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From: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
To: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>, "Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>,
	"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"X86 ML" <x86@kernel.org>, "KVM list" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Sean Christopherson" <seanjc@google.com>,
	"Venu Busireddy" <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 12/16] KVM: x86: Introduce new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature & Custom MSR.
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 14:01:07 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CABayD+cXJbRVV-fZFM+8xw3GypTLq=6WUES4ZrLnZEcgchVd9Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210210203606.GA30775@ashkalra_ubuntu_server>

Hi Ashish,

On Wed, Feb 10, 2021 at 12:37 PM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote:
>
> Hello Steve,
>
> We can remove the implicit enabling of this live migration feature
> from svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid() callback invoked afer KVM_SET_CPUID2
> ioctl, and let this feature flag be controlled by the userspace
> VMM/qemu.
>
> Userspace can set this feature flag explicitly by calling the
> KVM_SET_CPUID2 ioctl and enable this feature whenever it is ready to
> do so.
>
> I have tested this as part of Qemu code :
>
> int kvm_arch_init_vcpu(CPUState *cs)
> {
> ...
> ...
>         c->function = KVM_CPUID_FEATURES | kvm_base;
>         c->eax = env->features[FEAT_KVM];
>         c->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION);
> ...
> ...
>
>     r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl(cs, KVM_SET_CPUID2, &cpuid_data);
> ...
>
> Let me know if this addresses your concerns.
Removing implicit enablement is one part of the equation.
The other two are:
1) Host userspace being able to ask the kernel if it supports SEV Live Migration
2) Host userspace being able to disable access to the MSR/hypercall

Feature flagging for paravirt features is pretty complicated, since
you need all three parties to negotiate (host userspace/host
kernel/guest), and every single one has veto power. In the end, the
feature should only be available to the guest if every single party
says yes.

For an example of how to handle 1), the new feature flag could be
checked when asking the kernel which cpuid bits it supports by adding
it to the list of features that the kernel mentions in
KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID.

For example (in KVM's arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c):
case KVM_CPUID_FEATURES:
==========
entry->eax = (1 << KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE) |
    (1 << KVM_FEATURE_NOP_IO_DELAY) |
...
    (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD) |
+  (1 << KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT) |
-   (1 << KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT);
+  (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION);
==========

Without this, userspace has to infer if the kernel it is on supports that flag.

For an example of how to handle 2), in the new msr handler, KVM should
throw a GP `if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION))`
(it can do this by returning th. The issue here is "what if the guest
ignores CPUID and calls the MSR/hypercall anyway". This is a less
important issue as it requires the guest to be malicious, but still
worth resolving. Additionally, the hypercall itself should check if
the MSR has been toggled by the guest.

Thanks,
Steve

  reply	other threads:[~2021-02-10 22:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-04  0:35 [PATCH v10 00/17] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:36 ` [PATCH v10 01/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:36 ` [PATCH v10 02/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:37 ` [PATCH v10 03/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:37 ` [PATCH v10 04/16] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:37 ` [PATCH v10 05/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:37 ` [PATCH v10 06/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:38 ` [PATCH v10 07/16] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3 Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:38 ` [PATCH v10 08/16] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 16:03   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-02-05  1:44   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-05  3:32     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:39 ` [PATCH v10 09/16] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:39 ` [PATCH v10 10/16] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 16:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-02-04 16:34     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-17  1:03   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-17 14:00     ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-17 16:13       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-18  6:48         ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-18 16:39           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-18 17:05             ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-18 17:50               ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-18 18:32     ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-24 17:51       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-24 18:22         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-25 20:20           ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-25 22:59             ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-25 23:24               ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-26 14:04               ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-26 17:44                 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-02 14:55                   ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-02 15:15                     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-03 18:54                     ` Will Deacon
2021-03-03 19:32                       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-09 19:10                       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-11 18:14                       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-11 20:48                         ` Steve Rutherford
2021-03-19 17:59                           ` Ashish Kalra
2021-04-02  1:40                             ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-02 11:09                               ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 10:40                   ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 19:51                     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-08 21:05                       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 21:11                       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-08 21:32                         ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 21:51                         ` Steve Rutherford
2021-03-09 19:42                           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-10  3:42                           ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-03-10  3:47                             ` Steve Rutherford
2021-03-08 21:48                       ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-17  1:06   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04  0:39 ` [PATCH v10 11/16] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_SET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:39 ` [PATCH v10 12/16] KVM: x86: Introduce new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature & Custom MSR Ashish Kalra
2021-02-05  0:56   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-05  3:07     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-06  2:54       ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-06  4:49         ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-06  5:46         ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-06 13:56           ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-08  0:28             ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-08 22:50               ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-10 20:36                 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-10 22:01                   ` Steve Rutherford [this message]
2021-02-10 22:05                     ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-16 23:20   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04  0:40 ` [PATCH v10 13/16] EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:40 ` [PATCH v10 14/16] KVM: x86: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature Ashish Kalra
2021-02-18 17:56   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04  0:40 ` [PATCH v10 15/16] KVM: x86: Add kexec support for SEV Live Migration Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:40 ` [PATCH v10 16/16] KVM: SVM: Bypass DBG_DECRYPT API calls for unencrypted guest memory Ashish Kalra

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