From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
To: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>,
"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"joro@8bytes.org" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"venu.busireddy@oracle.com" <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>,
"Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
maz@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 10/16] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2021 18:14:58 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210311181458.GA6650@ashkalra_ubuntu_server> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210303185441.GA19944@willie-the-truck>
On Wed, Mar 03, 2021 at 06:54:41PM +0000, Will Deacon wrote:
> [+Marc]
>
> On Tue, Mar 02, 2021 at 02:55:43PM +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> > On Fri, Feb 26, 2021 at 09:44:41AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > On Fri, Feb 26, 2021, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Feb 25, 2021 at 02:59:27PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote:
> > > > > On Thu, Feb 25, 2021 at 12:20 PM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote:
> > > > > Thanks for grabbing the data!
> > > > >
> > > > > I am fine with both paths. Sean has stated an explicit desire for
> > > > > hypercall exiting, so I think that would be the current consensus.
> > >
> > > Yep, though it'd be good to get Paolo's input, too.
> > >
> > > > > If we want to do hypercall exiting, this should be in a follow-up
> > > > > series where we implement something more generic, e.g. a hypercall
> > > > > exiting bitmap or hypercall exit list. If we are taking the hypercall
> > > > > exit route, we can drop the kvm side of the hypercall.
> > >
> > > I don't think this is a good candidate for arbitrary hypercall interception. Or
> > > rather, I think hypercall interception should be an orthogonal implementation.
> > >
> > > The guest, including guest firmware, needs to be aware that the hypercall is
> > > supported, and the ABI needs to be well-defined. Relying on userspace VMMs to
> > > implement a common ABI is an unnecessary risk.
> > >
> > > We could make KVM's default behavior be a nop, i.e. have KVM enforce the ABI but
> > > require further VMM intervention. But, I just don't see the point, it would
> > > save only a few lines of code. It would also limit what KVM could do in the
> > > future, e.g. if KVM wanted to do its own bookkeeping _and_ exit to userspace,
> > > then mandatory interception would essentially make it impossible for KVM to do
> > > bookkeeping while still honoring the interception request.
> > >
> > > However, I do think it would make sense to have the userspace exit be a generic
> > > exit type. But hey, we already have the necessary ABI defined for that! It's
> > > just not used anywhere.
> > >
> > > /* KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL */
> > > struct {
> > > __u64 nr;
> > > __u64 args[6];
> > > __u64 ret;
> > > __u32 longmode;
> > > __u32 pad;
> > > } hypercall;
> > >
> > >
> > > > > Userspace could also handle the MSR using MSR filters (would need to
> > > > > confirm that). Then userspace could also be in control of the cpuid bit.
> > >
> > > An MSR is not a great fit; it's x86 specific and limited to 64 bits of data.
> > > The data limitation could be fudged by shoving data into non-standard GPRs, but
> > > that will result in truly heinous guest code, and extensibility issues.
> > >
> > > The data limitation is a moot point, because the x86-only thing is a deal
> > > breaker. arm64's pKVM work has a near-identical use case for a guest to share
> > > memory with a host. I can't think of a clever way to avoid having to support
> > > TDX's and SNP's hypervisor-agnostic variants, but we can at least not have
> > > multiple KVM variants.
> >
> > Looking at arm64's pKVM work, i see that it is a recently introduced RFC
> > patch-set and probably relevant to arm64 nVHE hypervisor
> > mode/implementation, and potentially makes sense as it adds guest
> > memory protection as both host and guest kernels are running on the same
> > privilege level ?
> >
> > Though i do see that the pKVM stuff adds two hypercalls, specifically :
> >
> > pkvm_create_mappings() ( I assume this is for setting shared memory
> > regions between host and guest) &
> > pkvm_create_private_mappings().
> >
> > And the use-cases are quite similar to memory protection architectues
> > use cases, for example, use with virtio devices, guest DMA I/O, etc.
>
> These hypercalls are both private to the host kernel communicating with
> its hypervisor counterpart, so I don't think they're particularly
> relevant here. As far as I can see, the more useful thing is to allow
> the guest to communicate back to the host (and the VMM) that it has opened
> up a memory window, perhaps for virtio rings or some other shared memory.
>
> We hacked this up as a prototype in the past:
>
> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fandroid-kvm.googlesource.com%2Flinux%2F%2B%2Fd12a9e2c12a52cf7140d40cd9fa092dc8a85fac9%255E%2521%2F&data=04%7C01%7Cashish.kalra%40amd.com%7C7ae6bbd9fa6442f9edcc08d8de75d14b%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637503944913839841%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=Juon5nJ7BB6moTWYssRXOWrDOrYfZLmA%2BLrz3s12Ook%3D&reserved=0
>
> but that's all arm64-specific and if we're solving the same problem as
> you, then let's avoid arch-specific stuff if possible. The way in which
> the guest discovers the interface will be arch-specific (we already have
> a mechanism for that and some hypercalls are already allocated by specs
> from Arm), but the interface back to the VMM and some (most?) of the host
> handling could be shared.
>
I have started implementing a similar "hypercall to userspace"
functionality for these DMA_SHARE/DMA_UNSHARE type of interfaces
corresponding to SEV guest's add/remove shared regions on the x86 platform.
This does not implement a generic hypercall exiting infrastructure,
mainly extends the KVM hypercall support to return back to userspace
specifically for add/remove shared region hypercalls and then re-uses
the complete userspace I/O callback functionality to resume the guest
after returning back from userspace handling of the hypercall.
Looking fwd. to any comments/feedback/thoughts on the above.
Thanks,
Ashish
> > But, isn't this patch set still RFC, and though i agree that it adds
> > an infrastructure for standardised communication between the host and
> > it's guests for mutually controlled shared memory regions and
> > surely adds some kind of portability between hypervisor
> > implementations, but nothing is standardised still, right ?
>
> No, and it seems that you're further ahead than us in terms of
> implementation in this area. We're happy to review patches though, to
> make sure we end up with something that works for us both.
>
> Will
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-03-11 18:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-02-04 0:35 [PATCH v10 00/17] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:36 ` [PATCH v10 01/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:36 ` [PATCH v10 02/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:37 ` [PATCH v10 03/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:37 ` [PATCH v10 04/16] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:37 ` [PATCH v10 05/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:37 ` [PATCH v10 06/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:38 ` [PATCH v10 07/16] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3 Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:38 ` [PATCH v10 08/16] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 16:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-02-05 1:44 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-05 3:32 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:39 ` [PATCH v10 09/16] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:39 ` [PATCH v10 10/16] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 16:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-02-04 16:34 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-17 1:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-17 14:00 ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-17 16:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-18 6:48 ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-18 16:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-18 17:05 ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-18 17:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-18 18:32 ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-24 17:51 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-24 18:22 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-25 20:20 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-25 22:59 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-25 23:24 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-26 14:04 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-26 17:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-02 14:55 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-02 15:15 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-03 18:54 ` Will Deacon
2021-03-03 19:32 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-09 19:10 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-11 18:14 ` Ashish Kalra [this message]
2021-03-11 20:48 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-03-19 17:59 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-04-02 1:40 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-02 11:09 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 10:40 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 19:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-08 21:05 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 21:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-08 21:32 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 21:51 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-03-09 19:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-10 3:42 ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-03-10 3:47 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-03-08 21:48 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-17 1:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04 0:39 ` [PATCH v10 11/16] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_SET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:39 ` [PATCH v10 12/16] KVM: x86: Introduce new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature & Custom MSR Ashish Kalra
2021-02-05 0:56 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-05 3:07 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-06 2:54 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-06 4:49 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-06 5:46 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-06 13:56 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-08 0:28 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-08 22:50 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-10 20:36 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-10 22:01 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-10 22:05 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-16 23:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04 0:40 ` [PATCH v10 13/16] EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:40 ` [PATCH v10 14/16] KVM: x86: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature Ashish Kalra
2021-02-18 17:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04 0:40 ` [PATCH v10 15/16] KVM: x86: Add kexec support for SEV Live Migration Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:40 ` [PATCH v10 16/16] KVM: SVM: Bypass DBG_DECRYPT API calls for unencrypted guest memory Ashish Kalra
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