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From: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
To: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"rkrcmar@redhat.com" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"joro@8bytes.org" <joro@8bytes.org>, "bp@suse.de" <bp@suse.de>,
	"Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"venu.busireddy@oracle.com" <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>,
	"Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 10/16] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2021 14:59:27 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CABayD+cn5e3PR6NtSWLeM_qxs6hKWtjEx=aeKpy=WC2dzPdRLw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210225202008.GA5208@ashkalra_ubuntu_server>

On Thu, Feb 25, 2021 at 12:20 PM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Feb 24, 2021 at 10:22:33AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Wed, Feb 24, 2021, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> > > # Samples: 19K of event 'kvm:kvm_hypercall'
> > > # Event count (approx.): 19573
> > > #
> > > # Overhead  Command          Shared Object     Symbol
> > > # ........  ...............  ................  .........................
> > > #
> > >    100.00%  qemu-system-x86  [kernel.vmlinux]  [k] kvm_emulate_hypercall
> > >
> > > Out of these 19573 hypercalls, # of page encryption status hcalls are 19479,
> > > so almost all hypercalls here are page encryption status hypercalls.
> >
> > Oof.
> >
> > > The above data indicates that there will be ~2% more Heavyweight VMEXITs
> > > during SEV guest boot if we do page encryption status hypercalls
> > > pass-through to host userspace.
> > >
> > > But, then Brijesh pointed out to me and highlighted that currently
> > > OVMF is doing lot of VMEXITs because they don't use the DMA pool to minimize the C-bit toggles,
> > > in other words, OVMF bounce buffer does page state change on every DMA allocate and free.
> > >
> > > So here is the performance analysis after kernel and initrd have been
> > > loaded into memory using grub and then starting perf just before booting the kernel.
> > >
> > > These are the performance #'s after kernel and initrd have been loaded into memory,
> > > then perf is attached and kernel is booted :
> > >
> > > # Samples: 1M of event 'kvm:kvm_userspace_exit'
> > > # Event count (approx.): 1081235
> > > #
> > > # Overhead  Trace output
> > > # ........  ........................
> > > #
> > >     99.77%  reason KVM_EXIT_IO (2)
> > >      0.23%  reason KVM_EXIT_MMIO (6)
> > >
> > > # Samples: 1K of event 'kvm:kvm_hypercall'
> > > # Event count (approx.): 1279
> > > #
> > >
> > > So as the above data indicates, Linux is only making ~1K hypercalls,
> > > compared to ~18K hypercalls made by OVMF in the above use case.
> > >
> > > Does the above adds a prerequisite that OVMF needs to be optimized if
> > > and before hypercall pass-through can be done ?
> >
> > Disclaimer: my math could be totally wrong.
> >
> > I doubt it's a hard requirement.  Assuming a conversative roundtrip time of 50k
> > cycles, those 18K hypercalls will add well under a 1/2 a second of boot time.
> > If userspace can push the roundtrip time down to 10k cycles, the overhead is
> > more like 50 milliseconds.
> >
> > That being said, this does seem like a good OVMF cleanup, irrespective of this
> > new hypercall.  I assume it's not cheap to convert a page between encrypted and
> > decrypted.
> >
> > Thanks much for getting the numbers!
>
> Considering the above data and guest boot time latencies
> (and potential issues with OVMF and optimizations required there),
> do we have any consensus on whether we want to do page encryption
> status hypercall passthrough or not ?
>
> Thanks,
> Ashish

Thanks for grabbing the data!

I am fine with both paths. Sean has stated an explicit desire for
hypercall exiting, so I think that would be the current consensus.

If we want to do hypercall exiting, this should be in a follow-up
series where we implement something more generic, e.g. a hypercall
exiting bitmap or hypercall exit list. If we are taking the hypercall
exit route, we can drop the kvm side of the hypercall. Userspace could
also handle the MSR using MSR filters (would need to confirm that).
Then userspace could also be in control of the cpuid bit.

Essentially, I think you could drop most of the host kernel work if
there were generic support for hypercall exiting. Then userspace would
be responsible for all of that. Thoughts on this?

--Steve

  reply	other threads:[~2021-02-25 23:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-04  0:35 [PATCH v10 00/17] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:36 ` [PATCH v10 01/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:36 ` [PATCH v10 02/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:37 ` [PATCH v10 03/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:37 ` [PATCH v10 04/16] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:37 ` [PATCH v10 05/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:37 ` [PATCH v10 06/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:38 ` [PATCH v10 07/16] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3 Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:38 ` [PATCH v10 08/16] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 16:03   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-02-05  1:44   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-05  3:32     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:39 ` [PATCH v10 09/16] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:39 ` [PATCH v10 10/16] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 16:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-02-04 16:34     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-17  1:03   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-17 14:00     ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-17 16:13       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-18  6:48         ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-18 16:39           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-18 17:05             ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-18 17:50               ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-18 18:32     ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-24 17:51       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-24 18:22         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-25 20:20           ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-25 22:59             ` Steve Rutherford [this message]
2021-02-25 23:24               ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-26 14:04               ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-26 17:44                 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-02 14:55                   ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-02 15:15                     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-03 18:54                     ` Will Deacon
2021-03-03 19:32                       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-09 19:10                       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-11 18:14                       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-11 20:48                         ` Steve Rutherford
2021-03-19 17:59                           ` Ashish Kalra
2021-04-02  1:40                             ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-02 11:09                               ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 10:40                   ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 19:51                     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-08 21:05                       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 21:11                       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-08 21:32                         ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 21:51                         ` Steve Rutherford
2021-03-09 19:42                           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-10  3:42                           ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-03-10  3:47                             ` Steve Rutherford
2021-03-08 21:48                       ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-17  1:06   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04  0:39 ` [PATCH v10 11/16] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_SET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:39 ` [PATCH v10 12/16] KVM: x86: Introduce new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature & Custom MSR Ashish Kalra
2021-02-05  0:56   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-05  3:07     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-06  2:54       ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-06  4:49         ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-06  5:46         ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-06 13:56           ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-08  0:28             ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-08 22:50               ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-10 20:36                 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-10 22:01                   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-10 22:05                     ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-16 23:20   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04  0:40 ` [PATCH v10 13/16] EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:40 ` [PATCH v10 14/16] KVM: x86: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature Ashish Kalra
2021-02-18 17:56   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04  0:40 ` [PATCH v10 15/16] KVM: x86: Add kexec support for SEV Live Migration Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:40 ` [PATCH v10 16/16] KVM: SVM: Bypass DBG_DECRYPT API calls for unencrypted guest memory Ashish Kalra

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