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From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org
Cc: linux-security@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH V33 07/30] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 18:19:18 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190621011941.186255-8-matthewgarrett@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190621011941.186255-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>

From: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>

Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure
boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy
kexec_load.  In this state, the system is missing the protections provided
by secure boot.

Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original
kernel.

secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the
stub.  Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot.

Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
---
 arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index 22f60dd26460..4243359ac509 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr,
 	if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
 		return 0;
 
+	params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot;
 	ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature;
 	ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab;
 	ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;
-- 
2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-06-21  1:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-06-21  1:19 [PATCH V33 00/30] Lockdown as an LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 01/30] security: Support early LSMs Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  3:21   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-21 19:26     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  5:23   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-21 19:27     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 02/30] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  3:23   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-21 19:29     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 03/30] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  3:44   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-21 19:37     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 21:04       ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 22:31   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 04/30] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  3:46   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 05/30] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 06/30] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 08/30] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 09/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 10/30] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 11/30] uswsusp: " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 12/30] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 13/30] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 14/30] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 15/30] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 16/30] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 17/30] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 18/30] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 19/30] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 20/30] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 21/30] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-06-26 12:46   ` Steven Rostedt
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 22/30] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 23/30] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 24/30] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  5:22   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-21 20:05     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-26 20:22     ` James Morris
2019-06-27  0:57       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-27 14:35         ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 18:06           ` James Morris
2019-06-27 20:16             ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 23:16               ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-27 23:23                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-27 23:27           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-28 18:47             ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-29 23:47               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 25/30] Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 26/30] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 27/30] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  4:09   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 28/30] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 29/30] tracefs: Restrict tracefs " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-26 13:07   ` Steven Rostedt
2019-06-26 19:39     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21  1:19 ` [PATCH V33 30/30] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load " Matthew Garrett

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