increasing until the SLES machine ultimately crashed
or hung."
https://access.redhat.com/solutions/99913
https://forum.manjaro.org/t/resolved-how-to-set-vm-max-map-count-during-boot/43360

Arguably the proper solution to this would be to raise the default
max_map_count to be much higher; but then that requires fixing the
mapcount overflow.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 07/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs
  2018-10-11 20:39   ` Jann Horn
@ 2018-10-11 20:49     ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 20:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
  2018-10-12 13:17     ` Matthew Wilcox
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-11 20:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Jann Horn, Andy Lutomirski
  Cc: the arch/x86 maintainers, H . Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner,
	Ingo Molnar, kernel list, linux-doc, Linux-MM, linux-arch,
	Linux API, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, hjl.tools,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, rdunlap,
	ravi.v.shankar, vedvyas.shanbhogue, Daniel Micay

On Thu, 2018-10-11 at 22:39 +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 5:20 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
> > Create a guard area between VMAs to detect memory corruption.
> 
> [...]
> > +config VM_AREA_GUARD
> > +       bool "VM area guard"
> > +       default n
> > +       help
> > +         Create a guard area between VM areas so that access beyond
> > +         limit can be detected.
> > +
> >  endmenu
> 
> Sorry to bring this up so late, but Daniel Micay pointed out to me
> that, given that VMA guards will raise the number of VMAs by
> inhibiting vma_merge(), people are more likely to run into
> /proc/sys/vm/max_map_count (which limits the number of VMAs to ~65k by
> default, and can't easily be raised without risking an overflow of
> page->_mapcount on systems with over ~800GiB of RAM, see
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180208021112.GB14918@bombadil.infradead.org/
> and replies) with this change.

Can we use the VMA guard only for Shadow Stacks?

Yu-cheng

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 07/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 07/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 20:39   ` Jann Horn
@ 2018-10-11 20:49   ` Dave Hansen
  2018-10-12 10:24     ` Florian Weimer
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2018-10-11 20:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu-cheng Yu, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	linux-kernel, linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api,
	Arnd Bergmann, Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On 10/11/2018 08:15 AM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Create a guard area between VMAs to detect memory corruption.

This is a pretty major change that has a bunch of end-user implications.
 It's not dependent on any debugging options and can't be turned on/off
by individual apps, at runtime, or even at boot.

Its connection to this series is also tenuous and not spelled out in the
exceptionally terse changelog.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 07/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs
  2018-10-11 20:39   ` Jann Horn
  2018-10-11 20:49     ` Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-11 20:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
  2018-10-12 21:49       ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-12 13:17     ` Matthew Wilcox
  2 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2018-10-11 20:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Jann Horn
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner,
	Ingo Molnar, LKML, linux-doc, Linux-MM, linux-arch, Linux API,
	Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H. J. Lu, Jonathan Corbet,
	Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit, Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek,
	Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap, Ravi V. Shankar, Shanbhogue,
	Vedvyas, Daniel Micay

On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 1:39 PM Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 5:20 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
> > Create a guard area between VMAs to detect memory corruption.
> [...]
> > +config VM_AREA_GUARD
> > +       bool "VM area guard"
> > +       default n
> > +       help
> > +         Create a guard area between VM areas so that access beyond
> > +         limit can be detected.
> > +
> >  endmenu
>
> Sorry to bring this up so late, but Daniel Micay pointed out to me
> that, given that VMA guards will raise the number of VMAs by
> inhibiting vma_merge(), people are more likely to run into
> /proc/sys/vm/max_map_count (which limits the number of VMAs to ~65k by
> default, and can't easily be raised without risking an overflow of
> page->_mapcount on systems with over ~800GiB of RAM, see
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180208021112.GB14918@bombadil.infradead.org/
> and replies) with this change.
>
> Playing with glibc's memory allocator, it looks like glibc will use
> mmap() for 128KB allocations; so at 65530*128KB=8GB of memory usage in
> 128KB chunks, an application could run out of VMAs.

Ugh.

Do we have a free VM flag so we could do VM_GUARD to force a guard
page?  (And to make sure that, when a new VMA is allocated, it won't
be directly adjacent to a VM_GUARD VMA.)

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 07/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs
  2018-10-11 20:49   ` Dave Hansen
@ 2018-10-12 10:24     ` Florian Weimer
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Florian Weimer @ 2018-10-12 10:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	linux-kernel, linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api,
	Arnd Bergmann, Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

* Dave Hansen:

> On 10/11/2018 08:15 AM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
>> Create a guard area between VMAs to detect memory corruption.
>
> This is a pretty major change that has a bunch of end-user implications.
>  It's not dependent on any debugging options and can't be turned on/off
> by individual apps, at runtime, or even at boot.
>
> Its connection to this series is also tenuous and not spelled out in the
> exceptionally terse changelog.

I agree.  We did have application failures due to the introduction of
the stack gap, so this change is likely to cause failures when applied
to existing mappings as well.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 07/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs
  2018-10-11 20:39   ` Jann Horn
  2018-10-11 20:49     ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-10-11 20:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
@ 2018-10-12 13:17     ` Matthew Wilcox
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Matthew Wilcox @ 2018-10-12 13:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Jann Horn
  Cc: yu-cheng.yu, Andy Lutomirski, the arch/x86 maintainers,
	H . Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, kernel list,
	linux-doc, Linux-MM, linux-arch, Linux API, Arnd Bergmann,
	Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov,
	Florian Weimer, hjl.tools, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook,
	Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit, Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek,
	Peter Zijlstra, rdunlap, ravi.v.shankar, vedvyas.shanbhogue,
	Daniel Micay

On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 10:39:24PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> Sorry to bring this up so late, but Daniel Micay pointed out to me
> that, given that VMA guards will raise the number of VMAs by
> inhibiting vma_merge(), people are more likely to run into
> /proc/sys/vm/max_map_count (which limits the number of VMAs to ~65k by
> default, and can't easily be raised without risking an overflow of
> page->_mapcount on systems with over ~800GiB of RAM, see
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180208021112.GB14918@bombadil.infradead.org/
> and replies) with this change.
> 
[...]
> 
> Arguably the proper solution to this would be to raise the default
> max_map_count to be much higher; but then that requires fixing the
> mapcount overflow.

I have a fix that nobody has any particular reaction to:

diff --git a/mm/internal.h b/mm/internal.h
index 7059a8389194..977852b8329e 100644
--- a/mm/internal.h
+++ b/mm/internal.h
@@ -97,6 +97,11 @@ extern void putback_lru_page(struct page *page);
  */
 extern pmd_t *mm_find_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+extern void mm_mapcount_overflow(struct page *page);
+#else
+static inline void mm_mapcount_overflow(struct page *page) { }
+#endif
 /*
  * in mm/page_alloc.c
  */
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 9efdc021ad22..575766ec02f8 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1315,6 +1315,115 @@ static inline int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+/*
+ * Machines with more than 2TB of memory can create enough VMAs to overflow
+ * page->_mapcount if they all point to the same page.  32-bit machines do
+ * not need to be concerned.
+ */
+/*
+ * Experimentally determined.  gnome-shell currently uses fewer than
+ * 3000 mappings, so should have zero effect on desktop users.
+ */
+#define mm_track_threshold	5000
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(heavy_users_lock);
+static DEFINE_IDR(heavy_users);
+
+static void mmap_track_user(struct mm_struct *mm, int max)
+{
+	struct mm_struct *entry;
+	unsigned int id;
+
+	idr_preload(GFP_KERNEL);
+	spin_lock(&heavy_users_lock);
+	idr_for_each_entry(&heavy_users, entry, id) {
+		if (entry == mm)
+			break;
+		if (entry->map_count < mm_track_threshold)
+			idr_remove(&heavy_users, id);
+	}
+	if (!entry)
+		idr_alloc(&heavy_users, mm, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	spin_unlock(&heavy_users_lock);
+}
+
+static void mmap_untrack_user(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	struct mm_struct *entry;
+	unsigned int id;
+
+	spin_lock(&heavy_users_lock);
+	idr_for_each_entry(&heavy_users, entry, id) {
+		if (entry == mm) {
+			idr_remove(&heavy_users, id);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&heavy_users_lock);
+}
+
+static void kill_mm(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	/* Tear down the mappings first */
+	do_send_sig_info(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_FORCED, tsk, true);
+}
+
+static void kill_abuser(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	struct task_struct *tsk;
+
+	for_each_process(tsk)
+		if (tsk->mm == mm)
+			break;
+
+	if (down_write_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)) {
+		kill_mm(tsk);
+		up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	} else {
+		do_send_sig_info(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_FORCED, tsk, true);
+	}
+}
+
+void mm_mapcount_overflow(struct page *page)
+{
+	struct mm_struct *entry = current->mm;
+	unsigned int id;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	struct address_space *mapping = page_mapping(page);
+	unsigned long pgoff = page_to_pgoff(page);
+	unsigned int count = 0;
+
+	vma_interval_tree_foreach(vma, &mapping->i_mmap, pgoff, pgoff + 1) {
+		if (vma->vm_mm == entry)
+			count++;
+		if (count > 1000)
+			kill_mm(current);
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	idr_for_each_entry(&heavy_users, entry, id) {
+		count = 0;
+
+		vma_interval_tree_foreach(vma, &mapping->i_mmap,
+				pgoff, pgoff + 1) {
+			if (vma->vm_mm == entry)
+				count++;
+			if (count > 1000) {
+				kill_abuser(entry);
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (!entry)
+		panic("No abusers found but mapcount exceeded\n");
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+#else
+static void mmap_track_user(struct mm_struct *mm, int max) { }
+static void mmap_untrack_user(struct mm_struct *mm) { }
+#endif
+
 /*
  * The caller must hold down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem).
  */
@@ -1357,6 +1466,8 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	/* Too many mappings? */
 	if (mm->map_count > sysctl_max_map_count)
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (mm->map_count > mm_track_threshold)
+		mmap_track_user(mm, mm_track_threshold);
 
 	/* Obtain the address to map to. we verify (or select) it and ensure
 	 * that it represents a valid section of the address space.
@@ -2997,6 +3108,8 @@ void exit_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
 	/* mm's last user has gone, and its about to be pulled down */
 	mmu_notifier_release(mm);
 
+	mmap_untrack_user(mm);
+
 	if (mm->locked_vm) {
 		vma = mm->mmap;
 		while (vma) {
diff --git a/mm/rmap.c b/mm/rmap.c
index 47db27f8049e..d88acf5c98e9 100644
--- a/mm/rmap.c
+++ b/mm/rmap.c
@@ -1190,6 +1190,7 @@ void page_add_file_rmap(struct page *page, bool compound)
 		VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageSwapBacked(page), page);
 		__inc_node_page_state(page, NR_SHMEM_PMDMAPPED);
 	} else {
+		int v;
 		if (PageTransCompound(page) && page_mapping(page)) {
 			VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(!PageLocked(page));
 
@@ -1197,8 +1198,13 @@ void page_add_file_rmap(struct page *page, bool compound)
 			if (PageMlocked(page))
 				clear_page_mlock(compound_head(page));
 		}
-		if (!atomic_inc_and_test(&page->_mapcount))
+		v = atomic_inc_return(&page->_mapcount);
+		if (likely(v > 0))
 			goto out;
+		if (unlikely(v < 0)) {
+			mm_mapcount_overflow(page);
+			goto out;
+		}
 	}
 	__mod_lruvec_page_state(page, NR_FILE_MAPPED, nr);
 out:

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 07/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs
  2018-10-11 20:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
@ 2018-10-12 21:49       ` Yu-cheng Yu
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-10-12 21:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andy Lutomirski, Jann Horn
  Cc: X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML,
	linux-doc, Linux-MM, linux-arch, Linux API, Arnd Bergmann,
	Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov,
	Florian Weimer, H. J. Lu, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook,
	Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit, Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek,
	Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap, Ravi V. Shankar, Shanbhogue,
	Vedvyas, Daniel Micay

On Thu, 2018-10-11 at 13:55 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 1:39 PM Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> wrote:
> > 
> > On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 5:20 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
> > > Create a guard area between VMAs to detect memory corruption.
> > 
> > [...]
> > > +config VM_AREA_GUARD
> > > +       bool "VM area guard"
> > > +       default n
> > > +       help
> > > +         Create a guard area between VM areas so that access beyond
> > > +         limit can be detected.
> > > +
> > >  endmenu
> > 
> > Sorry to bring this up so late, but Daniel Micay pointed out to me
> > that, given that VMA guards will raise the number of VMAs by
> > inhibiting vma_merge(), people are more likely to run into
> > /proc/sys/vm/max_map_count (which limits the number of VMAs to ~65k by
> > default, and can't easily be raised without risking an overflow of
> > page->_mapcount on systems with over ~800GiB of RAM, see
> > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180208021112.GB14918@bombadil.infradead.org/
> > and replies) with this change.
> > 
> > Playing with glibc's memory allocator, it looks like glibc will use
> > mmap() for 128KB allocations; so at 65530*128KB=8GB of memory usage in
> > 128KB chunks, an application could run out of VMAs.
> 
> Ugh.
> 
> Do we have a free VM flag so we could do VM_GUARD to force a guard
> page?  (And to make sure that, when a new VMA is allocated, it won't
> be directly adjacent to a VM_GUARD VMA.)

Maybe something like the following?  These vm_start_gap()/vm_end_gap() are used
in many architectures.  Do we want to put them in a different series?  Comments?

Yu-cheng




diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 0416a7204be3..92b580542411 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -224,11 +224,13 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2	34	/* bit only usable on 64-bit
architectures */
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3	35	/* bit only usable on 64-bit
architectures */
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4	36	/* bit only usable on 64-bit
architectures */
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5	37	/* bit only usable on 64-bit
architectures */
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_0	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0)
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_1	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1)
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_2	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2)
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_3	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3)
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_4	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4)
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_5	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5)
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
@@ -266,6 +268,12 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
 # define VM_MPX		VM_NONE
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+#define VM_GUARD	VM_HIGH_ARCH_5
+#else
+#define VM_GUARD	VM_NONE
+#endif
+
 #ifndef VM_GROWSUP
 # define VM_GROWSUP	VM_NONE
 #endif
@@ -2417,24 +2425,34 @@ static inline struct vm_area_struct *
find_vma_intersection(struct mm_struct * m
-static inline unsigned long vm_start_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+static inline unsigned long vm_start_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma, vm_flags_t
flags)
 {
 	unsigned long vm_start = vma->vm_start;
+	unsigned long gap = 0;
+
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN)
+		gap = stack_guard_gap;
+	else if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_GUARD) || (flags & VM_GUARD))
+		gap = PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	vm_start -= gap;
+	if (vm_start > vma->vm_start)
+		vm_start = 0;
 
-	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN) {
-		vm_start -= stack_guard_gap;
-		if (vm_start > vma->vm_start)
-			vm_start = 0;
-	}
 	return vm_start;
 }
 
-static inline unsigned long vm_end_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+static inline unsigned long vm_end_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma, vm_flags_t
flags)
 {
 	unsigned long vm_end = vma->vm_end;
+	unsigned long gap = 0;
+
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP)
+		gap = stack_guard_gap;
+	else if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_GUARD) || (flags & VM_GUARD))
+		gap = PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	vm_end += gap;
+	if (vm_end < vma->vm_end)
+		vm_end = -PAGE_SIZE;
 
-	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP) {
-		vm_end += stack_guard_gap;
-		if (vm_end < vma->vm_end)
-			vm_end = -PAGE_SIZE;
-	}
 	return vm_end;
 }

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change names to separate XSAVES system and user states
  2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-15 17:03   ` Borislav Petkov
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2018-10-15 17:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu-cheng Yu
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 08:14:58AM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Control Flow Enforcement (CET) MSRs are XSAVES system/supervisor
> states.  To support CET, we introduce XSAVES system states first.
> 
> XSAVES is a "supervisor" instruction and, comparing to XSAVE, saves
> additional "supervisor" states that can be modified only from CPL 0.
> However, these states are per-task and not kernel's own.  Rename
> "supervisor" states to "system" states to clearly separate them from
> "user" states.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h |  4 +-
>  arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h   | 20 +++----
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c          |  4 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c          |  2 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c        |  6 +--
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c        | 82 ++++++++++++++---------------
>  6 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)

...

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> index 87a57b7642d3..e7cbaed12ef1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> @@ -51,13 +51,14 @@ static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {
>  };
>  
>  /*
> - * Mask of xstate features supported by the CPU and the kernel:
> + * Mask of supported 'user' xstate features derived from boot_cpu_has() and
> + * SUPPORTED_XFEATURES_MASK.

<--- This comment here looks like a good place to put some blurb about
user and system states, what they are, what the distinction is and so
on.

>   */
> -u64 xfeatures_mask __read_mostly;
> +u64 xfeatures_mask_user __read_mostly;
>  
>  static unsigned int xstate_offsets[XFEATURE_MAX] = { [ 0 ... XFEATURE_MAX - 1] = -1};
>  static unsigned int xstate_sizes[XFEATURE_MAX]   = { [ 0 ... XFEATURE_MAX - 1] = -1};
> -static unsigned int xstate_comp_offsets[sizeof(xfeatures_mask)*8];
> +static unsigned int xstate_comp_offsets[sizeof(xfeatures_mask_user)*8];
>  
>  /*
>   * The XSAVE area of kernel can be in standard or compacted format;
> @@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ void fpu__xstate_clear_all_cpu_caps(void)
>   */
>  int cpu_has_xfeatures(u64 xfeatures_needed, const char **feature_name)
>  {
> -	u64 xfeatures_missing = xfeatures_needed & ~xfeatures_mask;
> +	u64 xfeatures_missing = xfeatures_needed & ~xfeatures_mask_user;
>  
>  	if (unlikely(feature_name)) {
>  		long xfeature_idx, max_idx;
> @@ -113,14 +114,11 @@ int cpu_has_xfeatures(u64 xfeatures_needed, const char **feature_name)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_has_xfeatures);
>  
> -static int xfeature_is_supervisor(int xfeature_nr)
> +static int xfeature_is_system(int xfeature_nr)
>  {
>  	/*
> -	 * We currently do not support supervisor states, but if
> -	 * we did, we could find out like this.
> -	 *
>  	 * SDM says: If state component 'i' is a user state component,
> -	 * ECX[0] return 0; if state component i is a supervisor
> +	 * ECX[0] return 0; if state component i is a system

		  is 0

>  	 * state component, ECX[0] returns 1.

				   is 1.

>  	 */
>  	u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;

...

> @@ -242,7 +238,7 @@ void fpu__init_cpu_xstate(void)
>   */
>  static int xfeature_enabled(enum xfeature xfeature)
>  {
> -	return !!(xfeatures_mask & (1UL << xfeature));
> +	return !!(xfeatures_mask_user & BIT_ULL(xfeature));
>  }
>  
>  /*
> @@ -272,7 +268,7 @@ static void __init setup_xstate_features(void)
>  		cpuid_count(XSTATE_CPUID, i, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
>  
>  		/*
> -		 * If an xfeature is supervisor state, the offset
> +		 * If an xfeature is system state, the offset

				is a system state, ...

>  		 * in EBX is invalid. We leave it to -1.
>  		 */
>  		if (xfeature_is_user(i))

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states
  2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-10-17 10:41   ` Borislav Petkov
  2018-10-17 22:39     ` Randy Dunlap
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2018-10-17 10:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu-cheng Yu
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 08:14:59AM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Control Flow Enforcement (CET) MSRs are XSAVES system states.

That sentence needs massaging. MSRs are system states?!?!

> To support CET, we introduce XSAVES system states first.

Pls drop the "we" in all commit messages and convert the tone to
impartial and passive.

Also, this commit message needs to explain *why* you're doing this - it
is too laconic.

> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h |  3 +-
>  arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h   |  4 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c          |  6 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c          | 10 ----
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c        | 86 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
>  5 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
> index 02c4296478c8..9a5db5a63f60 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
> @@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ extern void fpu__init_cpu_xstate(void);
>  extern void fpu__init_system(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
>  extern void fpu__init_check_bugs(void);
>  extern void fpu__resume_cpu(void);
> -extern u64 fpu__get_supported_xfeatures_mask(void);
>  
>  /*
>   * Debugging facility:
> @@ -93,7 +92,7 @@ static inline void fpstate_init_xstate(struct xregs_state *xsave)
>  	 * XRSTORS requires these bits set in xcomp_bv, or it will
>  	 * trigger #GP:
>  	 */
> -	xsave->header.xcomp_bv = XCOMP_BV_COMPACTED_FORMAT | xfeatures_mask_user;
> +	xsave->header.xcomp_bv = XCOMP_BV_COMPACTED_FORMAT | xfeatures_mask_all;
>  }
>  
>  static inline void fpstate_init_fxstate(struct fxregs_state *fx)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
> index 76f83d2ac10e..d8e2ec99f635 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
> @@ -19,9 +19,6 @@
>  #define XSAVE_YMM_SIZE	    256
>  #define XSAVE_YMM_OFFSET    (XSAVE_HDR_SIZE + XSAVE_HDR_OFFSET)
>  
> -/* Supervisor features */
> -#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR (XFEATURE_MASK_PT)
> -
>  /* All currently supported features */
>  #define SUPPORTED_XFEATURES_MASK (XFEATURE_MASK_FP | \
>  				  XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | \
> @@ -40,6 +37,7 @@
>  #endif
>  
>  extern u64 xfeatures_mask_user;
> +extern u64 xfeatures_mask_all;

You have a bunch of places where you generate the system mask by doing
~xfeatures_mask_user.

Why not define

	xfeatures_mask_system

instead and generate the _all mask at the places you need it by doing

	xfeatures_mask_user | xfeatures_mask_system

?

We are differentiating user and system states now so it is only logical
to have that mirrored in the variables, right?

You even do that in fpu__init_system_xstate().

...

> @@ -225,20 +230,19 @@ void fpu__init_cpu_xstate(void)
>  	 * set here.
>  	 */
>  
> -	xfeatures_mask_user &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR;
> -
>  	cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_OSXSAVE);
>  	xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, xfeatures_mask_user);

<---- newline here.

> +	/*
> +	 * MSR_IA32_XSS sets which XSAVES system states to be managed by

Improve:

"MSR_IA32_XSS controls which system (not user) states are going to be
managed by XSAVES."

> @@ -702,6 +703,7 @@ static int init_xstate_size(void)
>   */
>  static void fpu__init_disable_system_xstate(void)
>  {
> +	xfeatures_mask_all = 0;
>  	xfeatures_mask_user = 0;
>  	cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_OSXSAVE);
>  	fpu__xstate_clear_all_cpu_caps();
> @@ -717,6 +719,8 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void)
>  	static int on_boot_cpu __initdata = 1;
>  	int err;
>  	int i;
> +	u64 cpu_user_xfeatures_mask;
> +	u64 cpu_system_xfeatures_mask;

Please sort function local variables declaration in a reverse christmas
tree order:

	<type> longest_variable_name;
	<type> shorter_var_name;
	<type> even_shorter;
	<type> i;

>  
>  	WARN_ON_FPU(!on_boot_cpu);
>  	on_boot_cpu = 0;

...

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states
  2018-10-17 10:41   ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2018-10-17 22:39     ` Randy Dunlap
  2018-10-17 22:58       ` Borislav Petkov
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Randy Dunlap @ 2018-10-17 22:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Borislav Petkov, Yu-cheng Yu
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Ravi V. Shankar,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On 10/17/18 3:41 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:

>> @@ -702,6 +703,7 @@ static int init_xstate_size(void)
>>   */
>>  static void fpu__init_disable_system_xstate(void)
>>  {
>> +	xfeatures_mask_all = 0;
>>  	xfeatures_mask_user = 0;
>>  	cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_OSXSAVE);
>>  	fpu__xstate_clear_all_cpu_caps();
>> @@ -717,6 +719,8 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void)
>>  	static int on_boot_cpu __initdata = 1;
>>  	int err;
>>  	int i;
>> +	u64 cpu_user_xfeatures_mask;
>> +	u64 cpu_system_xfeatures_mask;
> 
> Please sort function local variables declaration in a reverse christmas
> tree order:
> 
> 	<type> longest_variable_name;
> 	<type> shorter_var_name;
> 	<type> even_shorter;
> 	<type> i;

Hi,

Would you mind explaining this request? (requirement?)
Other than to say that it is the preference of some maintainers,
please say Why it is preferred.

and since the <type>s above won't typically be the same length,
it's not for variable name alignment, right?

thanks,
-- 
~Randy

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states
  2018-10-17 22:39     ` Randy Dunlap
@ 2018-10-17 22:58       ` Borislav Petkov
  2018-10-17 23:17         ` Randy Dunlap
  2018-10-18  9:24         ` Pavel Machek
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2018-10-17 22:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Randy Dunlap
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	linux-kernel, linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api,
	Arnd Bergmann, Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Ravi V. Shankar,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 03:39:47PM -0700, Randy Dunlap wrote:
> Would you mind explaining this request? (requirement?)
> Other than to say that it is the preference of some maintainers,
> please say Why it is preferred.
> 
> and since the <type>s above won't typically be the same length,
> it's not for variable name alignment, right?

Searching the net a little, it shows you have asked that question
before. So what is it you really wanna know?

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states
  2018-10-17 22:58       ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2018-10-17 23:17         ` Randy Dunlap
  2018-10-18  9:26           ` Borislav Petkov
  2018-10-18  9:24         ` Pavel Machek
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Randy Dunlap @ 2018-10-17 23:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Borislav Petkov
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	linux-kernel, linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api,
	Arnd Bergmann, Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Ravi V. Shankar,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On 10/17/18 3:58 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 03:39:47PM -0700, Randy Dunlap wrote:
>> Would you mind explaining this request? (requirement?)
>> Other than to say that it is the preference of some maintainers,
>> please say Why it is preferred.
>>
>> and since the <type>s above won't typically be the same length,
>> it's not for variable name alignment, right?
> 
> Searching the net a little, it shows you have asked that question
> before. So what is it you really wanna know?

OK, you have shown that your web search skills are better than mine.

I asked what I really wanted to know.

ta.
-- 
~Randy

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states
  2018-10-17 22:58       ` Borislav Petkov
  2018-10-17 23:17         ` Randy Dunlap
@ 2018-10-18  9:24         ` Pavel Machek
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Pavel Machek @ 2018-10-18  9:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Borislav Petkov
  Cc: Randy Dunlap, Yu-cheng Yu, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner,
	Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel, linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch,
	linux-api, Arnd Bergmann, Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh,
	Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov,
	Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook,
	Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit, Oleg Nesterov, Peter Zijlstra,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 877 bytes --]

On Thu 2018-10-18 00:58:29, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 03:39:47PM -0700, Randy Dunlap wrote:
> > Would you mind explaining this request? (requirement?)
> > Other than to say that it is the preference of some maintainers,
> > please say Why it is preferred.
> > 
> > and since the <type>s above won't typically be the same length,
> > it's not for variable name alignment, right?
> 
> Searching the net a little, it shows you have asked that question
> before. So what is it you really wanna know?

Why do you think sorting local variables is good idea (for includes it
reduces collision, hopefully you don't have that for local variables),
and where is it documented in CodingStyle.

									Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states
  2018-10-17 23:17         ` Randy Dunlap
@ 2018-10-18  9:26           ` Borislav Petkov
  2018-10-18  9:31             ` Pavel Machek
  2018-10-18 18:33             ` Randy Dunlap
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2018-10-18  9:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Randy Dunlap
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	linux-kernel, linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api,
	Arnd Bergmann, Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Ravi V. Shankar,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 04:17:01PM -0700, Randy Dunlap wrote:
> I asked what I really wanted to know.

Then the answer is a bit better readability, I'd guess.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states
  2018-10-18  9:26           ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2018-10-18  9:31             ` Pavel Machek
  2018-10-18 12:10               ` Borislav Petkov
  2018-10-18 18:33             ` Randy Dunlap
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Pavel Machek @ 2018-10-18  9:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Borislav Petkov
  Cc: Randy Dunlap, Yu-cheng Yu, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner,
	Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel, linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch,
	linux-api, Arnd Bergmann, Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh,
	Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov,
	Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook,
	Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit, Oleg Nesterov, Peter Zijlstra,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 643 bytes --]

On Thu 2018-10-18 11:26:03, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 04:17:01PM -0700, Randy Dunlap wrote:
> > I asked what I really wanted to know.
> 
> Then the answer is a bit better readability, I'd guess.

Normally, similar local variables are grouped together, with
initialized variables giving additional constraints.

Additionally sorting them with length ... gives too much constraints
to the author. We want readable sources, not neat ascii art everywhere.

									Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states
  2018-10-18  9:31             ` Pavel Machek
@ 2018-10-18 12:10               ` Borislav Petkov
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2018-10-18 12:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Pavel Machek
  Cc: Randy Dunlap, Yu-cheng Yu, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner,
	Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel, linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch,
	linux-api, Arnd Bergmann, Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh,
	Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov,
	Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook,
	Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit, Oleg Nesterov, Peter Zijlstra,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On Thu, Oct 18, 2018 at 11:31:25AM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> We want readable sources, not neat ascii art everywhere.

And we want pink ponies.

Reverse xmas tree order is and has been the usual variable sorting in
the tip tree for years.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states
  2018-10-18  9:26           ` Borislav Petkov
  2018-10-18  9:31             ` Pavel Machek
@ 2018-10-18 18:33             ` Randy Dunlap
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Randy Dunlap @ 2018-10-18 18:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Borislav Petkov
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	linux-kernel, linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api,
	Arnd Bergmann, Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Ravi V. Shankar,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On 10/18/18 2:26 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 04:17:01PM -0700, Randy Dunlap wrote:
>> I asked what I really wanted to know.
> 
> Then the answer is a bit better readability, I'd guess.
> 

Thanks for the reply.

-- 
~Randy

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 21/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 21/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-11-06 18:43   ` Dave Hansen
  2018-11-06 18:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
  2018-11-06 20:21     ` Yu-cheng Yu
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2018-11-06 18:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu-cheng Yu, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	linux-kernel, linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api,
	Arnd Bergmann, Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On 10/11/18 8:15 AM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> @@ -1305,6 +1305,15 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
>  		error_code |= X86_PF_USER;
>  		flags |= FAULT_FLAG_USER;
>  	} else {
> +		/*
> +		 * WRUSS is a kernel instruction and but writes
> +		 * to user shadow stack.  When a fault occurs,
> +		 * both X86_PF_USER and X86_PF_SHSTK are set.
> +		 * Clear X86_PF_USER here.
> +		 */
> +		if ((error_code & (X86_PF_USER | X86_PF_SHSTK)) ==
> +		    (X86_PF_USER | X86_PF_SHSTK))
> +			error_code &= ~X86_PF_USER;
This hunk of code basically points out that the architecture of WRUSS is
broken for Linux.  The setting of X86_PF_USER for a ring-0 instruction
really is a mis-feature of the architecture for us and we *undo* it in
software which is unfortunate.  Wish I would have caught this earlier.

Andy, note that this is another case where hw_error_code and
sw_error_code will diverge, unfortunately.

Anyway, this is going to necessitate some comment updates in the page
fault code.  Yu-cheng, you are going to collide with some recent changes
I made to the page fault code.  Please be careful with the context when
you do the merge and make sure that all the new comments stay correct.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 21/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction
  2018-11-06 18:43   ` Dave Hansen
@ 2018-11-06 18:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
  2018-11-06 20:21     ` Yu-cheng Yu
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2018-11-06 18:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner,
	Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION, Linux-MM, linux-arch,
	Linux API, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H. J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Shanbhogue, Vedvyas

On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 10:43 AM Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> wrote:
>
> On 10/11/18 8:15 AM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> > --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> > @@ -1305,6 +1305,15 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
> >               error_code |= X86_PF_USER;
> >               flags |= FAULT_FLAG_USER;
> >       } else {
> > +             /*
> > +              * WRUSS is a kernel instruction and but writes
> > +              * to user shadow stack.  When a fault occurs,
> > +              * both X86_PF_USER and X86_PF_SHSTK are set.
> > +              * Clear X86_PF_USER here.
> > +              */
> > +             if ((error_code & (X86_PF_USER | X86_PF_SHSTK)) ==
> > +                 (X86_PF_USER | X86_PF_SHSTK))
> > +                     error_code &= ~X86_PF_USER;
> This hunk of code basically points out that the architecture of WRUSS is
> broken for Linux.  The setting of X86_PF_USER for a ring-0 instruction
> really is a mis-feature of the architecture for us and we *undo* it in
> software which is unfortunate.  Wish I would have caught this earlier.
>
> Andy, note that this is another case where hw_error_code and
> sw_error_code will diverge, unfortunately.
>
> Anyway, this is going to necessitate some comment updates in the page
> fault code.  Yu-cheng, you are going to collide with some recent changes
> I made to the page fault code.  Please be careful with the context when
> you do the merge and make sure that all the new comments stay correct.

I'm going to send a patch set in the next day or two that cleans it up
further and is probably good preparation for WRUSS.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 21/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction
  2018-11-06 18:43   ` Dave Hansen
  2018-11-06 18:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
@ 2018-11-06 20:21     ` Yu-cheng Yu
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-11-06 20:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	linux-kernel, linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api,
	Arnd Bergmann, Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On Tue, 2018-11-06 at 10:43 -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 10/11/18 8:15 AM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> > --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> > @@ -1305,6 +1305,15 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long
> > error_code,
> >  		error_code |= X86_PF_USER;
> >  		flags |= FAULT_FLAG_USER;
> >  	} else {
> > +		/*
> > +		 * WRUSS is a kernel instruction and but writes
> > +		 * to user shadow stack.  When a fault occurs,
> > +		 * both X86_PF_USER and X86_PF_SHSTK are set.
> > +		 * Clear X86_PF_USER here.
> > +		 */
> > +		if ((error_code & (X86_PF_USER | X86_PF_SHSTK)) ==
> > +		    (X86_PF_USER | X86_PF_SHSTK))
> > +			error_code &= ~X86_PF_USER;
> 
> This hunk of code basically points out that the architecture of WRUSS is
> broken for Linux.  The setting of X86_PF_USER for a ring-0 instruction
> really is a mis-feature of the architecture for us and we *undo* it in
> software which is unfortunate.  Wish I would have caught this earlier.
> 
> Andy, note that this is another case where hw_error_code and
> sw_error_code will diverge, unfortunately.
> 
> Anyway, this is going to necessitate some comment updates in the page
> fault code.  Yu-cheng, you are going to collide with some recent changes
> I made to the page fault code.  Please be careful with the context when
> you do the merge and make sure that all the new comments stay correct.

Ok.  Thanks!

Yu-cheng

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-11-08 18:40   ` Borislav Petkov
  2018-11-08 20:40     ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-11-11 11:31     ` Pavel Machek
  2018-11-08 20:46   ` Andy Lutomirski
  1 sibling, 2 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2018-11-08 18:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu-cheng Yu
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 08:15:00AM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Intel Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) introduces the
> following MSRs into the XSAVES system states.
> 
>     IA32_U_CET (user-mode CET settings),
>     IA32_PL3_SSP (user-mode shadow stack),
>     IA32_PL0_SSP (kernel-mode shadow stack),
>     IA32_PL1_SSP (ring-1 shadow stack),
>     IA32_PL2_SSP (ring-2 shadow stack).

And?

That commit message got chopped off here, it seems.

> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h            | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h           |  4 +++-
>  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h |  2 ++
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c                | 10 ++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
> index 202c53918ecf..e55d51d172f1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
> @@ -114,6 +114,9 @@ enum xfeature {
>  	XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM,
>  	XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR,
>  	XFEATURE_PKRU,
> +	XFEATURE_RESERVED,
> +	XFEATURE_SHSTK_USER,
> +	XFEATURE_SHSTK_KERNEL,
>  
>  	XFEATURE_MAX,
>  };
> @@ -128,6 +131,8 @@ enum xfeature {
>  #define XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM		(1 << XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM)
>  #define XFEATURE_MASK_PT		(1 << XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR)
>  #define XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU		(1 << XFEATURE_PKRU)
> +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER	(1 << XFEATURE_SHSTK_USER)
> +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_KERNEL	(1 << XFEATURE_SHSTK_KERNEL)
>  
>  #define XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE		(XFEATURE_MASK_FP | XFEATURE_MASK_SSE)
>  #define XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512		(XFEATURE_MASK_OPMASK \
> @@ -229,6 +234,23 @@ struct pkru_state {
>  	u32				pad;
>  } __packed;
>  
> +/*
> + * State component 11 is Control flow Enforcement user states

Why the Camel-cased naming?

"Control" then "flow" then capitalized again "Enforcement".

Fix all occurrences pls, especially the user-visible strings.

> + */
> +struct cet_user_state {
> +	u64 u_cet;	/* user control flow settings */
> +	u64 user_ssp;	/* user shadow stack pointer */

Prefix both with "usr_" instead.

> +} __packed;
> +
> +/*
> + * State component 12 is Control flow Enforcement kernel states
> + */
> +struct cet_kernel_state {
> +	u64 kernel_ssp;	/* kernel shadow stack */
> +	u64 pl1_ssp;	/* ring-1 shadow stack */
> +	u64 pl2_ssp;	/* ring-2 shadow stack */

Just write "privilege level" everywhere - not "ring".

Btw, do you see how the type and the name of all those other fields in
that file are tabulated? Except yours...

> +} __packed;
> +
>  struct xstate_header {
>  	u64				xfeatures;
>  	u64				xcomp_bv;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
> index d8e2ec99f635..18b60748a34d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
> @@ -28,7 +28,9 @@
>  				  XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM | \
>  				  XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU | \
>  				  XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS | \
> -				  XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR)
> +				  XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR | \
> +				  XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER | \
> +				  XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_KERNEL)
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>  #define REX_PREFIX	"0x48, "
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
> index bcba3c643e63..25311ec4b731 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
> @@ -130,6 +130,8 @@
>  #define X86_CR4_SMAP		_BITUL(X86_CR4_SMAP_BIT)
>  #define X86_CR4_PKE_BIT		22 /* enable Protection Keys support */
>  #define X86_CR4_PKE		_BITUL(X86_CR4_PKE_BIT)
> +#define X86_CR4_CET_BIT		23 /* enable Control flow Enforcement */
> +#define X86_CR4_CET		_BITUL(X86_CR4_CET_BIT)
>  
>  /*
>   * x86-64 Task Priority Register, CR8
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> index 605ec6decf3e..ad36ea28bfd1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> @@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ static const char *xfeature_names[] =
>  	"Processor Trace (unused)"	,
>  	"Protection Keys User registers",
>  	"unknown xstate feature"	,
> +	"Control flow User registers"	,
> +	"Control flow Kernel registers"	,
> +	"unknown xstate feature"	,

So there are two "unknown xstate feature" array elems now...

>  static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {
> @@ -48,6 +51,9 @@ static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {
>  	X86_FEATURE_AVX512F,
>  	X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT,
>  	X86_FEATURE_PKU,
> +	0,		   /* Unused */

What's that for?

> +	X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, /* XFEATURE_SHSTK_USER */
> +	X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, /* XFEATURE_SHSTK_KERNEL */
>  };

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-11-08 18:40   ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2018-11-08 20:40     ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-11-08 23:52       ` Borislav Petkov
  2018-11-11 11:31       ` Pavel Machek
  2018-11-11 11:31     ` Pavel Machek
  1 sibling, 2 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-11-08 20:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Borislav Petkov
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On Thu, 2018-11-08 at 19:40 +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 08:15:00AM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> > [...] 
> > +/*
> > + * State component 11 is Control flow Enforcement user states
> 
> Why the Camel-cased naming?
> 
> "Control" then "flow" then capitalized again "Enforcement".
> 
> Fix all occurrences pls, especially the user-visible strings.

I will change it to "Control-flow Enforcement" everywhere.

> > + */
> > +struct cet_user_state {
> > +	u64 u_cet;	/* user control flow settings */
> > +	u64 user_ssp;	/* user shadow stack pointer */
> 
> Prefix both with "usr_" instead.

Ok.

> [...]
> 
> Just write "privilege level" everywhere - not "ring".
> 
> Btw, do you see how the type and the name of all those other fields in
> that file are tabulated? Except yours...

I will fix it.

[...] 
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> > index 605ec6decf3e..ad36ea28bfd1 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> > @@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ static const char *xfeature_names[] =
> >  	"Processor Trace (unused)"	,
> >  	"Protection Keys User registers",
> >  	"unknown xstate feature"	,
> > +	"Control flow User registers"	,
> > +	"Control flow Kernel registers"	,
> > +	"unknown xstate feature"	,
> 
> So there are two "unknown xstate feature" array elems now...
> 
> >  static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {
> > @@ -48,6 +51,9 @@ static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {
> >  	X86_FEATURE_AVX512F,
> >  	X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT,
> >  	X86_FEATURE_PKU,
> > +	0,		   /* Unused */
> 
> What's that for?

In fpu_init_system_xstate(), we test and clear features that are not enabled.
There we depend on the order of these elements.  This is the tenth "unknown
xstate feature".

Yu-cheng

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-11-08 18:40   ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2018-11-08 20:46   ` Andy Lutomirski
  2018-11-08 21:01     ` Yu-cheng Yu
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2018-11-08 20:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu-cheng Yu
  Cc: X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML,
	open list:DOCUMENTATION, Linux-MM, linux-arch, Linux API,
	Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H. J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Shanbhogue, Vedvyas

On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 8:20 AM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>
> Intel Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) introduces the
> following MSRs into the XSAVES system states.
>
>     IA32_U_CET (user-mode CET settings),
>     IA32_PL3_SSP (user-mode shadow stack),
>     IA32_PL0_SSP (kernel-mode shadow stack),
>     IA32_PL1_SSP (ring-1 shadow stack),
>     IA32_PL2_SSP (ring-2 shadow stack).
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h            | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h           |  4 +++-
>  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h |  2 ++
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c                | 10 ++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
> index 202c53918ecf..e55d51d172f1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
> @@ -114,6 +114,9 @@ enum xfeature {
>         XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM,
>         XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR,
>         XFEATURE_PKRU,
> +       XFEATURE_RESERVED,
> +       XFEATURE_SHSTK_USER,
> +       XFEATURE_SHSTK_KERNEL,
>
>         XFEATURE_MAX,
>  };
> @@ -128,6 +131,8 @@ enum xfeature {
>  #define XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM         (1 << XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM)
>  #define XFEATURE_MASK_PT               (1 << XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR)
>  #define XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU             (1 << XFEATURE_PKRU)
> +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER       (1 << XFEATURE_SHSTK_USER)
> +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_KERNEL     (1 << XFEATURE_SHSTK_KERNEL)
>
>  #define XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE            (XFEATURE_MASK_FP | XFEATURE_MASK_SSE)
>  #define XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512           (XFEATURE_MASK_OPMASK \
> @@ -229,6 +234,23 @@ struct pkru_state {
>         u32                             pad;
>  } __packed;
>
> +/*
> + * State component 11 is Control flow Enforcement user states
> + */
> +struct cet_user_state {
> +       u64 u_cet;      /* user control flow settings */
> +       u64 user_ssp;   /* user shadow stack pointer */
> +} __packed;
> +
> +/*
> + * State component 12 is Control flow Enforcement kernel states
> + */
> +struct cet_kernel_state {
> +       u64 kernel_ssp; /* kernel shadow stack */
> +       u64 pl1_ssp;    /* ring-1 shadow stack */
> +       u64 pl2_ssp;    /* ring-2 shadow stack */
> +} __packed;
> +

Why are these __packed?  It seems like it'll generate bad code for no
obvious purpose.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-11-08 20:46   ` Andy Lutomirski
@ 2018-11-08 21:01     ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-11-08 21:22       ` Andy Lutomirski
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-11-08 21:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andy Lutomirski
  Cc: X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML,
	open list:DOCUMENTATION, Linux-MM, linux-arch, Linux API,
	Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H. J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Shanbhogue, Vedvyas

On Thu, 2018-11-08 at 12:46 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 8:20 AM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
> > 
> > Intel Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) introduces the
> > following MSRs into the XSAVES system states.
> > 
> >     IA32_U_CET (user-mode CET settings),
> >     IA32_PL3_SSP (user-mode shadow stack),
> >     IA32_PL0_SSP (kernel-mode shadow stack),
> >     IA32_PL1_SSP (ring-1 shadow stack),
> >     IA32_PL2_SSP (ring-2 shadow stack).
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h            | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++
> >  arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h           |  4 +++-
> >  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h |  2 ++
> >  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c                | 10 ++++++++++
> >  4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
> > b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
> > index 202c53918ecf..e55d51d172f1 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
> > @@ -114,6 +114,9 @@ enum xfeature {
> >         XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM,
> >         XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR,
> >         XFEATURE_PKRU,
> > +       XFEATURE_RESERVED,
> > +       XFEATURE_SHSTK_USER,
> > +       XFEATURE_SHSTK_KERNEL,
> > 
> >         XFEATURE_MAX,
> >  };
> > @@ -128,6 +131,8 @@ enum xfeature {
> >  #define XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM         (1 << XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM)
> >  #define XFEATURE_MASK_PT               (1 <<
> > XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR)
> >  #define XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU             (1 << XFEATURE_PKRU)
> > +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER       (1 << XFEATURE_SHSTK_USER)
> > +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_KERNEL     (1 << XFEATURE_SHSTK_KERNEL)
> > 
> >  #define XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE            (XFEATURE_MASK_FP |
> > XFEATURE_MASK_SSE)
> >  #define XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512           (XFEATURE_MASK_OPMASK \
> > @@ -229,6 +234,23 @@ struct pkru_state {
> >         u32                             pad;
> >  } __packed;
> > 
> > +/*
> > + * State component 11 is Control flow Enforcement user states
> > + */
> > +struct cet_user_state {
> > +       u64 u_cet;      /* user control flow settings */
> > +       u64 user_ssp;   /* user shadow stack pointer */
> > +} __packed;
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * State component 12 is Control flow Enforcement kernel states
> > + */
> > +struct cet_kernel_state {
> > +       u64 kernel_ssp; /* kernel shadow stack */
> > +       u64 pl1_ssp;    /* ring-1 shadow stack */
> > +       u64 pl2_ssp;    /* ring-2 shadow stack */
> > +} __packed;
> > +
> 
> Why are these __packed?  It seems like it'll generate bad code for no
> obvious purpose.

That prevents any possibility that the compiler will insert padding, although in
64-bit kernel this should not happen to either struct.  Also all xstate
components here are packed.

Yu-cheng

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-11-08 21:01     ` Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-11-08 21:22       ` Andy Lutomirski
  2018-11-08 21:31         ` Cyrill Gorcunov
                           ` (2 more replies)
  0 siblings, 3 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2018-11-08 21:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu-cheng Yu
  Cc: X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML,
	open list:DOCUMENTATION, Linux-MM, linux-arch, Linux API,
	Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H. J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Shanbhogue, Vedvyas

On Thu, Nov 8, 2018 at 1:06 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, 2018-11-08 at 12:46 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 8:20 AM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Intel Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) introduces the
> > > following MSRs into the XSAVES system states.
> > >
> > >     IA32_U_CET (user-mode CET settings),
> > >     IA32_PL3_SSP (user-mode shadow stack),
> > >     IA32_PL0_SSP (kernel-mode shadow stack),
> > >     IA32_PL1_SSP (ring-1 shadow stack),
> > >     IA32_PL2_SSP (ring-2 shadow stack).
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> > > ---
> > >  arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h            | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++
> > >  arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h           |  4 +++-
> > >  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h |  2 ++
> > >  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c                | 10 ++++++++++
> > >  4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
> > > b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
> > > index 202c53918ecf..e55d51d172f1 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
> > > @@ -114,6 +114,9 @@ enum xfeature {
> > >         XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM,
> > >         XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR,
> > >         XFEATURE_PKRU,
> > > +       XFEATURE_RESERVED,
> > > +       XFEATURE_SHSTK_USER,
> > > +       XFEATURE_SHSTK_KERNEL,
> > >
> > >         XFEATURE_MAX,
> > >  };
> > > @@ -128,6 +131,8 @@ enum xfeature {
> > >  #define XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM         (1 << XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM)
> > >  #define XFEATURE_MASK_PT               (1 <<
> > > XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR)
> > >  #define XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU             (1 << XFEATURE_PKRU)
> > > +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER       (1 << XFEATURE_SHSTK_USER)
> > > +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_KERNEL     (1 << XFEATURE_SHSTK_KERNEL)
> > >
> > >  #define XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE            (XFEATURE_MASK_FP |
> > > XFEATURE_MASK_SSE)
> > >  #define XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512           (XFEATURE_MASK_OPMASK \
> > > @@ -229,6 +234,23 @@ struct pkru_state {
> > >         u32                             pad;
> > >  } __packed;
> > >
> > > +/*
> > > + * State component 11 is Control flow Enforcement user states
> > > + */
> > > +struct cet_user_state {
> > > +       u64 u_cet;      /* user control flow settings */
> > > +       u64 user_ssp;   /* user shadow stack pointer */
> > > +} __packed;
> > > +
> > > +/*
> > > + * State component 12 is Control flow Enforcement kernel states
> > > + */
> > > +struct cet_kernel_state {
> > > +       u64 kernel_ssp; /* kernel shadow stack */
> > > +       u64 pl1_ssp;    /* ring-1 shadow stack */
> > > +       u64 pl2_ssp;    /* ring-2 shadow stack */
> > > +} __packed;
> > > +
> >
> > Why are these __packed?  It seems like it'll generate bad code for no
> > obvious purpose.
>
> That prevents any possibility that the compiler will insert padding, although in
> 64-bit kernel this should not happen to either struct.  Also all xstate
> components here are packed.
>

They both seem like bugs, perhaps.  As I understand it, __packed
removes padding, but it also forces the compiler to expect the fields
to be unaligned even if they are actually aligned.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-11-08 21:22       ` Andy Lutomirski
@ 2018-11-08 21:31         ` Cyrill Gorcunov
  2018-11-08 22:01           ` Andy Lutomirski
  2018-11-08 21:48         ` Dave Hansen
  2018-11-11 11:31         ` Pavel Machek
  2 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Cyrill Gorcunov @ 2018-11-08 21:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andy Lutomirski
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner,
	Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION, Linux-MM, linux-arch,
	Linux API, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H. J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Shanbhogue, Vedvyas

On Thu, Nov 08, 2018 at 01:22:54PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > >
> > > Why are these __packed?  It seems like it'll generate bad code for no
> > > obvious purpose.
> >
> > That prevents any possibility that the compiler will insert padding, although in
> > 64-bit kernel this should not happen to either struct.  Also all xstate
> > components here are packed.
> >
> 
> They both seem like bugs, perhaps.  As I understand it, __packed
> removes padding, but it also forces the compiler to expect the fields
> to be unaligned even if they are actually aligned.

How is that? Andy, mind to point where you get that this
attribute forces compiler to make such assumption?

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-11-08 21:22       ` Andy Lutomirski
  2018-11-08 21:31         ` Cyrill Gorcunov
@ 2018-11-08 21:48         ` Dave Hansen
  2018-11-08 22:00           ` Matthew Wilcox
  2018-11-11 11:31         ` Pavel Machek
  2 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2018-11-08 21:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andy Lutomirski, Yu-cheng Yu
  Cc: X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML,
	open list:DOCUMENTATION, Linux-MM, linux-arch, Linux API,
	Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H. J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Shanbhogue, Vedvyas

On 11/8/18 1:22 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> +struct cet_kernel_state {
>> +       u64 kernel_ssp; /* kernel shadow stack */
>> +       u64 pl1_ssp;    /* ring-1 shadow stack */
>> +       u64 pl2_ssp;    /* ring-2 shadow stack */
>> +} __packed;
>> +
> Why are these __packed?  It seems like it'll generate bad code for no
> obvious purpose.

It's a hardware-defined in-memory structure.  Granted, we'd need a
really wonky compiler to make that anything *other* than a nicely-packed
24-byte structure, but the __packed makes it explicit.

It is probably a really useful long-term thing to stop using __packed
and start using "__hw_defined" or something that #defines down to __packed.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-11-08 21:48         ` Dave Hansen
@ 2018-11-08 22:00           ` Matthew Wilcox
  2018-11-08 23:35             ` Dave Hansen
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Matthew Wilcox @ 2018-11-08 22:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen
  Cc: Andy Lutomirski, Yu-cheng Yu, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin,
	Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION,
	Linux-MM, linux-arch, Linux API, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh,
	Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov,
	Florian Weimer, H. J. Lu, Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook,
	Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit, Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek,
	Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap, Ravi V. Shankar, Shanbhogue,
	Vedvyas

On Thu, Nov 08, 2018 at 01:48:54PM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 11/8/18 1:22 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >> +struct cet_kernel_state {
> >> +       u64 kernel_ssp; /* kernel shadow stack */
> >> +       u64 pl1_ssp;    /* ring-1 shadow stack */
> >> +       u64 pl2_ssp;    /* ring-2 shadow stack */
> >> +} __packed;
> >> +
> > Why are these __packed?  It seems like it'll generate bad code for no
> > obvious purpose.
> 
> It's a hardware-defined in-memory structure.  Granted, we'd need a
> really wonky compiler to make that anything *other* than a nicely-packed
> 24-byte structure, but the __packed makes it explicit.
> 
> It is probably a really useful long-term thing to stop using __packed
> and start using "__hw_defined" or something that #defines down to __packed.

packed doesn't mean "don't leave gaps".  It means:

'packed'
     The 'packed' attribute specifies that a variable or structure field
     should have the smallest possible alignment--one byte for a
     variable, and one bit for a field, unless you specify a larger
     value with the 'aligned' attribute.

So Andy's right.  It tells the compiler, "this struct will not be naturally aligned, it will be aligned to a 1-byte boundary".  Which is silly.  If we have

struct b {
	unsigned long x;
} __packed;

struct a {
	char c;
	struct b b;
};

we want struct b to start at offset 8, but with __packed, it will start
at offset 1.

Delete __packed.  It doesn't do what you think it does.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-11-08 21:31         ` Cyrill Gorcunov
@ 2018-11-08 22:01           ` Andy Lutomirski
  2018-11-08 22:18             ` Cyrill Gorcunov
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2018-11-08 22:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Cyrill Gorcunov
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner,
	Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION, Linux-MM, linux-arch,
	Linux API, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H. J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Shanbhogue, Vedvyas

On Thu, Nov 8, 2018 at 1:31 PM Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 08, 2018 at 01:22:54PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Why are these __packed?  It seems like it'll generate bad code for no
> > > > obvious purpose.
> > >
> > > That prevents any possibility that the compiler will insert padding, although in
> > > 64-bit kernel this should not happen to either struct.  Also all xstate
> > > components here are packed.
> > >
> >
> > They both seem like bugs, perhaps.  As I understand it, __packed
> > removes padding, but it also forces the compiler to expect the fields
> > to be unaligned even if they are actually aligned.
>
> How is that? Andy, mind to point where you get that this
> attribute forces compiler to make such assumption?

It's from memory.  But gcc seems to agree with me I compiled this:

struct foo {
    int x;
} __attribute__((packed));

int read_foo(struct foo *f)
{
    return f->x;
}

int align_of_foo_x(struct foo *f)
{
    return __alignof__(f->x);
}

Compiling with -O2 gives:

    .globl    read_foo
    .type    read_foo, @function
read_foo:
    movl    (%rdi), %eax
    ret
    .size    read_foo, .-read_foo

    .p2align 4,,15
    .globl    align_of_foo_x
    .type    align_of_foo_x, @function
align_of_foo_x:
    movl    $1, %eax
    ret
    .size    align_of_foo_x, .-align_of_foo_x

So gcc thinks that the x field is one-byte-aligned, but the code is
okay (at least in this instance) on x86.
Building for armv5 gives:

    .type    read_foo, %function
read_foo:
    @ args = 0, pretend = 0, frame = 0
    @ frame_needed = 0, uses_anonymous_args = 0
    @ link register save eliminated.
    ldrb    r3, [r0]    @ zero_extendqisi2
    ldrb    r1, [r0, #1]    @ zero_extendqisi2
    ldrb    r2, [r0, #2]    @ zero_extendqisi2
    orr    r3, r3, r1, lsl #8
    ldrb    r0, [r0, #3]    @ zero_extendqisi2
    orr    r3, r3, r2, lsl #16
    orr    r0, r3, r0, lsl #24
    bx    lr
    .size    read_foo, .-read_foo
    .align    2
    .global    align_of_foo_x
    .syntax unified
    .arm
    .fpu vfpv3-d16
    .type    align_of_foo_x, %function

So I'm pretty sure I'm right.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-11-08 22:01           ` Andy Lutomirski
@ 2018-11-08 22:18             ` Cyrill Gorcunov
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Cyrill Gorcunov @ 2018-11-08 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andy Lutomirski
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner,
	Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION, Linux-MM, linux-arch,
	Linux API, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H. J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Shanbhogue, Vedvyas

On Thu, Nov 08, 2018 at 02:01:42PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > >
> > > They both seem like bugs, perhaps.  As I understand it, __packed
> > > removes padding, but it also forces the compiler to expect the fields
> > > to be unaligned even if they are actually aligned.
> >
> > How is that? Andy, mind to point where you get that this
> > attribute forces compiler to make such assumption?
> 
> It's from memory.  But gcc seems to agree with me I compiled this:
> 

Indeed, thanks!

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-11-08 22:00           ` Matthew Wilcox
@ 2018-11-08 23:35             ` Dave Hansen
  2018-11-09  0:32               ` Matthew Wilcox
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2018-11-08 23:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Matthew Wilcox
  Cc: Andy Lutomirski, Yu-cheng Yu, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin,
	Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION,
	Linux-MM, linux-arch, Linux API, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh,
	Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov,
	Florian Weimer, H. J. Lu, Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook,
	Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit, Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek,
	Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap, Ravi V. Shankar, Shanbhogue,
	Vedvyas

On 11/8/18 2:00 PM, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> struct a {
> 	char c;
> 	struct b b;
> };
> 
> we want struct b to start at offset 8, but with __packed, it will start
> at offset 1.

You're talking about how we want the struct laid out in memory if we
have control over the layout.  I'm talking about what happens if
something *else* tells us the layout, like a hardware specification
which is what is in play with the XSAVE instruction dictated layout
that's in question here.

What I'm concerned about is a structure like this:

struct foo {
        u32 i1;
        u64 i2;
};

If we leave that to natural alignment, we end up with a 16-byte
structure laid out like this:

	0-3	i1
	3-8	alignment gap
	8-15	i2

Which isn't what we want.  We want a 12-byte structure, laid out like this:

	0-3	i1
	4-11	i2

Which we get with:


struct foo {
        u32 i1;
        u64 i2;
} __packed;

Now, looking at Yu-cheng's specific example, it doesn't matter.  We've
got 64-bit types and natural 64-bit alignment.  Without __packed, we
need to look out for natural alignment screwing us up.  With __packed,
it just does what it *looks* like it does.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-11-08 20:40     ` Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-11-08 23:52       ` Borislav Petkov
  2018-11-11 11:31       ` Pavel Machek
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2018-11-08 23:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu-cheng Yu
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On Thu, Nov 08, 2018 at 12:40:02PM -0800, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> In fpu_init_system_xstate(), we test and clear features that are not enabled.
> There we depend on the order of these elements.  This is the tenth "unknown
> xstate feature".

Aha, those are *reserved* bits - not unused, in XCR0.

Do an s/unused/reserved/g pls.

Now let's see, you have 0 for the 10th bit which happens to be

#define X86_FEATURE_FPU                 ( 0*32+ 0) /* Onboard FPU */

too. And if we look at the code:

        for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xsave_cpuid_features); i++) {
                if (!boot_cpu_has(xsave_cpuid_features[i]))
                        xfeatures_mask_all &= ~BIT_ULL(i);

guess what happens if i == 10.

I know, the subsequent & SUPPORTED_XFEATURES_MASK saves you from the
#GP but that's still not good enough. The loop should not even call
boot_cpu_has() for reserved feature bits.

Thx.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-11-08 23:35             ` Dave Hansen
@ 2018-11-09  0:32               ` Matthew Wilcox
  2018-11-09  0:45                 ` Andy Lutomirski
  2018-11-09 17:13                 ` Dave Hansen
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Matthew Wilcox @ 2018-11-09  0:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen
  Cc: Andy Lutomirski, Yu-cheng Yu, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin,
	Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION,
	Linux-MM, linux-arch, Linux API, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh,
	Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov,
	Florian Weimer, H. J. Lu, Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook,
	Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit, Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek,
	Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap, Ravi V. Shankar, Shanbhogue,
	Vedvyas

On Thu, Nov 08, 2018 at 03:35:02PM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 11/8/18 2:00 PM, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> > struct a {
> > 	char c;
> > 	struct b b;
> > };
> > 
> > we want struct b to start at offset 8, but with __packed, it will start
> > at offset 1.
> 
> You're talking about how we want the struct laid out in memory if we
> have control over the layout.  I'm talking about what happens if
> something *else* tells us the layout, like a hardware specification
> which is what is in play with the XSAVE instruction dictated layout
> that's in question here.
> 
> What I'm concerned about is a structure like this:
> 
> struct foo {
>         u32 i1;
>         u64 i2;
> };
> 
> If we leave that to natural alignment, we end up with a 16-byte
> structure laid out like this:
> 
> 	0-3	i1
> 	3-8	alignment gap
> 	8-15	i2

I know you actually meant:

	0-3	i1
	4-7	pad
	8-15	i2

> Which isn't what we want.  We want a 12-byte structure, laid out like this:
> 
> 	0-3	i1
> 	4-11	i2
> 
> Which we get with:
> 
> struct foo {
>         u32 i1;
>         u64 i2;
> } __packed;

But we _also_ get pessimised accesses to i1 and i2.  Because gcc can't
rely on struct foo being aligned to a 4 or even 8 byte boundary (it
might be embedded in "struct a" from above).

> Now, looking at Yu-cheng's specific example, it doesn't matter.  We've
> got 64-bit types and natural 64-bit alignment.  Without __packed, we
> need to look out for natural alignment screwing us up.  With __packed,
> it just does what it *looks* like it does.

The question is whether Yu-cheng's struct is ever embedded in another
struct.  And if so, what does the hardware do?

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-11-09  0:32               ` Matthew Wilcox
@ 2018-11-09  0:45                 ` Andy Lutomirski
  2018-11-09 17:13                 ` Dave Hansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2018-11-09  0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Matthew Wilcox
  Cc: Dave Hansen, Yu-cheng Yu, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin,
	Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION,
	Linux-MM, linux-arch, Linux API, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh,
	Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov,
	Florian Weimer, H. J. Lu, Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook,
	Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit, Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek,
	Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap, Ravi V. Shankar, Shanbhogue,
	Vedvyas

On Thu, Nov 8, 2018 at 4:32 PM Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 08, 2018 at 03:35:02PM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
> > On 11/8/18 2:00 PM, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> > > struct a {
> > >     char c;
> > >     struct b b;
> > > };
> > >
> > > we want struct b to start at offset 8, but with __packed, it will start
> > > at offset 1.
> >
> > You're talking about how we want the struct laid out in memory if we
> > have control over the layout.  I'm talking about what happens if
> > something *else* tells us the layout, like a hardware specification
> > which is what is in play with the XSAVE instruction dictated layout
> > that's in question here.
> >
> > What I'm concerned about is a structure like this:
> >
> > struct foo {
> >         u32 i1;
> >         u64 i2;
> > };
> >
> > If we leave that to natural alignment, we end up with a 16-byte
> > structure laid out like this:
> >
> >       0-3     i1
> >       3-8     alignment gap
> >       8-15    i2
>
> I know you actually meant:
>
>         0-3     i1
>         4-7     pad
>         8-15    i2
>
> > Which isn't what we want.  We want a 12-byte structure, laid out like this:
> >
> >       0-3     i1
> >       4-11    i2
> >
> > Which we get with:
> >
> > struct foo {
> >         u32 i1;
> >         u64 i2;
> > } __packed;
>
> But we _also_ get pessimised accesses to i1 and i2.  Because gcc can't
> rely on struct foo being aligned to a 4 or even 8 byte boundary (it
> might be embedded in "struct a" from above).
>

In the event we end up with a hardware structure that has
not-really-aligned elements, I suspect we can ask gcc for a new
extension to help.  Or maybe some hack like:

struct foo {
  u32 i1;
  struct {
    u64 i2;
  } __attribute__((packed));
};

would do the trick.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-11-09  0:32               ` Matthew Wilcox
  2018-11-09  0:45                 ` Andy Lutomirski
@ 2018-11-09 17:13                 ` Dave Hansen
  2018-11-09 17:17                   ` Matthew Wilcox
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2018-11-09 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Matthew Wilcox
  Cc: Andy Lutomirski, Yu-cheng Yu, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin,
	Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION,
	Linux-MM, linux-arch, Linux API, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh,
	Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov,
	Florian Weimer, H. J. Lu, Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook,
	Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit, Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek,
	Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap, Ravi V. Shankar, Shanbhogue,
	Vedvyas

On 11/8/18 4:32 PM, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
>> Now, looking at Yu-cheng's specific example, it doesn't matter.  We've
>> got 64-bit types and natural 64-bit alignment.  Without __packed, we
>> need to look out for natural alignment screwing us up.  With __packed,
>> it just does what it *looks* like it does.
> The question is whether Yu-cheng's struct is ever embedded in another
> struct.  And if so, what does the hardware do?

It's not really.

+struct cet_user_state {
+	u64 u_cet;	/* user control flow settings */
+	u64 user_ssp;	/* user shadow stack pointer */
+} __packed;

This ends up embedded in 'struct fpu'.  The hardware tells us what the
sum of all the sizes of all the state components are, and also tells us
the offsets inside the larger buffer.

We double-check that the structure sizes exactly match the sizes that
the hardware tells us that the buffer pieces are via XCHECK_SZ().

But, later versions of the hardware have instructions that don't have
static offsets for the state components (when the XSAVES/XSAVEC
instructions are used).  So, for those, the structure embedding isn't
used at *all* since some state might not be present.


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-11-09 17:13                 ` Dave Hansen
@ 2018-11-09 17:17                   ` Matthew Wilcox
  2018-11-09 17:20                     ` Dave Hansen
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Matthew Wilcox @ 2018-11-09 17:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen
  Cc: Andy Lutomirski, Yu-cheng Yu, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin,
	Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION,
	Linux-MM, linux-arch, Linux API, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh,
	Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov,
	Florian Weimer, H. J. Lu, Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook,
	Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit, Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek,
	Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap, Ravi V. Shankar, Shanbhogue,
	Vedvyas

On Fri, Nov 09, 2018 at 09:13:32AM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 11/8/18 4:32 PM, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> >> Now, looking at Yu-cheng's specific example, it doesn't matter.  We've
> >> got 64-bit types and natural 64-bit alignment.  Without __packed, we
> >> need to look out for natural alignment screwing us up.  With __packed,
> >> it just does what it *looks* like it does.
> > The question is whether Yu-cheng's struct is ever embedded in another
> > struct.  And if so, what does the hardware do?
> 
> It's not really.
> 
> +struct cet_user_state {
> +	u64 u_cet;	/* user control flow settings */
> +	u64 user_ssp;	/* user shadow stack pointer */
> +} __packed;
> 
> This ends up embedded in 'struct fpu'.  The hardware tells us what the
> sum of all the sizes of all the state components are, and also tells us
> the offsets inside the larger buffer.
> 
> We double-check that the structure sizes exactly match the sizes that
> the hardware tells us that the buffer pieces are via XCHECK_SZ().
> 
> But, later versions of the hardware have instructions that don't have
> static offsets for the state components (when the XSAVES/XSAVEC
> instructions are used).  So, for those, the structure embedding isn't
> used at *all* since some state might not be present.

But *when present*, this structure is always aligned on an 8-byte
boundary, right?


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-11-09 17:17                   ` Matthew Wilcox
@ 2018-11-09 17:20                     ` Dave Hansen
  2018-11-09 17:28                       ` Dave Hansen
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2018-11-09 17:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Matthew Wilcox
  Cc: Andy Lutomirski, Yu-cheng Yu, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin,
	Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION,
	Linux-MM, linux-arch, Linux API, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh,
	Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov,
	Florian Weimer, H. J. Lu, Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook,
	Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit, Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek,
	Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap, Ravi V. Shankar, Shanbhogue,
	Vedvyas

On 11/9/18 9:17 AM, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
>> But, later versions of the hardware have instructions that don't have
>> static offsets for the state components (when the XSAVES/XSAVEC
>> instructions are used).  So, for those, the structure embedding isn't
>> used at *all* since some state might not be present.
> But *when present*, this structure is always aligned on an 8-byte
> boundary, right?

There's no guarantee of that.

There is an "aligned" attribute for each XSAVE state component, but I do
not believe it is set for anything yet.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-11-09 17:20                     ` Dave Hansen
@ 2018-11-09 17:28                       ` Dave Hansen
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2018-11-09 17:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Matthew Wilcox
  Cc: Andy Lutomirski, Yu-cheng Yu, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin,
	Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION,
	Linux-MM, linux-arch, Linux API, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh,
	Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov,
	Florian Weimer, H. J. Lu, Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook,
	Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit, Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek,
	Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap, Ravi V. Shankar, Shanbhogue,
	Vedvyas

On 11/9/18 9:20 AM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 11/9/18 9:17 AM, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
>>> But, later versions of the hardware have instructions that don't have
>>> static offsets for the state components (when the XSAVES/XSAVEC
>>> instructions are used).  So, for those, the structure embedding isn't
>>> used at *all* since some state might not be present.
>> But *when present*, this structure is always aligned on an 8-byte
>> boundary, right?

Practically, though, I think it ends up always being aligned on an
8-byte boundary.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-11-08 18:40   ` Borislav Petkov
  2018-11-08 20:40     ` Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-11-11 11:31     ` Pavel Machek
  2018-11-11 14:59       ` Andy Lutomirski
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Pavel Machek @ 2018-11-11 11:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Borislav Petkov
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	linux-kernel, linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api,
	Arnd Bergmann, Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap, Ravi V. Shankar,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 645 bytes --]

Hi!

> > +/*
> > + * State component 12 is Control flow Enforcement kernel states
> > + */
> > +struct cet_kernel_state {
> > +	u64 kernel_ssp;	/* kernel shadow stack */
> > +	u64 pl1_ssp;	/* ring-1 shadow stack */
> > +	u64 pl2_ssp;	/* ring-2 shadow stack */
> 
> Just write "privilege level" everywhere - not "ring".

Please just use word "ring". It is well estabilished terminology.

Which ring is priviledge level 1, given that we have SMM and
virtualization support?

									Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-11-08 20:40     ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-11-08 23:52       ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2018-11-11 11:31       ` Pavel Machek
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Pavel Machek @ 2018-11-11 11:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu-cheng Yu
  Cc: Borislav Petkov, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner,
	Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel, linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch,
	linux-api, Arnd Bergmann, Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh,
	Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov,
	Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook,
	Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit, Oleg Nesterov, Peter Zijlstra,
	Randy Dunlap, Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 378 bytes --]

> > Just write "privilege level" everywhere - not "ring".
> > 
> > Btw, do you see how the type and the name of all those other fields in
> > that file are tabulated? Except yours...
> 
> I will fix it.

Don't. It is not broken.

-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-11-08 21:22       ` Andy Lutomirski
  2018-11-08 21:31         ` Cyrill Gorcunov
  2018-11-08 21:48         ` Dave Hansen
@ 2018-11-11 11:31         ` Pavel Machek
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Pavel Machek @ 2018-11-11 11:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andy Lutomirski
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner,
	Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION, Linux-MM, linux-arch,
	Linux API, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H. J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap, Ravi V. Shankar,
	Shanbhogue, Vedvyas

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1219 bytes --]

> > > > +/*
> > > > + * State component 12 is Control flow Enforcement kernel states
> > > > + */
> > > > +struct cet_kernel_state {
> > > > +       u64 kernel_ssp; /* kernel shadow stack */
> > > > +       u64 pl1_ssp;    /* ring-1 shadow stack */
> > > > +       u64 pl2_ssp;    /* ring-2 shadow stack */
> > > > +} __packed;
> > > > +
> > >
> > > Why are these __packed?  It seems like it'll generate bad code for no
> > > obvious purpose.
> >
> > That prevents any possibility that the compiler will insert padding, although in
> > 64-bit kernel this should not happen to either struct.  Also all xstate
> > components here are packed.
> >
> 
> They both seem like bugs, perhaps.  As I understand it, __packed
> removes padding, but it also forces the compiler to expect the fields
> to be unaligned even if they are actually aligned.

This structure is shared with hardware, right? __packed seems like
right thing to do semantically.

As x86 handles unaligned accesses automatically, there should not be
much difference either way.
									Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-11-11 11:31     ` Pavel Machek
@ 2018-11-11 14:59       ` Andy Lutomirski
  2018-11-11 19:02         ` Pavel Machek
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2018-11-11 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Pavel Machek
  Cc: Borislav Petkov, Yu-cheng Yu, x86, H. Peter Anvin,
	Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel, linux-doc, linux-mm,
	linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh,
	Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov,
	Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook,
	Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit, Oleg Nesterov, Peter Zijlstra,
	Randy Dunlap, Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue



> On Nov 11, 2018, at 3:31 AM, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> wrote:
> 
> Hi!
> 
>>> +/*
>>> + * State component 12 is Control flow Enforcement kernel states
>>> + */
>>> +struct cet_kernel_state {
>>> +    u64 kernel_ssp;    /* kernel shadow stack */
>>> +    u64 pl1_ssp;    /* ring-1 shadow stack */
>>> +    u64 pl2_ssp;    /* ring-2 shadow stack */
>> 
>> Just write "privilege level" everywhere - not "ring".
> 
> Please just use word "ring". It is well estabilished terminology.
> 
> Which ring is priviledge level 1, given that we have SMM and
> virtualization support?

To the contrary: CPL, DPL, and RPL are very well defined terms in the architecture manuals. “PL” is privilege level. PL 1 is very well defined.

SMM is SMM, full stop (unless dual mode or whatever it’s called is on, but AFAIK no one uses it).  VMX non-root CPL 1 is *still* privilege level 1.

In contrast, the security community likes to call SMM “ring -1”, which is cute, but wrong from a systems programmer view. For example, SMM’s CPL can still range from 0-3.

> 
>                                    Pavel
> -- 
> (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
> (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
  2018-11-11 14:59       ` Andy Lutomirski
@ 2018-11-11 19:02         ` Pavel Machek
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Pavel Machek @ 2018-11-11 19:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andy Lutomirski
  Cc: Borislav Petkov, Yu-cheng Yu, x86, H. Peter Anvin,
	Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel, linux-doc, linux-mm,
	linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh,
	Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov,
	Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook,
	Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit, Oleg Nesterov, Peter Zijlstra,
	Randy Dunlap, Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1553 bytes --]

On Sun 2018-11-11 06:59:24, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> 
> 
> > On Nov 11, 2018, at 3:31 AM, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> wrote:
> > 
> > Hi!
> > 
> >>> +/*
> >>> + * State component 12 is Control flow Enforcement kernel states
> >>> + */
> >>> +struct cet_kernel_state {
> >>> +    u64 kernel_ssp;    /* kernel shadow stack */
> >>> +    u64 pl1_ssp;    /* ring-1 shadow stack */
> >>> +    u64 pl2_ssp;    /* ring-2 shadow stack */
> >> 
> >> Just write "privilege level" everywhere - not "ring".
> > 
> > Please just use word "ring". It is well estabilished terminology.
> > 
> > Which ring is priviledge level 1, given that we have SMM and
> > virtualization support?
> 
> To the contrary: CPL, DPL, and RPL are very well defined terms in the architecture manuals. “PL” is privilege level. PL 1 is very well defined.
> 

"Priviledge level" is generic term. "CPL" I may recognize as
Intel-specific. "priviledge level" I would not. So I'd really use
"ring" there. "CPL 1 shadow stack" would be okay, too I guess.

> SMM is SMM, full stop (unless dual mode or whatever it’s called is on, but AFAIK no one uses it).  VMX non-root CPL 1 is *still* privilege level 1.
> 
> In contrast, the security community likes to call SMM “ring -1”, which is cute, but wrong from a systems programmer view. For example, SMM’s CPL can still range from 0-3.
> 

Regards,
									Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-11-13 18:43   ` Borislav Petkov
  2018-11-13 21:02     ` Yu-cheng Yu
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2018-11-13 18:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu-cheng Yu
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 08:15:01AM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Explain how CET works and the no_cet_shstk/no_cet_ibt kernel
> parameters.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> ---
>  .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |   6 +
>  Documentation/index.rst                       |   1 +
>  Documentation/x86/index.rst                   |  11 +
>  Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst               | 266 ++++++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 284 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/index.rst
>  create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst

So this patch should probably come first in the series so that a reader
can know what to expect...

> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index 92eb1f42240d..3854423f7c86 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -2764,6 +2764,12 @@
>  			noexec=on: enable non-executable mappings (default)
>  			noexec=off: disable non-executable mappings
>  
> +	no_cet_ibt	[X86-64] Disable indirect branch tracking for user-mode
> +			applications
> +
> +	no_cet_shstk	[X86-64] Disable shadow stack support for user-mode
> +			applications
> +
>  	nosmap		[X86]
>  			Disable SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention)
>  			even if it is supported by processor.
> diff --git a/Documentation/index.rst b/Documentation/index.rst
> index 5db7e87c7cb1..1cdc139adb40 100644
> --- a/Documentation/index.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/index.rst

Please integrate scripts/checkpatch.pl into your patch creation
workflow. Some of the warnings/errors *actually* make sense:

WARNING: Missing or malformed SPDX-License-Identifier tag in line 1
#76: FILE: Documentation/x86/index.rst:1:
+=======================

WARNING: Missing or malformed SPDX-License-Identifier tag in line 1
#93: FILE: Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst:1:
+=========================================

> @@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ implementation.
>     :maxdepth: 2
>  
>     sh/index
> +   x86/index
>  
>  Filesystem Documentation
>  ------------------------
> diff --git a/Documentation/x86/index.rst b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..9c34d8cbc8f0
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
> @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
> +=======================
> +X86 Documentation
> +=======================
> +
> +Control Flow Enforcement
> +========================
> +
> +.. toctree::
> +   :maxdepth: 1
> +
> +   intel_cet
> diff --git a/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst b/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..946f4802a51f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
> @@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
> +=========================================
> +Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET)
> +=========================================
> +
> +[1] Overview
> +============
> +
> +Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET) provides protection against
> +return/jump-oriented programming (ROP) attacks.  It can be implemented
> +to protect both the kernel and applications.  In the first phase,
> +only the user-mode protection is implemented on the 64-bit kernel.

s/the//			         is implemented in 64-bit mode.

> +However, 32-bit applications are supported under the compatibility
> +mode.

Drop "However":

"32-bit applications are, of course, supported in compatibility mode."

> +
> +CET includes shadow stack (SHSTK) and indirect branch tracking (IBT).

"CET introduces two a shadow stack and an indirect branch tracking mechanism."

> +The SHSTK is a secondary stack allocated from memory.  The processor

s/The//

> +automatically pushes/pops a secure copy to the SHSTK every return
> +address and,

that reads funny - pls reorganize. Also, what is a "secure copy"?

You mean a copy of every return address which software cannot access?

> by comparing the secure copy to the program stack copy,
> +verifies function returns are as intended. 

			 ... have not been corrupted/modified."

> The IBT verifies all
> +indirect CALL/JMP targets are intended and marked by the compiler with
> +'ENDBR' op codes.

"opcode" - one word. And before you use "ENDBR" you need to explain it
above what it is.

/me reads further... encounters ENDBR's definition...

ah, ok, so you should say something like

"... and marked by the compiler with the ENDBR opcode (see below)."

> +
> +There are two kernel configuration options:
> +
> +    INTEL_X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER, and
> +    INTEL_X86_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER.
> +
> +To build a CET-enabled kernel, Binutils v2.31 and GCC v8.1 or later
> +are required.  To build a CET-enabled application, GLIBC v2.28 or
> +later is also required.
> +
> +There are two command-line options for disabling CET features:
> +
> +    no_cet_shstk - disables SHSTK, and
> +    no_cet_ibt - disables IBT.
> +
> +At run time, /proc/cpuinfo shows the availability of SHSTK and IBT.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
  2018-11-13 18:43   ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2018-11-13 21:02     ` Yu-cheng Yu
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-11-13 21:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Borislav Petkov
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On Tue, 2018-11-13 at 19:43 +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 08:15:01AM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> > Explain how CET works and the no_cet_shstk/no_cet_ibt kernel
> > parameters.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> > ---
> >  .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |   6 +
> >  Documentation/index.rst                       |   1 +
> >  Documentation/x86/index.rst                   |  11 +
> >  Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst               | 266 ++++++++++++++++++
> >  4 files changed, 284 insertions(+)
> >  create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/index.rst
> >  create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
> 
> So this patch should probably come first in the series so that a reader
> can know what to expect...
> 
> > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > index 92eb1f42240d..3854423f7c86 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > @@ -2764,6 +2764,12 @@
> >  			noexec=on: enable non-executable mappings (default)
> >  			noexec=off: disable non-executable mappings
> >  
> > +	no_cet_ibt	[X86-64] Disable indirect branch tracking for
> > user-mode
> > +			applications
> > +
> > +	no_cet_shstk	[X86-64] Disable shadow stack support for user-
> > mode
> > +			applications
> > +
> >  	nosmap		[X86]
> >  			Disable SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention)
> >  			even if it is supported by processor.
> > diff --git a/Documentation/index.rst b/Documentation/index.rst
> > index 5db7e87c7cb1..1cdc139adb40 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/index.rst
> > +++ b/Documentation/index.rst
> 
> Please integrate scripts/checkpatch.pl into your patch creation
> workflow. Some of the warnings/errors *actually* make sense:
> 
> WARNING: Missing or malformed SPDX-License-Identifier tag in line 1
> #76: FILE: Documentation/x86/index.rst:1:
> +=======================
> 
> WARNING: Missing or malformed SPDX-License-Identifier tag in line 1
> #93: FILE: Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst:1:
> +=========================================
> 
> > @@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ implementation.
> >     :maxdepth: 2
> >  
> >     sh/index
> > +   x86/index
> >  
> >  Filesystem Documentation
> >  ------------------------
> > diff --git a/Documentation/x86/index.rst b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..9c34d8cbc8f0
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
> > @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
> > +=======================
> > +X86 Documentation
> > +=======================
> > +
> > +Control Flow Enforcement
> > +========================
> > +
> > +.. toctree::
> > +   :maxdepth: 1
> > +
> > +   intel_cet
> > diff --git a/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
> > b/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..946f4802a51f
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
> > @@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
> > +=========================================
> > +Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET)
> > +=========================================
> > +
> > +[1] Overview
> > +============
> > +
> > +Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET) provides protection against
> > +return/jump-oriented programming (ROP) attacks.  It can be implemented
> > +to protect both the kernel and applications.  In the first phase,
> > +only the user-mode protection is implemented on the 64-bit kernel.
> 
> s/the//			         is implemented in 64-bit mode.
> 
> > +However, 32-bit applications are supported under the compatibility
> > +mode.
> 
> Drop "However":
> 
> "32-bit applications are, of course, supported in compatibility mode."
> 
> > +
> > +CET includes shadow stack (SHSTK) and indirect branch tracking (IBT).
> 
> "CET introduces two a shadow stack and an indirect branch tracking mechanism."
> 
> > +The SHSTK is a secondary stack allocated from memory.  The processor
> 
> s/The//
> 
> > +automatically pushes/pops a secure copy to the SHSTK every return
> > +address and,
> 
> that reads funny - pls reorganize. Also, what is a "secure copy"?
> 
> You mean a copy of every return address which software cannot access?
> 
> > by comparing the secure copy to the program stack copy,
> > +verifies function returns are as intended. 
> 
> 			 ... have not been corrupted/modified."
> 
> > The IBT verifies all
> > +indirect CALL/JMP targets are intended and marked by the compiler with
> > +'ENDBR' op codes.
> 
> "opcode" - one word. And before you use "ENDBR" you need to explain it
> above what it is.
> 
> /me reads further... encounters ENDBR's definition...
> 
> ah, ok, so you should say something like
> 
> "... and marked by the compiler with the ENDBR opcode (see below)."

I will work on it.  Thanks!

Yu-cheng

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler
  2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-11-14 18:44   ` Borislav Petkov
  2018-11-14 20:19     ` Yu-cheng Yu
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2018-11-14 18:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu-cheng Yu
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

That subject needs a verb:

Subject: [PATCH v5 06/27] x86/cet: Add control protection exception handler

On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 08:15:02AM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> A control protection exception is triggered when a control flow transfer
> attempt violated shadow stack or indirect branch tracking constraints.
> For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the
> safe copy on the shadow stack; or a JMP instruction arrives at a non-
> ENDBR instruction.
> 
> The control protection exception handler works in a similar way as the
> general protection fault handler.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S          |  2 +-
>  arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h       |  3 ++
>  arch/x86/kernel/idt.c              |  4 ++
>  arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c    |  2 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/traps.c            | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h |  3 +-
>  6 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

A *lot* of style problems here. Please use checkpatch and then common
sense to check your patches before sending. All those below are valid,
AFAICT:

WARNING: function definition argument 'struct pt_regs *' should also have an identifier name
#76: FILE: arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h:81:
+dotraplinkage void do_control_protection(struct pt_regs *, long);

WARNING: function definition argument 'long' should also have an identifier name
#76: FILE: arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h:81:
+dotraplinkage void do_control_protection(struct pt_regs *, long);

WARNING: static const char * array should probably be static const char * const
#124: FILE: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:581:
+static const char *control_protection_err[] =

ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line
#125: FILE: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:582:
+static const char *control_protection_err[] =
+{

WARNING: quoted string split across lines
#158: FILE: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:615:
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "CET is disabled but got control "
+			  "protection fault\n");

WARNING: Prefer printk_ratelimited or pr_<level>_ratelimited to printk_ratelimit
#165: FILE: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:622:
+	    printk_ratelimit()) {

WARNING: Avoid logging continuation uses where feasible
#176: FILE: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:633:
+		pr_cont("\n");

ERROR: "(foo*)" should be "(foo *)"
#183: FILE: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:640:
+	info.si_addr	= (void __user*)uprobe_get_trap_addr(regs);


And now that patch doesn't even build anymore because of the siginfo
changes which came in during the merge window. I guess I'll wait for
your v6 patchset.

---
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c: In function ‘do_control_protection’:
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:627:16: error: passing argument 1 of ‘clear_siginfo’ from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types]
  clear_siginfo(&info);
                ^~~~~
In file included from ./include/linux/sched/signal.h:6,
                 from ./include/linux/ptrace.h:7,
                 from ./include/linux/ftrace.h:14,
                 from ./include/linux/kprobes.h:42,
                 from arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:19:
./include/linux/signal.h:20:52: note: expected ‘kernel_siginfo_t *’ {aka ‘struct kernel_siginfo *’} but argument is of type ‘siginfo_t *’ {aka ‘struct siginfo *’}
 static inline void clear_siginfo(kernel_siginfo_t *info)
                                  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:632:26: error: passing argument 2 of ‘force_sig_info’ from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types]
  force_sig_info(SIGSEGV, &info, tsk);
                          ^~~~~
In file included from ./include/linux/ptrace.h:7,
                 from ./include/linux/ftrace.h:14,
                 from ./include/linux/kprobes.h:42,
                 from arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:19:
./include/linux/sched/signal.h:327:32: note: expected ‘struct kernel_siginfo *’ but argument is of type ‘siginfo_t *’ {aka ‘struct siginfo *’}
 extern int force_sig_info(int, struct kernel_siginfo *, struct task_struct *);
                                ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
cc1: some warnings being treated as errors
make[2]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:291: arch/x86/kernel/traps.o] Error 1
make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:516: arch/x86/kernel] Error 2
make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....
make: *** [Makefile:1060: arch/x86] Error 2
make: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler
  2018-11-14 18:44   ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2018-11-14 20:19     ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2018-11-14 20:28       ` Borislav Petkov
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2018-11-14 20:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Borislav Petkov
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On Wed, 2018-11-14 at 19:44 +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> That subject needs a verb:
> 
> Subject: [PATCH v5 06/27] x86/cet: Add control protection exception handler
> 
> On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 08:15:02AM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> > A control protection exception is triggered when a control flow transfer
> > attempt violated shadow stack or indirect branch tracking constraints.
> > For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the
> > safe copy on the shadow stack; or a JMP instruction arrives at a non-
> > ENDBR instruction.
> > 
> > The control protection exception handler works in a similar way as the
> > general protection fault handler.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S          |  2 +-
> >  arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h       |  3 ++
> >  arch/x86/kernel/idt.c              |  4 ++
> >  arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c    |  2 +-
> >  arch/x86/kernel/traps.c            | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h |  3 +-
> >  6 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> A *lot* of style problems here. Please use checkpatch and then common
> sense to check your patches before sending. All those below are valid,
> AFAICT:
> 
> WARNING: function definition argument 'struct pt_regs *' should also have an
> identifier name
> #76: FILE: arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h:81:
> +dotraplinkage void do_control_protection(struct pt_regs *, long);
> 
> WARNING: function definition argument 'long' should also have an identifier
> name
> #76: FILE: arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h:81:
> +dotraplinkage void do_control_protection(struct pt_regs *, long);

Yes, I was not sure if the addition should follow the existing style (which does
not have identifier names).  What do you think is right?

Thanks,
Yu-cheng

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler
  2018-11-14 20:19     ` Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2018-11-14 20:28       ` Borislav Petkov
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2018-11-14 20:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu-cheng Yu
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 12:19:42PM -0800, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Yes, I was not sure if the addition should follow the existing style (which does
> not have identifier names).  What do you think is right?

Yeah, we've converted them all now to named params:

https://git.kernel.org/tip/8e1599fcac2efda8b7d433ef69d2492f0b351e3f

It probably would be easier if you redo your patchset ontop of current
tip/master.

Thx.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2018-11-14 20:28 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 80+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 16:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-11 16:45     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-15 17:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-17 10:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-17 22:39     ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-17 22:58       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-17 23:17         ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-18  9:26           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-18  9:31             ` Pavel Machek
2018-10-18 12:10               ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-18 18:33             ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-18  9:24         ` Pavel Machek
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-08 18:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-08 20:40     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-08 23:52       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-11 11:31       ` Pavel Machek
2018-11-11 11:31     ` Pavel Machek
2018-11-11 14:59       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-11 19:02         ` Pavel Machek
2018-11-08 20:46   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-08 21:01     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-08 21:22       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-08 21:31         ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-11-08 22:01           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-08 22:18             ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-11-08 21:48         ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-08 22:00           ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-11-08 23:35             ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-09  0:32               ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-11-09  0:45                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-09 17:13                 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-09 17:17                   ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-11-09 17:20                     ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-09 17:28                       ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-11 11:31         ` Pavel Machek
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-13 18:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-13 21:02     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-14 18:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-14 20:19     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-14 20:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 07/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 20:39   ` Jann Horn
2018-10-11 20:49     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 20:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-12 21:49       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-12 13:17     ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-10-11 20:49   ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-12 10:24     ` Florian Weimer
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 08/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 09/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 10/27] mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 11/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 12/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 13/27] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 14/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 15/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 16/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 17/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 18/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 19/27] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 21/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-06 18:43   ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-06 18:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-06 20:21     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 22/27] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 23/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 25/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 19:21 ` [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Dave Hansen
2018-10-11 19:29   ` Yu-cheng Yu

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