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From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
To: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"rkrcmar@redhat.com" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"joro@8bytes.org" <joro@8bytes.org>, "bp@suse.de" <bp@suse.de>,
	"Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"venu.busireddy@oracle.com" <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>,
	"Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 10/16] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2021 14:04:32 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210226140432.GB5950@ashkalra_ubuntu_server> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABayD+cn5e3PR6NtSWLeM_qxs6hKWtjEx=aeKpy=WC2dzPdRLw@mail.gmail.com>

Hello Steve,

On Thu, Feb 25, 2021 at 02:59:27PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 25, 2021 at 12:20 PM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Feb 24, 2021 at 10:22:33AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > On Wed, Feb 24, 2021, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> > > > # Samples: 19K of event 'kvm:kvm_hypercall'
> > > > # Event count (approx.): 19573
> > > > #
> > > > # Overhead  Command          Shared Object     Symbol
> > > > # ........  ...............  ................  .........................
> > > > #
> > > >    100.00%  qemu-system-x86  [kernel.vmlinux]  [k] kvm_emulate_hypercall
> > > >
> > > > Out of these 19573 hypercalls, # of page encryption status hcalls are 19479,
> > > > so almost all hypercalls here are page encryption status hypercalls.
> > >
> > > Oof.
> > >
> > > > The above data indicates that there will be ~2% more Heavyweight VMEXITs
> > > > during SEV guest boot if we do page encryption status hypercalls
> > > > pass-through to host userspace.
> > > >
> > > > But, then Brijesh pointed out to me and highlighted that currently
> > > > OVMF is doing lot of VMEXITs because they don't use the DMA pool to minimize the C-bit toggles,
> > > > in other words, OVMF bounce buffer does page state change on every DMA allocate and free.
> > > >
> > > > So here is the performance analysis after kernel and initrd have been
> > > > loaded into memory using grub and then starting perf just before booting the kernel.
> > > >
> > > > These are the performance #'s after kernel and initrd have been loaded into memory,
> > > > then perf is attached and kernel is booted :
> > > >
> > > > # Samples: 1M of event 'kvm:kvm_userspace_exit'
> > > > # Event count (approx.): 1081235
> > > > #
> > > > # Overhead  Trace output
> > > > # ........  ........................
> > > > #
> > > >     99.77%  reason KVM_EXIT_IO (2)
> > > >      0.23%  reason KVM_EXIT_MMIO (6)
> > > >
> > > > # Samples: 1K of event 'kvm:kvm_hypercall'
> > > > # Event count (approx.): 1279
> > > > #
> > > >
> > > > So as the above data indicates, Linux is only making ~1K hypercalls,
> > > > compared to ~18K hypercalls made by OVMF in the above use case.
> > > >
> > > > Does the above adds a prerequisite that OVMF needs to be optimized if
> > > > and before hypercall pass-through can be done ?
> > >
> > > Disclaimer: my math could be totally wrong.
> > >
> > > I doubt it's a hard requirement.  Assuming a conversative roundtrip time of 50k
> > > cycles, those 18K hypercalls will add well under a 1/2 a second of boot time.
> > > If userspace can push the roundtrip time down to 10k cycles, the overhead is
> > > more like 50 milliseconds.
> > >
> > > That being said, this does seem like a good OVMF cleanup, irrespective of this
> > > new hypercall.  I assume it's not cheap to convert a page between encrypted and
> > > decrypted.
> > >
> > > Thanks much for getting the numbers!
> >
> > Considering the above data and guest boot time latencies
> > (and potential issues with OVMF and optimizations required there),
> > do we have any consensus on whether we want to do page encryption
> > status hypercall passthrough or not ?
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Ashish
> 
> Thanks for grabbing the data!
> 
> I am fine with both paths. Sean has stated an explicit desire for
> hypercall exiting, so I think that would be the current consensus.
> 
> If we want to do hypercall exiting, this should be in a follow-up
> series where we implement something more generic, e.g. a hypercall
> exiting bitmap or hypercall exit list. If we are taking the hypercall
> exit route, we can drop the kvm side of the hypercall. Userspace could
> also handle the MSR using MSR filters (would need to confirm that).
> Then userspace could also be in control of the cpuid bit.
> 
> Essentially, I think you could drop most of the host kernel work if
> there were generic support for hypercall exiting. Then userspace would
> be responsible for all of that. Thoughts on this?
> 
So if i understand it correctly, i will submitting v11 of this patch-set
with in-kernel support for page encryption status hypercalls and shared
pages list and the userspace control of SEV live migration feature
support and fixes for MSR handling.

In subsequent follow-up patches we will add generic support for hypercall 
exiting and then drop kvm side of hypercall and also add userspace
support for MSR handling.

Thanks,
Ashish

  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-02-26 14:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-04  0:35 [PATCH v10 00/17] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:36 ` [PATCH v10 01/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:36 ` [PATCH v10 02/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:37 ` [PATCH v10 03/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:37 ` [PATCH v10 04/16] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:37 ` [PATCH v10 05/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:37 ` [PATCH v10 06/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:38 ` [PATCH v10 07/16] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3 Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:38 ` [PATCH v10 08/16] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 16:03   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-02-05  1:44   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-05  3:32     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:39 ` [PATCH v10 09/16] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:39 ` [PATCH v10 10/16] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 16:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-02-04 16:34     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-17  1:03   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-17 14:00     ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-17 16:13       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-18  6:48         ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-18 16:39           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-18 17:05             ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-18 17:50               ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-18 18:32     ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-24 17:51       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-24 18:22         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-25 20:20           ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-25 22:59             ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-25 23:24               ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-26 14:04               ` Ashish Kalra [this message]
2021-02-26 17:44                 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-02 14:55                   ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-02 15:15                     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-03 18:54                     ` Will Deacon
2021-03-03 19:32                       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-09 19:10                       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-11 18:14                       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-11 20:48                         ` Steve Rutherford
2021-03-19 17:59                           ` Ashish Kalra
2021-04-02  1:40                             ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-02 11:09                               ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 10:40                   ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 19:51                     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-08 21:05                       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 21:11                       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-08 21:32                         ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 21:51                         ` Steve Rutherford
2021-03-09 19:42                           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-10  3:42                           ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-03-10  3:47                             ` Steve Rutherford
2021-03-08 21:48                       ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-17  1:06   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04  0:39 ` [PATCH v10 11/16] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_SET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:39 ` [PATCH v10 12/16] KVM: x86: Introduce new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature & Custom MSR Ashish Kalra
2021-02-05  0:56   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-05  3:07     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-06  2:54       ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-06  4:49         ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-06  5:46         ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-06 13:56           ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-08  0:28             ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-08 22:50               ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-10 20:36                 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-10 22:01                   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-10 22:05                     ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-16 23:20   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04  0:40 ` [PATCH v10 13/16] EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:40 ` [PATCH v10 14/16] KVM: x86: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature Ashish Kalra
2021-02-18 17:56   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04  0:40 ` [PATCH v10 15/16] KVM: x86: Add kexec support for SEV Live Migration Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:40 ` [PATCH v10 16/16] KVM: SVM: Bypass DBG_DECRYPT API calls for unencrypted guest memory Ashish Kalra

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