* [PATCH 5.15 01/89] x86/traps: Use pt_regs directly in fixup_bad_iret()
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 02/89] x86/entry: Switch the stack after error_entry() returns Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (93 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Lai Jiangshan, Borislav Petkov,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com>
commit 0aca53c6b522f8d6e2681ca875acbbe105f5fdcf upstream.
Always stash the address error_entry() is going to return to, in %r12
and get rid of the void *error_entry_ret; slot in struct bad_iret_stack
which was supposed to account for it and pt_regs pushed on the stack.
After this, both fixup_bad_iret() and sync_regs() can work on a struct
pt_regs pointer directly.
[ bp: Rewrite commit message, touch ups. ]
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503032107.680190-2-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 5 ++++-
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 19 +++++++------------
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -1041,9 +1041,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry)
* Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs
* as if we faulted immediately after IRET.
*/
- mov %rsp, %rdi
+ popq %r12 /* save return addr in %12 */
+ movq %rsp, %rdi /* arg0 = pt_regs pointer */
call fixup_bad_iret
mov %rax, %rsp
+ ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
+ pushq %r12
jmp .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs
SYM_CODE_END(error_entry)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
asmlinkage __visible notrace struct pt_regs *sync_regs(struct pt_regs *eregs);
asmlinkage __visible notrace
-struct bad_iret_stack *fixup_bad_iret(struct bad_iret_stack *s);
+struct pt_regs *fixup_bad_iret(struct pt_regs *bad_regs);
void __init trap_init(void);
asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *vc_switch_off_ist(struct pt_regs *eregs);
#endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -762,14 +762,10 @@ sync:
}
#endif
-struct bad_iret_stack {
- void *error_entry_ret;
- struct pt_regs regs;
-};
-
-asmlinkage __visible noinstr
-struct bad_iret_stack *fixup_bad_iret(struct bad_iret_stack *s)
+asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *fixup_bad_iret(struct pt_regs *bad_regs)
{
+ struct pt_regs tmp, *new_stack;
+
/*
* This is called from entry_64.S early in handling a fault
* caused by a bad iret to user mode. To handle the fault
@@ -778,19 +774,18 @@ struct bad_iret_stack *fixup_bad_iret(st
* just below the IRET frame) and we want to pretend that the
* exception came from the IRET target.
*/
- struct bad_iret_stack tmp, *new_stack =
- (struct bad_iret_stack *)__this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.sp0) - 1;
+ new_stack = (struct pt_regs *)__this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.sp0) - 1;
/* Copy the IRET target to the temporary storage. */
- __memcpy(&tmp.regs.ip, (void *)s->regs.sp, 5*8);
+ __memcpy(&tmp.ip, (void *)bad_regs->sp, 5*8);
/* Copy the remainder of the stack from the current stack. */
- __memcpy(&tmp, s, offsetof(struct bad_iret_stack, regs.ip));
+ __memcpy(&tmp, bad_regs, offsetof(struct pt_regs, ip));
/* Update the entry stack */
__memcpy(new_stack, &tmp, sizeof(tmp));
- BUG_ON(!user_mode(&new_stack->regs));
+ BUG_ON(!user_mode(new_stack));
return new_stack;
}
#endif
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 02/89] x86/entry: Switch the stack after error_entry() returns
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 01/89] x86/traps: Use pt_regs directly in fixup_bad_iret() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 03/89] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (92 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Lai Jiangshan, Borislav Petkov,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com>
commit 520a7e80c96d655fbe4650d9cc985bd9d0443389 upstream.
error_entry() calls fixup_bad_iret() before sync_regs() if it is a fault
from a bad IRET, to copy pt_regs to the kernel stack. It switches to the
kernel stack directly after sync_regs().
But error_entry() itself is also a function call, so it has to stash
the address it is going to return to, in %r12 which is unnecessarily
complicated.
Move the stack switching after error_entry() and get rid of the need to
handle the return address.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503032107.680190-3-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 16 ++++++----------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -323,6 +323,8 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ret_from_fork)
.macro idtentry_body cfunc has_error_code:req
call error_entry
+ movq %rax, %rsp /* switch to the task stack if from userspace */
+ ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
UNWIND_HINT_REGS
movq %rsp, %rdi /* pt_regs pointer into 1st argument*/
@@ -982,14 +984,10 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry)
/* We have user CR3. Change to kernel CR3. */
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
+ leaq 8(%rsp), %rdi /* arg0 = pt_regs pointer */
.Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs:
/* Put us onto the real thread stack. */
- popq %r12 /* save return addr in %12 */
- movq %rsp, %rdi /* arg0 = pt_regs pointer */
call sync_regs
- movq %rax, %rsp /* switch stack */
- ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
- pushq %r12
RET
/*
@@ -1021,6 +1019,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry)
*/
.Lerror_entry_done_lfence:
FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
+ leaq 8(%rsp), %rax /* return pt_regs pointer */
RET
.Lbstep_iret:
@@ -1041,12 +1040,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry)
* Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs
* as if we faulted immediately after IRET.
*/
- popq %r12 /* save return addr in %12 */
- movq %rsp, %rdi /* arg0 = pt_regs pointer */
+ leaq 8(%rsp), %rdi /* arg0 = pt_regs pointer */
call fixup_bad_iret
- mov %rax, %rsp
- ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
- pushq %r12
+ mov %rax, %rdi
jmp .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs
SYM_CODE_END(error_entry)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 03/89] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry()
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 01/89] x86/traps: Use pt_regs directly in fixup_bad_iret() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 02/89] x86/entry: Switch the stack after error_entry() returns Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 04/89] x86/entry: Dont call error_entry() for XENPV Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (91 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Lai Jiangshan, Borislav Petkov,
Juergen Gross, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com>
commit ee774dac0da1543376a69fd90840af6aa86879b3 upstream.
The macro idtentry() (through idtentry_body()) calls error_entry()
unconditionally even on XENPV. But XENPV needs to only push and clear
regs.
PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS in error_entry() makes the stack not return to its
original place when the function returns, which means it is not possible
to convert it to a C function.
Carve out PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry() and into a separate
function and call it before error_entry() in order to avoid calling
error_entry() on XENPV.
It will also allow for error_entry() to be converted to C code that can
use inlined sync_regs() and save a function call.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503032107.680190-4-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 15 ++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -315,6 +315,14 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ret_from_fork)
#endif
.endm
+/* Save all registers in pt_regs */
+SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(push_and_clear_regs)
+ UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
+ PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS save_ret=1
+ ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
+ RET
+SYM_CODE_END(push_and_clear_regs)
+
/**
* idtentry_body - Macro to emit code calling the C function
* @cfunc: C function to be called
@@ -322,6 +330,9 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ret_from_fork)
*/
.macro idtentry_body cfunc has_error_code:req
+ call push_and_clear_regs
+ UNWIND_HINT_REGS
+
call error_entry
movq %rax, %rsp /* switch to the task stack if from userspace */
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
@@ -965,13 +976,11 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_exit)
SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_exit)
/*
- * Save all registers in pt_regs, and switch GS if needed.
+ * Switch GS and CR3 if needed.
*/
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry)
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
cld
- PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS save_ret=1
- ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
testb $3, CS+8(%rsp)
jz .Lerror_kernelspace
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 04/89] x86/entry: Dont call error_entry() for XENPV
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 03/89] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 05/89] objtool: Classify symbols Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (90 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Lai Jiangshan, Borislav Petkov,
Juergen Gross, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com>
commit 64cbd0acb58203fb769ed2f4eab526d43e243847 upstream.
XENPV guests enter already on the task stack and they can't fault for
native_iret() nor native_load_gs_index() since they use their own pvop
for IRET and load_gs_index(). A CR3 switch is not needed either.
So there is no reason to call error_entry() in XENPV.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503032107.680190-6-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 13 +++++++++++--
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -333,8 +333,17 @@ SYM_CODE_END(push_and_clear_regs)
call push_and_clear_regs
UNWIND_HINT_REGS
- call error_entry
- movq %rax, %rsp /* switch to the task stack if from userspace */
+ /*
+ * Call error_entry() and switch to the task stack if from userspace.
+ *
+ * When in XENPV, it is already in the task stack, and it can't fault
+ * for native_iret() nor native_load_gs_index() since XENPV uses its
+ * own pvops for IRET and load_gs_index(). And it doesn't need to
+ * switch the CR3. So it can skip invoking error_entry().
+ */
+ ALTERNATIVE "call error_entry; movq %rax, %rsp", \
+ "", X86_FEATURE_XENPV
+
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
UNWIND_HINT_REGS
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 05/89] objtool: Classify symbols
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 04/89] x86/entry: Dont call error_entry() for XENPV Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 06/89] objtool: Explicitly avoid self modifying code in .altinstr_replacement Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (89 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Alexei Starovoitov,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 1739c66eb7bd5f27f1b69a5a26e10e8327d1e136 upstream.
In order to avoid calling str*cmp() on symbol names, over and over, do
them all once upfront and store the result.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120309.658539311@infradead.org
[cascardo: no pv_target on struct symbol, because of missing
db2b0c5d7b6f19b3c2cab08c531b65342eb5252b]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
tools/objtool/check.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------
tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h | 7 +++++--
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -859,8 +859,7 @@ static void add_call_dest(struct objtool
* so they need a little help, NOP out any KCOV calls from noinstr
* text.
*/
- if (insn->sec->noinstr &&
- !strncmp(insn->call_dest->name, "__sanitizer_cov_", 16)) {
+ if (insn->sec->noinstr && insn->call_dest->kcov) {
if (reloc) {
reloc->type = R_NONE;
elf_write_reloc(file->elf, reloc);
@@ -884,7 +883,7 @@ static void add_call_dest(struct objtool
}
}
- if (mcount && !strcmp(insn->call_dest->name, "__fentry__")) {
+ if (mcount && insn->call_dest->fentry) {
if (sibling)
WARN_FUNC("Tail call to __fentry__ !?!?", insn->sec, insn->offset);
@@ -934,7 +933,7 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct
} else if (reloc->sym->type == STT_SECTION) {
dest_sec = reloc->sym->sec;
dest_off = arch_dest_reloc_offset(reloc->addend);
- } else if (arch_is_retpoline(reloc->sym)) {
+ } else if (reloc->sym->retpoline_thunk) {
/*
* Retpoline jumps are really dynamic jumps in
* disguise, so convert them accordingly.
@@ -1075,7 +1074,7 @@ static int add_call_destinations(struct
add_call_dest(file, insn, dest, false);
- } else if (arch_is_retpoline(reloc->sym)) {
+ } else if (reloc->sym->retpoline_thunk) {
/*
* Retpoline calls are really dynamic calls in
* disguise, so convert them accordingly.
@@ -1759,17 +1758,28 @@ static int read_intra_function_calls(str
return 0;
}
-static int read_static_call_tramps(struct objtool_file *file)
+static int classify_symbols(struct objtool_file *file)
{
struct section *sec;
struct symbol *func;
for_each_sec(file, sec) {
list_for_each_entry(func, &sec->symbol_list, list) {
- if (func->bind == STB_GLOBAL &&
- !strncmp(func->name, STATIC_CALL_TRAMP_PREFIX_STR,
+ if (func->bind != STB_GLOBAL)
+ continue;
+
+ if (!strncmp(func->name, STATIC_CALL_TRAMP_PREFIX_STR,
strlen(STATIC_CALL_TRAMP_PREFIX_STR)))
func->static_call_tramp = true;
+
+ if (arch_is_retpoline(func))
+ func->retpoline_thunk = true;
+
+ if (!strcmp(func->name, "__fentry__"))
+ func->fentry = true;
+
+ if (!strncmp(func->name, "__sanitizer_cov_", 16))
+ func->kcov = true;
}
}
@@ -1831,7 +1841,7 @@ static int decode_sections(struct objtoo
/*
* Must be before add_{jump_call}_destination.
*/
- ret = read_static_call_tramps(file);
+ ret = classify_symbols(file);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -1889,9 +1899,9 @@ static int decode_sections(struct objtoo
static bool is_fentry_call(struct instruction *insn)
{
- if (insn->type == INSN_CALL && insn->call_dest &&
- insn->call_dest->type == STT_NOTYPE &&
- !strcmp(insn->call_dest->name, "__fentry__"))
+ if (insn->type == INSN_CALL &&
+ insn->call_dest &&
+ insn->call_dest->fentry)
return true;
return false;
--- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h
+++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h
@@ -54,8 +54,11 @@ struct symbol {
unsigned long offset;
unsigned int len;
struct symbol *pfunc, *cfunc, *alias;
- bool uaccess_safe;
- bool static_call_tramp;
+ u8 uaccess_safe : 1;
+ u8 static_call_tramp : 1;
+ u8 retpoline_thunk : 1;
+ u8 fentry : 1;
+ u8 kcov : 1;
};
struct reloc {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 06/89] objtool: Explicitly avoid self modifying code in .altinstr_replacement
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 05/89] objtool: Classify symbols Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 07/89] objtool: Shrink struct instruction Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (88 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Alexei Starovoitov,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit dd003edeffa3cb87bc9862582004f405d77d7670 upstream.
Assume ALTERNATIVE()s know what they're doing and do not change, or
cause to change, instructions in .altinstr_replacement sections.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120309.722511775@infradead.org
[cascardo: context adjustment]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
tools/objtool/check.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -840,18 +840,27 @@ static void remove_insn_ops(struct instr
}
}
-static void add_call_dest(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn,
- struct symbol *dest, bool sibling)
+static void annotate_call_site(struct objtool_file *file,
+ struct instruction *insn, bool sibling)
{
struct reloc *reloc = insn_reloc(file, insn);
+ struct symbol *sym = insn->call_dest;
- insn->call_dest = dest;
- if (!dest)
+ if (!sym)
+ sym = reloc->sym;
+
+ /*
+ * Alternative replacement code is just template code which is
+ * sometimes copied to the original instruction. For now, don't
+ * annotate it. (In the future we might consider annotating the
+ * original instruction if/when it ever makes sense to do so.)
+ */
+ if (!strcmp(insn->sec->name, ".altinstr_replacement"))
return;
- if (insn->call_dest->static_call_tramp) {
- list_add_tail(&insn->call_node,
- &file->static_call_list);
+ if (sym->static_call_tramp) {
+ list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, &file->static_call_list);
+ return;
}
/*
@@ -859,7 +868,7 @@ static void add_call_dest(struct objtool
* so they need a little help, NOP out any KCOV calls from noinstr
* text.
*/
- if (insn->sec->noinstr && insn->call_dest->kcov) {
+ if (insn->sec->noinstr && sym->kcov) {
if (reloc) {
reloc->type = R_NONE;
elf_write_reloc(file->elf, reloc);
@@ -881,9 +890,11 @@ static void add_call_dest(struct objtool
*/
insn->retpoline_safe = true;
}
+
+ return;
}
- if (mcount && insn->call_dest->fentry) {
+ if (mcount && sym->fentry) {
if (sibling)
WARN_FUNC("Tail call to __fentry__ !?!?", insn->sec, insn->offset);
@@ -898,9 +909,17 @@ static void add_call_dest(struct objtool
insn->type = INSN_NOP;
- list_add_tail(&insn->mcount_loc_node,
- &file->mcount_loc_list);
+ list_add_tail(&insn->mcount_loc_node, &file->mcount_loc_list);
+ return;
}
+}
+
+static void add_call_dest(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn,
+ struct symbol *dest, bool sibling)
+{
+ insn->call_dest = dest;
+ if (!dest)
+ return;
/*
* Whatever stack impact regular CALLs have, should be undone
@@ -910,6 +929,8 @@ static void add_call_dest(struct objtool
* are converted to JUMP, see read_intra_function_calls().
*/
remove_insn_ops(insn);
+
+ annotate_call_site(file, insn, sibling);
}
/*
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 07/89] objtool: Shrink struct instruction
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 06/89] objtool: Explicitly avoid self modifying code in .altinstr_replacement Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 08/89] objtool,x86: Replace alternatives with .retpoline_sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (87 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Alexei Starovoitov,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit c509331b41b7365e17396c246e8c5797bccc8074 upstream.
Any one instruction can only ever call a single function, therefore
insn->mcount_loc_node is superfluous and can use insn->call_node.
This shrinks struct instruction, which is by far the most numerous
structure objtool creates.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120309.785456706@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
tools/objtool/check.c | 6 +++---
tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h | 1 -
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ static int create_mcount_loc_sections(st
return 0;
idx = 0;
- list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->mcount_loc_list, mcount_loc_node)
+ list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->mcount_loc_list, call_node)
idx++;
sec = elf_create_section(file->elf, "__mcount_loc", 0, sizeof(unsigned long), idx);
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static int create_mcount_loc_sections(st
return -1;
idx = 0;
- list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->mcount_loc_list, mcount_loc_node) {
+ list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->mcount_loc_list, call_node) {
loc = (unsigned long *)sec->data->d_buf + idx;
memset(loc, 0, sizeof(unsigned long));
@@ -909,7 +909,7 @@ static void annotate_call_site(struct ob
insn->type = INSN_NOP;
- list_add_tail(&insn->mcount_loc_node, &file->mcount_loc_list);
+ list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, &file->mcount_loc_list);
return;
}
}
--- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h
+++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ struct instruction {
struct list_head list;
struct hlist_node hash;
struct list_head call_node;
- struct list_head mcount_loc_node;
struct section *sec;
unsigned long offset;
unsigned int len;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 08/89] objtool,x86: Replace alternatives with .retpoline_sites
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 07/89] objtool: Shrink struct instruction Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 09/89] objtool: Introduce CFI hash Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (86 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Alexei Starovoitov,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 134ab5bd1883312d7a4b3033b05c6b5a1bb8889b upstream.
Instead of writing complete alternatives, simply provide a list of all
the retpoline thunk calls. Then the kernel is free to do with them as
it pleases. Simpler code all-round.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120309.850007165@infradead.org
[cascardo: fixed conflict because of missing
8b946cc38e063f0f7bb67789478c38f6d7d457c9]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 14 +++
tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c | 120 --------------------------------
tools/objtool/check.c | 132 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
tools/objtool/elf.c | 84 ----------------------
tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h | 1
tools/objtool/special.c | 8 --
6 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 252 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -272,6 +272,20 @@ SECTIONS
__parainstructions_end = .;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ /*
+ * List of instructions that call/jmp/jcc to retpoline thunks
+ * __x86_indirect_thunk_*(). These instructions can be patched along
+ * with alternatives, after which the section can be freed.
+ */
+ . = ALIGN(8);
+ .retpoline_sites : AT(ADDR(.retpoline_sites) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+ __retpoline_sites = .;
+ *(.retpoline_sites)
+ __retpoline_sites_end = .;
+ }
+#endif
+
/*
* struct alt_inst entries. From the header (alternative.h):
* "Alternative instructions for different CPU types or capabilities"
--- a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
@@ -684,126 +684,6 @@ const char *arch_ret_insn(int len)
return ret[len-1];
}
-/* asm/alternative.h ? */
-
-#define ALTINSTR_FLAG_INV (1 << 15)
-#define ALT_NOT(feat) ((feat) | ALTINSTR_FLAG_INV)
-
-struct alt_instr {
- s32 instr_offset; /* original instruction */
- s32 repl_offset; /* offset to replacement instruction */
- u16 cpuid; /* cpuid bit set for replacement */
- u8 instrlen; /* length of original instruction */
- u8 replacementlen; /* length of new instruction */
-} __packed;
-
-static int elf_add_alternative(struct elf *elf,
- struct instruction *orig, struct symbol *sym,
- int cpuid, u8 orig_len, u8 repl_len)
-{
- const int size = sizeof(struct alt_instr);
- struct alt_instr *alt;
- struct section *sec;
- Elf_Scn *s;
-
- sec = find_section_by_name(elf, ".altinstructions");
- if (!sec) {
- sec = elf_create_section(elf, ".altinstructions",
- SHF_ALLOC, 0, 0);
-
- if (!sec) {
- WARN_ELF("elf_create_section");
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- s = elf_getscn(elf->elf, sec->idx);
- if (!s) {
- WARN_ELF("elf_getscn");
- return -1;
- }
-
- sec->data = elf_newdata(s);
- if (!sec->data) {
- WARN_ELF("elf_newdata");
- return -1;
- }
-
- sec->data->d_size = size;
- sec->data->d_align = 1;
-
- alt = sec->data->d_buf = malloc(size);
- if (!sec->data->d_buf) {
- perror("malloc");
- return -1;
- }
- memset(sec->data->d_buf, 0, size);
-
- if (elf_add_reloc_to_insn(elf, sec, sec->sh.sh_size,
- R_X86_64_PC32, orig->sec, orig->offset)) {
- WARN("elf_create_reloc: alt_instr::instr_offset");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (elf_add_reloc(elf, sec, sec->sh.sh_size + 4,
- R_X86_64_PC32, sym, 0)) {
- WARN("elf_create_reloc: alt_instr::repl_offset");
- return -1;
- }
-
- alt->cpuid = bswap_if_needed(cpuid);
- alt->instrlen = orig_len;
- alt->replacementlen = repl_len;
-
- sec->sh.sh_size += size;
- sec->changed = true;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12)
-
-int arch_rewrite_retpolines(struct objtool_file *file)
-{
- struct instruction *insn;
- struct reloc *reloc;
- struct symbol *sym;
- char name[32] = "";
-
- list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->retpoline_call_list, call_node) {
-
- if (insn->type != INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC &&
- insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC)
- continue;
-
- if (!strcmp(insn->sec->name, ".text.__x86.indirect_thunk"))
- continue;
-
- reloc = insn->reloc;
-
- sprintf(name, "__x86_indirect_alt_%s_%s",
- insn->type == INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC ? "jmp" : "call",
- reloc->sym->name + 21);
-
- sym = find_symbol_by_name(file->elf, name);
- if (!sym) {
- sym = elf_create_undef_symbol(file->elf, name);
- if (!sym) {
- WARN("elf_create_undef_symbol");
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- if (elf_add_alternative(file->elf, insn, sym,
- ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE), 5, 5)) {
- WARN("elf_add_alternative");
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
int arch_decode_hint_reg(struct instruction *insn, u8 sp_reg)
{
struct cfi_reg *cfa = &insn->cfi.cfa;
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -533,6 +533,52 @@ static int create_static_call_sections(s
return 0;
}
+static int create_retpoline_sites_sections(struct objtool_file *file)
+{
+ struct instruction *insn;
+ struct section *sec;
+ int idx;
+
+ sec = find_section_by_name(file->elf, ".retpoline_sites");
+ if (sec) {
+ WARN("file already has .retpoline_sites, skipping");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ idx = 0;
+ list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->retpoline_call_list, call_node)
+ idx++;
+
+ if (!idx)
+ return 0;
+
+ sec = elf_create_section(file->elf, ".retpoline_sites", 0,
+ sizeof(int), idx);
+ if (!sec) {
+ WARN("elf_create_section: .retpoline_sites");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ idx = 0;
+ list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->retpoline_call_list, call_node) {
+
+ int *site = (int *)sec->data->d_buf + idx;
+ *site = 0;
+
+ if (elf_add_reloc_to_insn(file->elf, sec,
+ idx * sizeof(int),
+ R_X86_64_PC32,
+ insn->sec, insn->offset)) {
+ WARN("elf_add_reloc_to_insn: .retpoline_sites");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ idx++;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int create_mcount_loc_sections(struct objtool_file *file)
{
struct section *sec;
@@ -863,6 +909,11 @@ static void annotate_call_site(struct ob
return;
}
+ if (sym->retpoline_thunk) {
+ list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, &file->retpoline_call_list);
+ return;
+ }
+
/*
* Many compilers cannot disable KCOV with a function attribute
* so they need a little help, NOP out any KCOV calls from noinstr
@@ -933,6 +984,39 @@ static void add_call_dest(struct objtool
annotate_call_site(file, insn, sibling);
}
+static void add_retpoline_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn)
+{
+ /*
+ * Retpoline calls/jumps are really dynamic calls/jumps in disguise,
+ * so convert them accordingly.
+ */
+ switch (insn->type) {
+ case INSN_CALL:
+ insn->type = INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC;
+ break;
+ case INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL:
+ insn->type = INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC;
+ break;
+ case INSN_JUMP_CONDITIONAL:
+ insn->type = INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC_CONDITIONAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return;
+ }
+
+ insn->retpoline_safe = true;
+
+ /*
+ * Whatever stack impact regular CALLs have, should be undone
+ * by the RETURN of the called function.
+ *
+ * Annotated intra-function calls retain the stack_ops but
+ * are converted to JUMP, see read_intra_function_calls().
+ */
+ remove_insn_ops(insn);
+
+ annotate_call_site(file, insn, false);
+}
/*
* Find the destination instructions for all jumps.
*/
@@ -955,19 +1039,7 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct
dest_sec = reloc->sym->sec;
dest_off = arch_dest_reloc_offset(reloc->addend);
} else if (reloc->sym->retpoline_thunk) {
- /*
- * Retpoline jumps are really dynamic jumps in
- * disguise, so convert them accordingly.
- */
- if (insn->type == INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL)
- insn->type = INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC;
- else
- insn->type = INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC_CONDITIONAL;
-
- list_add_tail(&insn->call_node,
- &file->retpoline_call_list);
-
- insn->retpoline_safe = true;
+ add_retpoline_call(file, insn);
continue;
} else if (insn->func) {
/* internal or external sibling call (with reloc) */
@@ -1096,18 +1168,7 @@ static int add_call_destinations(struct
add_call_dest(file, insn, dest, false);
} else if (reloc->sym->retpoline_thunk) {
- /*
- * Retpoline calls are really dynamic calls in
- * disguise, so convert them accordingly.
- */
- insn->type = INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC;
- insn->retpoline_safe = true;
-
- list_add_tail(&insn->call_node,
- &file->retpoline_call_list);
-
- remove_insn_ops(insn);
- continue;
+ add_retpoline_call(file, insn);
} else
add_call_dest(file, insn, reloc->sym, false);
@@ -1833,11 +1894,6 @@ static void mark_rodata(struct objtool_f
file->rodata = found;
}
-__weak int arch_rewrite_retpolines(struct objtool_file *file)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
static int decode_sections(struct objtool_file *file)
{
int ret;
@@ -1906,15 +1962,6 @@ static int decode_sections(struct objtoo
if (ret)
return ret;
- /*
- * Must be after add_special_section_alts(), since this will emit
- * alternatives. Must be after add_{jump,call}_destination(), since
- * those create the call insn lists.
- */
- ret = arch_rewrite_retpolines(file);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
return 0;
}
@@ -3252,6 +3299,13 @@ int check(struct objtool_file *file)
goto out;
warnings += ret;
+ if (retpoline) {
+ ret = create_retpoline_sites_sections(file);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ warnings += ret;
+ }
+
if (mcount) {
ret = create_mcount_loc_sections(file);
if (ret < 0)
--- a/tools/objtool/elf.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/elf.c
@@ -944,90 +944,6 @@ static int elf_add_string(struct elf *el
return len;
}
-struct symbol *elf_create_undef_symbol(struct elf *elf, const char *name)
-{
- struct section *symtab, *symtab_shndx;
- struct symbol *sym;
- Elf_Data *data;
- Elf_Scn *s;
-
- sym = malloc(sizeof(*sym));
- if (!sym) {
- perror("malloc");
- return NULL;
- }
- memset(sym, 0, sizeof(*sym));
-
- sym->name = strdup(name);
-
- sym->sym.st_name = elf_add_string(elf, NULL, sym->name);
- if (sym->sym.st_name == -1)
- return NULL;
-
- sym->sym.st_info = GELF_ST_INFO(STB_GLOBAL, STT_NOTYPE);
- // st_other 0
- // st_shndx 0
- // st_value 0
- // st_size 0
-
- symtab = find_section_by_name(elf, ".symtab");
- if (!symtab) {
- WARN("can't find .symtab");
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s = elf_getscn(elf->elf, symtab->idx);
- if (!s) {
- WARN_ELF("elf_getscn");
- return NULL;
- }
-
- data = elf_newdata(s);
- if (!data) {
- WARN_ELF("elf_newdata");
- return NULL;
- }
-
- data->d_buf = &sym->sym;
- data->d_size = sizeof(sym->sym);
- data->d_align = 1;
- data->d_type = ELF_T_SYM;
-
- sym->idx = symtab->sh.sh_size / sizeof(sym->sym);
-
- symtab->sh.sh_size += data->d_size;
- symtab->changed = true;
-
- symtab_shndx = find_section_by_name(elf, ".symtab_shndx");
- if (symtab_shndx) {
- s = elf_getscn(elf->elf, symtab_shndx->idx);
- if (!s) {
- WARN_ELF("elf_getscn");
- return NULL;
- }
-
- data = elf_newdata(s);
- if (!data) {
- WARN_ELF("elf_newdata");
- return NULL;
- }
-
- data->d_buf = &sym->sym.st_size; /* conveniently 0 */
- data->d_size = sizeof(Elf32_Word);
- data->d_align = 4;
- data->d_type = ELF_T_WORD;
-
- symtab_shndx->sh.sh_size += 4;
- symtab_shndx->changed = true;
- }
-
- sym->sec = find_section_by_index(elf, 0);
-
- elf_add_symbol(elf, sym);
-
- return sym;
-}
-
struct section *elf_create_section(struct elf *elf, const char *name,
unsigned int sh_flags, size_t entsize, int nr)
{
--- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h
+++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h
@@ -143,7 +143,6 @@ int elf_write_insn(struct elf *elf, stru
unsigned long offset, unsigned int len,
const char *insn);
int elf_write_reloc(struct elf *elf, struct reloc *reloc);
-struct symbol *elf_create_undef_symbol(struct elf *elf, const char *name);
int elf_write(struct elf *elf);
void elf_close(struct elf *elf);
--- a/tools/objtool/special.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/special.c
@@ -109,14 +109,6 @@ static int get_alt_entry(struct elf *elf
return -1;
}
- /*
- * Skip retpoline .altinstr_replacement... we already rewrite the
- * instructions for retpolines anyway, see arch_is_retpoline()
- * usage in add_{call,jump}_destinations().
- */
- if (arch_is_retpoline(new_reloc->sym))
- return 1;
-
reloc_to_sec_off(new_reloc, &alt->new_sec, &alt->new_off);
/* _ASM_EXTABLE_EX hack */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 09/89] objtool: Introduce CFI hash
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 08/89] objtool,x86: Replace alternatives with .retpoline_sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 10/89] x86/retpoline: Remove unused replacement symbols Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (85 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andi Kleen, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 8b946cc38e063f0f7bb67789478c38f6d7d457c9 upstream.
Andi reported that objtool on vmlinux.o consumes more memory than his
system has, leading to horrific performance.
This is in part because we keep a struct instruction for every
instruction in the file in-memory. Shrink struct instruction by
removing the CFI state (which includes full register state) from it
and demand allocating it.
Given most instructions don't actually change CFI state, there's lots
of repetition there, so add a hash table to find previous CFI
instances.
Reduces memory consumption (and runtime) for processing an
x86_64-allyesconfig:
pre: 4:40.84 real, 143.99 user, 44.18 sys, 30624988 mem
post: 2:14.61 real, 108.58 user, 25.04 sys, 16396184 mem
Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210624095147.756759107@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c | 20 +---
tools/objtool/check.c | 154 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
tools/objtool/include/objtool/arch.h | 2
tools/objtool/include/objtool/cfi.h | 2
tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h | 2
tools/objtool/orc_gen.c | 15 ++-
6 files changed, 160 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
--- a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
@@ -684,34 +684,32 @@ const char *arch_ret_insn(int len)
return ret[len-1];
}
-int arch_decode_hint_reg(struct instruction *insn, u8 sp_reg)
+int arch_decode_hint_reg(u8 sp_reg, int *base)
{
- struct cfi_reg *cfa = &insn->cfi.cfa;
-
switch (sp_reg) {
case ORC_REG_UNDEFINED:
- cfa->base = CFI_UNDEFINED;
+ *base = CFI_UNDEFINED;
break;
case ORC_REG_SP:
- cfa->base = CFI_SP;
+ *base = CFI_SP;
break;
case ORC_REG_BP:
- cfa->base = CFI_BP;
+ *base = CFI_BP;
break;
case ORC_REG_SP_INDIRECT:
- cfa->base = CFI_SP_INDIRECT;
+ *base = CFI_SP_INDIRECT;
break;
case ORC_REG_R10:
- cfa->base = CFI_R10;
+ *base = CFI_R10;
break;
case ORC_REG_R13:
- cfa->base = CFI_R13;
+ *base = CFI_R13;
break;
case ORC_REG_DI:
- cfa->base = CFI_DI;
+ *base = CFI_DI;
break;
case ORC_REG_DX:
- cfa->base = CFI_DX;
+ *base = CFI_DX;
break;
default:
return -1;
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <arch/elf.h>
#include <objtool/builtin.h>
@@ -27,7 +28,11 @@ struct alternative {
bool skip_orig;
};
-struct cfi_init_state initial_func_cfi;
+static unsigned long nr_cfi, nr_cfi_reused, nr_cfi_cache;
+
+static struct cfi_init_state initial_func_cfi;
+static struct cfi_state init_cfi;
+static struct cfi_state func_cfi;
struct instruction *find_insn(struct objtool_file *file,
struct section *sec, unsigned long offset)
@@ -267,6 +272,78 @@ static void init_insn_state(struct insn_
state->noinstr = sec->noinstr;
}
+static struct cfi_state *cfi_alloc(void)
+{
+ struct cfi_state *cfi = calloc(sizeof(struct cfi_state), 1);
+ if (!cfi) {
+ WARN("calloc failed");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ nr_cfi++;
+ return cfi;
+}
+
+static int cfi_bits;
+static struct hlist_head *cfi_hash;
+
+static inline bool cficmp(struct cfi_state *cfi1, struct cfi_state *cfi2)
+{
+ return memcmp((void *)cfi1 + sizeof(cfi1->hash),
+ (void *)cfi2 + sizeof(cfi2->hash),
+ sizeof(struct cfi_state) - sizeof(struct hlist_node));
+}
+
+static inline u32 cfi_key(struct cfi_state *cfi)
+{
+ return jhash((void *)cfi + sizeof(cfi->hash),
+ sizeof(*cfi) - sizeof(cfi->hash), 0);
+}
+
+static struct cfi_state *cfi_hash_find_or_add(struct cfi_state *cfi)
+{
+ struct hlist_head *head = &cfi_hash[hash_min(cfi_key(cfi), cfi_bits)];
+ struct cfi_state *obj;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(obj, head, hash) {
+ if (!cficmp(cfi, obj)) {
+ nr_cfi_cache++;
+ return obj;
+ }
+ }
+
+ obj = cfi_alloc();
+ *obj = *cfi;
+ hlist_add_head(&obj->hash, head);
+
+ return obj;
+}
+
+static void cfi_hash_add(struct cfi_state *cfi)
+{
+ struct hlist_head *head = &cfi_hash[hash_min(cfi_key(cfi), cfi_bits)];
+
+ hlist_add_head(&cfi->hash, head);
+}
+
+static void *cfi_hash_alloc(unsigned long size)
+{
+ cfi_bits = max(10, ilog2(size));
+ cfi_hash = mmap(NULL, sizeof(struct hlist_head) << cfi_bits,
+ PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANON, -1, 0);
+ if (cfi_hash == (void *)-1L) {
+ WARN("mmap fail cfi_hash");
+ cfi_hash = NULL;
+ } else if (stats) {
+ printf("cfi_bits: %d\n", cfi_bits);
+ }
+
+ return cfi_hash;
+}
+
+static unsigned long nr_insns;
+static unsigned long nr_insns_visited;
+
/*
* Call the arch-specific instruction decoder for all the instructions and add
* them to the global instruction list.
@@ -277,7 +354,6 @@ static int decode_instructions(struct ob
struct symbol *func;
unsigned long offset;
struct instruction *insn;
- unsigned long nr_insns = 0;
int ret;
for_each_sec(file, sec) {
@@ -303,7 +379,6 @@ static int decode_instructions(struct ob
memset(insn, 0, sizeof(*insn));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&insn->alts);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&insn->stack_ops);
- init_cfi_state(&insn->cfi);
insn->sec = sec;
insn->offset = offset;
@@ -1239,7 +1314,6 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objto
memset(nop, 0, sizeof(*nop));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&nop->alts);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&nop->stack_ops);
- init_cfi_state(&nop->cfi);
nop->sec = special_alt->new_sec;
nop->offset = special_alt->new_off + special_alt->new_len;
@@ -1648,10 +1722,11 @@ static void set_func_state(struct cfi_st
static int read_unwind_hints(struct objtool_file *file)
{
+ struct cfi_state cfi = init_cfi;
struct section *sec, *relocsec;
- struct reloc *reloc;
struct unwind_hint *hint;
struct instruction *insn;
+ struct reloc *reloc;
int i;
sec = find_section_by_name(file->elf, ".discard.unwind_hints");
@@ -1689,19 +1764,24 @@ static int read_unwind_hints(struct objt
insn->hint = true;
if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC) {
- set_func_state(&insn->cfi);
+ insn->cfi = &func_cfi;
continue;
}
- if (arch_decode_hint_reg(insn, hint->sp_reg)) {
+ if (insn->cfi)
+ cfi = *(insn->cfi);
+
+ if (arch_decode_hint_reg(hint->sp_reg, &cfi.cfa.base)) {
WARN_FUNC("unsupported unwind_hint sp base reg %d",
insn->sec, insn->offset, hint->sp_reg);
return -1;
}
- insn->cfi.cfa.offset = bswap_if_needed(hint->sp_offset);
- insn->cfi.type = hint->type;
- insn->cfi.end = hint->end;
+ cfi.cfa.offset = bswap_if_needed(hint->sp_offset);
+ cfi.type = hint->type;
+ cfi.end = hint->end;
+
+ insn->cfi = cfi_hash_find_or_add(&cfi);
}
return 0;
@@ -2552,13 +2632,18 @@ static int propagate_alt_cfi(struct objt
if (!insn->alt_group)
return 0;
+ if (!insn->cfi) {
+ WARN("CFI missing");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
alt_cfi = insn->alt_group->cfi;
group_off = insn->offset - insn->alt_group->first_insn->offset;
if (!alt_cfi[group_off]) {
- alt_cfi[group_off] = &insn->cfi;
+ alt_cfi[group_off] = insn->cfi;
} else {
- if (memcmp(alt_cfi[group_off], &insn->cfi, sizeof(struct cfi_state))) {
+ if (cficmp(alt_cfi[group_off], insn->cfi)) {
WARN_FUNC("stack layout conflict in alternatives",
insn->sec, insn->offset);
return -1;
@@ -2609,9 +2694,14 @@ static int handle_insn_ops(struct instru
static bool insn_cfi_match(struct instruction *insn, struct cfi_state *cfi2)
{
- struct cfi_state *cfi1 = &insn->cfi;
+ struct cfi_state *cfi1 = insn->cfi;
int i;
+ if (!cfi1) {
+ WARN("CFI missing");
+ return false;
+ }
+
if (memcmp(&cfi1->cfa, &cfi2->cfa, sizeof(cfi1->cfa))) {
WARN_FUNC("stack state mismatch: cfa1=%d%+d cfa2=%d%+d",
@@ -2796,7 +2886,7 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtoo
struct instruction *insn, struct insn_state state)
{
struct alternative *alt;
- struct instruction *next_insn;
+ struct instruction *next_insn, *prev_insn = NULL;
struct section *sec;
u8 visited;
int ret;
@@ -2825,15 +2915,25 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtoo
if (insn->visited & visited)
return 0;
+ } else {
+ nr_insns_visited++;
}
if (state.noinstr)
state.instr += insn->instr;
- if (insn->hint)
- state.cfi = insn->cfi;
- else
- insn->cfi = state.cfi;
+ if (insn->hint) {
+ state.cfi = *insn->cfi;
+ } else {
+ /* XXX track if we actually changed state.cfi */
+
+ if (prev_insn && !cficmp(prev_insn->cfi, &state.cfi)) {
+ insn->cfi = prev_insn->cfi;
+ nr_cfi_reused++;
+ } else {
+ insn->cfi = cfi_hash_find_or_add(&state.cfi);
+ }
+ }
insn->visited |= visited;
@@ -2997,6 +3097,7 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtoo
return 1;
}
+ prev_insn = insn;
insn = next_insn;
}
@@ -3252,10 +3353,20 @@ int check(struct objtool_file *file)
int ret, warnings = 0;
arch_initial_func_cfi_state(&initial_func_cfi);
+ init_cfi_state(&init_cfi);
+ init_cfi_state(&func_cfi);
+ set_func_state(&func_cfi);
+
+ if (!cfi_hash_alloc(1UL << (file->elf->symbol_bits - 3)))
+ goto out;
+
+ cfi_hash_add(&init_cfi);
+ cfi_hash_add(&func_cfi);
ret = decode_sections(file);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
+
warnings += ret;
if (list_empty(&file->insn_list))
@@ -3313,6 +3424,13 @@ int check(struct objtool_file *file)
warnings += ret;
}
+ if (stats) {
+ printf("nr_insns_visited: %ld\n", nr_insns_visited);
+ printf("nr_cfi: %ld\n", nr_cfi);
+ printf("nr_cfi_reused: %ld\n", nr_cfi_reused);
+ printf("nr_cfi_cache: %ld\n", nr_cfi_cache);
+ }
+
out:
/*
* For now, don't fail the kernel build on fatal warnings. These
--- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/arch.h
+++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/arch.h
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ unsigned long arch_dest_reloc_offset(int
const char *arch_nop_insn(int len);
const char *arch_ret_insn(int len);
-int arch_decode_hint_reg(struct instruction *insn, u8 sp_reg);
+int arch_decode_hint_reg(u8 sp_reg, int *base);
bool arch_is_retpoline(struct symbol *sym);
--- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/cfi.h
+++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/cfi.h
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
#define _OBJTOOL_CFI_H
#include <arch/cfi_regs.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
#define CFI_UNDEFINED -1
#define CFI_CFA -2
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ struct cfi_init_state {
};
struct cfi_state {
+ struct hlist_node hash; /* must be first, cficmp() */
struct cfi_reg regs[CFI_NUM_REGS];
struct cfi_reg vals[CFI_NUM_REGS];
struct cfi_reg cfa;
--- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h
+++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ struct instruction {
struct list_head alts;
struct symbol *func;
struct list_head stack_ops;
- struct cfi_state cfi;
+ struct cfi_state *cfi;
};
static inline bool is_static_jump(struct instruction *insn)
--- a/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c
@@ -13,13 +13,19 @@
#include <objtool/warn.h>
#include <objtool/endianness.h>
-static int init_orc_entry(struct orc_entry *orc, struct cfi_state *cfi)
+static int init_orc_entry(struct orc_entry *orc, struct cfi_state *cfi,
+ struct instruction *insn)
{
- struct instruction *insn = container_of(cfi, struct instruction, cfi);
struct cfi_reg *bp = &cfi->regs[CFI_BP];
memset(orc, 0, sizeof(*orc));
+ if (!cfi) {
+ orc->end = 0;
+ orc->sp_reg = ORC_REG_UNDEFINED;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
orc->end = cfi->end;
if (cfi->cfa.base == CFI_UNDEFINED) {
@@ -162,7 +168,7 @@ int orc_create(struct objtool_file *file
int i;
if (!alt_group) {
- if (init_orc_entry(&orc, &insn->cfi))
+ if (init_orc_entry(&orc, insn->cfi, insn))
return -1;
if (!memcmp(&prev_orc, &orc, sizeof(orc)))
continue;
@@ -186,7 +192,8 @@ int orc_create(struct objtool_file *file
struct cfi_state *cfi = alt_group->cfi[i];
if (!cfi)
continue;
- if (init_orc_entry(&orc, cfi))
+ /* errors are reported on the original insn */
+ if (init_orc_entry(&orc, cfi, insn))
return -1;
if (!memcmp(&prev_orc, &orc, sizeof(orc)))
continue;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 10/89] x86/retpoline: Remove unused replacement symbols
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 09/89] objtool: Introduce CFI hash Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 11/89] x86/asm: Fix register order Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (84 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Alexei Starovoitov,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 4fe79e710d9574a14993f8b4e16b7252da72d5e8 upstream.
Now that objtool no longer creates alternatives, these replacement
symbols are no longer needed, remove them.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120309.915051744@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 10 --------
arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 42 ----------------------------------
2 files changed, 52 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
@@ -24,14 +24,4 @@ extern void cmpxchg8b_emu(void);
extern asmlinkage void __x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg (void);
#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
-#undef GEN
-#define GEN(reg) \
- extern asmlinkage void __x86_indirect_alt_call_ ## reg (void);
-#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
-
-#undef GEN
-#define GEN(reg) \
- extern asmlinkage void __x86_indirect_alt_jmp_ ## reg (void);
-#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
-
#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -41,36 +41,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg)
.endm
/*
- * This generates .altinstr_replacement symbols for use by objtool. They,
- * however, must not actually live in .altinstr_replacement since that will be
- * discarded after init, but module alternatives will also reference these
- * symbols.
- *
- * Their names matches the "__x86_indirect_" prefix to mark them as retpolines.
- */
-.macro ALT_THUNK reg
-
- .align 1
-
-SYM_FUNC_START_NOALIGN(__x86_indirect_alt_call_\reg)
- ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
-1: call *%\reg
-2: .skip 5-(2b-1b), 0x90
-SYM_FUNC_END(__x86_indirect_alt_call_\reg)
-
-STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(__x86_indirect_alt_call_\reg)
-
-SYM_FUNC_START_NOALIGN(__x86_indirect_alt_jmp_\reg)
- ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
-1: jmp *%\reg
-2: .skip 5-(2b-1b), 0x90
-SYM_FUNC_END(__x86_indirect_alt_jmp_\reg)
-
-STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(__x86_indirect_alt_jmp_\reg)
-
-.endm
-
-/*
* Despite being an assembler file we can't just use .irp here
* because __KSYM_DEPS__ only uses the C preprocessor and would
* only see one instance of "__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg" rather
@@ -92,15 +62,3 @@ STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(__x86_indirect_
#undef GEN
#define GEN(reg) EXPORT_THUNK(reg)
#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
-
-#undef GEN
-#define GEN(reg) ALT_THUNK reg
-#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
-
-#undef GEN
-#define GEN(reg) __EXPORT_THUNK(__x86_indirect_alt_call_ ## reg)
-#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
-
-#undef GEN
-#define GEN(reg) __EXPORT_THUNK(__x86_indirect_alt_jmp_ ## reg)
-#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 11/89] x86/asm: Fix register order
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 10/89] x86/retpoline: Remove unused replacement symbols Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 12/89] x86/asm: Fixup odd GEN-for-each-reg.h usage Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (83 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Alexei Starovoitov,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit a92ede2d584a2e070def59c7e47e6b6f6341c55c upstream.
Ensure the register order is correct; this allows for easy translation
between register number and trampoline and vice-versa.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120309.978573921@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h | 14 ++++++++++----
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h
@@ -1,11 +1,16 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * These are in machine order; things rely on that.
+ */
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
GEN(rax)
-GEN(rbx)
GEN(rcx)
GEN(rdx)
+GEN(rbx)
+GEN(rsp)
+GEN(rbp)
GEN(rsi)
GEN(rdi)
-GEN(rbp)
GEN(r8)
GEN(r9)
GEN(r10)
@@ -16,10 +21,11 @@ GEN(r14)
GEN(r15)
#else
GEN(eax)
-GEN(ebx)
GEN(ecx)
GEN(edx)
+GEN(ebx)
+GEN(esp)
+GEN(ebp)
GEN(esi)
GEN(edi)
-GEN(ebp)
#endif
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 12/89] x86/asm: Fixup odd GEN-for-each-reg.h usage
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 11/89] x86/asm: Fix register order Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 13/89] x86/retpoline: Move the retpoline thunk declarations to nospec-branch.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (82 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Alexei Starovoitov,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit b6d3d9944bd7c9e8c06994ead3c9952f673f2a66 upstream.
Currently GEN-for-each-reg.h usage leaves GEN defined, relying on any
subsequent usage to start with #undef, which is rude.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120310.041792350@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ extern void cmpxchg8b_emu(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
-#undef GEN
#define GEN(reg) \
extern asmlinkage void __x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg (void);
#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
+#undef GEN
#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg)
#define __EXPORT_THUNK(sym) _ASM_NOKPROBE(sym); EXPORT_SYMBOL(sym)
#define EXPORT_THUNK(reg) __EXPORT_THUNK(__x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg)
-#undef GEN
#define GEN(reg) THUNK reg
#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
-
#undef GEN
+
#define GEN(reg) EXPORT_THUNK(reg)
#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
+#undef GEN
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 13/89] x86/retpoline: Move the retpoline thunk declarations to nospec-branch.h
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 12/89] x86/asm: Fixup odd GEN-for-each-reg.h usage Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 14/89] x86/retpoline: Create a retpoline thunk array Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (81 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Alexei Starovoitov,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 6fda8a38865607db739be3e567a2387376222dbd upstream.
Because it makes no sense to split the retpoline gunk over multiple
headers.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120310.106290934@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 8 --------
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 7 +++++++
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 1 -
3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
@@ -17,11 +17,3 @@
extern void cmpxchg8b_emu(void);
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
-
-#define GEN(reg) \
- extern asmlinkage void __x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg (void);
-#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
-#undef GEN
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <linux/static_key.h>
#include <linux/objtool.h>
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
@@ -118,6 +119,12 @@
".popsection\n\t"
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+
+#define GEN(reg) \
+ extern asmlinkage void __x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg (void);
+#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
+#undef GEN
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm/text-patching.h>
-#include <asm/asm-prototypes.h>
static u8 *emit_code(u8 *ptr, u32 bytes, unsigned int len)
{
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 14/89] x86/retpoline: Create a retpoline thunk array
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 13/89] x86/retpoline: Move the retpoline thunk declarations to nospec-branch.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 15/89] x86/alternative: Implement .retpoline_sites support Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (80 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Alexei Starovoitov,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 1a6f74429c42a3854980359a758e222005712aee upstream.
Stick all the retpolines in a single symbol and have the individual
thunks as inner labels, this should guarantee thunk order and layout.
Previously there were 16 (or rather 15 without rsp) separate symbols and
a toolchain might reasonably expect it could displace them however it
liked, with disregard for their relative position.
However, now they're part of a larger symbol. Any change to their
relative position would disrupt this larger _array symbol and thus not
be sound.
This is the same reasoning used for data symbols. On their own there
is no guarantee about their relative position wrt to one aonther, but
we're still able to do arrays because an array as a whole is a single
larger symbol.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120310.169659320@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 8 +++++++-
arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 14 +++++++++-----
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
#include <asm/msr-index.h>
#include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
+#define RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE 32
+
/*
* Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
*
@@ -120,11 +122,15 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+typedef u8 retpoline_thunk_t[RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE];
+
#define GEN(reg) \
- extern asmlinkage void __x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg (void);
+ extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg;
#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
#undef GEN
+extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[];
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -28,16 +28,14 @@
.macro THUNK reg
- .align 32
-
-SYM_FUNC_START(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg)
+ .align RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
+ UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg), \
__stringify(RETPOLINE \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
__stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg; int3), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE
-SYM_FUNC_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg)
-
.endm
/*
@@ -55,10 +53,16 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg)
#define __EXPORT_THUNK(sym) _ASM_NOKPROBE(sym); EXPORT_SYMBOL(sym)
#define EXPORT_THUNK(reg) __EXPORT_THUNK(__x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg)
+ .align RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE
+SYM_CODE_START(__x86_indirect_thunk_array)
+
#define GEN(reg) THUNK reg
#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
#undef GEN
+ .align RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE
+SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array)
+
#define GEN(reg) EXPORT_THUNK(reg)
#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
#undef GEN
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 15/89] x86/alternative: Implement .retpoline_sites support
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 14/89] x86/retpoline: Create a retpoline thunk array Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 16/89] x86/alternative: Handle Jcc __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (79 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Alexei Starovoitov,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 7508500900814d14e2e085cdc4e28142721abbdf upstream.
Rewrite retpoline thunk call sites to be indirect calls for
spectre_v2=off. This ensures spectre_v2=off is as near to a
RETPOLINE=n build as possible.
This is the replacement for objtool writing alternative entries to
ensure the same and achieves feature-parity with the previous
approach.
One noteworthy feature is that it relies on the thunks to be in
machine order to compute the register index.
Specifically, this does not yet address the Jcc __x86_indirect_thunk_*
calls generated by clang, a future patch will add this.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120310.232495794@infradead.org
[cascardo: small conflict fixup at arch/x86/kernel/module.c]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c | 4 +
arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h | 1
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 141 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kernel/module.c | 9 ++
4 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c
+++ b/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c
@@ -421,6 +421,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
os_check_bugs();
}
+void apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end)
+{
+}
+
void apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, struct alt_instr *end)
{
}
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ extern int alternatives_patched;
extern void alternative_instructions(void);
extern void apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, struct alt_instr *end);
+extern void apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end);
struct module;
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/fixmap.h>
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
+#include <asm/asm-prototypes.h>
int __read_mostly alternatives_patched;
@@ -113,6 +114,7 @@ static void __init_or_module add_nops(vo
}
}
+extern s32 __retpoline_sites[], __retpoline_sites_end[];
extern struct alt_instr __alt_instructions[], __alt_instructions_end[];
extern s32 __smp_locks[], __smp_locks_end[];
void text_poke_early(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len);
@@ -221,7 +223,7 @@ static __always_inline int optimize_nops
* "noinline" to cause control flow change and thus invalidate I$ and
* cause refetch after modification.
*/
-static void __init_or_module noinline optimize_nops(struct alt_instr *a, u8 *instr)
+static void __init_or_module noinline optimize_nops(u8 *instr, size_t len)
{
struct insn insn;
int i = 0;
@@ -239,11 +241,11 @@ static void __init_or_module noinline op
* optimized.
*/
if (insn.length == 1 && insn.opcode.bytes[0] == 0x90)
- i += optimize_nops_range(instr, a->instrlen, i);
+ i += optimize_nops_range(instr, len, i);
else
i += insn.length;
- if (i >= a->instrlen)
+ if (i >= len)
return;
}
}
@@ -331,10 +333,135 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_alt
text_poke_early(instr, insn_buff, insn_buff_sz);
next:
- optimize_nops(a, instr);
+ optimize_nops(instr, a->instrlen);
}
}
+#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION)
+
+/*
+ * CALL/JMP *%\reg
+ */
+static int emit_indirect(int op, int reg, u8 *bytes)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ u8 modrm;
+
+ switch (op) {
+ case CALL_INSN_OPCODE:
+ modrm = 0x10; /* Reg = 2; CALL r/m */
+ break;
+
+ case JMP32_INSN_OPCODE:
+ modrm = 0x20; /* Reg = 4; JMP r/m */
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (reg >= 8) {
+ bytes[i++] = 0x41; /* REX.B prefix */
+ reg -= 8;
+ }
+
+ modrm |= 0xc0; /* Mod = 3 */
+ modrm += reg;
+
+ bytes[i++] = 0xff; /* opcode */
+ bytes[i++] = modrm;
+
+ return i;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Rewrite the compiler generated retpoline thunk calls.
+ *
+ * For spectre_v2=off (!X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE), rewrite them into immediate
+ * indirect instructions, avoiding the extra indirection.
+ *
+ * For example, convert:
+ *
+ * CALL __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg
+ *
+ * into:
+ *
+ * CALL *%\reg
+ *
+ */
+static int patch_retpoline(void *addr, struct insn *insn, u8 *bytes)
+{
+ retpoline_thunk_t *target;
+ int reg, i = 0;
+
+ target = addr + insn->length + insn->immediate.value;
+ reg = target - __x86_indirect_thunk_array;
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg & ~0xf))
+ return -1;
+
+ /* If anyone ever does: CALL/JMP *%rsp, we're in deep trouble. */
+ BUG_ON(reg == 4);
+
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE))
+ return -1;
+
+ i = emit_indirect(insn->opcode.bytes[0], reg, bytes);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return i;
+
+ for (; i < insn->length;)
+ bytes[i++] = BYTES_NOP1;
+
+ return i;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generated by 'objtool --retpoline'.
+ */
+void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end)
+{
+ s32 *s;
+
+ for (s = start; s < end; s++) {
+ void *addr = (void *)s + *s;
+ struct insn insn;
+ int len, ret;
+ u8 bytes[16];
+ u8 op1, op2;
+
+ ret = insn_decode_kernel(&insn, addr);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret < 0))
+ continue;
+
+ op1 = insn.opcode.bytes[0];
+ op2 = insn.opcode.bytes[1];
+
+ switch (op1) {
+ case CALL_INSN_OPCODE:
+ case JMP32_INSN_OPCODE:
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ len = patch_retpoline(addr, &insn, bytes);
+ if (len == insn.length) {
+ optimize_nops(bytes, len);
+ text_poke_early(addr, bytes, len);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#else /* !RETPOLINES || !CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION */
+
+void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE && CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION */
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
static void alternatives_smp_lock(const s32 *start, const s32 *end,
u8 *text, u8 *text_end)
@@ -643,6 +770,12 @@ void __init alternative_instructions(voi
apply_paravirt(__parainstructions, __parainstructions_end);
/*
+ * Rewrite the retpolines, must be done before alternatives since
+ * those can rewrite the retpoline thunks.
+ */
+ apply_retpolines(__retpoline_sites, __retpoline_sites_end);
+
+ /*
* Then patch alternatives, such that those paravirt calls that are in
* alternatives can be overwritten by their immediate fragments.
*/
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
@@ -252,7 +252,8 @@ int module_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr,
struct module *me)
{
const Elf_Shdr *s, *text = NULL, *alt = NULL, *locks = NULL,
- *para = NULL, *orc = NULL, *orc_ip = NULL;
+ *para = NULL, *orc = NULL, *orc_ip = NULL,
+ *retpolines = NULL;
char *secstrings = (void *)hdr + sechdrs[hdr->e_shstrndx].sh_offset;
for (s = sechdrs; s < sechdrs + hdr->e_shnum; s++) {
@@ -268,6 +269,8 @@ int module_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr,
orc = s;
if (!strcmp(".orc_unwind_ip", secstrings + s->sh_name))
orc_ip = s;
+ if (!strcmp(".retpoline_sites", secstrings + s->sh_name))
+ retpolines = s;
}
/*
@@ -278,6 +281,10 @@ int module_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr,
void *pseg = (void *)para->sh_addr;
apply_paravirt(pseg, pseg + para->sh_size);
}
+ if (retpolines) {
+ void *rseg = (void *)retpolines->sh_addr;
+ apply_retpolines(rseg, rseg + retpolines->sh_size);
+ }
if (alt) {
/* patch .altinstructions */
void *aseg = (void *)alt->sh_addr;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 16/89] x86/alternative: Handle Jcc __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 15/89] x86/alternative: Implement .retpoline_sites support Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 17/89] x86/alternative: Try inline spectre_v2=retpoline,amd Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (78 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Alexei Starovoitov,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 2f0cbb2a8e5bbf101e9de118fc0eb168111a5e1e upstream.
Handle the rare cases where the compiler (clang) does an indirect
conditional tail-call using:
Jcc __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg
For the !RETPOLINE case this can be rewritten to fit the original (6
byte) instruction like:
Jncc.d8 1f
JMP *%\reg
NOP
1:
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120310.296470217@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -393,7 +393,8 @@ static int emit_indirect(int op, int reg
static int patch_retpoline(void *addr, struct insn *insn, u8 *bytes)
{
retpoline_thunk_t *target;
- int reg, i = 0;
+ int reg, ret, i = 0;
+ u8 op, cc;
target = addr + insn->length + insn->immediate.value;
reg = target - __x86_indirect_thunk_array;
@@ -407,9 +408,36 @@ static int patch_retpoline(void *addr, s
if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE))
return -1;
- i = emit_indirect(insn->opcode.bytes[0], reg, bytes);
- if (i < 0)
- return i;
+ op = insn->opcode.bytes[0];
+
+ /*
+ * Convert:
+ *
+ * Jcc.d32 __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg
+ *
+ * into:
+ *
+ * Jncc.d8 1f
+ * JMP *%\reg
+ * NOP
+ * 1:
+ */
+ /* Jcc.d32 second opcode byte is in the range: 0x80-0x8f */
+ if (op == 0x0f && (insn->opcode.bytes[1] & 0xf0) == 0x80) {
+ cc = insn->opcode.bytes[1] & 0xf;
+ cc ^= 1; /* invert condition */
+
+ bytes[i++] = 0x70 + cc; /* Jcc.d8 */
+ bytes[i++] = insn->length - 2; /* sizeof(Jcc.d8) == 2 */
+
+ /* Continue as if: JMP.d32 __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg */
+ op = JMP32_INSN_OPCODE;
+ }
+
+ ret = emit_indirect(op, reg, bytes + i);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ i += ret;
for (; i < insn->length;)
bytes[i++] = BYTES_NOP1;
@@ -443,6 +471,10 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_ret
case JMP32_INSN_OPCODE:
break;
+ case 0x0f: /* escape */
+ if (op2 >= 0x80 && op2 <= 0x8f)
+ break;
+ fallthrough;
default:
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
continue;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 17/89] x86/alternative: Try inline spectre_v2=retpoline,amd
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 16/89] x86/alternative: Handle Jcc __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 18/89] x86/alternative: Add debug prints to apply_retpolines() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (77 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Alexei Starovoitov,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit bbe2df3f6b6da7848398d55b1311d58a16ec21e4 upstream.
Try and replace retpoline thunk calls with:
LFENCE
CALL *%\reg
for spectre_v2=retpoline,amd.
Specifically, the sequence above is 5 bytes for the low 8 registers,
but 6 bytes for the high 8 registers. This means that unless the
compilers prefix stuff the call with higher registers this replacement
will fail.
Luckily GCC strongly favours RAX for the indirect calls and most (95%+
for defconfig-x86_64) will be converted. OTOH clang strongly favours
R11 and almost nothing gets converted.
Note: it will also generate a correct replacement for the Jcc.d32
case, except unless the compilers start to prefix stuff that, it'll
never fit. Specifically:
Jncc.d8 1f
LFENCE
JMP *%\reg
1:
is 7-8 bytes long, where the original instruction in unpadded form is
only 6 bytes.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120310.359986601@infradead.org
[cascardo: RETPOLINE_AMD was renamed to RETPOLINE_LFENCE]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ static int emit_indirect(int op, int reg
*
* CALL *%\reg
*
+ * It also tries to inline spectre_v2=retpoline,amd when size permits.
*/
static int patch_retpoline(void *addr, struct insn *insn, u8 *bytes)
{
@@ -405,7 +406,8 @@ static int patch_retpoline(void *addr, s
/* If anyone ever does: CALL/JMP *%rsp, we're in deep trouble. */
BUG_ON(reg == 4);
- if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE))
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) &&
+ !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE))
return -1;
op = insn->opcode.bytes[0];
@@ -418,8 +420,9 @@ static int patch_retpoline(void *addr, s
* into:
*
* Jncc.d8 1f
+ * [ LFENCE ]
* JMP *%\reg
- * NOP
+ * [ NOP ]
* 1:
*/
/* Jcc.d32 second opcode byte is in the range: 0x80-0x8f */
@@ -434,6 +437,15 @@ static int patch_retpoline(void *addr, s
op = JMP32_INSN_OPCODE;
}
+ /*
+ * For RETPOLINE_AMD: prepend the indirect CALL/JMP with an LFENCE.
+ */
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)) {
+ bytes[i++] = 0x0f;
+ bytes[i++] = 0xae;
+ bytes[i++] = 0xe8; /* LFENCE */
+ }
+
ret = emit_indirect(op, reg, bytes + i);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 18/89] x86/alternative: Add debug prints to apply_retpolines()
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (16 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 17/89] x86/alternative: Try inline spectre_v2=retpoline,amd Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 19/89] bpf,x86: Simplify computing label offsets Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (76 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Alexei Starovoitov,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit d4b5a5c993009ffeb5febe3b701da3faab6adb96 upstream.
Make sure we can see the text changes when booting with
'debug-alternative'.
Example output:
[ ] SMP alternatives: retpoline at: __traceiter_initcall_level+0x1f/0x30 (ffffffff8100066f) len: 5 to: __x86_indirect_thunk_rax+0x0/0x20
[ ] SMP alternatives: ffffffff82603e58: [2:5) optimized NOPs: ff d0 0f 1f 00
[ ] SMP alternatives: ffffffff8100066f: orig: e8 cc 30 00 01
[ ] SMP alternatives: ffffffff8100066f: repl: ff d0 0f 1f 00
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120310.422273830@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -492,9 +492,15 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_ret
continue;
}
+ DPRINTK("retpoline at: %pS (%px) len: %d to: %pS",
+ addr, addr, insn.length,
+ addr + insn.length + insn.immediate.value);
+
len = patch_retpoline(addr, &insn, bytes);
if (len == insn.length) {
optimize_nops(bytes, len);
+ DUMP_BYTES(((u8*)addr), len, "%px: orig: ", addr);
+ DUMP_BYTES(((u8*)bytes), len, "%px: repl: ", addr);
text_poke_early(addr, bytes, len);
}
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 19/89] bpf,x86: Simplify computing label offsets
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (17 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 18/89] x86/alternative: Add debug prints to apply_retpolines() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 20/89] bpf,x86: Respect X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE* Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (75 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Alexei Starovoitov, Josh Poimboeuf,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit dceba0817ca329868a15e2e1dd46eb6340b69206 upstream.
Take an idea from the 32bit JIT, which uses the multi-pass nature of
the JIT to compute the instruction offsets on a prior pass in order to
compute the relative jump offsets on a later pass.
Application to the x86_64 JIT is slightly more involved because the
offsets depend on program variables (such as callee_regs_used and
stack_depth) and hence the computed offsets need to be kept in the
context of the JIT.
This removes, IMO quite fragile, code that hard-codes the offsets and
tries to compute the length of variable parts of it.
Convert both emit_bpf_tail_call_*() functions which have an out: label
at the end. Additionally emit_bpt_tail_call_direct() also has a poke
table entry, for which it computes the offset from the end (and thus
already relies on the previous pass to have computed addrs[i]), also
convert this to be a forward based offset.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120310.552304864@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 123 +++++++++++++++-----------------------------
1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 81 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -224,6 +224,14 @@ static void jit_fill_hole(void *area, un
struct jit_context {
int cleanup_addr; /* Epilogue code offset */
+
+ /*
+ * Program specific offsets of labels in the code; these rely on the
+ * JIT doing at least 2 passes, recording the position on the first
+ * pass, only to generate the correct offset on the second pass.
+ */
+ int tail_call_direct_label;
+ int tail_call_indirect_label;
};
/* Maximum number of bytes emitted while JITing one eBPF insn */
@@ -379,22 +387,6 @@ int bpf_arch_text_poke(void *ip, enum bp
return __bpf_arch_text_poke(ip, t, old_addr, new_addr, true);
}
-static int get_pop_bytes(bool *callee_regs_used)
-{
- int bytes = 0;
-
- if (callee_regs_used[3])
- bytes += 2;
- if (callee_regs_used[2])
- bytes += 2;
- if (callee_regs_used[1])
- bytes += 2;
- if (callee_regs_used[0])
- bytes += 1;
-
- return bytes;
-}
-
/*
* Generate the following code:
*
@@ -410,29 +402,12 @@ static int get_pop_bytes(bool *callee_re
* out:
*/
static void emit_bpf_tail_call_indirect(u8 **pprog, bool *callee_regs_used,
- u32 stack_depth)
+ u32 stack_depth, u8 *ip,
+ struct jit_context *ctx)
{
int tcc_off = -4 - round_up(stack_depth, 8);
- u8 *prog = *pprog;
- int pop_bytes = 0;
- int off1 = 42;
- int off2 = 31;
- int off3 = 9;
-
- /* count the additional bytes used for popping callee regs from stack
- * that need to be taken into account for each of the offsets that
- * are used for bailing out of the tail call
- */
- pop_bytes = get_pop_bytes(callee_regs_used);
- off1 += pop_bytes;
- off2 += pop_bytes;
- off3 += pop_bytes;
-
- if (stack_depth) {
- off1 += 7;
- off2 += 7;
- off3 += 7;
- }
+ u8 *prog = *pprog, *start = *pprog;
+ int offset;
/*
* rdi - pointer to ctx
@@ -447,8 +422,9 @@ static void emit_bpf_tail_call_indirect(
EMIT2(0x89, 0xD2); /* mov edx, edx */
EMIT3(0x39, 0x56, /* cmp dword ptr [rsi + 16], edx */
offsetof(struct bpf_array, map.max_entries));
-#define OFFSET1 (off1 + RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT_SIZE) /* Number of bytes to jump */
- EMIT2(X86_JBE, OFFSET1); /* jbe out */
+
+ offset = ctx->tail_call_indirect_label - (prog + 2 - start);
+ EMIT2(X86_JBE, offset); /* jbe out */
/*
* if (tail_call_cnt > MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT)
@@ -456,8 +432,9 @@ static void emit_bpf_tail_call_indirect(
*/
EMIT2_off32(0x8B, 0x85, tcc_off); /* mov eax, dword ptr [rbp - tcc_off] */
EMIT3(0x83, 0xF8, MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT); /* cmp eax, MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT */
-#define OFFSET2 (off2 + RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT_SIZE)
- EMIT2(X86_JA, OFFSET2); /* ja out */
+
+ offset = ctx->tail_call_indirect_label - (prog + 2 - start);
+ EMIT2(X86_JA, offset); /* ja out */
EMIT3(0x83, 0xC0, 0x01); /* add eax, 1 */
EMIT2_off32(0x89, 0x85, tcc_off); /* mov dword ptr [rbp - tcc_off], eax */
@@ -470,12 +447,11 @@ static void emit_bpf_tail_call_indirect(
* goto out;
*/
EMIT3(0x48, 0x85, 0xC9); /* test rcx,rcx */
-#define OFFSET3 (off3 + RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT_SIZE)
- EMIT2(X86_JE, OFFSET3); /* je out */
- *pprog = prog;
- pop_callee_regs(pprog, callee_regs_used);
- prog = *pprog;
+ offset = ctx->tail_call_indirect_label - (prog + 2 - start);
+ EMIT2(X86_JE, offset); /* je out */
+
+ pop_callee_regs(&prog, callee_regs_used);
EMIT1(0x58); /* pop rax */
if (stack_depth)
@@ -495,38 +471,18 @@ static void emit_bpf_tail_call_indirect(
RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT();
/* out: */
+ ctx->tail_call_indirect_label = prog - start;
*pprog = prog;
}
static void emit_bpf_tail_call_direct(struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *poke,
- u8 **pprog, int addr, u8 *image,
- bool *callee_regs_used, u32 stack_depth)
+ u8 **pprog, u8 *ip,
+ bool *callee_regs_used, u32 stack_depth,
+ struct jit_context *ctx)
{
int tcc_off = -4 - round_up(stack_depth, 8);
- u8 *prog = *pprog;
- int pop_bytes = 0;
- int off1 = 20;
- int poke_off;
-
- /* count the additional bytes used for popping callee regs to stack
- * that need to be taken into account for jump offset that is used for
- * bailing out from of the tail call when limit is reached
- */
- pop_bytes = get_pop_bytes(callee_regs_used);
- off1 += pop_bytes;
-
- /*
- * total bytes for:
- * - nop5/ jmpq $off
- * - pop callee regs
- * - sub rsp, $val if depth > 0
- * - pop rax
- */
- poke_off = X86_PATCH_SIZE + pop_bytes + 1;
- if (stack_depth) {
- poke_off += 7;
- off1 += 7;
- }
+ u8 *prog = *pprog, *start = *pprog;
+ int offset;
/*
* if (tail_call_cnt > MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT)
@@ -534,28 +490,30 @@ static void emit_bpf_tail_call_direct(st
*/
EMIT2_off32(0x8B, 0x85, tcc_off); /* mov eax, dword ptr [rbp - tcc_off] */
EMIT3(0x83, 0xF8, MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT); /* cmp eax, MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT */
- EMIT2(X86_JA, off1); /* ja out */
+
+ offset = ctx->tail_call_direct_label - (prog + 2 - start);
+ EMIT2(X86_JA, offset); /* ja out */
EMIT3(0x83, 0xC0, 0x01); /* add eax, 1 */
EMIT2_off32(0x89, 0x85, tcc_off); /* mov dword ptr [rbp - tcc_off], eax */
- poke->tailcall_bypass = image + (addr - poke_off - X86_PATCH_SIZE);
+ poke->tailcall_bypass = ip + (prog - start);
poke->adj_off = X86_TAIL_CALL_OFFSET;
- poke->tailcall_target = image + (addr - X86_PATCH_SIZE);
+ poke->tailcall_target = ip + ctx->tail_call_direct_label - X86_PATCH_SIZE;
poke->bypass_addr = (u8 *)poke->tailcall_target + X86_PATCH_SIZE;
emit_jump(&prog, (u8 *)poke->tailcall_target + X86_PATCH_SIZE,
poke->tailcall_bypass);
- *pprog = prog;
- pop_callee_regs(pprog, callee_regs_used);
- prog = *pprog;
+ pop_callee_regs(&prog, callee_regs_used);
EMIT1(0x58); /* pop rax */
if (stack_depth)
EMIT3_off32(0x48, 0x81, 0xC4, round_up(stack_depth, 8));
memcpy(prog, x86_nops[5], X86_PATCH_SIZE);
prog += X86_PATCH_SIZE;
+
/* out: */
+ ctx->tail_call_direct_label = prog - start;
*pprog = prog;
}
@@ -1453,13 +1411,16 @@ st: if (is_imm8(insn->off))
case BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL:
if (imm32)
emit_bpf_tail_call_direct(&bpf_prog->aux->poke_tab[imm32 - 1],
- &prog, addrs[i], image,
+ &prog, image + addrs[i - 1],
callee_regs_used,
- bpf_prog->aux->stack_depth);
+ bpf_prog->aux->stack_depth,
+ ctx);
else
emit_bpf_tail_call_indirect(&prog,
callee_regs_used,
- bpf_prog->aux->stack_depth);
+ bpf_prog->aux->stack_depth,
+ image + addrs[i - 1],
+ ctx);
break;
/* cond jump */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 20/89] bpf,x86: Respect X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE*
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (18 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 19/89] bpf,x86: Simplify computing label offsets Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 21/89] objtool: Default ignore INT3 for unreachable Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (74 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Alexei Starovoitov, Josh Poimboeuf,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 87c87ecd00c54ecd677798cb49ef27329e0fab41 upstream.
Current BPF codegen doesn't respect X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE* flags and
unconditionally emits a thunk call, this is sub-optimal and doesn't
match the regular, compiler generated, code.
Update the i386 JIT to emit code equal to what the compiler emits for
the regular kernel text (IOW. a plain THUNK call).
Update the x86_64 JIT to emit code similar to the result of compiler
and kernel rewrites as according to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE* flags.
Inlining RETPOLINE_AMD (lfence; jmp *%reg) and !RETPOLINE (jmp *%reg),
while doing a THUNK call for RETPOLINE.
This removes the hard-coded retpoline thunks and shrinks the generated
code. Leaving a single retpoline thunk definition in the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120310.614772675@infradead.org
[cascardo: RETPOLINE_AMD was renamed to RETPOLINE_LFENCE]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 59 -----------------------------------
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 46 +++++++++++++--------------
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c | 22 +++++++++++--
3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -320,63 +320,4 @@ static inline void mds_idle_clear_cpu_bu
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
-/*
- * Below is used in the eBPF JIT compiler and emits the byte sequence
- * for the following assembly:
- *
- * With retpolines configured:
- *
- * callq do_rop
- * spec_trap:
- * pause
- * lfence
- * jmp spec_trap
- * do_rop:
- * mov %rcx,(%rsp) for x86_64
- * mov %edx,(%esp) for x86_32
- * retq
- *
- * Without retpolines configured:
- *
- * jmp *%rcx for x86_64
- * jmp *%edx for x86_32
- */
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
-# ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-# define RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT_SIZE 17
-# define RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT() \
-do { \
- EMIT1_off32(0xE8, 7); /* callq do_rop */ \
- /* spec_trap: */ \
- EMIT2(0xF3, 0x90); /* pause */ \
- EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8); /* lfence */ \
- EMIT2(0xEB, 0xF9); /* jmp spec_trap */ \
- /* do_rop: */ \
- EMIT4(0x48, 0x89, 0x0C, 0x24); /* mov %rcx,(%rsp) */ \
- EMIT1(0xC3); /* retq */ \
-} while (0)
-# else /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
-# define RETPOLINE_EDX_BPF_JIT() \
-do { \
- EMIT1_off32(0xE8, 7); /* call do_rop */ \
- /* spec_trap: */ \
- EMIT2(0xF3, 0x90); /* pause */ \
- EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8); /* lfence */ \
- EMIT2(0xEB, 0xF9); /* jmp spec_trap */ \
- /* do_rop: */ \
- EMIT3(0x89, 0x14, 0x24); /* mov %edx,(%esp) */ \
- EMIT1(0xC3); /* ret */ \
-} while (0)
-# endif
-#else /* !CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
-# ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-# define RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT_SIZE 2
-# define RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT() \
- EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE1); /* jmp *%rcx */
-# else /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
-# define RETPOLINE_EDX_BPF_JIT() \
- EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE2) /* jmp *%edx */
-# endif
-#endif
-
#endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -387,6 +387,25 @@ int bpf_arch_text_poke(void *ip, enum bp
return __bpf_arch_text_poke(ip, t, old_addr, new_addr, true);
}
+#define EMIT_LFENCE() EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8)
+
+static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **pprog, int reg, u8 *ip)
+{
+ u8 *prog = *pprog;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)) {
+ EMIT_LFENCE();
+ EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg);
+ } else if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)) {
+ emit_jump(&prog, &__x86_indirect_thunk_array[reg], ip);
+ } else
+#endif
+ EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg);
+
+ *pprog = prog;
+}
+
/*
* Generate the following code:
*
@@ -468,7 +487,7 @@ static void emit_bpf_tail_call_indirect(
* rdi == ctx (1st arg)
* rcx == prog->bpf_func + X86_TAIL_CALL_OFFSET
*/
- RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT();
+ emit_indirect_jump(&prog, 1 /* rcx */, ip + (prog - start));
/* out: */
ctx->tail_call_indirect_label = prog - start;
@@ -1185,8 +1204,7 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_prog *bpf_p
/* speculation barrier */
case BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC:
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM2))
- /* Emit 'lfence' */
- EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8);
+ EMIT_LFENCE();
break;
/* ST: *(u8*)(dst_reg + off) = imm */
@@ -2122,24 +2140,6 @@ cleanup:
return ret;
}
-static int emit_fallback_jump(u8 **pprog)
-{
- u8 *prog = *pprog;
- int err = 0;
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
- /* Note that this assumes the the compiler uses external
- * thunks for indirect calls. Both clang and GCC use the same
- * naming convention for external thunks.
- */
- err = emit_jump(&prog, __x86_indirect_thunk_rdx, prog);
-#else
- EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE2); /* jmp rdx */
-#endif
- *pprog = prog;
- return err;
-}
-
static int emit_bpf_dispatcher(u8 **pprog, int a, int b, s64 *progs)
{
u8 *jg_reloc, *prog = *pprog;
@@ -2161,9 +2161,7 @@ static int emit_bpf_dispatcher(u8 **ppro
if (err)
return err;
- err = emit_fallback_jump(&prog); /* jmp thunk/indirect */
- if (err)
- return err;
+ emit_indirect_jump(&prog, 2 /* rdx */, prog);
*pprog = prog;
return 0;
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/asm-prototypes.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
/*
@@ -1267,6 +1268,21 @@ static void emit_epilogue(u8 **pprog, u3
*pprog = prog;
}
+static int emit_jmp_edx(u8 **pprog, u8 *ip)
+{
+ u8 *prog = *pprog;
+ int cnt = 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ EMIT1_off32(0xE9, (u8 *)__x86_indirect_thunk_edx - (ip + 5));
+#else
+ EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE2);
+#endif
+ *pprog = prog;
+
+ return cnt;
+}
+
/*
* Generate the following code:
* ... bpf_tail_call(void *ctx, struct bpf_array *array, u64 index) ...
@@ -1280,7 +1296,7 @@ static void emit_epilogue(u8 **pprog, u3
* goto *(prog->bpf_func + prologue_size);
* out:
*/
-static void emit_bpf_tail_call(u8 **pprog)
+static void emit_bpf_tail_call(u8 **pprog, u8 *ip)
{
u8 *prog = *pprog;
int cnt = 0;
@@ -1362,7 +1378,7 @@ static void emit_bpf_tail_call(u8 **ppro
* eax == ctx (1st arg)
* edx == prog->bpf_func + prologue_size
*/
- RETPOLINE_EDX_BPF_JIT();
+ cnt += emit_jmp_edx(&prog, ip + cnt);
if (jmp_label1 == -1)
jmp_label1 = cnt;
@@ -2122,7 +2138,7 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_prog *bpf_p
break;
}
case BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL:
- emit_bpf_tail_call(&prog);
+ emit_bpf_tail_call(&prog, image + addrs[i - 1]);
break;
/* cond jump */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 21/89] objtool: Default ignore INT3 for unreachable
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (19 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 20/89] bpf,x86: Respect X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE* Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 22/89] x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcx Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (73 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 1ffbe4e935f9b7308615c75be990aec07464d1e7 upstream.
Ignore all INT3 instructions for unreachable code warnings, similar to NOP.
This allows using INT3 for various paddings instead of NOPs.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308154317.343312938@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
tools/objtool/check.c | 12 +++++-------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -2965,9 +2965,8 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtoo
switch (insn->type) {
case INSN_RETURN:
- if (next_insn && next_insn->type == INSN_TRAP) {
- next_insn->ignore = true;
- } else if (sls && !insn->retpoline_safe) {
+ if (sls && !insn->retpoline_safe &&
+ next_insn && next_insn->type != INSN_TRAP) {
WARN_FUNC("missing int3 after ret",
insn->sec, insn->offset);
}
@@ -3014,9 +3013,8 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtoo
break;
case INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC:
- if (next_insn && next_insn->type == INSN_TRAP) {
- next_insn->ignore = true;
- } else if (sls && !insn->retpoline_safe) {
+ if (sls && !insn->retpoline_safe &&
+ next_insn && next_insn->type != INSN_TRAP) {
WARN_FUNC("missing int3 after indirect jump",
insn->sec, insn->offset);
}
@@ -3187,7 +3185,7 @@ static bool ignore_unreachable_insn(stru
int i;
struct instruction *prev_insn;
- if (insn->ignore || insn->type == INSN_NOP)
+ if (insn->ignore || insn->type == INSN_NOP || insn->type == INSN_TRAP)
return true;
/*
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 22/89] x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcx
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (20 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 21/89] objtool: Default ignore INT3 for unreachable Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 23/89] x86/realmode: build with -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (72 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 1b331eeea7b8676fc5dbdf80d0a07e41be226177 upstream.
Yes, r11 and rcx have been restored previously, but since they're being
popped anyway (into rsi) might as well pop them into their own regs --
setting them to the value they already are.
Less magical code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506121631.365070674@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 10 +---------
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 3 +--
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -119,27 +119,19 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
CLEAR_REGS
.endm
-.macro POP_REGS pop_rdi=1 skip_r11rcx=0
+.macro POP_REGS pop_rdi=1
popq %r15
popq %r14
popq %r13
popq %r12
popq %rbp
popq %rbx
- .if \skip_r11rcx
- popq %rsi
- .else
popq %r11
- .endif
popq %r10
popq %r9
popq %r8
popq %rax
- .if \skip_r11rcx
- popq %rsi
- .else
popq %rcx
- .endif
popq %rdx
popq %rsi
.if \pop_rdi
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -189,8 +189,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_h
* perf profiles. Nothing jumps here.
*/
syscall_return_via_sysret:
- /* rcx and r11 are already restored (see code above) */
- POP_REGS pop_rdi=0 skip_r11rcx=1
+ POP_REGS pop_rdi=0
/*
* Now all regs are restored except RSP and RDI.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 23/89] x86/realmode: build with -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (21 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 22/89] x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcx Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 24/89] x86/kvm/vmx: Make noinstr clean Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (71 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Commit 156ff4a544ae ("x86/ibt: Base IBT bits") added this option when
building realmode in order to disable IBT there. This is also needed in
order to disable return thunks.
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/Makefile | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ endif
# How to compile the 16-bit code. Note we always compile for -march=i386;
# that way we can complain to the user if the CPU is insufficient.
-REALMODE_CFLAGS := -m16 -g -Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \
+REALMODE_CFLAGS := -m16 -g -Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS \
-Wall -Wstrict-prototypes -march=i386 -mregparm=3 \
-fno-strict-aliasing -fomit-frame-pointer -fno-pic \
-mno-mmx -mno-sse $(call cc-option,-fcf-protection=none)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 24/89] x86/kvm/vmx: Make noinstr clean
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (22 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 23/89] x86/realmode: build with -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 25/89] x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (70 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 742ab6df974ae8384a2dd213db1a3a06cf6d8936 upstream.
The recent mmio_stale_data fixes broke the noinstr constraints:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: vmx_vcpu_enter_exit+0x15b: call to wrmsrl.constprop.0() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: vmx_vcpu_enter_exit+0x1bf: call to kvm_arch_has_assigned_device() leaves .noinstr.text section
make it all happy again.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 ++--
include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +-
3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -380,9 +380,9 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_disable_
if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear)
return;
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr);
+ msr = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL);
msr |= FB_CLEAR_DIS;
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr);
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr);
/* Cache the MSR value to avoid reading it later */
vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl = msr;
}
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_enable_f
return;
vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl &= ~FB_CLEAR_DIS;
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl);
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl);
}
static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -12179,9 +12179,9 @@ void kvm_arch_end_assignment(struct kvm
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_end_assignment);
-bool kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm)
+bool noinstr kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm)
{
- return atomic_read(&kvm->arch.assigned_device_count);
+ return arch_atomic_read(&kvm->arch.assigned_device_count);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_has_assigned_device);
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -1233,7 +1233,7 @@ static inline void kvm_arch_end_assignme
{
}
-static inline bool kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm)
+static __always_inline bool kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm)
{
return false;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 25/89] x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (23 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 24/89] x86/kvm/vmx: Make noinstr clean Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 26/89] x86/retpoline: Cleanup some #ifdefery Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (69 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit a883d624aed463c84c22596006e5a96f5b44db31 upstream.
In order to extend the RETPOLINE features to 4, move them to word 11
where there is still room. This mostly keeps DISABLE_RETPOLINE
simple.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -203,8 +203,8 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
/* FREE! ( 7*32+10) */
#define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ( 7*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
+/* FREE! ( 7*32+12) */
+/* FREE! ( 7*32+13) */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
#define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */
@@ -294,6 +294,10 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA (11*32+ 7) /* "" Per-thread Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
#define X86_FEATURE_SGX1 (11*32+ 8) /* "" Basic SGX */
#define X86_FEATURE_SGX2 (11*32+ 9) /* "" SGX Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM) */
+/* FREE! (11*32+10) */
+/* FREE! (11*32+11) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 26/89] x86/retpoline: Cleanup some #ifdefery
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (24 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 25/89] x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 27/89] x86/retpoline: Swizzle retpoline thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (68 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 369ae6ffc41a3c1137cab697635a84d0cc7cdcea upstream.
On it's own not much of a cleanup but it prepares for more/similar
code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: conflict fixup because of DISABLE_ENQCMD]
[cascardo: no changes at nospec-branch.h and bpf_jit_comp.c]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -56,6 +56,13 @@
# define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE 0
+#else
+# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE ((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \
+ (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)))
+#endif
+
/* Force disable because it's broken beyond repair */
#define DISABLE_ENQCMD (1 << (X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD & 31))
@@ -79,7 +86,7 @@
#define DISABLED_MASK8 0
#define DISABLED_MASK9 (DISABLE_SMAP|DISABLE_SGX)
#define DISABLED_MASK10 0
-#define DISABLED_MASK11 0
+#define DISABLED_MASK11 (DISABLE_RETPOLINE)
#define DISABLED_MASK12 0
#define DISABLED_MASK13 0
#define DISABLED_MASK14 0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 27/89] x86/retpoline: Swizzle retpoline thunk
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (25 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 26/89] x86/retpoline: Cleanup some #ifdefery Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 28/89] x86/retpoline: Use -mfunction-return Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (67 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 00e1533325fd1fb5459229fe37f235462649f668 upstream.
Put the actual retpoline thunk as the original code so that it can
become more complicated. Specifically, it allows RET to be a JMP,
which can't be .altinstr_replacement since that doesn't do relocations
(except for the very first instruction).
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@
SYM_INNER_LABEL(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
- ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg), \
- __stringify(RETPOLINE \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
- __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg; int3), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE
+ ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(RETPOLINE \reg), \
+ __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg; int3), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE, \
+ __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg), ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
.endm
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 28/89] x86/retpoline: Use -mfunction-return
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (26 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 27/89] x86/retpoline: Swizzle retpoline thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 29/89] x86: Undo return-thunk damage Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (66 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Nick Desaulniers, Josh Poimboeuf,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 0b53c374b9eff2255a386f1f1cfb9a928e52a5ae upstream.
Utilize -mfunction-return=thunk-extern when available to have the
compiler replace RET instructions with direct JMPs to the symbol
__x86_return_thunk. This does not affect assembler (.S) sources, only C
sources.
-mfunction-return=thunk-extern has been available since gcc 7.3 and
clang 15.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: RETPOLINE_CFLAGS is at Makefile]
[cascardo: remove ANNOTATE_NOENDBR from __x86_return_thunk]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Makefile | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 12 ++++++++++++
3 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -687,11 +687,13 @@ endif
ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC
RETPOLINE_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register)
+RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern)
RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-inline -mindirect-branch-register)
endif
ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG
RETPOLINE_CFLAGS := -mretpoline-external-thunk
RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := -mretpoline
+RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern)
endif
export RETPOLINE_CFLAGS
export RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -120,6 +120,8 @@
_ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t" \
".popsection\n\t"
+extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
typedef u8 retpoline_thunk_t[RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE];
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -66,3 +66,15 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array)
#define GEN(reg) EXPORT_THUNK(reg)
#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
#undef GEN
+
+/*
+ * This function name is magical and is used by -mfunction-return=thunk-extern
+ * for the compiler to generate JMPs to it.
+ */
+SYM_CODE_START(__x86_return_thunk)
+ UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+ ret
+ int3
+SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk)
+
+__EXPORT_THUNK(__x86_return_thunk)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 29/89] x86: Undo return-thunk damage
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (27 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 28/89] x86/retpoline: Use -mfunction-return Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 30/89] x86,objtool: Create .return_sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (65 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 15e67227c49a57837108acfe1c80570e1bd9f962 upstream.
Introduce X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK for those afflicted with needing this.
[ bp: Do only INT3 padding - simpler. ]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION vs CONFIG_OBJTOOL]
[cascardo: no IBT support]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h | 1
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 +
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/module.c | 8 +++-
arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 7 +++
6 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ extern int alternatives_patched;
extern void alternative_instructions(void);
extern void apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, struct alt_instr *end);
extern void apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end);
+extern void apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end);
struct module;
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -298,6 +298,7 @@
/* FREE! (11*32+11) */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK (11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -60,7 +60,8 @@
# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE 0
#else
# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE ((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \
- (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)))
+ (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)) | \
+ (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31)))
#endif
/* Force disable because it's broken beyond repair */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ static void __init_or_module add_nops(vo
}
extern s32 __retpoline_sites[], __retpoline_sites_end[];
+extern s32 __return_sites[], __return_sites_end[];
extern struct alt_instr __alt_instructions[], __alt_instructions_end[];
extern s32 __smp_locks[], __smp_locks_end[];
void text_poke_early(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len);
@@ -506,9 +507,67 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_ret
}
}
+/*
+ * Rewrite the compiler generated return thunk tail-calls.
+ *
+ * For example, convert:
+ *
+ * JMP __x86_return_thunk
+ *
+ * into:
+ *
+ * RET
+ */
+static int patch_return(void *addr, struct insn *insn, u8 *bytes)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK))
+ return -1;
+
+ bytes[i++] = RET_INSN_OPCODE;
+
+ for (; i < insn->length;)
+ bytes[i++] = INT3_INSN_OPCODE;
+
+ return i;
+}
+
+void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end)
+{
+ s32 *s;
+
+ for (s = start; s < end; s++) {
+ void *addr = (void *)s + *s;
+ struct insn insn;
+ int len, ret;
+ u8 bytes[16];
+ u8 op1;
+
+ ret = insn_decode_kernel(&insn, addr);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret < 0))
+ continue;
+
+ op1 = insn.opcode.bytes[0];
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(op1 != JMP32_INSN_OPCODE))
+ continue;
+
+ DPRINTK("return thunk at: %pS (%px) len: %d to: %pS",
+ addr, addr, insn.length,
+ addr + insn.length + insn.immediate.value);
+
+ len = patch_return(addr, &insn, bytes);
+ if (len == insn.length) {
+ DUMP_BYTES(((u8*)addr), len, "%px: orig: ", addr);
+ DUMP_BYTES(((u8*)bytes), len, "%px: repl: ", addr);
+ text_poke_early(addr, bytes, len);
+ }
+ }
+}
#else /* !RETPOLINES || !CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION */
void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
+void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE && CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION */
@@ -824,6 +883,7 @@ void __init alternative_instructions(voi
* those can rewrite the retpoline thunks.
*/
apply_retpolines(__retpoline_sites, __retpoline_sites_end);
+ apply_returns(__return_sites, __return_sites_end);
/*
* Then patch alternatives, such that those paravirt calls that are in
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ int module_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr,
{
const Elf_Shdr *s, *text = NULL, *alt = NULL, *locks = NULL,
*para = NULL, *orc = NULL, *orc_ip = NULL,
- *retpolines = NULL;
+ *retpolines = NULL, *returns = NULL;
char *secstrings = (void *)hdr + sechdrs[hdr->e_shstrndx].sh_offset;
for (s = sechdrs; s < sechdrs + hdr->e_shnum; s++) {
@@ -271,6 +271,8 @@ int module_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr,
orc_ip = s;
if (!strcmp(".retpoline_sites", secstrings + s->sh_name))
retpolines = s;
+ if (!strcmp(".return_sites", secstrings + s->sh_name))
+ returns = s;
}
/*
@@ -285,6 +287,10 @@ int module_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr,
void *rseg = (void *)retpolines->sh_addr;
apply_retpolines(rseg, rseg + retpolines->sh_size);
}
+ if (returns) {
+ void *rseg = (void *)returns->sh_addr;
+ apply_returns(rseg, rseg + returns->sh_size);
+ }
if (alt) {
/* patch .altinstructions */
void *aseg = (void *)alt->sh_addr;
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -284,6 +284,13 @@ SECTIONS
*(.retpoline_sites)
__retpoline_sites_end = .;
}
+
+ . = ALIGN(8);
+ .return_sites : AT(ADDR(.return_sites) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+ __return_sites = .;
+ *(.return_sites)
+ __return_sites_end = .;
+ }
#endif
/*
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 30/89] x86,objtool: Create .return_sites
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (28 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 29/89] x86: Undo return-thunk damage Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 31/89] objtool: skip non-text sections when adding return-thunk sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (64 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit d9e9d2300681d68a775c28de6aa6e5290ae17796 upstream.
Find all the return-thunk sites and record them in a .return_sites
section such that the kernel can undo this.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: conflict fixup because of functions added to support IBT]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c | 5 ++
tools/objtool/check.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/objtool/include/objtool/arch.h | 1
tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h | 1
tools/objtool/include/objtool/objtool.h | 1
tools/objtool/objtool.c | 1
6 files changed, 84 insertions(+)
--- a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
@@ -722,3 +722,8 @@ bool arch_is_retpoline(struct symbol *sy
{
return !strncmp(sym->name, "__x86_indirect_", 15);
}
+
+bool arch_is_rethunk(struct symbol *sym)
+{
+ return !strcmp(sym->name, "__x86_return_thunk");
+}
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -654,6 +654,52 @@ static int create_retpoline_sites_sectio
return 0;
}
+static int create_return_sites_sections(struct objtool_file *file)
+{
+ struct instruction *insn;
+ struct section *sec;
+ int idx;
+
+ sec = find_section_by_name(file->elf, ".return_sites");
+ if (sec) {
+ WARN("file already has .return_sites, skipping");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ idx = 0;
+ list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->return_thunk_list, call_node)
+ idx++;
+
+ if (!idx)
+ return 0;
+
+ sec = elf_create_section(file->elf, ".return_sites", 0,
+ sizeof(int), idx);
+ if (!sec) {
+ WARN("elf_create_section: .return_sites");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ idx = 0;
+ list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->return_thunk_list, call_node) {
+
+ int *site = (int *)sec->data->d_buf + idx;
+ *site = 0;
+
+ if (elf_add_reloc_to_insn(file->elf, sec,
+ idx * sizeof(int),
+ R_X86_64_PC32,
+ insn->sec, insn->offset)) {
+ WARN("elf_add_reloc_to_insn: .return_sites");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ idx++;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int create_mcount_loc_sections(struct objtool_file *file)
{
struct section *sec;
@@ -932,6 +978,11 @@ __weak bool arch_is_retpoline(struct sym
return false;
}
+__weak bool arch_is_rethunk(struct symbol *sym)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
#define NEGATIVE_RELOC ((void *)-1L)
static struct reloc *insn_reloc(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn)
@@ -1092,6 +1143,19 @@ static void add_retpoline_call(struct ob
annotate_call_site(file, insn, false);
}
+
+static void add_return_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn)
+{
+ /*
+ * Return thunk tail calls are really just returns in disguise,
+ * so convert them accordingly.
+ */
+ insn->type = INSN_RETURN;
+ insn->retpoline_safe = true;
+
+ list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, &file->return_thunk_list);
+}
+
/*
* Find the destination instructions for all jumps.
*/
@@ -1116,6 +1180,9 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct
} else if (reloc->sym->retpoline_thunk) {
add_retpoline_call(file, insn);
continue;
+ } else if (reloc->sym->return_thunk) {
+ add_return_call(file, insn);
+ continue;
} else if (insn->func) {
/* internal or external sibling call (with reloc) */
add_call_dest(file, insn, reloc->sym, true);
@@ -1937,6 +2004,9 @@ static int classify_symbols(struct objto
if (arch_is_retpoline(func))
func->retpoline_thunk = true;
+ if (arch_is_rethunk(func))
+ func->return_thunk = true;
+
if (!strcmp(func->name, "__fentry__"))
func->fentry = true;
@@ -3413,6 +3483,11 @@ int check(struct objtool_file *file)
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
warnings += ret;
+
+ ret = create_return_sites_sections(file);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ warnings += ret;
}
if (mcount) {
--- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/arch.h
+++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/arch.h
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ const char *arch_ret_insn(int len);
int arch_decode_hint_reg(u8 sp_reg, int *base);
bool arch_is_retpoline(struct symbol *sym);
+bool arch_is_rethunk(struct symbol *sym);
int arch_rewrite_retpolines(struct objtool_file *file);
--- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h
+++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ struct symbol {
u8 uaccess_safe : 1;
u8 static_call_tramp : 1;
u8 retpoline_thunk : 1;
+ u8 return_thunk : 1;
u8 fentry : 1;
u8 kcov : 1;
};
--- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/objtool.h
+++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/objtool.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ struct objtool_file {
struct list_head insn_list;
DECLARE_HASHTABLE(insn_hash, 20);
struct list_head retpoline_call_list;
+ struct list_head return_thunk_list;
struct list_head static_call_list;
struct list_head mcount_loc_list;
bool ignore_unreachables, c_file, hints, rodata;
--- a/tools/objtool/objtool.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/objtool.c
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ struct objtool_file *objtool_open_read(c
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.insn_list);
hash_init(file.insn_hash);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.retpoline_call_list);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.return_thunk_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.static_call_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.mcount_loc_list);
file.c_file = !vmlinux && find_section_by_name(file.elf, ".comment");
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 31/89] objtool: skip non-text sections when adding return-thunk sites
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (29 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 30/89] x86,objtool: Create .return_sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 32/89] x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (63 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo,
Josh Poimboeuf
From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
The .discard.text section is added in order to reserve BRK, with a
temporary function just so it can give it a size. This adds a relocation to
the return thunk, which objtool will add to the .return_sites section.
Linking will then fail as there are references to the .discard.text
section.
Do not add instructions from non-text sections to the list of return thunk
calls, avoiding the reference to .discard.text.
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
tools/objtool/check.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -1153,7 +1153,9 @@ static void add_return_call(struct objto
insn->type = INSN_RETURN;
insn->retpoline_safe = true;
- list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, &file->return_thunk_list);
+ /* Skip the non-text sections, specially .discard ones */
+ if (insn->sec->text)
+ list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, &file->return_thunk_list);
}
/*
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 32/89] x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (30 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 31/89] objtool: skip non-text sections when adding return-thunk sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 33/89] x86/ftrace: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (62 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit ee88d363d15617ff50ac24fab0ffec11113b2aeb upstream.
In addition to teaching static_call about the new way to spell 'RET',
there is an added complication in that static_call() is allowed to
rewrite text before it is known which particular spelling is required.
In order to deal with this; have a static_call specific fixup in the
apply_return() 'alternative' patching routine that will rewrite the
static_call trampoline to match the definite sequence.
This in turn creates the problem of uniquely identifying static call
trampolines. Currently trampolines are 8 bytes, the first 5 being the
jmp.d32/ret sequence and the final 3 a byte sequence that spells out
'SCT'.
This sequence is used in __static_call_validate() to ensure it is
patching a trampoline and not a random other jmp.d32. That is,
false-positives shouldn't be plenty, but aren't a big concern.
OTOH the new __static_call_fixup() must not have false-positives, and
'SCT' decodes to the somewhat weird but semi plausible sequence:
push %rbx
rex.XB push %r12
Additionally, there are SLS concerns with immediate jumps. Combined it
seems like a good moment to change the signature to a single 3 byte
trap instruction that is unique to this usage and will not ever get
generated by accident.
As such, change the signature to: '0x0f, 0xb9, 0xcc', which decodes
to:
ud1 %esp, %ecx
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: skip validation as introduced by 2105a92748e8 ("static_call,x86: Robustify trampoline patching")]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h | 17 ++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 12 +++++++----
arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h
@@ -21,6 +21,16 @@
* relative displacement across sections.
*/
+/*
+ * The trampoline is 8 bytes and of the general form:
+ *
+ * jmp.d32 \func
+ * ud1 %esp, %ecx
+ *
+ * That trailing #UD provides both a speculation stop and serves as a unique
+ * 3 byte signature identifying static call trampolines. Also see tramp_ud[]
+ * and __static_call_fixup().
+ */
#define __ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, insns) \
asm(".pushsection .static_call.text, \"ax\" \n" \
".align 4 \n" \
@@ -34,8 +44,13 @@
#define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, func) \
__ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, ".byte 0xe9; .long " #func " - (. + 4)")
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP(name) \
+ __ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, "jmp __x86_return_thunk")
+#else
#define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP(name) \
__ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, "ret; int3; nop; nop; nop")
+#endif
#define ARCH_ADD_TRAMP_KEY(name) \
@@ -44,4 +59,6 @@
".long " STATIC_CALL_KEY_STR(name) " - . \n" \
".popsection \n")
+extern bool __static_call_fixup(void *tramp, u8 op, void *dest);
+
#endif /* _ASM_STATIC_CALL_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -538,18 +538,22 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_ret
s32 *s;
for (s = start; s < end; s++) {
- void *addr = (void *)s + *s;
+ void *dest = NULL, *addr = (void *)s + *s;
struct insn insn;
int len, ret;
u8 bytes[16];
- u8 op1;
+ u8 op;
ret = insn_decode_kernel(&insn, addr);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret < 0))
continue;
- op1 = insn.opcode.bytes[0];
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(op1 != JMP32_INSN_OPCODE))
+ op = insn.opcode.bytes[0];
+ if (op == JMP32_INSN_OPCODE)
+ dest = addr + insn.length + insn.immediate.value;
+
+ if (__static_call_fixup(addr, op, dest) ||
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(dest != &__x86_return_thunk))
continue;
DPRINTK("return thunk at: %pS (%px) len: %d to: %pS",
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
@@ -12,6 +12,13 @@ enum insn_type {
};
/*
+ * ud1 %esp, %ecx - a 3 byte #UD that is unique to trampolines, chosen such
+ * that there is no false-positive trampoline identification while also being a
+ * speculation stop.
+ */
+static const u8 tramp_ud[] = { 0x0f, 0xb9, 0xcc };
+
+/*
* cs cs cs xorl %eax, %eax - a single 5 byte instruction that clears %[er]ax
*/
static const u8 xor5rax[] = { 0x2e, 0x2e, 0x2e, 0x31, 0xc0 };
@@ -43,7 +50,10 @@ static void __ref __static_call_transfor
break;
case RET:
- code = &retinsn;
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK))
+ code = text_gen_insn(JMP32_INSN_OPCODE, insn, &__x86_return_thunk);
+ else
+ code = &retinsn;
break;
}
@@ -109,3 +119,29 @@ void arch_static_call_transform(void *si
mutex_unlock(&text_mutex);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_static_call_transform);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+/*
+ * This is called by apply_returns() to fix up static call trampolines,
+ * specifically ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP which is recorded as
+ * having a return trampoline.
+ *
+ * The problem is that static_call() is available before determining
+ * X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK and, by implication, running alternatives.
+ *
+ * This means that __static_call_transform() above can have overwritten the
+ * return trampoline and we now need to fix things up to be consistent.
+ */
+bool __static_call_fixup(void *tramp, u8 op, void *dest)
+{
+ if (memcmp(tramp+5, tramp_ud, 3)) {
+ /* Not a trampoline site, not our problem. */
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (op == RET_INSN_OPCODE || dest == &__x86_return_thunk)
+ __static_call_transform(tramp, RET, NULL);
+
+ return true;
+}
+#endif
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 33/89] x86/ftrace: Use alternative RET encoding
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (31 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 32/89] x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 34/89] x86/bpf: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (61 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 1f001e9da6bbf482311e45e48f53c2bd2179e59c upstream.
Use the return thunk in ftrace trampolines, if needed.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: still copy return from ftrace_stub]
[cascardo: use memcpy(text_gen_insn) as there is no __text_gen_insn]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ union ftrace_op_code_union {
} __attribute__((packed));
};
-#define RET_SIZE 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS)
+#define RET_SIZE (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
static unsigned long
create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size)
@@ -367,7 +367,10 @@ create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops
/* The trampoline ends with ret(q) */
retq = (unsigned long)ftrace_stub;
- ret = copy_from_kernel_nofault(ip, (void *)retq, RET_SIZE);
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK))
+ memcpy(ip, text_gen_insn(JMP32_INSN_OPCODE, ip, &__x86_return_thunk), JMP32_INSN_SIZE);
+ else
+ ret = copy_from_kernel_nofault(ip, (void *)retq, RET_SIZE);
if (WARN_ON(ret < 0))
goto fail;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 34/89] x86/bpf: Use alternative RET encoding
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (32 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 33/89] x86/ftrace: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 35/89] x86/kvm: Fix SETcc emulation for return thunks Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (60 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit d77cfe594ad50e0bf95d457e02ccd578791b2a15 upstream.
Use the return thunk in eBPF generated code, if needed.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -406,6 +406,21 @@ static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **ppro
*pprog = prog;
}
+static void emit_return(u8 **pprog, u8 *ip)
+{
+ u8 *prog = *pprog;
+
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK)) {
+ emit_jump(&prog, &__x86_return_thunk, ip);
+ } else {
+ EMIT1(0xC3); /* ret */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+ EMIT1(0xCC); /* int3 */
+ }
+
+ *pprog = prog;
+}
+
/*
* Generate the following code:
*
@@ -1681,7 +1696,7 @@ emit_jmp:
ctx->cleanup_addr = proglen;
pop_callee_regs(&prog, callee_regs_used);
EMIT1(0xC9); /* leave */
- EMIT1(0xC3); /* ret */
+ emit_return(&prog, image + addrs[i - 1] + (prog - temp));
break;
default:
@@ -2127,7 +2142,7 @@ int arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct b
if (flags & BPF_TRAMP_F_SKIP_FRAME)
/* skip our return address and return to parent */
EMIT4(0x48, 0x83, 0xC4, 8); /* add rsp, 8 */
- EMIT1(0xC3); /* ret */
+ emit_return(&prog, prog);
/* Make sure the trampoline generation logic doesn't overflow */
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(prog > (u8 *)image_end - BPF_INSN_SAFETY)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 35/89] x86/kvm: Fix SETcc emulation for return thunks
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (33 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 34/89] x86/bpf: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 36/89] x86/vsyscall_emu/64: Dont use RET in vsyscall emulation Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (59 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit af2e140f34208a5dfb6b7a8ad2d56bda88f0524d upstream.
Prepare the SETcc fastop stuff for when RET can be larger still.
The tricky bit here is that the expressions should not only be
constant C expressions, but also absolute GAS expressions. This means
no ?: and 'true' is ~0.
Also ensure em_setcc() has the same alignment as the actual FOP_SETCC()
ops, this ensures there cannot be an alignment hole between em_setcc()
and the first op.
Additionally, add a .skip directive to the FOP_SETCC() macro to fill
any remaining space with INT3 traps; however the primary purpose of
this directive is to generate AS warnings when the remaining space
goes negative. Which is a very good indication the alignment magic
went side-ways.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: ignore ENDBR when computing SETCC_LENGTH]
[cascardo: conflict fixup]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 26 ++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -321,13 +321,15 @@ static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctx
#define FOP_RET(name) \
__FOP_RET(#name)
-#define FOP_START(op) \
+#define __FOP_START(op, align) \
extern void em_##op(struct fastop *fake); \
asm(".pushsection .text, \"ax\" \n\t" \
".global em_" #op " \n\t" \
- ".align " __stringify(FASTOP_SIZE) " \n\t" \
+ ".align " __stringify(align) " \n\t" \
"em_" #op ":\n\t"
+#define FOP_START(op) __FOP_START(op, FASTOP_SIZE)
+
#define FOP_END \
".popsection")
@@ -431,15 +433,14 @@ static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctx
/*
* Depending on .config the SETcc functions look like:
*
- * SETcc %al [3 bytes]
- * RET [1 byte]
- * INT3 [1 byte; CONFIG_SLS]
- *
- * Which gives possible sizes 4 or 5. When rounded up to the
- * next power-of-two alignment they become 4 or 8.
+ * SETcc %al [3 bytes]
+ * RET | JMP __x86_return_thunk [1,5 bytes; CONFIG_RETPOLINE]
+ * INT3 [1 byte; CONFIG_SLS]
*/
-#define SETCC_LENGTH (4 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
-#define SETCC_ALIGN (4 << IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+#define RET_LENGTH (1 + (4 * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) + \
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+#define SETCC_LENGTH (3 + RET_LENGTH)
+#define SETCC_ALIGN (4 << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 4) & 1) << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 8) & 1))
static_assert(SETCC_LENGTH <= SETCC_ALIGN);
#define FOP_SETCC(op) \
@@ -447,13 +448,14 @@ static_assert(SETCC_LENGTH <= SETCC_ALIG
".type " #op ", @function \n\t" \
#op ": \n\t" \
#op " %al \n\t" \
- __FOP_RET(#op)
+ __FOP_RET(#op) \
+ ".skip " __stringify(SETCC_ALIGN) " - (.-" #op "), 0xcc \n\t"
asm(".pushsection .fixup, \"ax\"\n"
"kvm_fastop_exception: xor %esi, %esi; " ASM_RET
".popsection");
-FOP_START(setcc)
+__FOP_START(setcc, SETCC_ALIGN)
FOP_SETCC(seto)
FOP_SETCC(setno)
FOP_SETCC(setc)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 36/89] x86/vsyscall_emu/64: Dont use RET in vsyscall emulation
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (34 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 35/89] x86/kvm: Fix SETcc emulation for return thunks Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 37/89] x86/sev: Avoid using __x86_return_thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (58 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 15583e514eb16744b80be85dea0774ece153177d upstream.
This is userspace code and doesn't play by the normal kernel rules.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S | 9 ++++++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S
@@ -19,17 +19,20 @@ __vsyscall_page:
mov $__NR_gettimeofday, %rax
syscall
- RET
+ ret
+ int3
.balign 1024, 0xcc
mov $__NR_time, %rax
syscall
- RET
+ ret
+ int3
.balign 1024, 0xcc
mov $__NR_getcpu, %rax
syscall
- RET
+ ret
+ int3
.balign 4096, 0xcc
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 37/89] x86/sev: Avoid using __x86_return_thunk
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (35 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 36/89] x86/vsyscall_emu/64: Dont use RET in vsyscall emulation Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 38/89] x86: Use return-thunk in asm code Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (57 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Kim Phillips, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
commit 0ee9073000e8791f8b134a8ded31bcc767f7f232 upstream.
Specifically, it's because __enc_copy() encrypts the kernel after
being relocated outside the kernel in sme_encrypt_execute(), and the
RET macro's jmp offset isn't amended prior to execution.
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
@@ -65,7 +65,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(sme_encrypt_execute)
movq %rbp, %rsp /* Restore original stack pointer */
pop %rbp
- RET
+ /* Offset to __x86_return_thunk would be wrong here */
+ ret
+ int3
SYM_FUNC_END(sme_encrypt_execute)
SYM_FUNC_START(__enc_copy)
@@ -151,6 +153,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__enc_copy)
pop %r12
pop %r15
- RET
+ /* Offset to __x86_return_thunk would be wrong here */
+ ret
+ int3
.L__enc_copy_end:
SYM_FUNC_END(__enc_copy)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 38/89] x86: Use return-thunk in asm code
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (36 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 37/89] x86/sev: Avoid using __x86_return_thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 39/89] x86/entry: Avoid very early RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (56 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit aa3d480315ba6c3025a60958e1981072ea37c3df upstream.
Use the return thunk in asm code. If the thunk isn't needed, it will
get patched into a RET instruction during boot by apply_returns().
Since alternatives can't handle relocations outside of the first
instruction, putting a 'jmp __x86_return_thunk' in one is not valid,
therefore carve out the memmove ERMS path into a separate label and jump
to it.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: no RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h | 8 ++++++++
arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S | 7 ++++++-
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ endif
endif
$(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(CC_FLAGS_LTO) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) $(CFL)
+$(vobjs): KBUILD_AFLAGS += -DBUILD_VDSO
#
# vDSO code runs in userspace and -pg doesn't help with profiling anyway.
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
@@ -18,19 +18,27 @@
#define __ALIGN_STR __stringify(__ALIGN)
#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
+#define RET jmp __x86_return_thunk
+#else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
#ifdef CONFIG_SLS
#define RET ret; int3
#else
#define RET ret
#endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
+#define ASM_RET "jmp __x86_return_thunk\n\t"
+#else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
#ifdef CONFIG_SLS
#define ASM_RET "ret; int3\n\t"
#else
#define ASM_RET "ret\n\t"
#endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
--- a/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__memmove)
/* FSRM implies ERMS => no length checks, do the copy directly */
.Lmemmove_begin_forward:
ALTERNATIVE "cmp $0x20, %rdx; jb 1f", "", X86_FEATURE_FSRM
- ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(movq %rdx, %rcx; rep movsb; RET), X86_FEATURE_ERMS
+ ALTERNATIVE "", "jmp .Lmemmove_erms", X86_FEATURE_ERMS
/*
* movsq instruction have many startup latency
@@ -206,6 +206,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__memmove)
movb %r11b, (%rdi)
13:
RET
+
+.Lmemmove_erms:
+ movq %rdx, %rcx
+ rep movsb
+ RET
SYM_FUNC_END(__memmove)
SYM_FUNC_END_ALIAS(memmove)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__memmove)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 39/89] x86/entry: Avoid very early RET
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (37 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 38/89] x86: Use return-thunk in asm code Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 40/89] objtool: Treat .text.__x86.* as noinstr Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (55 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 7c81c0c9210c9bfab2bae76aab2999de5bad27db upstream.
Commit
ee774dac0da1 ("x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry()")
manages to introduce a CALL/RET pair that is before SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3,
which means it is before RETBleed can be mitigated.
Revert to an earlier version of the commit in Fixes. Down side is that
this will bloat .text size somewhat. The alternative is fully reverting
it.
The purpose of this patch was to allow migrating error_entry() to C,
including the whole of kPTI. Much care needs to be taken moving that
forward to not re-introduce this problem of early RETs.
Fixes: ee774dac0da1 ("x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry()")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 12 ++----------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -314,14 +314,6 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ret_from_fork)
#endif
.endm
-/* Save all registers in pt_regs */
-SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(push_and_clear_regs)
- UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
- PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS save_ret=1
- ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
- RET
-SYM_CODE_END(push_and_clear_regs)
-
/**
* idtentry_body - Macro to emit code calling the C function
* @cfunc: C function to be called
@@ -329,8 +321,8 @@ SYM_CODE_END(push_and_clear_regs)
*/
.macro idtentry_body cfunc has_error_code:req
- call push_and_clear_regs
- UNWIND_HINT_REGS
+ PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS
+ ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
/*
* Call error_entry() and switch to the task stack if from userspace.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 40/89] objtool: Treat .text.__x86.* as noinstr
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (38 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 39/89] x86/entry: Avoid very early RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 41/89] x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (54 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 951ddecf435659553ed15a9214e153a3af43a9a1 upstream.
Needed because zen_untrain_ret() will be called from noinstr code.
Also makes sense since the thunks MUST NOT contain instrumentation nor
be poked with dynamic instrumentation.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
tools/objtool/check.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -367,7 +367,8 @@ static int decode_instructions(struct ob
sec->text = true;
if (!strcmp(sec->name, ".noinstr.text") ||
- !strcmp(sec->name, ".entry.text"))
+ !strcmp(sec->name, ".entry.text") ||
+ !strncmp(sec->name, ".text.__x86.", 12))
sec->noinstr = true;
for (offset = 0; offset < sec->sh.sh_size; offset += insn->len) {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 41/89] x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (39 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 40/89] objtool: Treat .text.__x86.* as noinstr Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 42/89] x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (53 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andrew Cooper, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit a149180fbcf336e97ce4eb2cdc13672727feb94d upstream.
Note: needs to be in a section distinct from Retpolines such that the
Retpoline RET substitution cannot possibly use immediate jumps.
ORC unwinding for zen_untrain_ret() and __x86_return_thunk() is a
little tricky but works due to the fact that zen_untrain_ret() doesn't
have any stack ops and as such will emit a single ORC entry at the
start (+0x3f).
Meanwhile, unwinding an IP, including the __x86_return_thunk() one
(+0x40) will search for the largest ORC entry smaller or equal to the
IP, these will find the one ORC entry (+0x3f) and all works.
[ Alexandre: SVM part. ]
[ bp: Build fix, massages. ]
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: conflicts at arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S]
[cascardo: there is no ANNOTATE_NOENDBR]
[cascardo: objtool commit 34c861e806478ac2ea4032721defbf1d6967df08 missing]
[cascardo: conflict fixup]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 6 ++
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 4 +
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 -
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 17 ++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 2
arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S | 18 ++++++++
arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
tools/objtool/check.c | 20 ++++++++-
9 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_64)
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
+ UNTRAIN_RET
/* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */
pushq $__USER_DS /* pt_regs->ss */
@@ -688,6 +689,7 @@ native_irq_return_ldt:
pushq %rdi /* Stash user RDI */
swapgs /* to kernel GS */
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rdi /* to kernel CR3 */
+ UNTRAIN_RET
movq PER_CPU_VAR(espfix_waddr), %rdi
movq %rax, (0*8)(%rdi) /* user RAX */
@@ -882,6 +884,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry)
* be retrieved from a kernel internal table.
*/
SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%r14
+ UNTRAIN_RET
/*
* Handling GSBASE depends on the availability of FSGSBASE.
@@ -992,6 +995,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry)
FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
/* We have user CR3. Change to kernel CR3. */
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
+ UNTRAIN_RET
leaq 8(%rsp), %rdi /* arg0 = pt_regs pointer */
.Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs:
@@ -1044,6 +1048,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry)
SWAPGS
FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
+ UNTRAIN_RET
/*
* Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs
@@ -1138,6 +1143,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi)
movq %rsp, %rdx
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS base=%rdx offset=8
+ UNTRAIN_RET
pushq 5*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->ss */
pushq 4*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->rsp */
pushq 3*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->flags */
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <asm/irqflags.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm/smap.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
@@ -71,6 +72,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSENTER_compat)
pushq $__USER32_CS /* pt_regs->cs */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->ip = 0 (placeholder) */
SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
+ UNTRAIN_RET
/*
* User tracing code (ptrace or signal handlers) might assume that
@@ -211,6 +213,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_compat)
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
+ UNTRAIN_RET
/* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */
pushq $__USER32_DS /* pt_regs->ss */
@@ -377,6 +380,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_INT80_compat)
pushq (%rdi) /* pt_regs->di */
.Lint80_keep_stack:
+ UNTRAIN_RET
pushq %rsi /* pt_regs->si */
xorl %esi, %esi /* nospec si */
pushq %rdx /* pt_regs->dx */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -299,6 +299,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK (11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */
+#define X86_FEATURE_UNRET (11*32+15) /* "" AMD BTB untrain return */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -61,7 +61,8 @@
#else
# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE ((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \
(1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)) | \
- (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31)))
+ (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31)) | \
+ (1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31)))
#endif
/* Force disable because it's broken beyond repair */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -112,6 +112,22 @@
#endif
.endm
+/*
+ * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. Requires KERNEL CR3 because the
+ * return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD
+ * typically has NO_MELTDOWN).
+ *
+ * Doesn't clobber any registers but does require a stable stack.
+ *
+ * As such, this must be placed after every *SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 at a point
+ * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction.
+ */
+.macro UNTRAIN_RET
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ ALTERNATIVE "", "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET
+#endif
+.endm
+
#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
@@ -121,6 +137,7 @@
".popsection\n\t"
extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
+extern void zen_untrain_ret(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ SECTIONS
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
__indirect_thunk_start = .;
- *(.text.__x86.indirect_thunk)
+ *(.text.__x86.*)
__indirect_thunk_end = .;
#endif
} :text =0xcccc
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
@@ -111,6 +111,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run)
#endif
/*
+ * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. RET should be
+ * untrained as soon as we exit the VM and are back to the
+ * kernel. This should be done before re-enabling interrupts
+ * because interrupt handlers won't sanitize 'ret' if the return is
+ * from the kernel.
+ */
+ UNTRAIN_RET
+
+ /*
* Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent
* speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded
* via the stack. In theory, an L1 cache miss when restoring registers
@@ -190,6 +199,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run)
FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
#endif
+ /*
+ * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. RET should be
+ * untrained as soon as we exit the VM and are back to the
+ * kernel. This should be done before re-enabling interrupts
+ * because interrupt handlers won't sanitize RET if the return is
+ * from the kernel.
+ */
+ UNTRAIN_RET
+
pop %_ASM_BX
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -71,10 +71,67 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array)
* This function name is magical and is used by -mfunction-return=thunk-extern
* for the compiler to generate JMPs to it.
*/
-SYM_CODE_START(__x86_return_thunk)
- UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+ .section .text.__x86.return_thunk
+
+/*
+ * Safety details here pertain to the AMD Zen{1,2} microarchitecture:
+ * 1) The RET at __x86_return_thunk must be on a 64 byte boundary, for
+ * alignment within the BTB.
+ * 2) The instruction at zen_untrain_ret must contain, and not
+ * end with, the 0xc3 byte of the RET.
+ * 3) STIBP must be enabled, or SMT disabled, to prevent the sibling thread
+ * from re-poisioning the BTB prediction.
+ */
+ .align 64
+ .skip 63, 0xcc
+SYM_FUNC_START_NOALIGN(zen_untrain_ret);
+
+ /*
+ * As executed from zen_untrain_ret, this is:
+ *
+ * TEST $0xcc, %bl
+ * LFENCE
+ * JMP __x86_return_thunk
+ *
+ * Executing the TEST instruction has a side effect of evicting any BTB
+ * prediction (potentially attacker controlled) attached to the RET, as
+ * __x86_return_thunk + 1 isn't an instruction boundary at the moment.
+ */
+ .byte 0xf6
+
+ /*
+ * As executed from __x86_return_thunk, this is a plain RET.
+ *
+ * As part of the TEST above, RET is the ModRM byte, and INT3 the imm8.
+ *
+ * We subsequently jump backwards and architecturally execute the RET.
+ * This creates a correct BTB prediction (type=ret), but in the
+ * meantime we suffer Straight Line Speculation (because the type was
+ * no branch) which is halted by the INT3.
+ *
+ * With SMT enabled and STIBP active, a sibling thread cannot poison
+ * RET's prediction to a type of its choice, but can evict the
+ * prediction due to competitive sharing. If the prediction is
+ * evicted, __x86_return_thunk will suffer Straight Line Speculation
+ * which will be contained safely by the INT3.
+ */
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(__x86_return_thunk, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
ret
int3
SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk)
-__EXPORT_THUNK(__x86_return_thunk)
+ /*
+ * Ensure the TEST decoding / BTB invalidation is complete.
+ */
+ lfence
+
+ /*
+ * Jump back and execute the RET in the middle of the TEST instruction.
+ * INT3 is for SLS protection.
+ */
+ jmp __x86_return_thunk
+ int3
+SYM_FUNC_END(zen_untrain_ret)
+__EXPORT_THUNK(zen_untrain_ret)
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk)
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ static void add_retpoline_call(struct ob
annotate_call_site(file, insn, false);
}
-static void add_return_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn)
+static void add_return_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn, bool add)
{
/*
* Return thunk tail calls are really just returns in disguise,
@@ -1155,7 +1155,7 @@ static void add_return_call(struct objto
insn->retpoline_safe = true;
/* Skip the non-text sections, specially .discard ones */
- if (insn->sec->text)
+ if (add && insn->sec->text)
list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, &file->return_thunk_list);
}
@@ -1184,7 +1184,7 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct
add_retpoline_call(file, insn);
continue;
} else if (reloc->sym->return_thunk) {
- add_return_call(file, insn);
+ add_return_call(file, insn, true);
continue;
} else if (insn->func) {
/* internal or external sibling call (with reloc) */
@@ -1201,6 +1201,7 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct
insn->jump_dest = find_insn(file, dest_sec, dest_off);
if (!insn->jump_dest) {
+ struct symbol *sym = find_symbol_by_offset(dest_sec, dest_off);
/*
* This is a special case where an alt instruction
@@ -1210,6 +1211,19 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct
if (!strcmp(insn->sec->name, ".altinstr_replacement"))
continue;
+ /*
+ * This is a special case for zen_untrain_ret().
+ * It jumps to __x86_return_thunk(), but objtool
+ * can't find the thunk's starting RET
+ * instruction, because the RET is also in the
+ * middle of another instruction. Objtool only
+ * knows about the outer instruction.
+ */
+ if (sym && sym->return_thunk) {
+ add_return_call(file, insn, false);
+ continue;
+ }
+
WARN_FUNC("can't find jump dest instruction at %s+0x%lx",
insn->sec, insn->offset, dest_sec->name,
dest_off);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 42/89] x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (40 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 41/89] x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 43/89] x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (52 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Kim Phillips, Alexandre Chartre,
Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream.
Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack.
[peterz: add hygon]
[kim: invert parity; fam15h]
Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 13 +++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
drivers/base/cpu.c | 8 ++++++++
include/linux/cpu.h | 2 ++
5 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -443,5 +443,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
#define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
+#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1987,6 +1987,11 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *bu
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
}
+static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+
static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf, unsigned int bug)
{
@@ -2032,6 +2037,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de
case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA:
return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf);
+ case X86_BUG_RETBLEED:
+ return retbleed_show_state(buf);
+
default:
break;
}
@@ -2088,4 +2096,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
+}
#endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1095,16 +1095,27 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
{}
};
+#define VULNBL(vendor, family, model, blacklist) \
+ X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, blacklist)
+
#define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues) \
X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, \
INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \
X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
+#define VULNBL_AMD(family, blacklist) \
+ VULNBL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist)
+
+#define VULNBL_HYGON(family, blacklist) \
+ VULNBL(HYGON, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist)
+
#define SRBDS BIT(0)
/* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
#define MMIO BIT(1)
/* CPU is affected by Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), a variant of X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
#define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2)
+/* CPU is affected by RETbleed, speculating where you would not expect it */
+#define RETBLEED BIT(3)
static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
@@ -1137,6 +1148,11 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+
+ VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED),
{}
};
@@ -1238,6 +1254,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
!arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
+
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -570,6 +570,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(
return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
}
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
@@ -580,6 +586,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444
static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(mmio_stale_data, 0444, cpu_show_mmio_stale_data, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(retbleed, 0444, cpu_show_retbleed, NULL);
static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -592,6 +599,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulner
&dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr,
&dev_attr_srbds.attr,
&dev_attr_mmio_stale_data.attr,
+ &dev_attr_retbleed.attr,
NULL
};
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct dev
extern ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
extern __printf(4, 5)
struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 43/89] x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (41 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 42/89] x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 44/89] x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (51 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Alexandre Chartre,
Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
commit 7fbf47c7ce50b38a64576b150e7011ae73d54669 upstream.
Add the "retbleed=<value>" boot parameter to select a mitigation for
RETBleed. Possible values are "off", "auto" and "unret"
(JMP2RET mitigation). The default value is "auto".
Currently, "retbleed=auto" will select the unret mitigation on
AMD and Hygon and no mitigation on Intel (JMP2RET is not effective on
Intel).
[peterz: rebase; add hygon]
[jpoimboe: cleanups]
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 15 +++
arch/x86/Kconfig | 3
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4968,6 +4968,21 @@
retain_initrd [RAM] Keep initrd memory after extraction
+ retbleed= [X86] Control mitigation of RETBleed (Arbitrary
+ Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions)
+ vulnerability.
+
+ off - unconditionally disable
+ auto - automatically select a migitation
+ unret - force enable untrained return thunks,
+ only effective on AMD Zen {1,2}
+ based systems.
+
+ Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run
+ time according to the CPU.
+
+ Not specifying this option is equivalent to retbleed=auto.
+
rfkill.default_state=
0 "airplane mode". All wifi, bluetooth, wimax, gps, fm,
etc. communication is blocked by default.
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -471,6 +471,9 @@ config RETPOLINE
config CC_HAS_SLS
def_bool $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all)
+config CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
+ def_bool $(cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern)
+
config SLS
bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation"
depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#include "cpu.h"
static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -120,6 +121,12 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
+ retbleed_select_mitigation();
+ /*
+ * spectre_v2_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by
+ * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is
+ * forced for UNRET.
+ */
spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
ssb_select_mitigation();
l1tf_select_mitigation();
@@ -746,6 +753,100 @@ static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(c
early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RETBleed: " fmt
+
+enum retbleed_mitigation {
+ RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE,
+ RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET,
+};
+
+enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd {
+ RETBLEED_CMD_OFF,
+ RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO,
+ RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET,
+};
+
+const char * const retbleed_strings[] = {
+ [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
+ [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET] = "Mitigation: untrained return thunk",
+};
+
+static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+ RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE;
+static enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd retbleed_cmd __ro_after_init =
+ RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
+
+static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+ retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_OFF;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "auto"))
+ retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "unret"))
+ retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET;
+ else
+ pr_err("Unknown retbleed option (%s). Defaulting to 'auto'\n", str);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline);
+
+#define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n"
+#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n"
+
+static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) || cpu_mitigations_off())
+ return;
+
+ switch (retbleed_cmd) {
+ case RETBLEED_CMD_OFF:
+ return;
+
+ case RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET:
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
+ break;
+
+ case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO:
+ default:
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED))
+ break;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch (retbleed_mitigation) {
+ case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET:
+
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) ||
+ !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK)) {
+ pr_err(RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG);
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
+
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
+ pr_err(RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt
static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
@@ -1989,7 +2090,12 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *bu
static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf)
{
- return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+ if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET &&
+ (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON))
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n");
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
}
static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 44/89] x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RET
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (42 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 43/89] x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 45/89] x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (50 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josh Poimboeuf, Kim Phillips,
Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
commit e8ec1b6e08a2102d8755ccb06fa26d540f26a2fa upstream.
For untrained return thunks to be fully effective, STIBP must be enabled
or SMT disabled.
Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 16 ++++--
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++-----
2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4972,11 +4972,17 @@
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions)
vulnerability.
- off - unconditionally disable
- auto - automatically select a migitation
- unret - force enable untrained return thunks,
- only effective on AMD Zen {1,2}
- based systems.
+ off - no mitigation
+ auto - automatically select a migitation
+ auto,nosmt - automatically select a mitigation,
+ disabling SMT if necessary for
+ the full mitigation (only on Zen1
+ and older without STIBP).
+ unret - force enable untrained return thunks,
+ only effective on AMD f15h-f17h
+ based systems.
+ unret,nosmt - like unret, will disable SMT when STIBP
+ is not available.
Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run
time according to the CPU.
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -776,19 +776,34 @@ static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed
static enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd retbleed_cmd __ro_after_init =
RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
+static int __ro_after_init retbleed_nosmt = false;
+
static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str)
{
if (!str)
return -EINVAL;
- if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
- retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_OFF;
- else if (!strcmp(str, "auto"))
- retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
- else if (!strcmp(str, "unret"))
- retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET;
- else
- pr_err("Unknown retbleed option (%s). Defaulting to 'auto'\n", str);
+ while (str) {
+ char *next = strchr(str, ',');
+ if (next) {
+ *next = 0;
+ next++;
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
+ retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_OFF;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "auto")) {
+ retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "unret")) {
+ retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "nosmt")) {
+ retbleed_nosmt = true;
+ } else {
+ pr_err("Ignoring unknown retbleed option (%s).", str);
+ }
+
+ str = next;
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -834,6 +849,10 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitig
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) &&
+ (retbleed_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
+ cpu_smt_disable(false);
+
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
pr_err(RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG);
@@ -1080,6 +1099,13 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum s
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON))
mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED;
+ if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET) {
+ if (mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT &&
+ mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
+ pr_info("Selecting STIBP always-on mode to complement retbleed mitigation'\n");
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED;
+ }
+
spectre_v2_user_stibp = mode;
set_mode:
@@ -2090,10 +2116,18 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *bu
static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf)
{
- if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET &&
- (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
- boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON))
- return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n");
+ if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET) {
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n");
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n",
+ retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation],
+ !sched_smt_active() ? "disabled" :
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ?
+ "enabled with STIBP protection" : "vulnerable");
+ }
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 45/89] x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (43 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 44/89] x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 46/89] x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (49 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit caa0ff24d5d0e02abce5e65c3d2b7f20a6617be5 upstream.
Due to TIF_SSBD and TIF_SPEC_IB the actual IA32_SPEC_CTRL value can
differ from x86_spec_ctrl_base. As such, keep a per-CPU value
reflecting the current task's MSR content.
[jpoimboe: rename]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -254,6 +254,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_predi
/* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val);
/*
* With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -49,12 +49,30 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigatio
static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);
-/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
+/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+
+/* The current value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR with task-specific bits set */
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+
static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
/*
+ * Keep track of the SPEC_CTRL MSR value for the current task, which may differ
+ * from x86_spec_ctrl_base due to STIBP/SSB in __speculation_ctrl_update().
+ */
+void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val)
+{
+ if (this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current) == val)
+ return;
+
+ this_cpu_write(x86_spec_ctrl_current, val);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val);
+}
+
+/*
* The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
* x86_spec_ctrl_base.
*/
@@ -1272,7 +1290,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
/* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
}
switch (mode) {
@@ -1327,7 +1345,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)
{
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
}
/* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */
@@ -1570,7 +1588,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_
x86_amd_ssb_disable();
} else {
x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
}
}
@@ -1821,7 +1839,7 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task
void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
{
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
x86_amd_ssb_disable();
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ static __always_inline void __speculatio
}
if (updmsr)
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
+ write_spec_ctrl_current(msr);
}
static unsigned long speculation_ctrl_update_tif(struct task_struct *tsk)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 46/89] x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (44 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 45/89] x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 47/89] x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (48 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
commit 2dbb887e875b1de3ca8f40ddf26bcfe55798c609 upstream.
Implement Kernel IBRS - currently the only known option to mitigate RSB
underflow speculation issues on Skylake hardware.
Note: since IBRS_ENTER requires fuller context established than
UNTRAIN_RET, it must be placed after it. However, since UNTRAIN_RET
itself implies a RET, it must come after IBRS_ENTER. This means
IBRS_ENTER needs to also move UNTRAIN_RET.
Note 2: KERNEL_IBRS is sub-optimal for XenPV.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: conflict at arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S]
[cascardo: conflict fixups, no ANNOTATE_NOENDBR]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 17 ++++++++--
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 -
4 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
#include <asm/ptrace-abi.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
/*
@@ -282,6 +284,62 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
#endif
/*
+ * IBRS kernel mitigation for Spectre_v2.
+ *
+ * Assumes full context is established (PUSH_REGS, CR3 and GS) and it clobbers
+ * the regs it uses (AX, CX, DX). Must be called before the first RET
+ * instruction (NOTE! UNTRAIN_RET includes a RET instruction)
+ *
+ * The optional argument is used to save/restore the current value,
+ * which is used on the paranoid paths.
+ *
+ * Assumes x86_spec_ctrl_{base,current} to have SPEC_CTRL_IBRS set.
+ */
+.macro IBRS_ENTER save_reg
+ ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
+ movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
+
+.ifnb \save_reg
+ rdmsr
+ shl $32, %rdx
+ or %rdx, %rax
+ mov %rax, \save_reg
+ test $SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, %eax
+ jz .Ldo_wrmsr_\@
+ lfence
+ jmp .Lend_\@
+.Ldo_wrmsr_\@:
+.endif
+
+ movq PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx
+ movl %edx, %eax
+ shr $32, %rdx
+ wrmsr
+.Lend_\@:
+.endm
+
+/*
+ * Similar to IBRS_ENTER, requires KERNEL GS,CR3 and clobbers (AX, CX, DX)
+ * regs. Must be called after the last RET.
+ */
+.macro IBRS_EXIT save_reg
+ ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
+ movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
+
+.ifnb \save_reg
+ mov \save_reg, %rdx
+.else
+ movq PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx
+ andl $(~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS), %edx
+.endif
+
+ movl %edx, %eax
+ shr $32, %rdx
+ wrmsr
+.Lend_\@:
+.endm
+
+/*
* Mitigate Spectre v1 for conditional swapgs code paths.
*
* FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY is used in the user entry swapgs code path, to
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -94,7 +94,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_64)
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
- UNTRAIN_RET
/* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */
pushq $__USER_DS /* pt_regs->ss */
@@ -111,6 +110,11 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_h
movq %rsp, %rdi
/* Sign extend the lower 32bit as syscall numbers are treated as int */
movslq %eax, %rsi
+
+ /* clobbers %rax, make sure it is after saving the syscall nr */
+ IBRS_ENTER
+ UNTRAIN_RET
+
call do_syscall_64 /* returns with IRQs disabled */
/*
@@ -190,6 +194,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_h
* perf profiles. Nothing jumps here.
*/
syscall_return_via_sysret:
+ IBRS_EXIT
POP_REGS pop_rdi=0
/*
@@ -582,6 +587,7 @@ __irqentry_text_end:
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(common_interrupt_return)
SYM_INNER_LABEL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
+ IBRS_EXIT
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY
/* Assert that pt_regs indicates user mode. */
testb $3, CS(%rsp)
@@ -861,6 +867,9 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xen_failsafe_callback)
* 1 -> no SWAPGS on exit
*
* Y GSBASE value at entry, must be restored in paranoid_exit
+ *
+ * R14 - old CR3
+ * R15 - old SPEC_CTRL
*/
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry)
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
@@ -884,7 +893,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry)
* be retrieved from a kernel internal table.
*/
SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%r14
- UNTRAIN_RET
/*
* Handling GSBASE depends on the availability of FSGSBASE.
@@ -906,7 +914,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry)
* is needed here.
*/
SAVE_AND_SET_GSBASE scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%rbx
- RET
+ jmp .Lparanoid_gsbase_done
.Lparanoid_entry_checkgs:
/* EBX = 1 -> kernel GSBASE active, no restore required */
@@ -925,8 +933,16 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry)
xorl %ebx, %ebx
swapgs
.Lparanoid_kernel_gsbase:
-
FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
+.Lparanoid_gsbase_done:
+
+ /*
+ * Once we have CR3 and %GS setup save and set SPEC_CTRL. Just like
+ * CR3 above, keep the old value in a callee saved register.
+ */
+ IBRS_ENTER save_reg=%r15
+ UNTRAIN_RET
+
RET
SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_entry)
@@ -948,9 +964,19 @@ SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_entry)
* 1 -> no SWAPGS on exit
*
* Y User space GSBASE, must be restored unconditionally
+ *
+ * R14 - old CR3
+ * R15 - old SPEC_CTRL
*/
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_exit)
UNWIND_HINT_REGS
+
+ /*
+ * Must restore IBRS state before both CR3 and %GS since we need access
+ * to the per-CPU x86_spec_ctrl_shadow variable.
+ */
+ IBRS_EXIT save_reg=%r15
+
/*
* The order of operations is important. RESTORE_CR3 requires
* kernel GSBASE.
@@ -995,10 +1021,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry)
FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
/* We have user CR3. Change to kernel CR3. */
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
+ IBRS_ENTER
UNTRAIN_RET
leaq 8(%rsp), %rdi /* arg0 = pt_regs pointer */
.Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs:
+
/* Put us onto the real thread stack. */
call sync_regs
RET
@@ -1048,6 +1076,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry)
SWAPGS
FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
+ IBRS_ENTER
UNTRAIN_RET
/*
@@ -1143,7 +1172,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi)
movq %rsp, %rdx
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS base=%rdx offset=8
- UNTRAIN_RET
pushq 5*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->ss */
pushq 4*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->rsp */
pushq 3*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->flags */
@@ -1154,6 +1182,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi)
PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rdx=(%rdx)
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
+ IBRS_ENTER
+ UNTRAIN_RET
+
/*
* At this point we no longer need to worry about stack damage
* due to nesting -- we're on the normal thread stack and we're
@@ -1376,6 +1407,9 @@ end_repeat_nmi:
movq $-1, %rsi
call exc_nmi
+ /* Always restore stashed SPEC_CTRL value (see paranoid_entry) */
+ IBRS_EXIT save_reg=%r15
+
/* Always restore stashed CR3 value (see paranoid_entry) */
RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg=%r15 save_reg=%r14
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
*
* Copyright 2000-2002 Andi Kleen, SuSE Labs.
*/
-#include "calling.h"
#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
#include <asm/current.h>
#include <asm/errno.h>
@@ -18,6 +17,8 @@
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
+#include "calling.h"
+
.section .entry.text, "ax"
/*
@@ -72,7 +73,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSENTER_compat)
pushq $__USER32_CS /* pt_regs->cs */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->ip = 0 (placeholder) */
SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
- UNTRAIN_RET
/*
* User tracing code (ptrace or signal handlers) might assume that
@@ -114,6 +114,9 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSENTER_compat_af
cld
+ IBRS_ENTER
+ UNTRAIN_RET
+
/*
* SYSENTER doesn't filter flags, so we need to clear NT and AC
* ourselves. To save a few cycles, we can check whether
@@ -213,7 +216,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_compat)
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
- UNTRAIN_RET
/* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */
pushq $__USER32_DS /* pt_regs->ss */
@@ -255,6 +257,9 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_aft
UNWIND_HINT_REGS
+ IBRS_ENTER
+ UNTRAIN_RET
+
movq %rsp, %rdi
call do_fast_syscall_32
/* XEN PV guests always use IRET path */
@@ -269,6 +274,8 @@ sysret32_from_system_call:
*/
STACKLEAK_ERASE
+ IBRS_EXIT
+
movq RBX(%rsp), %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */
movq RBP(%rsp), %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */
movq EFLAGS(%rsp), %r11 /* pt_regs->flags (in r11) */
@@ -380,7 +387,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_INT80_compat)
pushq (%rdi) /* pt_regs->di */
.Lint80_keep_stack:
- UNTRAIN_RET
pushq %rsi /* pt_regs->si */
xorl %esi, %esi /* nospec si */
pushq %rdx /* pt_regs->dx */
@@ -413,6 +419,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_INT80_compat)
cld
+ IBRS_ENTER
+ UNTRAIN_RET
+
movq %rsp, %rdi
call do_int80_syscall_32
jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
/* FREE! ( 7*32+10) */
#define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
-/* FREE! ( 7*32+12) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS ( 7*32+12) /* "" Set/clear IBRS on kernel entry/exit */
/* FREE! ( 7*32+13) */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
#define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 47/89] x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (45 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 46/89] x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 48/89] x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (47 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit c779bc1a9002fa474175b80e72b85c9bf628abb0 upstream.
When changing SPEC_CTRL for user control, the WRMSR can be delayed
until return-to-user when KERNEL_IBRS has been enabled.
This avoids an MSR write during context switch.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_predi
/* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
-extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val);
+extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force);
/*
* With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -63,13 +63,19 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
* Keep track of the SPEC_CTRL MSR value for the current task, which may differ
* from x86_spec_ctrl_base due to STIBP/SSB in __speculation_ctrl_update().
*/
-void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val)
+void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force)
{
if (this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current) == val)
return;
this_cpu_write(x86_spec_ctrl_current, val);
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val);
+
+ /*
+ * When KERNEL_IBRS this MSR is written on return-to-user, unless
+ * forced the update can be delayed until that time.
+ */
+ if (force || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS))
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val);
}
/*
@@ -1290,7 +1296,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
/* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
- write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
}
switch (mode) {
@@ -1345,7 +1351,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)
{
- write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
}
/* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */
@@ -1588,7 +1594,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_
x86_amd_ssb_disable();
} else {
x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
- write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
}
}
@@ -1839,7 +1845,7 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task
void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
{
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
- write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
x86_amd_ssb_disable();
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ static __always_inline void __speculatio
}
if (updmsr)
- write_spec_ctrl_current(msr);
+ write_spec_ctrl_current(msr, false);
}
static unsigned long speculation_ctrl_update_tif(struct task_struct *tsk)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 48/89] x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (46 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 47/89] x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 49/89] x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (46 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pawan Gupta, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
commit 7c693f54c873691a4b7da05c7e0f74e67745d144 upstream.
Extend spectre_v2= boot option with Kernel IBRS.
[jpoimboe: no STIBP with IBRS]
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 1
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++------
3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -5335,6 +5335,7 @@
eibrs - enhanced IBRS
eibrs,retpoline - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
eibrs,lfence - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
+ ibrs - use IBRS to protect kernel
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
spectre_v2=auto.
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS,
SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
};
/* The indirect branch speculation control variants */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -965,6 +965,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS,
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS,
};
enum spectre_v2_user_cmd {
@@ -1037,11 +1038,12 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spect
return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
}
-static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
{
- return (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
- mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
- mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE);
+ return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS ||
+ mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
+ mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
+ mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
}
static void __init
@@ -1106,12 +1108,12 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum s
}
/*
- * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not
- * required.
+ * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible,
+ * STIBP is not required.
*/
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
!smt_possible ||
- spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+ spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
return;
/*
@@ -1143,6 +1145,7 @@ static const char * const spectre_v2_str
[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE",
[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS",
};
static const struct {
@@ -1160,6 +1163,7 @@ static const struct {
{ "eibrs,lfence", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE, false },
{ "eibrs,retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, false },
{ "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false },
+ { "ibrs", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS, false },
};
static void __init spec_v2_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
@@ -1222,6 +1226,24 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
+ if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
+ pr_err("%s selected but not Intel CPU. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+
+ if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) {
+ pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have IBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+
+ if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
+ pr_err("%s selected but running as XenPV guest. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+
spec_v2_print_cond(mitigation_options[i].option,
mitigation_options[i].secure);
return cmd;
@@ -1261,6 +1283,14 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
break;
}
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) &&
+ retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
+ break;
+ }
+
mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
break;
@@ -1277,6 +1307,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS:
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
+ break;
+
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS:
mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
break;
@@ -1293,7 +1327,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
- if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
+ if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
/* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
@@ -1304,6 +1338,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS);
+ break;
+
case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE);
@@ -1330,17 +1368,17 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
/*
- * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect
- * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted
- * speculation around firmware calls only when Enhanced IBRS isn't
- * supported.
+ * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS
+ * and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around
+ * firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced IBRS aren't otherwise
+ * enabled.
*
* Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because
* the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
* the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not
* enable IBRS around firmware calls.
*/
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
}
@@ -2082,7 +2120,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_stat
static char *stibp_state(void)
{
- if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+ if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
return "";
switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 49/89] x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation()
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (47 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 48/89] x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 50/89] x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (45 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 166115c08a9b0b846b783088808a27d739be6e8d upstream.
retbleed will depend on spectre_v2, while spectre_v2_user depends on
retbleed. Break this cycle.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -37,8 +37,9 @@
#include "cpu.h"
static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -145,13 +146,19 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
+ spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
+ /*
+ * retbleed_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by
+ * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); specifically it wants to know about
+ * spectre_v2=ibrs.
+ */
retbleed_select_mitigation();
/*
- * spectre_v2_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by
+ * spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by
* retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is
* forced for UNRET.
*/
- spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
+ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation();
ssb_select_mitigation();
l1tf_select_mitigation();
md_clear_select_mitigation();
@@ -1006,13 +1013,15 @@ static void __init spec_v2_user_print_co
pr_info("spectre_v2_user=%s forced on command line.\n", reason);
}
+static __ro_after_init enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd spectre_v2_cmd;
+
static enum spectre_v2_user_cmd __init
-spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
+spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
{
char arg[20];
int ret, i;
- switch (v2_cmd) {
+ switch (spectre_v2_cmd) {
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
@@ -1047,7 +1056,7 @@ static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mo
}
static void __init
-spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
+spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
{
enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP);
@@ -1060,7 +1069,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum s
cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED)
smt_possible = false;
- cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd);
+ cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline();
switch (cmd) {
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE:
goto set_mode;
@@ -1384,7 +1393,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
}
/* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */
- spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(cmd);
+ spectre_v2_cmd = cmd;
}
static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 50/89] x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (48 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 49/89] x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 51/89] intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (44 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 6ad0ad2bf8a67e27d1f9d006a1dabb0e1c360cc3 upstream.
Skylake suffers from RSB underflow speculation issues; report this
vulnerability and it's mitigation (spectre_v2=ibrs).
[jpoimboe: cleanups, eibrs]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
3 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
#define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a
#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO BIT(0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL BIT(1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */
+#define ARCH_CAP_RSBA BIT(2) /* RET may use alternative branch predictors */
#define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH BIT(3) /* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */
#define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO BIT(4) /*
* Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -783,12 +783,17 @@ static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(c
}
early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
+ SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RETBleed: " fmt
enum retbleed_mitigation {
RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE,
RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET,
+ RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS,
+ RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS,
};
enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd {
@@ -800,6 +805,8 @@ enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd {
const char * const retbleed_strings[] = {
[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET] = "Mitigation: untrained return thunk",
+ [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS",
+ [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
};
static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init =
@@ -842,6 +849,7 @@ early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_c
#define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n"
#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n"
+#define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n"
static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
{
@@ -858,12 +866,15 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitig
case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO:
default:
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED))
- break;
-
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
+
+ /*
+ * The Intel mitigation (IBRS) was already selected in
+ * spectre_v2_select_mitigation().
+ */
+
break;
}
@@ -893,15 +904,31 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitig
break;
}
+ /*
+ * Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the
+ * retbleed= cmdline option.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
+ switch (spectre_v2_enabled) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS;
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_err(RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG);
+ }
+ }
+
pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
}
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt
-static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
- SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
-
static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_stibp __ro_after_init =
SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_ibpb __ro_after_init =
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1127,24 +1127,24 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) |
- BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO),
+ BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6), MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
@@ -1254,7 +1254,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
!arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
- if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED))
+ if ((cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA)))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 51/89] intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (49 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 50/89] x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 52/89] objtool: Update Retpoline validation Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (43 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Tim Chen, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit bf5835bcdb9635c97f85120dba9bfa21e111130f upstream.
Having IBRS enabled while the SMT sibling is idle unnecessarily slows
down the running sibling. OTOH, disabling IBRS around idle takes two
MSR writes, which will increase the idle latency.
Therefore, only disable IBRS around deeper idle states. Shallow idle
states are bounded by the tick in duration, since NOHZ is not allowed
for them by virtue of their short target residency.
Only do this for mwait-driven idle, since that keeps interrupts disabled
across idle, which makes disabling IBRS vs IRQ-entry a non-issue.
Note: C6 is a random threshold, most importantly C1 probably shouldn't
disable IBRS, benchmarking needed.
Suggested-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: no CPUIDLE_FLAG_IRQ_ENABLE]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 ++++
drivers/idle/intel_idle.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -256,6 +256,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_predi
/* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force);
+extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void);
/*
* With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -79,6 +79,12 @@ void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bo
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val);
}
+u64 spec_ctrl_current(void)
+{
+ return this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spec_ctrl_current);
+
/*
* The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
* x86_spec_ctrl_base.
--- a/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c
+++ b/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c
@@ -47,11 +47,13 @@
#include <linux/tick.h>
#include <trace/events/power.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/smt.h>
#include <linux/notifier.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm/mwait.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
@@ -94,6 +96,12 @@ static unsigned int mwait_substates __in
#define CPUIDLE_FLAG_ALWAYS_ENABLE BIT(15)
/*
+ * Disable IBRS across idle (when KERNEL_IBRS), is exclusive vs IRQ_ENABLE
+ * above.
+ */
+#define CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS BIT(16)
+
+/*
* MWAIT takes an 8-bit "hint" in EAX "suggesting"
* the C-state (top nibble) and sub-state (bottom nibble)
* 0x00 means "MWAIT(C1)", 0x10 means "MWAIT(C2)" etc.
@@ -132,6 +140,24 @@ static __cpuidle int intel_idle(struct c
return index;
}
+static __cpuidle int intel_idle_ibrs(struct cpuidle_device *dev,
+ struct cpuidle_driver *drv, int index)
+{
+ bool smt_active = sched_smt_active();
+ u64 spec_ctrl = spec_ctrl_current();
+ int ret;
+
+ if (smt_active)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
+
+ ret = intel_idle(dev, drv, index);
+
+ if (smt_active)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, spec_ctrl);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/**
* intel_idle_s2idle - Ask the processor to enter the given idle state.
* @dev: cpuidle device of the target CPU.
@@ -653,7 +679,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[
{
.name = "C6",
.desc = "MWAIT 0x20",
- .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED,
+ .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS,
.exit_latency = 85,
.target_residency = 200,
.enter = &intel_idle,
@@ -661,7 +687,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[
{
.name = "C7s",
.desc = "MWAIT 0x33",
- .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x33) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED,
+ .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x33) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS,
.exit_latency = 124,
.target_residency = 800,
.enter = &intel_idle,
@@ -669,7 +695,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[
{
.name = "C8",
.desc = "MWAIT 0x40",
- .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x40) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED,
+ .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x40) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS,
.exit_latency = 200,
.target_residency = 800,
.enter = &intel_idle,
@@ -677,7 +703,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[
{
.name = "C9",
.desc = "MWAIT 0x50",
- .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x50) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED,
+ .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x50) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS,
.exit_latency = 480,
.target_residency = 5000,
.enter = &intel_idle,
@@ -685,7 +711,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[
{
.name = "C10",
.desc = "MWAIT 0x60",
- .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x60) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED,
+ .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x60) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS,
.exit_latency = 890,
.target_residency = 5000,
.enter = &intel_idle,
@@ -714,7 +740,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skx_cstates[
{
.name = "C6",
.desc = "MWAIT 0x20",
- .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED,
+ .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS,
.exit_latency = 133,
.target_residency = 600,
.enter = &intel_idle,
@@ -1574,6 +1600,11 @@ static void __init intel_idle_init_cstat
/* Structure copy. */
drv->states[drv->state_count] = cpuidle_state_table[cstate];
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS) &&
+ cpuidle_state_table[cstate].flags & CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS) {
+ drv->states[drv->state_count].enter = intel_idle_ibrs;
+ }
+
if ((disabled_states_mask & BIT(drv->state_count)) ||
((icpu->use_acpi || force_use_acpi) &&
intel_idle_off_by_default(mwait_hint) &&
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 52/89] objtool: Update Retpoline validation
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (50 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 51/89] intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 53/89] x86/xen: Rename SYS* entry points Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (42 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 9bb2ec608a209018080ca262f771e6a9ff203b6f upstream.
Update retpoline validation with the new CONFIG_RETPOLINE requirement of
not having bare naked RET instructions.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: conflict fixup at arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 6 ++++++
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 2 ++
arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S | 1 +
tools/objtool/check.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -76,6 +76,12 @@
.endm
/*
+ * (ab)use RETPOLINE_SAFE on RET to annotate away 'bare' RET instructions
+ * vs RETBleed validation.
+ */
+#define ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
+
+/*
* JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
* indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
* attack.
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(sme_encrypt_execute)
pop %rbp
/* Offset to __x86_return_thunk would be wrong here */
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
ret
int3
SYM_FUNC_END(sme_encrypt_execute)
@@ -154,6 +155,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__enc_copy)
pop %r15
/* Offset to __x86_return_thunk would be wrong here */
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
ret
int3
.L__enc_copy_end:
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(hypercall_page)
.rept (PAGE_SIZE / 32)
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
.skip 31, 0x90
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
RET
.endr
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -1894,8 +1894,9 @@ static int read_retpoline_hints(struct o
}
if (insn->type != INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC &&
- insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC) {
- WARN_FUNC("retpoline_safe hint not an indirect jump/call",
+ insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC &&
+ insn->type != INSN_RETURN) {
+ WARN_FUNC("retpoline_safe hint not an indirect jump/call/ret",
insn->sec, insn->offset);
return -1;
}
@@ -3229,7 +3230,8 @@ static int validate_retpoline(struct obj
for_each_insn(file, insn) {
if (insn->type != INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC &&
- insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC)
+ insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC &&
+ insn->type != INSN_RETURN)
continue;
if (insn->retpoline_safe)
@@ -3244,9 +3246,14 @@ static int validate_retpoline(struct obj
if (!strcmp(insn->sec->name, ".init.text") && !module)
continue;
- WARN_FUNC("indirect %s found in RETPOLINE build",
- insn->sec, insn->offset,
- insn->type == INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC ? "jump" : "call");
+ if (insn->type == INSN_RETURN) {
+ WARN_FUNC("'naked' return found in RETPOLINE build",
+ insn->sec, insn->offset);
+ } else {
+ WARN_FUNC("indirect %s found in RETPOLINE build",
+ insn->sec, insn->offset,
+ insn->type == INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC ? "jump" : "call");
+ }
warnings++;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 53/89] x86/xen: Rename SYS* entry points
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (51 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 52/89] objtool: Update Retpoline validation Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 54/89] x86/xen: Add UNTRAIN_RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (41 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit b75b7f8ef1148be1b9321ffc2f6c19238904b438 upstream.
Native SYS{CALL,ENTER} entry points are called
entry_SYS{CALL,ENTER}_{64,compat}, make sure the Xen versions are
named consistently.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/xen/setup.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S | 20 ++++++++++----------
arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h | 6 +++---
3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/xen/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/setup.c
@@ -922,7 +922,7 @@ void xen_enable_sysenter(void)
if (!boot_cpu_has(sysenter_feature))
return;
- ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter, xen_sysenter_target);
+ ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter, xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat);
if(ret != 0)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(sysenter_feature);
}
@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ void xen_enable_syscall(void)
{
int ret;
- ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall, xen_syscall_target);
+ ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall, xen_entry_SYSCALL_64);
if (ret != 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Failed to set syscall callback: %d\n", ret);
/* Pretty fatal; 64-bit userspace has no other
@@ -940,7 +940,7 @@ void xen_enable_syscall(void)
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32)) {
ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall32,
- xen_syscall32_target);
+ xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat);
if (ret != 0)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32);
}
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xenpv_restore_regs_and_retu
*/
/* Normal 64-bit system call target */
-SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall_target)
+SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64)
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
popq %rcx
popq %r11
@@ -241,12 +241,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall_target)
movq $__USER_CS, 1*8(%rsp)
jmp entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
-SYM_CODE_END(xen_syscall_target)
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64)
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
/* 32-bit compat syscall target */
-SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall32_target)
+SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat)
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
popq %rcx
popq %r11
@@ -260,10 +260,10 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall32_target)
movq $__USER32_CS, 1*8(%rsp)
jmp entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe
-SYM_CODE_END(xen_syscall32_target)
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat)
/* 32-bit compat sysenter target */
-SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target)
+SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat)
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
/*
* NB: Xen is polite and clears TF from EFLAGS for us. This means
@@ -281,18 +281,18 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target)
movq $__USER32_CS, 1*8(%rsp)
jmp entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe
-SYM_CODE_END(xen_sysenter_target)
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat)
#else /* !CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */
-SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall32_target)
-SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target)
+SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat)
+SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat)
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
lea 16(%rsp), %rsp /* strip %rcx, %r11 */
mov $-ENOSYS, %rax
pushq $0
jmp hypercall_iret
-SYM_CODE_END(xen_sysenter_target)
-SYM_CODE_END(xen_syscall32_target)
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat)
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat)
#endif /* CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h
@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@
/* These are code, but not functions. Defined in entry.S */
extern const char xen_failsafe_callback[];
-void xen_sysenter_target(void);
+void xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-void xen_syscall_target(void);
-void xen_syscall32_target(void);
+void xen_entry_SYSCALL_64(void);
+void xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat(void);
#endif
extern void *xen_initial_gdt;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 54/89] x86/xen: Add UNTRAIN_RET
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (52 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 53/89] x86/xen: Rename SYS* entry points Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 55/89] x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (40 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit d147553b64bad34d2f92cb7d8ba454ae95c3baac upstream.
Ensure the Xen entry also passes through UNTRAIN_RET.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -320,6 +320,12 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ret_from_fork)
#endif
.endm
+SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(xen_error_entry)
+ UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
+ UNTRAIN_RET
+ RET
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_error_entry)
+
/**
* idtentry_body - Macro to emit code calling the C function
* @cfunc: C function to be called
@@ -339,7 +345,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ret_from_fork)
* switch the CR3. So it can skip invoking error_entry().
*/
ALTERNATIVE "call error_entry; movq %rax, %rsp", \
- "", X86_FEATURE_XENPV
+ "call xen_error_entry", X86_FEATURE_XENPV
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
UNWIND_HINT_REGS
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 55/89] x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (53 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 54/89] x86/xen: Add UNTRAIN_RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 56/89] x86/bugs: Do IBPB fallback check only once Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (39 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andrew Cooper, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 3ebc170068885b6fc7bedda6c667bb2c4d533159 upstream.
jmp2ret mitigates the easy-to-attack case at relatively low overhead.
It mitigates the long speculation windows after a mispredicted RET, but
it does not mitigate the short speculation window from arbitrary
instruction boundaries.
On Zen2, there is a chicken bit which needs setting, which mitigates
"arbitrary instruction boundaries" down to just "basic block boundaries".
But there is no fix for the short speculation window on basic block
boundaries, other than to flush the entire BTB to evict all attacker
predictions.
On the spectrum of "fast & blurry" -> "safe", there is (on top of STIBP
or no-SMT):
1) Nothing System wide open
2) jmp2ret May stop a script kiddy
3) jmp2ret+chickenbit Raises the bar rather further
4) IBPB Only thing which can count as "safe".
Tentative numbers put IBPB-on-entry at a 2.5x hit on Zen2, and a 10x hit
on Zen1 according to lmbench.
[ bp: Fixup feature bit comments, document option, 32-bit build fix. ]
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 +
arch/x86/entry/Makefile | 2 -
arch/x86/entry/entry.S | 22 ++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 -
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 8 +++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++------
6 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/entry.S
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4978,6 +4978,9 @@
disabling SMT if necessary for
the full mitigation (only on Zen1
and older without STIBP).
+ ibpb - mitigate short speculation windows on
+ basic block boundaries too. Safe, highest
+ perf impact.
unret - force enable untrained return thunks,
only effective on AMD f15h-f17h
based systems.
--- a/arch/x86/entry/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/Makefile
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ CFLAGS_REMOVE_common.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTR
CFLAGS_common.o += -fno-stack-protector
-obj-y := entry_$(BITS).o thunk_$(BITS).o syscall_$(BITS).o
+obj-y := entry.o entry_$(BITS).o thunk_$(BITS).o syscall_$(BITS).o
obj-y += common.o
obj-y += vdso/
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry.S
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Common place for both 32- and 64-bit entry routines.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/export.h>
+#include <asm/msr-index.h>
+
+.pushsection .noinstr.text, "ax"
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(entry_ibpb)
+ movl $MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, %ecx
+ movl $PRED_CMD_IBPB, %eax
+ xorl %edx, %edx
+ wrmsr
+ RET
+SYM_FUNC_END(entry_ibpb)
+/* For KVM */
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(entry_ibpb);
+
+.popsection
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA (11*32+ 7) /* "" Per-thread Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
#define X86_FEATURE_SGX1 (11*32+ 8) /* "" Basic SGX */
#define X86_FEATURE_SGX2 (11*32+ 9) /* "" SGX Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM) */
-/* FREE! (11*32+10) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB (11*32+10) /* "" Issue an IBPB on kernel entry */
/* FREE! (11*32+11) */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -123,14 +123,17 @@
* return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD
* typically has NO_MELTDOWN).
*
- * Doesn't clobber any registers but does require a stable stack.
+ * While zen_untrain_ret() doesn't clobber anything but requires stack,
+ * entry_ibpb() will clobber AX, CX, DX.
*
* As such, this must be placed after every *SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 at a point
* where we have a stack but before any RET instruction.
*/
.macro UNTRAIN_RET
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
- ALTERNATIVE "", "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET
+ ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \
+ "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \
+ "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB
#endif
.endm
@@ -144,6 +147,7 @@
extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
extern void zen_untrain_ret(void);
+extern void entry_ibpb(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -798,6 +798,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectr
enum retbleed_mitigation {
RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE,
RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET,
+ RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB,
RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS,
RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS,
};
@@ -806,11 +807,13 @@ enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd {
RETBLEED_CMD_OFF,
RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO,
RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET,
+ RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB,
};
const char * const retbleed_strings[] = {
[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET] = "Mitigation: untrained return thunk",
+ [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB] = "Mitigation: IBPB",
[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS",
[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
};
@@ -840,6 +843,8 @@ static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline
retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
} else if (!strcmp(str, "unret")) {
retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb")) {
+ retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB;
} else if (!strcmp(str, "nosmt")) {
retbleed_nosmt = true;
} else {
@@ -854,11 +859,13 @@ static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline
early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline);
#define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n"
-#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n"
+#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler; falling back to IBPB!\n"
#define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n"
static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
{
+ bool mitigate_smt = false;
+
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) || cpu_mitigations_off())
return;
@@ -870,11 +877,21 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitig
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
break;
+ case RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB:
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
+ break;
+
case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO:
default:
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
- boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
- retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) &&
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK))
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
+ else
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
+ }
/*
* The Intel mitigation (IBRS) was already selected in
@@ -890,26 +907,34 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitig
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) ||
!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK)) {
pr_err(RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG);
- retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE;
- break;
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
+ goto retbleed_force_ibpb;
}
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) &&
- (retbleed_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
- cpu_smt_disable(false);
-
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
pr_err(RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG);
+
+ mitigate_smt = true;
+ break;
+
+ case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB:
+retbleed_force_ibpb:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
+ mitigate_smt = true;
break;
default:
break;
}
+ if (mitigate_smt && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) &&
+ (retbleed_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
+ cpu_smt_disable(false);
+
/*
* Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the
* retbleed= cmdline option.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 56/89] x86/bugs: Do IBPB fallback check only once
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (54 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 55/89] x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 57/89] objtool: Add entry UNRET validation Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (38 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josh Poimboeuf, Borislav Petkov,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
commit 0fe4aeea9c01baabecc8c3afc7889c809d939bc2 upstream.
When booting with retbleed=auto, if the kernel wasn't built with
CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK, the mitigation falls back to IBPB. Make
sure a warning is printed in that case. The IBPB fallback check is done
twice, but it really only needs to be done once.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 15 +++++----------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -884,18 +884,13 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitig
case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO:
default:
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
- boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
-
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) &&
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK))
- retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
- else
- retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
- }
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
/*
- * The Intel mitigation (IBRS) was already selected in
- * spectre_v2_select_mitigation().
+ * The Intel mitigation (IBRS or eIBRS) was already selected in
+ * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(). 'retbleed_mitigation' will
+ * be set accordingly below.
*/
break;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 57/89] objtool: Add entry UNRET validation
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (55 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 56/89] x86/bugs: Do IBPB fallback check only once Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 58/89] x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (37 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit a09a6e2399ba0595c3042b3164f3ca68a3cff33e upstream.
Since entry asm is tricky, add a validation pass that ensures the
retbleed mitigation has been done before the first actual RET
instruction.
Entry points are those that either have UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY, which acts
as UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY but marks the instruction as an entry point, or
those that have UWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS at +0.
This is basically a variant of validate_branch() that is
intra-function and it will simply follow all branches from marked
entry points and ensures that all paths lead to ANNOTATE_UNRET_END.
If a path hits RET or an indirection the path is a fail and will be
reported.
There are 3 ANNOTATE_UNRET_END instances:
- UNTRAIN_RET itself
- exception from-kernel; this path doesn't need UNTRAIN_RET
- all early exceptions; these also don't need UNTRAIN_RET
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: tools/objtool/builtin-check.c no link option validation]
[cascardo: tools/objtool/check.c opts.ibt is ibt]
[cascardo: tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h leave unret option as bool, no struct opts]
[cascardo: objtool is still called from scripts/link-vmlinux.sh]
[cascardo: no IBT support]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 3
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 6 -
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 12 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h | 4
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 5
arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S | 10 -
include/linux/objtool.h | 3
scripts/link-vmlinux.sh | 3
tools/include/linux/objtool.h | 3
tools/objtool/builtin-check.c | 3
tools/objtool/check.c | 172 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h | 2
tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h | 6 +
13 files changed, 217 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
*/
SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_64)
- UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+ UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY
swapgs
/* tss.sp2 is scratch space. */
@@ -1067,6 +1067,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry)
.Lerror_entry_done_lfence:
FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
leaq 8(%rsp), %rax /* return pt_regs pointer */
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_END
RET
.Lbstep_iret:
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* 0(%ebp) arg6
*/
SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSENTER_compat)
- UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+ UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY
/* Interrupts are off on entry. */
SWAPGS
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(entry_SYSENTER_compat)
* 0(%esp) arg6
*/
SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_compat)
- UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+ UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY
/* Interrupts are off on entry. */
swapgs
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(entry_SYSCALL_compat)
* ebp arg6
*/
SYM_CODE_START(entry_INT80_compat)
- UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+ UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY
/*
* Interrupts are off on entry.
*/
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -82,6 +82,17 @@
#define ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
/*
+ * Abuse ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE on a NOP to indicate UNRET_END, should
+ * eventually turn into it's own annotation.
+ */
+.macro ANNOTATE_UNRET_END
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY
+ ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
+ nop
+#endif
+.endm
+
+/*
* JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
* indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
* attack.
@@ -131,6 +142,7 @@
*/
.macro UNTRAIN_RET
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_END
ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \
"call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \
"call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@
UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_UNDEFINED type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL end=1
.endm
+.macro UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY
+ UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_UNDEFINED type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY end=1
+.endm
+
.macro UNWIND_HINT_REGS base=%rsp offset=0 indirect=0 extra=1 partial=0
.if \base == %rsp
.if \indirect
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -312,6 +312,8 @@ SYM_CODE_END(start_cpu0)
SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(vc_boot_ghcb)
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=8
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_END
+
/* Build pt_regs */
PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS
@@ -369,6 +371,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(early_idt_handler_array)
SYM_CODE_END(early_idt_handler_array)
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(early_idt_handler_common)
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_END
/*
* The stack is the hardware frame, an error code or zero, and the
* vector number.
@@ -415,6 +418,8 @@ SYM_CODE_END(early_idt_handler_common)
SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(vc_no_ghcb)
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=8
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_END
+
/* Build pt_regs */
PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(xen_read_cr2_direct);
.macro xen_pv_trap name
SYM_CODE_START(xen_\name)
- UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+ UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY
pop %rcx
pop %r11
jmp \name
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xenpv_restore_regs_and_retu
/* Normal 64-bit system call target */
SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64)
- UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+ UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY
popq %rcx
popq %r11
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64)
/* 32-bit compat syscall target */
SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat)
- UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+ UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY
popq %rcx
popq %r11
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat)
/* 32-bit compat sysenter target */
SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat)
- UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+ UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY
/*
* NB: Xen is polite and clears TF from EFLAGS for us. This means
* that we don't need to guard against single step exceptions here.
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat)
SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat)
SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat)
- UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+ UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY
lea 16(%rsp), %rsp /* strip %rcx, %r11 */
mov $-ENOSYS, %rax
pushq $0
--- a/include/linux/objtool.h
+++ b/include/linux/objtool.h
@@ -32,11 +32,14 @@ struct unwind_hint {
*
* UNWIND_HINT_FUNC: Generate the unwind metadata of a callable function.
* Useful for code which doesn't have an ELF function annotation.
+ *
+ * UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY: machine entry without stack, SYSCALL/SYSENTER etc.
*/
#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL 0
#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS 1
#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL 2
#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC 3
+#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY 4
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION
--- a/scripts/link-vmlinux.sh
+++ b/scripts/link-vmlinux.sh
@@ -120,6 +120,9 @@ objtool_link()
if [ -n "${CONFIG_VMLINUX_VALIDATION}" ]; then
objtoolopt="${objtoolopt} --noinstr"
+ if is_enabled CONFIG_RETPOLINE; then
+ objtoolopt="${objtoolopt} --unret"
+ fi
fi
if [ -n "${objtoolopt}" ]; then
--- a/tools/include/linux/objtool.h
+++ b/tools/include/linux/objtool.h
@@ -32,11 +32,14 @@ struct unwind_hint {
*
* UNWIND_HINT_FUNC: Generate the unwind metadata of a callable function.
* Useful for code which doesn't have an ELF function annotation.
+ *
+ * UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY: machine entry without stack, SYSCALL/SYSENTER etc.
*/
#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL 0
#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS 1
#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL 2
#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC 3
+#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY 4
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION
--- a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
#include <objtool/objtool.h>
bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline, module, backtrace, uaccess, stats,
- validate_dup, vmlinux, mcount, noinstr, backup, sls;
+ validate_dup, vmlinux, mcount, noinstr, backup, sls, unret;
static const char * const check_usage[] = {
"objtool check [<options>] file.o",
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ const struct option check_options[] = {
OPT_BOOLEAN('f', "no-fp", &no_fp, "Skip frame pointer validation"),
OPT_BOOLEAN('u', "no-unreachable", &no_unreachable, "Skip 'unreachable instruction' warnings"),
OPT_BOOLEAN('r', "retpoline", &retpoline, "Validate retpoline assumptions"),
+ OPT_BOOLEAN(0, "unret", &unret, "validate entry unret placement"),
OPT_BOOLEAN('m', "module", &module, "Indicates the object will be part of a kernel module"),
OPT_BOOLEAN('b', "backtrace", &backtrace, "unwind on error"),
OPT_BOOLEAN('a', "uaccess", &uaccess, "enable uaccess checking"),
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -1847,6 +1847,19 @@ static int read_unwind_hints(struct objt
insn->hint = true;
+ if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL) {
+ struct symbol *sym = find_symbol_by_offset(insn->sec, insn->offset);
+
+ if (sym && sym->bind == STB_GLOBAL) {
+ insn->entry = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY) {
+ hint->type = UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL;
+ insn->entry = 1;
+ }
+
if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC) {
insn->cfi = &func_cfi;
continue;
@@ -1895,8 +1908,9 @@ static int read_retpoline_hints(struct o
if (insn->type != INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC &&
insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC &&
- insn->type != INSN_RETURN) {
- WARN_FUNC("retpoline_safe hint not an indirect jump/call/ret",
+ insn->type != INSN_RETURN &&
+ insn->type != INSN_NOP) {
+ WARN_FUNC("retpoline_safe hint not an indirect jump/call/ret/nop",
insn->sec, insn->offset);
return -1;
}
@@ -2996,8 +3010,8 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtoo
return 1;
}
- visited = 1 << state.uaccess;
- if (insn->visited) {
+ visited = VISITED_BRANCH << state.uaccess;
+ if (insn->visited & VISITED_BRANCH_MASK) {
if (!insn->hint && !insn_cfi_match(insn, &state.cfi))
return 1;
@@ -3223,6 +3237,145 @@ static int validate_unwind_hints(struct
return warnings;
}
+/*
+ * Validate rethunk entry constraint: must untrain RET before the first RET.
+ *
+ * Follow every branch (intra-function) and ensure ANNOTATE_UNRET_END comes
+ * before an actual RET instruction.
+ */
+static int validate_entry(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn)
+{
+ struct instruction *next, *dest;
+ int ret, warnings = 0;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ next = next_insn_to_validate(file, insn);
+
+ if (insn->visited & VISITED_ENTRY)
+ return 0;
+
+ insn->visited |= VISITED_ENTRY;
+
+ if (!insn->ignore_alts && !list_empty(&insn->alts)) {
+ struct alternative *alt;
+ bool skip_orig = false;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(alt, &insn->alts, list) {
+ if (alt->skip_orig)
+ skip_orig = true;
+
+ ret = validate_entry(file, alt->insn);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (backtrace)
+ BT_FUNC("(alt)", insn);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (skip_orig)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (insn->type) {
+
+ case INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC:
+ case INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC:
+ case INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC_CONDITIONAL:
+ WARN_FUNC("early indirect call", insn->sec, insn->offset);
+ return 1;
+
+ case INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL:
+ case INSN_JUMP_CONDITIONAL:
+ if (!is_sibling_call(insn)) {
+ if (!insn->jump_dest) {
+ WARN_FUNC("unresolved jump target after linking?!?",
+ insn->sec, insn->offset);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ret = validate_entry(file, insn->jump_dest);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (backtrace) {
+ BT_FUNC("(branch%s)", insn,
+ insn->type == INSN_JUMP_CONDITIONAL ? "-cond" : "");
+ }
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (insn->type == INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL)
+ return 0;
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* fallthrough */
+ case INSN_CALL:
+ dest = find_insn(file, insn->call_dest->sec,
+ insn->call_dest->offset);
+ if (!dest) {
+ WARN("Unresolved function after linking!?: %s",
+ insn->call_dest->name);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ret = validate_entry(file, dest);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (backtrace)
+ BT_FUNC("(call)", insn);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If a call returns without error, it must have seen UNTRAIN_RET.
+ * Therefore any non-error return is a success.
+ */
+ return 0;
+
+ case INSN_RETURN:
+ WARN_FUNC("RET before UNTRAIN", insn->sec, insn->offset);
+ return 1;
+
+ case INSN_NOP:
+ if (insn->retpoline_safe)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!next) {
+ WARN_FUNC("teh end!", insn->sec, insn->offset);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ insn = next;
+ }
+
+ return warnings;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Validate that all branches starting at 'insn->entry' encounter UNRET_END
+ * before RET.
+ */
+static int validate_unret(struct objtool_file *file)
+{
+ struct instruction *insn;
+ int ret, warnings = 0;
+
+ for_each_insn(file, insn) {
+ if (!insn->entry)
+ continue;
+
+ ret = validate_entry(file, insn);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ WARN_FUNC("Failed UNRET validation", insn->sec, insn->offset);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ warnings += ret;
+ }
+
+ return warnings;
+}
+
static int validate_retpoline(struct objtool_file *file)
{
struct instruction *insn;
@@ -3490,6 +3643,17 @@ int check(struct objtool_file *file)
goto out;
warnings += ret;
+ if (unret) {
+ /*
+ * Must be after validate_branch() and friends, it plays
+ * further games with insn->visited.
+ */
+ ret = validate_unret(file);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ warnings += ret;
+ }
+
if (!warnings) {
ret = validate_reachable_instructions(file);
if (ret < 0)
--- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h
+++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
extern const struct option check_options[];
extern bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline, module, backtrace, uaccess, stats,
- validate_dup, vmlinux, mcount, noinstr, backup, sls;
+ validate_dup, vmlinux, mcount, noinstr, backup, sls, unret;
extern int cmd_parse_options(int argc, const char **argv, const char * const usage[]);
--- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h
+++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct instruction {
bool dead_end, ignore, ignore_alts;
bool hint;
bool retpoline_safe;
+ bool entry;
s8 instr;
u8 visited;
struct alt_group *alt_group;
@@ -62,6 +63,11 @@ struct instruction {
struct cfi_state *cfi;
};
+#define VISITED_BRANCH 0x01
+#define VISITED_BRANCH_UACCESS 0x02
+#define VISITED_BRANCH_MASK 0x03
+#define VISITED_ENTRY 0x04
+
static inline bool is_static_jump(struct instruction *insn)
{
return insn->type == INSN_JUMP_CONDITIONAL ||
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 58/89] x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (56 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 57/89] objtool: Add entry UNRET validation Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 59/89] x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (36 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andrew Cooper, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit d7caac991feeef1b871ee6988fd2c9725df09039 upstream.
Zen2 uarchs have an undocumented, unnamed, MSR that contains a chicken
bit for some speculation behaviour. It needs setting.
Note: very belatedly AMD released naming; it's now officially called
MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2 and MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2_SUPPRESS_NOBR_PRED_BIT
but shall remain the SPECTRAL CHICKEN.
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 3 +++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c | 6 ++++++
4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -515,6 +515,9 @@
/* Fam 17h MSRs */
#define MSR_F17H_IRPERF 0xc00000e9
+#define MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN 0xc00110e3
+#define MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN_BIT BIT_ULL(1)
+
/* Fam 16h MSRs */
#define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTL 0xc0010230
#define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTR 0xc0010231
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -886,6 +886,26 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x
clear_rdrand_cpuid_bit(c);
}
+void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u64 value;
+
+ /*
+ * On Zen2 we offer this chicken (bit) on the altar of Speculation.
+ *
+ * This suppresses speculation from the middle of a basic block, i.e. it
+ * suppresses non-branch predictions.
+ *
+ * We use STIBP as a heuristic to filter out Zen2 from the rest of F17H
+ */
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) {
+ if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, &value)) {
+ value |= MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN_BIT;
+ wrmsrl_safe(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, value);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN);
@@ -931,7 +951,8 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86
case 0x12: init_amd_ln(c); break;
case 0x15: init_amd_bd(c); break;
case 0x16: init_amd_jg(c); break;
- case 0x17: fallthrough;
+ case 0x17: init_spectral_chicken(c);
+ fallthrough;
case 0x19: init_amd_zn(c); break;
}
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ static inline void tsx_init(void) { }
static inline void tsx_ap_init(void) { }
#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL */
+extern void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+
extern void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern void get_cpu_address_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c
@@ -302,6 +302,12 @@ static void init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x8
/* get apicid instead of initial apic id from cpuid */
c->apicid = hard_smp_processor_id();
+ /*
+ * XXX someone from Hygon needs to confirm this DTRT
+ *
+ init_spectral_chicken(c);
+ */
+
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN);
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 59/89] x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (57 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 58/89] x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 60/89] x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (35 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josh Poimboeuf,
Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
commit b2620facef4889fefcbf2e87284f34dcd4189bce upstream.
If a kernel is built with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n, but the user still wants
to mitigate Spectre v2 using IBRS or eIBRS, the RSB filling will be
silently disabled.
There's nothing retpoline-specific about RSB buffer filling. Remove the
CONFIG_RETPOLINE guards around it.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 2 --
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 --
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 --
3 files changed, 6 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -701,7 +701,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__switch_to_asm)
movl %ebx, PER_CPU_VAR(__stack_chk_guard)
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
/*
* When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
* the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
@@ -710,7 +709,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__switch_to_asm)
* speculative execution to prevent attack.
*/
FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
-#endif
/* Restore flags or the incoming task to restore AC state. */
popfl
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -248,7 +248,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__switch_to_asm)
movq %rbx, PER_CPU_VAR(fixed_percpu_data) + stack_canary_offset
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
/*
* When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
* the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
@@ -257,7 +256,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__switch_to_asm)
* speculative execution to prevent attack.
*/
FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
-#endif
/* restore callee-saved registers */
popq %r15
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -122,11 +122,9 @@
* monstrosity above, manually.
*/
.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr
__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)
.Lskip_rsb_\@:
-#endif
.endm
/*
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 60/89] x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (58 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 59/89] x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 61/89] x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (34 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josh Poimboeuf,
Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
commit e6aa13622ea8283cc699cac5d018cc40a2ba2010 upstream.
The firmware entry code may accidentally clear STIBP or SSBD. Fix that.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 10 ++++------
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -286,18 +286,16 @@ extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void);
*/
#define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start() \
do { \
- u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; \
- \
preempt_disable(); \
- alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \
+ alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, \
+ spec_ctrl_current() | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, \
X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \
} while (0)
#define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end() \
do { \
- u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base; \
- \
- alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \
+ alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, \
+ spec_ctrl_current(), \
X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \
preempt_enable(); \
} while (0)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 61/89] x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (59 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 60/89] x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 62/89] x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (33 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josh Poimboeuf,
Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
commit 56aa4d221f1ee2c3a49b45b800778ec6e0ab73c5 upstream.
If the SMT state changes, SSBD might get accidentally disabled. Fix
that.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1451,7 +1451,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)
{
- write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
+ u64 val = spec_ctrl_current() | (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP);
+ write_spec_ctrl_current(val, true);
}
/* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 62/89] x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (60 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 61/89] x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 63/89] x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (32 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josh Poimboeuf,
Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
commit bbb69e8bee1bd882784947095ffb2bfe0f7c9470 upstream.
There's no need to recalculate the host value for every entry/exit.
Just use the cached value in spec_ctrl_current().
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 +-----------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
void
x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
{
- u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+ u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = spec_ctrl_current();
struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
/* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */
@@ -221,15 +221,6 @@ x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl,
guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
- /* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
- if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
- static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
- hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
-
- /* Conditional STIBP enabled? */
- if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp))
- hostval |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
-
if (hostval != guestval) {
msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval;
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);
@@ -1390,7 +1381,6 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
- /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 63/89] x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (61 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 62/89] x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 64/89] objtool: Re-add UNWIND_HINT_{SAVE_RESTORE} Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (31 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josh Poimboeuf, Borislav Petkov,
Paolo Bonzini, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
commit acac5e98ef8d638a411cfa2ee676c87e1973f126 upstream.
This mask has been made redundant by kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(). And it
doesn't even work when MSR interception is disabled, as the guest can
just write to SPEC_CTRL directly.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 31 +------------------------------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 30 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -86,12 +86,6 @@ u64 spec_ctrl_current(void)
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spec_ctrl_current);
/*
- * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
- * x86_spec_ctrl_base.
- */
-static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
-
-/*
* AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
* x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
*/
@@ -146,10 +140,6 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
- /* Allow STIBP in MSR_SPEC_CTRL if supported */
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
- x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
-
/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
@@ -208,19 +198,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
void
x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
{
- u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = spec_ctrl_current();
+ u64 msrval, guestval = guest_spec_ctrl, hostval = spec_ctrl_current();
struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
- /* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
- /*
- * Restrict guest_spec_ctrl to supported values. Clear the
- * modifiable bits in the host base value and or the
- * modifiable bits from the guest value.
- */
- guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
- guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
-
if (hostval != guestval) {
msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval;
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);
@@ -1659,16 +1640,6 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_
}
/*
- * If SSBD is controlled by the SPEC_CTRL MSR, then set the proper
- * bit in the mask to allow guests to use the mitigation even in the
- * case where the host does not enable it.
- */
- if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
- static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
- x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
- }
-
- /*
* We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
* - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
* - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 64/89] objtool: Re-add UNWIND_HINT_{SAVE_RESTORE}
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (62 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 63/89] x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 65/89] KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (30 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josh Poimboeuf,
Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
commit 8faea26e611189e933ea2281975ff4dc7c1106b6 upstream.
Commit
c536ed2fffd5 ("objtool: Remove SAVE/RESTORE hints")
removed the save/restore unwind hints because they were no longer
needed. Now they're going to be needed again so re-add them.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h | 12 ++++++++--
include/linux/objtool.h | 6 +++--
tools/include/linux/objtool.h | 6 +++--
tools/objtool/check.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h | 1
5 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h
@@ -8,11 +8,11 @@
#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
.macro UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
- UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_UNDEFINED type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL end=1
+ UNWIND_HINT type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL end=1
.endm
.macro UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY
- UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_UNDEFINED type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY end=1
+ UNWIND_HINT type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY end=1
.endm
.macro UNWIND_HINT_REGS base=%rsp offset=0 indirect=0 extra=1 partial=0
@@ -56,6 +56,14 @@
UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_SP sp_offset=8 type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC
.endm
+.macro UNWIND_HINT_SAVE
+ UNWIND_HINT type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_SAVE
+.endm
+
+.macro UNWIND_HINT_RESTORE
+ UNWIND_HINT type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RESTORE
+.endm
+
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_UNWIND_HINTS_H */
--- a/include/linux/objtool.h
+++ b/include/linux/objtool.h
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ struct unwind_hint {
#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL 2
#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC 3
#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY 4
+#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_SAVE 5
+#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RESTORE 6
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION
@@ -102,7 +104,7 @@ struct unwind_hint {
* the debuginfo as necessary. It will also warn if it sees any
* inconsistencies.
*/
-.macro UNWIND_HINT sp_reg:req sp_offset=0 type:req end=0
+.macro UNWIND_HINT type:req sp_reg=0 sp_offset=0 end=0
.Lunwind_hint_ip_\@:
.pushsection .discard.unwind_hints
/* struct unwind_hint */
@@ -132,7 +134,7 @@ struct unwind_hint {
#define STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(func)
#else
#define ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL
-.macro UNWIND_HINT sp_reg:req sp_offset=0 type:req end=0
+.macro UNWIND_HINT type:req sp_reg=0 sp_offset=0 end=0
.endm
.macro STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD func:req
.endm
--- a/tools/include/linux/objtool.h
+++ b/tools/include/linux/objtool.h
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ struct unwind_hint {
#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL 2
#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC 3
#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY 4
+#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_SAVE 5
+#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RESTORE 6
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION
@@ -102,7 +104,7 @@ struct unwind_hint {
* the debuginfo as necessary. It will also warn if it sees any
* inconsistencies.
*/
-.macro UNWIND_HINT sp_reg:req sp_offset=0 type:req end=0
+.macro UNWIND_HINT type:req sp_reg=0 sp_offset=0 end=0
.Lunwind_hint_ip_\@:
.pushsection .discard.unwind_hints
/* struct unwind_hint */
@@ -132,7 +134,7 @@ struct unwind_hint {
#define STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(func)
#else
#define ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL
-.macro UNWIND_HINT sp_reg:req sp_offset=0 type:req end=0
+.macro UNWIND_HINT type:req sp_reg=0 sp_offset=0 end=0
.endm
.macro STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD func:req
.endm
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -1847,6 +1847,17 @@ static int read_unwind_hints(struct objt
insn->hint = true;
+ if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_SAVE) {
+ insn->hint = false;
+ insn->save = true;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RESTORE) {
+ insn->restore = true;
+ continue;
+ }
+
if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL) {
struct symbol *sym = find_symbol_by_offset(insn->sec, insn->offset);
@@ -3025,6 +3036,35 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtoo
state.instr += insn->instr;
if (insn->hint) {
+ if (insn->restore) {
+ struct instruction *save_insn, *i;
+
+ i = insn;
+ save_insn = NULL;
+
+ sym_for_each_insn_continue_reverse(file, func, i) {
+ if (i->save) {
+ save_insn = i;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!save_insn) {
+ WARN_FUNC("no corresponding CFI save for CFI restore",
+ sec, insn->offset);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!save_insn->visited) {
+ WARN_FUNC("objtool isn't smart enough to handle this CFI save/restore combo",
+ sec, insn->offset);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ insn->cfi = save_insn->cfi;
+ nr_cfi_reused++;
+ }
+
state.cfi = *insn->cfi;
} else {
/* XXX track if we actually changed state.cfi */
--- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h
+++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ struct instruction {
unsigned long immediate;
bool dead_end, ignore, ignore_alts;
bool hint;
+ bool save, restore;
bool retpoline_safe;
bool entry;
s8 instr;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 65/89] KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run()
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (63 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 64/89] objtool: Re-add UNWIND_HINT_{SAVE_RESTORE} Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 66/89] KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (29 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josh Poimboeuf,
Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
commit 8bd200d23ec42d66ccd517a72dd0b9cc6132d2fd upstream.
Move the vmx_vm{enter,exit}() functionality into __vmx_vcpu_run(). This
will make it easier to do the spec_ctrl handling before the first RET.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: remove ENDBR]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 118 +++++++++++++++++----------------------------
1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -31,68 +31,6 @@
.section .noinstr.text, "ax"
/**
- * vmx_vmenter - VM-Enter the current loaded VMCS
- *
- * %RFLAGS.ZF: !VMCS.LAUNCHED, i.e. controls VMLAUNCH vs. VMRESUME
- *
- * Returns:
- * %RFLAGS.CF is set on VM-Fail Invalid
- * %RFLAGS.ZF is set on VM-Fail Valid
- * %RFLAGS.{CF,ZF} are cleared on VM-Success, i.e. VM-Exit
- *
- * Note that VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH fall-through and return directly if
- * they VM-Fail, whereas a successful VM-Enter + VM-Exit will jump
- * to vmx_vmexit.
- */
-SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(vmx_vmenter)
- /* EFLAGS.ZF is set if VMCS.LAUNCHED == 0 */
- je 2f
-
-1: vmresume
- RET
-
-2: vmlaunch
- RET
-
-3: cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting
- je 4f
- RET
-4: ud2
-
- _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 3b)
- _ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 3b)
-
-SYM_FUNC_END(vmx_vmenter)
-
-/**
- * vmx_vmexit - Handle a VMX VM-Exit
- *
- * Returns:
- * %RFLAGS.{CF,ZF} are cleared on VM-Success, i.e. VM-Exit
- *
- * This is vmx_vmenter's partner in crime. On a VM-Exit, control will jump
- * here after hardware loads the host's state, i.e. this is the destination
- * referred to by VMCS.HOST_RIP.
- */
-SYM_FUNC_START(vmx_vmexit)
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
- ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lvmexit_skip_rsb", "", X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
- /* Preserve guest's RAX, it's used to stuff the RSB. */
- push %_ASM_AX
-
- /* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
- FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
-
- /* Clear RFLAGS.CF and RFLAGS.ZF to preserve VM-Exit, i.e. !VM-Fail. */
- or $1, %_ASM_AX
-
- pop %_ASM_AX
-.Lvmexit_skip_rsb:
-#endif
- RET
-SYM_FUNC_END(vmx_vmexit)
-
-/**
* __vmx_vcpu_run - Run a vCPU via a transition to VMX guest mode
* @vmx: struct vcpu_vmx * (forwarded to vmx_update_host_rsp)
* @regs: unsigned long * (to guest registers)
@@ -124,8 +62,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
/* Copy @launched to BL, _ASM_ARG3 is volatile. */
mov %_ASM_ARG3B, %bl
- /* Adjust RSP to account for the CALL to vmx_vmenter(). */
- lea -WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2
+ lea (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2
call vmx_update_host_rsp
/* Load @regs to RAX. */
@@ -154,11 +91,36 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
/* Load guest RAX. This kills the @regs pointer! */
mov VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX
- /* Enter guest mode */
- call vmx_vmenter
+ /* Check EFLAGS.ZF from 'testb' above */
+ je .Lvmlaunch
- /* Jump on VM-Fail. */
- jbe 2f
+ /*
+ * After a successful VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH, control flow "magically"
+ * resumes below at 'vmx_vmexit' due to the VMCS HOST_RIP setting.
+ * So this isn't a typical function and objtool needs to be told to
+ * save the unwind state here and restore it below.
+ */
+ UNWIND_HINT_SAVE
+
+/*
+ * If VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH and corresponding vmexit succeed, execution resumes at
+ * the 'vmx_vmexit' label below.
+ */
+.Lvmresume:
+ vmresume
+ jmp .Lvmfail
+
+.Lvmlaunch:
+ vmlaunch
+ jmp .Lvmfail
+
+ _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lvmresume, .Lfixup)
+ _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lvmlaunch, .Lfixup)
+
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
+
+ /* Restore unwind state from before the VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH. */
+ UNWIND_HINT_RESTORE
/* Temporarily save guest's RAX. */
push %_ASM_AX
@@ -185,9 +147,13 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
mov %r15, VCPU_R15(%_ASM_AX)
#endif
+ /* IMPORTANT: RSB must be stuffed before the first return. */
+ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_BX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
+
/* Clear RAX to indicate VM-Exit (as opposed to VM-Fail). */
xor %eax, %eax
+.Lclear_regs:
/*
* Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent
* speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded
@@ -197,7 +163,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
* free. RSP and RAX are exempt as RSP is restored by hardware during
* VM-Exit and RAX is explicitly loaded with 0 or 1 to return VM-Fail.
*/
-1: xor %ecx, %ecx
+ xor %ecx, %ecx
xor %edx, %edx
xor %ebx, %ebx
xor %ebp, %ebp
@@ -216,8 +182,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
/* "POP" @regs. */
add $WORD_SIZE, %_ASM_SP
- pop %_ASM_BX
+ pop %_ASM_BX
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
pop %r12
pop %r13
@@ -230,9 +196,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
pop %_ASM_BP
RET
- /* VM-Fail. Out-of-line to avoid a taken Jcc after VM-Exit. */
-2: mov $1, %eax
- jmp 1b
+.Lfixup:
+ cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting
+ jne .Lvmfail
+ ud2
+.Lvmfail:
+ /* VM-Fail: set return value to 1 */
+ mov $1, %eax
+ jmp .Lclear_regs
+
SYM_FUNC_END(__vmx_vcpu_run)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 66/89] KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flags
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (64 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 65/89] KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 67/89] KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (28 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josh Poimboeuf,
Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
commit bb06650634d3552c0f8557e9d16aa1a408040e28 upstream.
Convert __vmx_vcpu_run()'s 'launched' argument to 'flags', in
preparation for doing SPEC_CTRL handling immediately after vmexit, which
will need another flag.
This is much easier than adding a fourth argument, because this code
supports both 32-bit and 64-bit, and the fourth argument on 32-bit would
have to be pushed on the stack.
Note that __vmx_vcpu_run_flags() is called outside of the noinstr
critical section because it will soon start calling potentially
traceable functions.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h | 7 +++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 9 +++++----
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 5 ++++-
5 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -3077,7 +3077,7 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw(s
}
vm_fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs,
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched);
+ __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx));
if (vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr)
vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr);
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H
+#define __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H
+
+#define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME (1 << 0)
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <asm/kvm_vcpu_regs.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm/segment.h>
+#include "run_flags.h"
#define WORD_SIZE (BITS_PER_LONG / 8)
@@ -34,7 +35,7 @@
* __vmx_vcpu_run - Run a vCPU via a transition to VMX guest mode
* @vmx: struct vcpu_vmx * (forwarded to vmx_update_host_rsp)
* @regs: unsigned long * (to guest registers)
- * @launched: %true if the VMCS has been launched
+ * @flags: VMX_RUN_VMRESUME: use VMRESUME instead of VMLAUNCH
*
* Returns:
* 0 on VM-Exit, 1 on VM-Fail
@@ -59,7 +60,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
*/
push %_ASM_ARG2
- /* Copy @launched to BL, _ASM_ARG3 is volatile. */
+ /* Copy @flags to BL, _ASM_ARG3 is volatile. */
mov %_ASM_ARG3B, %bl
lea (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2
@@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
mov (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_AX
/* Check if vmlaunch or vmresume is needed */
- testb %bl, %bl
+ testb $VMX_RUN_VMRESUME, %bl
/* Load guest registers. Don't clobber flags. */
mov VCPU_RCX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_CX
@@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
mov VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX
/* Check EFLAGS.ZF from 'testb' above */
- je .Lvmlaunch
+ jz .Lvmlaunch
/*
* After a successful VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH, control flow "magically"
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -835,6 +835,16 @@ static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct
MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
}
+unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+ unsigned int flags = 0;
+
+ if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched)
+ flags |= VMX_RUN_VMRESUME;
+
+ return flags;
+}
+
static void clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit)
{
@@ -6667,7 +6677,8 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_exit_handlers_fast
}
static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+ struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
+ unsigned long flags)
{
kvm_guest_enter_irqoff();
@@ -6686,7 +6697,7 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(
native_write_cr2(vcpu->arch.cr2);
vmx->fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs,
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched);
+ flags);
vcpu->arch.cr2 = native_read_cr2();
@@ -6786,7 +6797,7 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kv
x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0);
/* The actual VMENTER/EXIT is in the .noinstr.text section. */
- vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, vmx);
+ vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, vmx, __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx));
/*
* We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include "vmcs.h"
#include "vmx_ops.h"
#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "run_flags.h"
#define MSR_TYPE_R 1
#define MSR_TYPE_W 2
@@ -382,7 +383,9 @@ void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kv
struct vmx_uret_msr *vmx_find_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr);
void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp);
-bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, bool launched);
+unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx);
+bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs,
+ unsigned int flags);
int vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(struct vmx_msrs *m, u32 msr);
void vmx_ept_load_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 67/89] KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (65 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 66/89] KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 68/89] KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (27 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josh Poimboeuf,
Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
commit fc02735b14fff8c6678b521d324ade27b1a3d4cf upstream.
On eIBRS systems, the returns in the vmexit return path from
__vmx_vcpu_run() to vmx_vcpu_run() are exposed to RSB poisoning attacks.
Fix that by moving the post-vmexit spec_ctrl handling to immediately
after the vmexit.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h | 1
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 1
6 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_predi
/* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_current;
extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force);
extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -195,6 +195,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
#endif
}
+/*
+ * NOTE: For VMX, this function is not called in the vmexit path.
+ * It uses vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host() instead.
+ */
void
x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
{
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h
@@ -3,5 +3,6 @@
#define __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H
#define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME (1 << 0)
+#define VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL (1 << 1)
#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -33,9 +33,10 @@
/**
* __vmx_vcpu_run - Run a vCPU via a transition to VMX guest mode
- * @vmx: struct vcpu_vmx * (forwarded to vmx_update_host_rsp)
+ * @vmx: struct vcpu_vmx *
* @regs: unsigned long * (to guest registers)
- * @flags: VMX_RUN_VMRESUME: use VMRESUME instead of VMLAUNCH
+ * @flags: VMX_RUN_VMRESUME: use VMRESUME instead of VMLAUNCH
+ * VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL: save guest SPEC_CTRL into vmx->spec_ctrl
*
* Returns:
* 0 on VM-Exit, 1 on VM-Fail
@@ -54,6 +55,12 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
#endif
push %_ASM_BX
+ /* Save @vmx for SPEC_CTRL handling */
+ push %_ASM_ARG1
+
+ /* Save @flags for SPEC_CTRL handling */
+ push %_ASM_ARG3
+
/*
* Save @regs, _ASM_ARG2 may be modified by vmx_update_host_rsp() and
* @regs is needed after VM-Exit to save the guest's register values.
@@ -148,25 +155,23 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL
mov %r15, VCPU_R15(%_ASM_AX)
#endif
- /* IMPORTANT: RSB must be stuffed before the first return. */
- FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_BX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
-
- /* Clear RAX to indicate VM-Exit (as opposed to VM-Fail). */
- xor %eax, %eax
+ /* Clear return value to indicate VM-Exit (as opposed to VM-Fail). */
+ xor %ebx, %ebx
.Lclear_regs:
/*
- * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent
+ * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RBX to prevent
* speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded
* via the stack. In theory, an L1 cache miss when restoring registers
* could lead to speculative execution with the guest's values.
* Zeroing XORs are dirt cheap, i.e. the extra paranoia is essentially
* free. RSP and RAX are exempt as RSP is restored by hardware during
- * VM-Exit and RAX is explicitly loaded with 0 or 1 to return VM-Fail.
+ * VM-Exit and RBX is explicitly loaded with 0 or 1 to hold the return
+ * value.
*/
+ xor %eax, %eax
xor %ecx, %ecx
xor %edx, %edx
- xor %ebx, %ebx
xor %ebp, %ebp
xor %esi, %esi
xor %edi, %edi
@@ -184,6 +189,28 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL
/* "POP" @regs. */
add $WORD_SIZE, %_ASM_SP
+ /*
+ * IMPORTANT: RSB filling and SPEC_CTRL handling must be done before
+ * the first unbalanced RET after vmexit!
+ *
+ * For retpoline, RSB filling is needed to prevent poisoned RSB entries
+ * and (in some cases) RSB underflow.
+ *
+ * eIBRS has its own protection against poisoned RSB, so it doesn't
+ * need the RSB filling sequence. But it does need to be enabled
+ * before the first unbalanced RET.
+ */
+
+ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
+
+ pop %_ASM_ARG2 /* @flags */
+ pop %_ASM_ARG1 /* @vmx */
+
+ call vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host
+
+ /* Put return value in AX */
+ mov %_ASM_BX, %_ASM_AX
+
pop %_ASM_BX
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
pop %r12
@@ -203,7 +230,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL
ud2
.Lvmfail:
/* VM-Fail: set return value to 1 */
- mov $1, %eax
+ mov $1, %_ASM_BX
jmp .Lclear_regs
SYM_FUNC_END(__vmx_vcpu_run)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -842,6 +842,14 @@ unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct
if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched)
flags |= VMX_RUN_VMRESUME;
+ /*
+ * If writes to the SPEC_CTRL MSR aren't intercepted, the guest is free
+ * to change it directly without causing a vmexit. In that case read
+ * it after vmexit and store it in vmx->spec_ctrl.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
+ flags |= VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL;
+
return flags;
}
@@ -6664,6 +6672,26 @@ void noinstr vmx_update_host_rsp(struct
}
}
+void noinstr vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ u64 hostval = this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
+ return;
+
+ if (flags & VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL)
+ vmx->spec_ctrl = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
+
+ /*
+ * If the guest/host SPEC_CTRL values differ, restore the host value.
+ */
+ if (vmx->spec_ctrl != hostval)
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, hostval);
+
+ barrier_nospec();
+}
+
static fastpath_t vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
switch (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.basic) {
@@ -6799,26 +6827,6 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kv
/* The actual VMENTER/EXIT is in the .noinstr.text section. */
vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, vmx, __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx));
- /*
- * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the
- * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and
- * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding
- * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former
- * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM.
- *
- * For non-nested case:
- * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
- * save it.
- *
- * For nested case:
- * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
- * save it.
- */
- if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
- vmx->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
-
- x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0);
-
/* All fields are clean at this point */
if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs)) {
current_evmcs->hv_clean_fields |=
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -383,6 +383,7 @@ void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kv
struct vmx_uret_msr *vmx_find_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr);
void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp);
+void vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned int flags);
unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx);
bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs,
unsigned int flags);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 68/89] KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (66 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 67/89] KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 69/89] x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (26 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josh Poimboeuf,
Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
commit bea7e31a5caccb6fe8ed989c065072354f0ecb52 upstream.
For legacy IBRS to work, the IBRS bit needs to be always re-written
after vmexit, even if it's already on.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6685,8 +6685,13 @@ void noinstr vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(
/*
* If the guest/host SPEC_CTRL values differ, restore the host value.
+ *
+ * For legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit always needs to be written after
+ * transitioning from a less privileged predictor mode, regardless of
+ * whether the guest/host values differ.
*/
- if (vmx->spec_ctrl != hostval)
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS) ||
+ vmx->spec_ctrl != hostval)
native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, hostval);
barrier_nospec();
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 69/89] x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (67 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 68/89] KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 70/89] x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (25 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josh Poimboeuf,
Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
commit 9756bba28470722dacb79ffce554336dd1f6a6cd upstream.
Prevent RSB underflow/poisoning attacks with RSB. While at it, add a
bunch of comments to attempt to document the current state of tribal
knowledge about RSB attacks and what exactly is being mitigated.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 -
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 6 +--
3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@
/* FREE! ( 7*32+10) */
#define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
#define X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS ( 7*32+12) /* "" Set/clear IBRS on kernel entry/exit */
-/* FREE! ( 7*32+13) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT ( 7*32+13) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
#define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1394,17 +1394,70 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
/*
- * If spectre v2 protection has been enabled, unconditionally fill
- * RSB during a context switch; this protects against two independent
- * issues:
+ * If Spectre v2 protection has been enabled, fill the RSB during a
+ * context switch. In general there are two types of RSB attacks
+ * across context switches, for which the CALLs/RETs may be unbalanced.
*
- * - RSB underflow (and switch to BTB) on Skylake+
- * - SpectreRSB variant of spectre v2 on X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 CPUs
+ * 1) RSB underflow
+ *
+ * Some Intel parts have "bottomless RSB". When the RSB is empty,
+ * speculated return targets may come from the branch predictor,
+ * which could have a user-poisoned BTB or BHB entry.
+ *
+ * AMD has it even worse: *all* returns are speculated from the BTB,
+ * regardless of the state of the RSB.
+ *
+ * When IBRS or eIBRS is enabled, the "user -> kernel" attack
+ * scenario is mitigated by the IBRS branch prediction isolation
+ * properties, so the RSB buffer filling wouldn't be necessary to
+ * protect against this type of attack.
+ *
+ * The "user -> user" attack scenario is mitigated by RSB filling.
+ *
+ * 2) Poisoned RSB entry
+ *
+ * If the 'next' in-kernel return stack is shorter than 'prev',
+ * 'next' could be tricked into speculating with a user-poisoned RSB
+ * entry.
+ *
+ * The "user -> kernel" attack scenario is mitigated by SMEP and
+ * eIBRS.
+ *
+ * The "user -> user" scenario, also known as SpectreBHB, requires
+ * RSB clearing.
+ *
+ * So to mitigate all cases, unconditionally fill RSB on context
+ * switches.
+ *
+ * FIXME: Is this pointless for retbleed-affected AMD?
*/
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
/*
+ * Similar to context switches, there are two types of RSB attacks
+ * after vmexit:
+ *
+ * 1) RSB underflow
+ *
+ * 2) Poisoned RSB entry
+ *
+ * When retpoline is enabled, both are mitigated by filling/clearing
+ * the RSB.
+ *
+ * When IBRS is enabled, while #1 would be mitigated by the IBRS branch
+ * prediction isolation protections, RSB still needs to be cleared
+ * because of #2. Note that SMEP provides no protection here, unlike
+ * user-space-poisoned RSB entries.
+ *
+ * eIBRS, on the other hand, has RSB-poisoning protections, so it
+ * doesn't need RSB clearing after vmexit.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) ||
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS))
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
+
+ /*
* Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS
* and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around
* firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced IBRS aren't otherwise
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -193,15 +193,15 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL
* IMPORTANT: RSB filling and SPEC_CTRL handling must be done before
* the first unbalanced RET after vmexit!
*
- * For retpoline, RSB filling is needed to prevent poisoned RSB entries
- * and (in some cases) RSB underflow.
+ * For retpoline or IBRS, RSB filling is needed to prevent poisoned RSB
+ * entries and (in some cases) RSB underflow.
*
* eIBRS has its own protection against poisoned RSB, so it doesn't
* need the RSB filling sequence. But it does need to be enabled
* before the first unbalanced RET.
*/
- FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
+ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT
pop %_ASM_ARG2 /* @flags */
pop %_ASM_ARG1 /* @vmx */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 70/89] x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (68 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 69/89] x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 71/89] x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (24 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 7a05bc95ed1c5a59e47aaade9fb4083c27de9e62 upstream.
The whole MMIO/RETBLEED enumeration went overboard on steppings. Get
rid of all that and simply use ANY.
If a future stepping of these models would not be affected, it had
better set the relevant ARCH_CAP_$FOO_NO bit in
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1122,32 +1122,27 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X, BIT(2) | BIT(4), MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x5), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) |
- BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6), MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED),
VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 71/89] x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (69 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 70/89] x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 72/89] x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (23 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andrew Cooper, Borislav Petkov,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
commit 26aae8ccbc1972233afd08fb3f368947c0314265 upstream.
BTC_NO indicates that hardware is not susceptible to Branch Type Confusion.
Zen3 CPUs don't suffer BTC.
Hypervisors are expected to synthesise BTC_NO when it is appropriate
given the migration pool, to prevent kernels using heuristics.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: no X86_FEATURE_BRS]
[cascardo: no X86_FEATURE_CPPC]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 6 ++++--
3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -319,6 +319,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD (13*32+24) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
#define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD (13*32+25) /* Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO (13*32+26) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass is fixed in hardware. */
+#define X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO (13*32+29) /* "" Not vulnerable to Branch Type Confusion */
/* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */
#define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM (14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -914,12 +914,21 @@ static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x
node_reclaim_distance = 32;
#endif
- /*
- * Fix erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID.
- * Always set it, except when running under a hypervisor.
- */
- if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB))
- set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB);
+ /* Fix up CPUID bits, but only if not virtualised. */
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+
+ /* Erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. */
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB);
+
+ /*
+ * Zen3 (Fam19 model < 0x10) parts are not susceptible to
+ * Branch Type Confusion, but predate the allocation of the
+ * BTC_NO bit.
+ */
+ if (c->x86 == 0x19 && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO);
+ }
}
static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1249,8 +1249,10 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
!arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
- if ((cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA)))
- setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) {
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
+ }
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 72/89] x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (70 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 71/89] x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 73/89] x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (22 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit f43b9876e857c739d407bc56df288b0ebe1a9164 upstream.
Do fine-grained Kconfig for all the various retbleed parts.
NOTE: if your compiler doesn't support return thunks this will
silently 'upgrade' your mitigation to IBPB, you might not like this.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: there is no CONFIG_OBJTOOL]
[cascardo: objtool calling and option parsing has changed]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Makefile | 8 +-
arch/x86/Kconfig | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------
arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 4 +
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 18 ++++-
arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h | 4 -
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 10 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h | 2
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 5 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 2
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 42 +++++++-----
arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c | 2
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 4 -
arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 4 +
scripts/Makefile.build | 1
scripts/link-vmlinux.sh | 2
security/Kconfig | 11 ---
tools/objtool/builtin-check.c | 3
tools/objtool/check.c | 9 ++
tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h | 2
19 files changed, 170 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -687,14 +687,18 @@ endif
ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC
RETPOLINE_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register)
-RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern)
RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-inline -mindirect-branch-register)
endif
ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG
RETPOLINE_CFLAGS := -mretpoline-external-thunk
RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := -mretpoline
-RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern)
endif
+
+ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+RETHUNK_CFLAGS := -mfunction-return=thunk-extern
+RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(RETHUNK_CFLAGS)
+endif
+
export RETPOLINE_CFLAGS
export RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -459,30 +459,6 @@ config GOLDFISH
def_bool y
depends on X86_GOLDFISH
-config RETPOLINE
- bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel"
- default y
- help
- Compile kernel with the retpoline compiler options to guard against
- kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding speculative indirect
- branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern
- support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.
-
-config CC_HAS_SLS
- def_bool $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all)
-
-config CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
- def_bool $(cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern)
-
-config SLS
- bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation"
- depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64
- default n
- help
- Compile the kernel with straight-line-speculation options to guard
- against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly
- larger.
-
config X86_CPU_RESCTRL
bool "x86 CPU resource control support"
depends on X86 && (CPU_SUP_INTEL || CPU_SUP_AMD)
@@ -2410,6 +2386,88 @@ source "kernel/livepatch/Kconfig"
endmenu
+config CC_HAS_SLS
+ def_bool $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all)
+
+config CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
+ def_bool $(cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern)
+
+menuconfig SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS
+ bool "Mitigations for speculative execution vulnerabilities"
+ default y
+ help
+ Say Y here to enable options which enable mitigations for
+ speculative execution hardware vulnerabilities.
+
+ If you say N, all mitigations will be disabled. You really
+ should know what you are doing to say so.
+
+if SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS
+
+config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+ bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
+ default y
+ depends on (X86_64 || X86_PAE)
+ help
+ This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by
+ ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped
+ into userspace.
+
+ See Documentation/x86/pti.rst for more details.
+
+config RETPOLINE
+ bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel"
+ default y
+ help
+ Compile kernel with the retpoline compiler options to guard against
+ kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding speculative indirect
+ branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern
+ support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.
+
+config RETHUNK
+ bool "Enable return-thunks"
+ depends on RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
+ default y
+ help
+ Compile the kernel with the return-thunks compiler option to guard
+ against kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding return speculation.
+ Requires a compiler with -mfunction-return=thunk-extern
+ support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.
+
+config CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+ bool "Enable UNRET on kernel entry"
+ depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK
+ default y
+ help
+ Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=unret mitigation.
+
+config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY
+ bool "Enable IBPB on kernel entry"
+ depends on CPU_SUP_AMD
+ default y
+ help
+ Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation.
+
+config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
+ bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry"
+ depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+ default y
+ help
+ Compile the kernel with support for the spectre_v2=ibrs mitigation.
+ This mitigates both spectre_v2 and retbleed at great cost to
+ performance.
+
+config SLS
+ bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation"
+ depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64
+ default n
+ help
+ Compile the kernel with straight-line-speculation options to guard
+ against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly
+ larger.
+
+endif
+
config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES
def_bool y
depends on X86_64 && ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
* Assumes x86_spec_ctrl_{base,current} to have SPEC_CTRL_IBRS set.
*/
.macro IBRS_ENTER save_reg
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
@@ -316,6 +317,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
shr $32, %rdx
wrmsr
.Lend_\@:
+#endif
.endm
/*
@@ -323,6 +325,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
* regs. Must be called after the last RET.
*/
.macro IBRS_EXIT save_reg
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
@@ -337,6 +340,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
shr $32, %rdx
wrmsr
.Lend_\@:
+#endif
.endm
/*
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -60,9 +60,19 @@
# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE 0
#else
# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE ((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \
- (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)) | \
- (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31)) | \
- (1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31)))
+ (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)))
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+# define DISABLE_RETHUNK 0
+#else
+# define DISABLE_RETHUNK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31))
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+# define DISABLE_UNRET 0
+#else
+# define DISABLE_UNRET (1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31))
#endif
/* Force disable because it's broken beyond repair */
@@ -88,7 +98,7 @@
#define DISABLED_MASK8 0
#define DISABLED_MASK9 (DISABLE_SMAP|DISABLE_SGX)
#define DISABLED_MASK10 0
-#define DISABLED_MASK11 (DISABLE_RETPOLINE)
+#define DISABLED_MASK11 (DISABLE_RETPOLINE|DISABLE_RETHUNK|DISABLE_UNRET)
#define DISABLED_MASK12 0
#define DISABLED_MASK13 0
#define DISABLED_MASK14 0
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
#define __ALIGN_STR __stringify(__ALIGN)
#endif
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
#define RET jmp __x86_return_thunk
#else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
#ifdef CONFIG_SLS
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
#define ASM_RET "jmp __x86_return_thunk\n\t"
#else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
#ifdef CONFIG_SLS
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -127,6 +127,12 @@
.Lskip_rsb_\@:
.endm
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+#define CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET "call zen_untrain_ret"
+#else
+#define CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET ""
+#endif
+
/*
* Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. Requires KERNEL CR3 because the
* return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD
@@ -139,10 +145,10 @@
* where we have a stack but before any RET instruction.
*/
.macro UNTRAIN_RET
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)
ANNOTATE_UNRET_END
ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \
- "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \
+ CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \
"call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB
#endif
.endm
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
#define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, func) \
__ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, ".byte 0xe9; .long " #func " - (. + 4)")
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
#define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP(name) \
__ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, "jmp __x86_return_thunk")
#else
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -507,6 +507,7 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_ret
}
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
/*
* Rewrite the compiler generated return thunk tail-calls.
*
@@ -568,6 +569,10 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_ret
}
}
}
+#else
+void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
+#endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */
+
#else /* !RETPOLINES || !CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION */
void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -888,6 +888,7 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x
void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
u64 value;
/*
@@ -904,6 +905,7 @@ void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinf
wrmsrl_safe(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, value);
}
}
+#endif
}
static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -835,7 +835,6 @@ static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline
early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline);
#define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n"
-#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler; falling back to IBPB!\n"
#define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n"
static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
@@ -850,18 +849,33 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitig
return;
case RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET:
- retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY)) {
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
+ } else {
+ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_UNRET_ENTRY.\n");
+ goto do_cmd_auto;
+ }
break;
case RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB:
- retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
+ } else {
+ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
+ goto do_cmd_auto;
+ }
break;
+do_cmd_auto:
case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO:
default:
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
- boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
- retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY))
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
+ else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY))
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
+ }
/*
* The Intel mitigation (IBRS or eIBRS) was already selected in
@@ -874,14 +888,6 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitig
switch (retbleed_mitigation) {
case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET:
-
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) ||
- !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK)) {
- pr_err(RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG);
- retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
- goto retbleed_force_ibpb;
- }
-
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
@@ -893,7 +899,6 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitig
break;
case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB:
-retbleed_force_ibpb:
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
mitigate_smt = true;
break;
@@ -1264,6 +1269,12 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
+ if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY)) {
+ pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+
if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
pr_err("%s selected but not Intel CPU. Switching to AUTO select\n",
mitigation_options[i].option);
@@ -1321,7 +1332,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
break;
}
- if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) &&
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY) &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) &&
retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_OFF &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ void arch_static_call_transform(void *si
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_static_call_transform);
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
/*
* This is called by apply_returns() to fix up static call trampolines,
* specifically ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP which is recorded as
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -434,10 +434,10 @@ static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctx
* Depending on .config the SETcc functions look like:
*
* SETcc %al [3 bytes]
- * RET | JMP __x86_return_thunk [1,5 bytes; CONFIG_RETPOLINE]
+ * RET | JMP __x86_return_thunk [1,5 bytes; CONFIG_RETHUNK]
* INT3 [1 byte; CONFIG_SLS]
*/
-#define RET_LENGTH (1 + (4 * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) + \
+#define RET_LENGTH (1 + (4 * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETHUNK)) + \
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
#define SETCC_LENGTH (3 + RET_LENGTH)
#define SETCC_ALIGN (4 << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 4) & 1) << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 8) & 1))
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array)
* This function name is magical and is used by -mfunction-return=thunk-extern
* for the compiler to generate JMPs to it.
*/
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+
.section .text.__x86.return_thunk
/*
@@ -135,3 +137,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(zen_untrain_ret)
__EXPORT_THUNK(zen_untrain_ret)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk)
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */
--- a/scripts/Makefile.build
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.build
@@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ objtool_args = \
$(if $(CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER),, --no-fp) \
$(if $(CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL)$(CONFIG_LTO_CLANG), --no-unreachable)\
$(if $(CONFIG_RETPOLINE), --retpoline) \
+ $(if $(CONFIG_RETHUNK), --rethunk) \
$(if $(CONFIG_X86_SMAP), --uaccess) \
$(if $(CONFIG_FTRACE_MCOUNT_USE_OBJTOOL), --mcount) \
$(if $(CONFIG_SLS), --sls)
--- a/scripts/link-vmlinux.sh
+++ b/scripts/link-vmlinux.sh
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ objtool_link()
if [ -n "${CONFIG_VMLINUX_VALIDATION}" ]; then
objtoolopt="${objtoolopt} --noinstr"
- if is_enabled CONFIG_RETPOLINE; then
+ if is_enabled CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY; then
objtoolopt="${objtoolopt} --unret"
fi
fi
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -54,17 +54,6 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK
implement socket and networking access controls.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
- bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
- default y
- depends on (X86_64 || X86_PAE) && !UML
- help
- This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by
- ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped
- into userspace.
-
- See Documentation/x86/pti.rst for more details.
-
config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND
--- a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
#include <objtool/objtool.h>
bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline, module, backtrace, uaccess, stats,
- validate_dup, vmlinux, mcount, noinstr, backup, sls, unret;
+ validate_dup, vmlinux, mcount, noinstr, backup, sls, unret, rethunk;
static const char * const check_usage[] = {
"objtool check [<options>] file.o",
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ const struct option check_options[] = {
OPT_BOOLEAN('f', "no-fp", &no_fp, "Skip frame pointer validation"),
OPT_BOOLEAN('u', "no-unreachable", &no_unreachable, "Skip 'unreachable instruction' warnings"),
OPT_BOOLEAN('r', "retpoline", &retpoline, "Validate retpoline assumptions"),
+ OPT_BOOLEAN(0, "rethunk", &rethunk, "validate and annotate rethunk usage"),
OPT_BOOLEAN(0, "unret", &unret, "validate entry unret placement"),
OPT_BOOLEAN('m', "module", &module, "Indicates the object will be part of a kernel module"),
OPT_BOOLEAN('b', "backtrace", &backtrace, "unwind on error"),
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -3440,8 +3440,11 @@ static int validate_retpoline(struct obj
continue;
if (insn->type == INSN_RETURN) {
- WARN_FUNC("'naked' return found in RETPOLINE build",
- insn->sec, insn->offset);
+ if (rethunk) {
+ WARN_FUNC("'naked' return found in RETHUNK build",
+ insn->sec, insn->offset);
+ } else
+ continue;
} else {
WARN_FUNC("indirect %s found in RETPOLINE build",
insn->sec, insn->offset,
@@ -3711,7 +3714,9 @@ int check(struct objtool_file *file)
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
warnings += ret;
+ }
+ if (rethunk) {
ret = create_return_sites_sections(file);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
--- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h
+++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
extern const struct option check_options[];
extern bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline, module, backtrace, uaccess, stats,
- validate_dup, vmlinux, mcount, noinstr, backup, sls, unret;
+ validate_dup, vmlinux, mcount, noinstr, backup, sls, unret, rethunk;
extern int cmd_parse_options(int argc, const char **argv, const char * const usage[]);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 73/89] x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (71 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 72/89] x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 74/89] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS() back into error_entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (21 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pawan Gupta, Borislav Petkov,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
commit f54d45372c6ac9c993451de5e51312485f7d10bc upstream.
Cannon lake is also affected by RETBleed, add it to the list.
Fixes: 6ad0ad2bf8a6 ("x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability")
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1132,6 +1132,7 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(CANNONLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 74/89] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS() back into error_entry
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (72 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 73/89] x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 75/89] x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB-on-entry when IBPB is not supported Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (20 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 2c08b9b38f5b0f4a6c2d29be22b695e4ec4a556b upstream.
Commit
ee774dac0da1 ("x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry()")
moved PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry, into its own function, in
part to avoid calling error_entry() for XenPV.
However, commit
7c81c0c9210c ("x86/entry: Avoid very early RET")
had to change that because the 'ret' was too early and moved it into
idtentry, bloating the text size, since idtentry is expanded for every
exception vector.
However, with the advent of xen_error_entry() in commit
d147553b64bad ("x86/xen: Add UNTRAIN_RET")
it became possible to remove PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS from idtentry, back
into *error_entry().
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: error_entry still does cld]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 9 ++++++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -320,6 +320,8 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ret_from_fork)
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(xen_error_entry)
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
+ PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS save_ret=1
+ ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
UNTRAIN_RET
RET
SYM_CODE_END(xen_error_entry)
@@ -331,9 +333,6 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xen_error_entry)
*/
.macro idtentry_body cfunc has_error_code:req
- PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS
- ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
-
/*
* Call error_entry() and switch to the task stack if from userspace.
*
@@ -1014,6 +1013,10 @@ SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_exit)
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry)
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
cld
+
+ PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS save_ret=1
+ ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
+
testb $3, CS+8(%rsp)
jz .Lerror_kernelspace
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 75/89] x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB-on-entry when IBPB is not supported
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (73 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 74/89] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS() back into error_entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 76/89] x86/kexec: Disable RET on kexec Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (19 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo,
Borislav Petkov
From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
commit 2259da159fbe5dba8ac00b560cf00b6a6537fa18 upstream.
There are some VM configurations which have Skylake model but do not
support IBPB. In those cases, when using retbleed=ibpb, userspace is going
to be killed and kernel is going to panic.
If the CPU does not support IBPB, warn and proceed with the auto option. Also,
do not fallback to IBPB on AMD/Hygon systems if it is not supported.
Fixes: 3ebc17006888 ("x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb")
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -858,7 +858,10 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitig
break;
case RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB:
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
+ pr_err("WARNING: CPU does not support IBPB.\n");
+ goto do_cmd_auto;
+ } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
} else {
pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
@@ -873,7 +876,7 @@ do_cmd_auto:
boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY))
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
- else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY))
+ else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 76/89] x86/kexec: Disable RET on kexec
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (74 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 75/89] x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB-on-entry when IBPB is not supported Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 77/89] x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (18 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Edward Tran, Awais Tanveer,
Ankur Arora, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, Alexandre Chartre,
Borislav Petkov, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
commit 697977d8415d61f3acbc4ee6d564c9dcf0309507 upstream.
All the invocations unroll to __x86_return_thunk and this file
must be PIC independent.
This fixes kexec on 64-bit AMD boxes.
[ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ]
Reported-by: Edward Tran <edward.tran@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Awais Tanveer <awais.tanveer@oracle.com>
Suggested-by: Ankur Arora <ankur.a.arora@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_32.S | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 23 +++++++++++++++++------
2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_32.S
@@ -7,10 +7,12 @@
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/page_types.h>
#include <asm/kexec.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
/*
- * Must be relocatable PIC code callable as a C function
+ * Must be relocatable PIC code callable as a C function, in particular
+ * there must be a plain RET and not jump to return thunk.
*/
#define PTR(x) (x << 2)
@@ -91,7 +93,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(relocate_kernel)
movl %edi, %eax
addl $(identity_mapped - relocate_kernel), %eax
pushl %eax
- RET
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
SYM_CODE_END(relocate_kernel)
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped)
@@ -159,12 +163,15 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_ma
xorl %edx, %edx
xorl %esi, %esi
xorl %ebp, %ebp
- RET
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
1:
popl %edx
movl CP_PA_SWAP_PAGE(%edi), %esp
addl $PAGE_SIZE, %esp
2:
+ ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
call *%edx
/* get the re-entry point of the peer system */
@@ -190,7 +197,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_ma
movl %edi, %eax
addl $(virtual_mapped - relocate_kernel), %eax
pushl %eax
- RET
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
SYM_CODE_END(identity_mapped)
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(virtual_mapped)
@@ -208,7 +217,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(virtual_map
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
- RET
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
SYM_CODE_END(virtual_mapped)
/* Do the copies */
@@ -271,7 +282,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(swap_pages)
popl %edi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
- RET
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
SYM_CODE_END(swap_pages)
.globl kexec_control_code_size
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@
#include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
/*
- * Must be relocatable PIC code callable as a C function
+ * Must be relocatable PIC code callable as a C function, in particular
+ * there must be a plain RET and not jump to return thunk.
*/
#define PTR(x) (x << 3)
@@ -104,7 +105,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(relocate_kernel)
/* jump to identity mapped page */
addq $(identity_mapped - relocate_kernel), %r8
pushq %r8
- RET
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
SYM_CODE_END(relocate_kernel)
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped)
@@ -191,7 +194,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_ma
xorl %r14d, %r14d
xorl %r15d, %r15d
- RET
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
1:
popq %rdx
@@ -210,7 +215,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_ma
call swap_pages
movq $virtual_mapped, %rax
pushq %rax
- RET
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
SYM_CODE_END(identity_mapped)
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(virtual_mapped)
@@ -231,7 +238,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(virtual_map
popq %r12
popq %rbp
popq %rbx
- RET
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
SYM_CODE_END(virtual_mapped)
/* Do the copies */
@@ -288,7 +297,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(swap_pages)
lea PAGE_SIZE(%rax), %rsi
jmp 0b
3:
- RET
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
SYM_CODE_END(swap_pages)
.globl kexec_control_code_size
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 77/89] x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (75 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 76/89] x86/kexec: Disable RET on kexec Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 78/89] x86/static_call: Serialize __static_call_fixup() properly Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (17 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pawan Gupta, Borislav Petkov,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
commit 4ad3278df6fe2b0852b00d5757fc2ccd8e92c26e upstream.
Some Intel processors may use alternate predictors for RETs on
RSB-underflow. This condition may be vulnerable to Branch History
Injection (BHI) and intramode-BTI.
Kernel earlier added spectre_v2 mitigation modes (eIBRS+Retpolines,
eIBRS+LFENCE, Retpolines) which protect indirect CALLs and JMPs against
such attacks. However, on RSB-underflow, RET target prediction may
fallback to alternate predictors. As a result, RET's predicted target
may get influenced by branch history.
A new MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL bit (RRSBA_DIS_S) controls this fallback
behavior when in kernel mode. When set, RETs will not take predictions
from alternate predictors, hence mitigating RETs as well. Support for
this is enumerated by CPUID.7.2.EDX[RRSBA_CTRL] (bit2).
For spectre v2 mitigation, when a user selects a mitigation that
protects indirect CALLs and JMPs against BHI and intramode-BTI, set
RRSBA_DIS_S also to protect RETs for RSB-underflow case.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: no X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 9 +++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 +
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 9 +++++++++
5 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_SGX1 (11*32+ 8) /* "" Basic SGX */
#define X86_FEATURE_SGX2 (11*32+ 9) /* "" SGX Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM) */
#define X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB (11*32+10) /* "" Issue an IBPB on kernel entry */
-/* FREE! (11*32+11) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL (11*32+11) /* "" RET prediction control */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK (11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT) /* STIBP mask */
#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT 2 /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT 6 /* Disable RRSBA behavior */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT)
#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
#define PRED_CMD_IBPB BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
@@ -139,6 +141,13 @@
* bit available to control VERW
* behavior.
*/
+#define ARCH_CAP_RRSBA BIT(19) /*
+ * Indicates RET may use predictors
+ * other than the RSB. With eIBRS
+ * enabled predictions in kernel mode
+ * are restricted to targets in
+ * kernel.
+ */
#define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b
#define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /*
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1311,6 +1311,22 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init
return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
}
+/* Disable in-kernel use of non-RSB RET predictors */
+static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void)
+{
+ u64 ia32_cap;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL))
+ return;
+
+ ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+ if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA) {
+ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S;
+ write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
+ }
+}
+
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
{
enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
@@ -1405,6 +1421,16 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
break;
}
+ /*
+ * Disable alternate RSB predictions in kernel when indirect CALLs and
+ * JMPs gets protection against BHI and Intramode-BTI, but RET
+ * prediction from a non-RSB predictor is still a risk.
+ */
+ if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
+ mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
+ mode == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE)
+ spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba();
+
spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ struct cpuid_bit {
static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
{ X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, CPUID_ECX, 0, 0x00000006, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_EPB, CPUID_ECX, 3, 0x00000006, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL, CPUID_EDX, 2, 0x00000007, 2 },
{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC, CPUID_EDX, 1, 0x0000000f, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC, CPUID_EDX, 0, 0x0000000f, 1 },
{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL, CPUID_EDX, 1, 0x0000000f, 1 },
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT) /* STIBP mask */
#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT 2 /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT 6 /* Disable RRSBA behavior */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT)
#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
#define PRED_CMD_IBPB BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
@@ -138,6 +140,13 @@
* bit available to control VERW
* behavior.
*/
+#define ARCH_CAP_RRSBA BIT(19) /*
+ * Indicates RET may use predictors
+ * other than the RSB. With eIBRS
+ * enabled predictions in kernel mode
+ * are restricted to targets in
+ * kernel.
+ */
#define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b
#define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /*
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 78/89] x86/static_call: Serialize __static_call_fixup() properly
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (76 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 77/89] x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 79/89] x86/xen: Fix initialisation in hypercall_page after rethunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (16 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
commit c27c753ea6fd1237f4f96abf8b623d7bab505513 upstream.
__static_call_fixup() invokes __static_call_transform() without holding
text_mutex, which causes lockdep to complain in text_poke_bp().
Adding the proper locking cures that, but as this is either used during
early boot or during module finalizing, it's not required to use
text_poke_bp(). Add an argument to __static_call_transform() which tells
it to use text_poke_early() for it.
Fixes: ee88d363d156 ("x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c | 13 ++++++++-----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
@@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ static const u8 xor5rax[] = { 0x2e, 0x2e
static const u8 retinsn[] = { RET_INSN_OPCODE, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc };
-static void __ref __static_call_transform(void *insn, enum insn_type type, void *func)
+static void __ref __static_call_transform(void *insn, enum insn_type type,
+ void *func, bool modinit)
{
const void *emulate = NULL;
int size = CALL_INSN_SIZE;
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ static void __ref __static_call_transfor
if (memcmp(insn, code, size) == 0)
return;
- if (unlikely(system_state == SYSTEM_BOOTING))
+ if (system_state == SYSTEM_BOOTING || modinit)
return text_poke_early(insn, code, size);
text_poke_bp(insn, code, size, emulate);
@@ -108,12 +109,12 @@ void arch_static_call_transform(void *si
if (tramp) {
__static_call_validate(tramp, true);
- __static_call_transform(tramp, __sc_insn(!func, true), func);
+ __static_call_transform(tramp, __sc_insn(!func, true), func, false);
}
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE) && site) {
__static_call_validate(site, tail);
- __static_call_transform(site, __sc_insn(!func, tail), func);
+ __static_call_transform(site, __sc_insn(!func, tail), func, false);
}
mutex_unlock(&text_mutex);
@@ -139,8 +140,10 @@ bool __static_call_fixup(void *tramp, u8
return false;
}
+ mutex_lock(&text_mutex);
if (op == RET_INSN_OPCODE || dest == &__x86_return_thunk)
- __static_call_transform(tramp, RET, NULL);
+ __static_call_transform(tramp, RET, NULL, true);
+ mutex_unlock(&text_mutex);
return true;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 79/89] x86/xen: Fix initialisation in hypercall_page after rethunk
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (77 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 78/89] x86/static_call: Serialize __static_call_fixup() properly Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 80/89] x86/asm/32: Fix ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE use on 32-bit Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (15 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ben Hutchings
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
The hypercall_page is special and the RETs there should not be changed
into rethunk calls (but can have SLS mitigation). Change the initial
instructions to ret + int3 padding, as was done in upstream commit
5b2fc51576ef "x86/ibt,xen: Sprinkle the ENDBR".
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S
@@ -69,9 +69,9 @@ SYM_CODE_END(asm_cpu_bringup_and_idle)
SYM_CODE_START(hypercall_page)
.rept (PAGE_SIZE / 32)
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
- .skip 31, 0x90
ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
- RET
+ ret
+ .skip 31, 0xcc
.endr
#define HYPERCALL(n) \
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 80/89] x86/asm/32: Fix ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE use on 32-bit
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (78 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 79/89] x86/xen: Fix initialisation in hypercall_page after rethunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 81/89] x86/speculation: Use DECLARE_PER_CPU for x86_spec_ctrl_current Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (14 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jiri Slaby, Borislav Petkov
From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
commit 3131ef39fb03bbde237d0b8260445898f3dfda5b upstream.
The build on x86_32 currently fails after commit
9bb2ec608a20 (objtool: Update Retpoline validation)
with:
arch/x86/kernel/../../x86/xen/xen-head.S:35: Error: no such instruction: `annotate_unret_safe'
ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE is defined in nospec-branch.h. And head_32.S is
missing this include. Fix this.
Fixes: 9bb2ec608a20 ("objtool: Update Retpoline validation")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/63e23f80-033f-f64e-7522-2816debbc367@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
#include <asm/percpu.h>
#include <asm/nops.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm/bootparam.h>
#include <asm/export.h>
#include <asm/pgtable_32.h>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 81/89] x86/speculation: Use DECLARE_PER_CPU for x86_spec_ctrl_current
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (79 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 80/89] x86/asm/32: Fix ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE use on 32-bit Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 82/89] efi/x86: use naked RET on mixed mode call wrapper Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (13 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, kernel test robot, Nathan Chancellor,
Linus Torvalds
From: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
commit db886979683a8360ced9b24ab1125ad0c4d2cf76 upstream.
Clang warns:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:58:21: error: section attribute is specified on redeclared variable [-Werror,-Wsection]
DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
^
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h:283:12: note: previous declaration is here
extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_current;
^
1 error generated.
The declaration should be using DECLARE_PER_CPU instead so all
attributes stay in sync.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: fc02735b14ff ("KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
#include <asm/msr-index.h>
#include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
+#include <asm/percpu.h>
#define RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE 32
@@ -281,7 +282,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_predi
/* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
-extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_current;
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force);
extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 82/89] efi/x86: use naked RET on mixed mode call wrapper
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (80 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 81/89] x86/speculation: Use DECLARE_PER_CPU for x86_spec_ctrl_current Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 83/89] x86/kvm: fix FASTOP_SIZE when return thunks are enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (12 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Guenter Roeck,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Linus Torvalds
From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
commit 51a6fa0732d6be6a44e0032752ad2ac10d67c796 upstream.
When running with return thunks enabled under 32-bit EFI, the system
crashes with:
kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000005bc02900
#PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0011) - permissions violation
PGD 18f7063 P4D 18f7063 PUD 18ff063 PMD 190e063 PTE 800000005bc02063
Oops: 0011 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc6+ #166
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:0x5bc02900
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x5bc028d6.
RSP: 0018:ffffffffb3203e10 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000048
RDX: 000000000190dfac RSI: 0000000000001710 RDI: 000000007eae823b
RBP: ffffffffb3203e70 R08: 0000000001970000 R09: ffffffffb3203e28
R10: 747563657865206c R11: 6c6977203a696665 R12: 0000000000001710
R13: 0000000000000030 R14: 0000000001970000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e013ca00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000005bc02900 CR3: 0000000001930000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
? efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x9c/0x175
efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x4a6/0x53e
start_kernel+0x67c/0x71e
x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x2a
x86_64_start_kernel+0xe9/0xf4
secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xe5/0xeb
That's because it cannot jump to the return thunk from the 32-bit code.
Using a naked RET and marking it as safe allows the system to proceed
booting.
Fixes: aa3d480315ba ("x86: Use return-thunk in asm code")
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_thunk_64.S | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_thunk_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_thunk_64.S
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/page_types.h>
#include <asm/segment.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
.text
.code64
@@ -63,7 +64,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__efi64_thunk)
1: movq 24(%rsp), %rsp
pop %rbx
pop %rbp
- RET
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
.code32
2: pushl $__KERNEL_CS
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 83/89] x86/kvm: fix FASTOP_SIZE when return thunks are enabled
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (81 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 82/89] efi/x86: use naked RET on mixed mode call wrapper Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 84/89] KVM: emulate: do not adjust size of fastop and setcc subroutines Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (11 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo,
Borislav Petkov, Josh Poimboeuf, Paolo Bonzini,
Linux Kernel Functional Testing, Jack Wang, Peter Zijlstra
From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
commit 84e7051c0bc1f2a13101553959b3a9d9a8e24939 upstream.
The return thunk call makes the fastop functions larger, just like IBT
does. Consider a 16-byte FASTOP_SIZE when CONFIG_RETHUNK is enabled.
Otherwise, functions will be incorrectly aligned and when computing their
position for differently sized operators, they will executed in the middle
or end of a function, which may as well be an int3, leading to a crash
like:
[ 36.091116] int3: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 36.091119] CPU: 3 PID: 1371 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 5.15.0-41-generic #44
[ 36.091120] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 36.091121] RIP: 0010:xaddw_ax_dx+0x9/0x10 [kvm]
[ 36.091185] Code: 00 0f bb d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 0f bb d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f c0 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 66 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc
[ 36.091186] RSP: 0018:ffffb1f541143c98 EFLAGS: 00000202
[ 36.091188] RAX: 0000000089abcdef RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 36.091188] RDX: 0000000076543210 RSI: ffffffffc073c6d0 RDI: 0000000000000200
[ 36.091189] RBP: ffffb1f541143ca0 R08: ffff9f1803350a70 R09: 0000000000000002
[ 36.091190] R10: ffff9f1803350a70 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9f1803350a70
[ 36.091190] R13: ffffffffc077fee0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 36.091191] FS: 00007efdfce8d640(0000) GS:ffff9f187dd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 36.091192] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 36.091192] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000009b62002 CR4: 0000000000772ee0
[ 36.091195] PKRU: 55555554
[ 36.091195] Call Trace:
[ 36.091197] <TASK>
[ 36.091198] ? fastop+0x5a/0xa0 [kvm]
[ 36.091222] x86_emulate_insn+0x7b8/0xe90 [kvm]
[ 36.091244] x86_emulate_instruction+0x2f4/0x630 [kvm]
[ 36.091263] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x7c/0x230 [kvm]
[ 36.091283] ? vmx_prepare_switch_to_host+0xf7/0x190 [kvm_intel]
[ 36.091290] complete_emulated_mmio+0x297/0x320 [kvm]
[ 36.091310] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x32f/0x550 [kvm]
[ 36.091330] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x29e/0x6d0 [kvm]
[ 36.091344] ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x120/0x6d0 [kvm]
[ 36.091357] ? __fget_files+0x86/0xc0
[ 36.091362] ? __fget_files+0x86/0xc0
[ 36.091363] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x92/0xd0
[ 36.091366] do_syscall_64+0x59/0xc0
[ 36.091369] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x50
[ 36.091370] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
[ 36.091371] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x50
[ 36.091372] ? __x64_sys_writev+0x1c/0x30
[ 36.091374] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
[ 36.091374] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x37/0xb0
[ 36.091378] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x50
[ 36.091379] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
[ 36.091379] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
[ 36.091380] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
[ 36.091381] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
[ 36.091381] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
[ 36.091384] RIP: 0033:0x7efdfe6d1aff
[ 36.091390] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1f 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00
[ 36.091391] RSP: 002b:00007efdfce8c460 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[ 36.091393] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000ae80 RCX: 00007efdfe6d1aff
[ 36.091393] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000ae80 RDI: 000000000000000c
[ 36.091394] RBP: 0000558f1609e220 R08: 0000558f13fb8190 R09: 00000000ffffffff
[ 36.091394] R10: 0000558f16b5e950 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 36.091394] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 36.091396] </TASK>
[ 36.091397] Modules linked in: isofs nls_iso8859_1 kvm_intel joydev kvm input_leds serio_raw sch_fq_codel dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler drm msr ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic zstd_compress raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel virtio_net net_failover crypto_simd ahci xhci_pci cryptd psmouse virtio_blk libahci xhci_pci_renesas failover
[ 36.123271] ---[ end trace db3c0ab5a48fabcc ]---
[ 36.123272] RIP: 0010:xaddw_ax_dx+0x9/0x10 [kvm]
[ 36.123319] Code: 00 0f bb d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 0f bb d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f c0 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 66 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc
[ 36.123320] RSP: 0018:ffffb1f541143c98 EFLAGS: 00000202
[ 36.123321] RAX: 0000000089abcdef RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 36.123321] RDX: 0000000076543210 RSI: ffffffffc073c6d0 RDI: 0000000000000200
[ 36.123322] RBP: ffffb1f541143ca0 R08: ffff9f1803350a70 R09: 0000000000000002
[ 36.123322] R10: ffff9f1803350a70 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9f1803350a70
[ 36.123323] R13: ffffffffc077fee0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 36.123323] FS: 00007efdfce8d640(0000) GS:ffff9f187dd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 36.123324] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 36.123325] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000009b62002 CR4: 0000000000772ee0
[ 36.123327] PKRU: 55555554
[ 36.123328] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 36.123410] Kernel Offset: 0x1400000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
[ 36.135305] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---
Fixes: aa3d480315ba ("x86: Use return-thunk in asm code")
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20220713171241.184026-1-cascardo@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@ionos.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 10 ++++++----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -187,8 +187,12 @@
#define X8(x...) X4(x), X4(x)
#define X16(x...) X8(x), X8(x)
-#define NR_FASTOP (ilog2(sizeof(ulong)) + 1)
-#define FASTOP_SIZE 8
+#define NR_FASTOP (ilog2(sizeof(ulong)) + 1)
+#define RET_LENGTH (1 + (4 * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETHUNK)) + \
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+#define FASTOP_LENGTH (ENDBR_INSN_SIZE + 7 + RET_LENGTH)
+#define FASTOP_SIZE (8 << ((FASTOP_LENGTH > 8) & 1) << ((FASTOP_LENGTH > 16) & 1))
+static_assert(FASTOP_LENGTH <= FASTOP_SIZE);
struct opcode {
u64 flags : 56;
@@ -437,8 +441,6 @@ static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctx
* RET | JMP __x86_return_thunk [1,5 bytes; CONFIG_RETHUNK]
* INT3 [1 byte; CONFIG_SLS]
*/
-#define RET_LENGTH (1 + (4 * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETHUNK)) + \
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
#define SETCC_LENGTH (3 + RET_LENGTH)
#define SETCC_ALIGN (4 << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 4) & 1) << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 8) & 1))
static_assert(SETCC_LENGTH <= SETCC_ALIGN);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 84/89] KVM: emulate: do not adjust size of fastop and setcc subroutines
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (82 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 83/89] x86/kvm: fix FASTOP_SIZE when return thunks are enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 85/89] tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (10 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Linus Torvalds, Paolo Bonzini
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
commit 79629181607e801c0b41b8790ac4ee2eb5d7bc3e upstream.
Instead of doing complicated calculations to find the size of the subroutines
(which are even more complicated because they need to be stringified into
an asm statement), just hardcode to 16.
It is less dense for a few combinations of IBT/SLS/retbleed, but it has
the advantage of being really simple.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15.x: 84e7051c0bc1: x86/kvm: fix FASTOP_SIZE when return thunks are enabled
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 17 +++++++----------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -187,13 +187,6 @@
#define X8(x...) X4(x), X4(x)
#define X16(x...) X8(x), X8(x)
-#define NR_FASTOP (ilog2(sizeof(ulong)) + 1)
-#define RET_LENGTH (1 + (4 * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETHUNK)) + \
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
-#define FASTOP_LENGTH (ENDBR_INSN_SIZE + 7 + RET_LENGTH)
-#define FASTOP_SIZE (8 << ((FASTOP_LENGTH > 8) & 1) << ((FASTOP_LENGTH > 16) & 1))
-static_assert(FASTOP_LENGTH <= FASTOP_SIZE);
-
struct opcode {
u64 flags : 56;
u64 intercept : 8;
@@ -307,9 +300,15 @@ static void invalidate_registers(struct
* Moreover, they are all exactly FASTOP_SIZE bytes long, so functions for
* different operand sizes can be reached by calculation, rather than a jump
* table (which would be bigger than the code).
+ *
+ * The 16 byte alignment, considering 5 bytes for the RET thunk, 3 for ENDBR
+ * and 1 for the straight line speculation INT3, leaves 7 bytes for the
+ * body of the function. Currently none is larger than 4.
*/
static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, fastop_t fop);
+#define FASTOP_SIZE 16
+
#define __FOP_FUNC(name) \
".align " __stringify(FASTOP_SIZE) " \n\t" \
".type " name ", @function \n\t" \
@@ -441,9 +440,7 @@ static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctx
* RET | JMP __x86_return_thunk [1,5 bytes; CONFIG_RETHUNK]
* INT3 [1 byte; CONFIG_SLS]
*/
-#define SETCC_LENGTH (3 + RET_LENGTH)
-#define SETCC_ALIGN (4 << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 4) & 1) << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 8) & 1))
-static_assert(SETCC_LENGTH <= SETCC_ALIGN);
+#define SETCC_ALIGN 16
#define FOP_SETCC(op) \
".align " __stringify(SETCC_ALIGN) " \n\t" \
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 85/89] tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (83 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 84/89] KVM: emulate: do not adjust size of fastop and setcc subroutines Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:12 ` [PATCH 5.15 86/89] tools headers cpufeatures: Sync " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (9 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Adrian Hunter, Borislav Petkov,
Ian Rogers, Jiri Olsa, Namhyung Kim, Pawan Gupta, Peter Zijlstra,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
commit 91d248c3b903b46a58cbc7e8d38d684d3e4007c2 upstream.
To pick up the changes from these csets:
4ad3278df6fe2b08 ("x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior")
d7caac991feeef1b ("x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken")
That cause no changes to tooling:
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > before
$ cp arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > after
$ diff -u before after
$
Just silences this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YtQTm9wsB3hxQWvy@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@
#define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a
#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO BIT(0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL BIT(1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */
+#define ARCH_CAP_RSBA BIT(2) /* RET may use alternative branch predictors */
#define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH BIT(3) /* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */
#define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO BIT(4) /*
* Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
@@ -523,6 +524,9 @@
/* Fam 17h MSRs */
#define MSR_F17H_IRPERF 0xc00000e9
+#define MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN 0xc00110e3
+#define MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN_BIT BIT_ULL(1)
+
/* Fam 16h MSRs */
#define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTL 0xc0010230
#define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTR 0xc0010231
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 86/89] tools headers cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sources
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (84 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 85/89] tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:12 ` [PATCH 5.15 87/89] x86/bugs: Remove apostrophe typo Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (8 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Adrian Hunter, Borislav Petkov,
Ian Rogers, Jiri Olsa, Namhyung Kim, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
commit f098addbdb44c8a565367f5162f3ab170ed9404a upstream.
To pick the changes from:
f43b9876e857c739 ("x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs")
a149180fbcf336e9 ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
15e67227c49a5783 ("x86: Undo return-thunk damage")
369ae6ffc41a3c11 ("x86/retpoline: Cleanup some #ifdefery")
4ad3278df6fe2b08 x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior
26aae8ccbc197223 x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO
9756bba28470722d x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS
3ebc170068885b6f x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb
2dbb887e875b1de3 x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation
6b80b59b35557065 x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability
a149180fbcf336e9 x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk
15e67227c49a5783 x86: Undo return-thunk damage
a883d624aed463c8 x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11
51802186158c74a0 x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YtQM40VmiLTkPND2@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 12 ++++++++++--
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -203,8 +203,8 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
/* FREE! ( 7*32+10) */
#define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ( 7*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCEs for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS ( 7*32+12) /* "" Set/clear IBRS on kernel entry/exit */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT ( 7*32+13) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
#define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */
@@ -294,6 +294,12 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA (11*32+ 7) /* "" Per-thread Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
#define X86_FEATURE_SGX1 (11*32+ 8) /* "" Basic SGX */
#define X86_FEATURE_SGX2 (11*32+ 9) /* "" SGX Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB (11*32+10) /* "" Issue an IBPB on kernel entry */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL (11*32+11) /* "" RET prediction control */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK (11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */
+#define X86_FEATURE_UNRET (11*32+15) /* "" AMD BTB untrain return */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */
@@ -313,6 +319,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD (13*32+24) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
#define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD (13*32+25) /* Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO (13*32+26) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass is fixed in hardware. */
+#define X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO (13*32+29) /* "" Not vulnerable to Branch Type Confusion */
/* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */
#define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM (14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */
@@ -437,5 +444,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
#define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
+#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -56,6 +56,25 @@
# define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE 0
+#else
+# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE ((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \
+ (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)))
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+# define DISABLE_RETHUNK 0
+#else
+# define DISABLE_RETHUNK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31))
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+# define DISABLE_UNRET 0
+#else
+# define DISABLE_UNRET (1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31))
+#endif
+
/* Force disable because it's broken beyond repair */
#define DISABLE_ENQCMD (1 << (X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD & 31))
@@ -79,7 +98,7 @@
#define DISABLED_MASK8 0
#define DISABLED_MASK9 (DISABLE_SMAP|DISABLE_SGX)
#define DISABLED_MASK10 0
-#define DISABLED_MASK11 0
+#define DISABLED_MASK11 (DISABLE_RETPOLINE|DISABLE_RETHUNK|DISABLE_UNRET)
#define DISABLED_MASK12 0
#define DISABLED_MASK13 0
#define DISABLED_MASK14 0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 87/89] x86/bugs: Remove apostrophe typo
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (85 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:12 ` [PATCH 5.15 86/89] tools headers cpufeatures: Sync " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:12 ` [PATCH 5.15 88/89] um: Add missing apply_returns() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (7 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Kim Phillips, Borislav Petkov
From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
commit bcf163150cd37348a0cb59e95c916a83a9344b0e upstream.
Remove a superfluous ' in the mitigation string.
Fixes: e8ec1b6e08a2 ("x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RET")
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1174,7 +1174,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET) {
if (mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT &&
mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
- pr_info("Selecting STIBP always-on mode to complement retbleed mitigation'\n");
+ pr_info("Selecting STIBP always-on mode to complement retbleed mitigation\n");
mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 88/89] um: Add missing apply_returns()
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (86 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:12 ` [PATCH 5.15 87/89] x86/bugs: Remove apostrophe typo Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:12 ` [PATCH 5.15 89/89] x86: Use -mindirect-branch-cs-prefix for RETPOLINE builds Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (6 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel), Borislav Petkov
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 564d998106397394b6aad260f219b882b3347e62 upstream.
Implement apply_returns() stub for UM, just like all the other patching
routines.
Fixes: 15e67227c49a ("x86: Undo return-thunk damage")
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org)
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Ys%2Ft45l%2FgarIrD0u@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c
+++ b/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c
@@ -425,6 +425,10 @@ void apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *e
{
}
+void apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end)
+{
+}
+
void apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, struct alt_instr *end)
{
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15 89/89] x86: Use -mindirect-branch-cs-prefix for RETPOLINE builds
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (87 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:12 ` [PATCH 5.15 88/89] um: Add missing apply_returns() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 9:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 12:14 ` [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Bagas Sanjaya
` (5 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-07-22 9:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Borislav Petkov, Kees Cook, Nick Desaulniers
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 68cf4f2a72ef8786e6b7af6fd9a89f27ac0f520d upstream.
In order to further enable commit:
bbe2df3f6b6d ("x86/alternative: Try inline spectre_v2=retpoline,amd")
add the new GCC flag -mindirect-branch-cs-prefix:
https://gcc.gnu.org/g:2196a681d7810ad8b227bf983f38ba716620545e
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=102952
https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=52323
to RETPOLINE=y builds. This should allow fully inlining retpoline,amd
for GCC builds.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211119165630.276205624@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Makefile | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -687,6 +687,7 @@ endif
ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC
RETPOLINE_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register)
+RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch-cs-prefix)
RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-inline -mindirect-branch-register)
endif
ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (88 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 9:12 ` [PATCH 5.15 89/89] x86: Use -mindirect-branch-cs-prefix for RETPOLINE builds Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-07-22 12:14 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-07-22 17:58 ` Florian Fainelli
` (4 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Bagas Sanjaya @ 2022-07-22 12:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: linux-kernel, stable, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli, sudipm.mukherjee,
slade
On Fri, Jul 22, 2022 at 11:10:34AM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.57 release.
> There are 89 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
Successfully cross-compiled for arm64 (bcm2711_defconfig, GCC 10.2.0)
and powerpc (ps3_defconfig, GCC 12.1.0).
Tested-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
--
An old man doll... just what I always wanted! - Clara
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (89 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 12:14 ` [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Bagas Sanjaya
@ 2022-07-22 17:58 ` Florian Fainelli
2022-07-22 19:36 ` Naresh Kamboju
` (3 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Florian Fainelli @ 2022-07-22 17:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
Cc: stable, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches, lkft-triage,
pavel, jonathanh, sudipm.mukherjee, slade
On 7/22/22 02:10, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.57 release.
> There are 89 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sun, 24 Jul 2022 09:10:51 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.57-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.15.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, and built tested with BMIPS_GENERIC:
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
--
Florian
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (90 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 17:58 ` Florian Fainelli
@ 2022-07-22 19:36 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-07-22 21:59 ` Guenter Roeck
` (2 subsequent siblings)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Naresh Kamboju @ 2022-07-22 19:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: linux-kernel, stable, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli, sudipm.mukherjee,
slade
On Fri, 22 Jul 2022 at 14:43, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.57 release.
> There are 89 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sun, 24 Jul 2022 09:10:51 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.57-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.15.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>
## Build
* kernel: 5.15.57-rc1
* git: https://gitlab.com/Linaro/lkft/mirrors/stable/linux-stable-rc
* git branch: linux-5.15.y
* git commit: 377c0f983cd943f563003e5be4947692afba815c
* git describe: v5.15.56-90-g377c0f983cd9
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-5.15.y/build/v5.15.56-90-g377c0f983cd9
## Test Regressions (compared to v5.15.55)
No test regressions found.
## Metric Regressions (compared to v5.15.55)
No metric regressions found.
## Test Fixes (compared to v5.15.55)
No test fixes found.
## Metric Fixes (compared to v5.15.55)
No metric fixes found.
## Test result summary
total: 140090, pass: 126270, fail: 474, skip: 12514, xfail: 832
## Build Summary
* arc: 10 total, 10 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 308 total, 308 passed, 0 failed
* arm64: 62 total, 60 passed, 2 failed
* i386: 52 total, 50 passed, 2 failed
* mips: 45 total, 45 passed, 0 failed
* parisc: 12 total, 12 passed, 0 failed
* powerpc: 54 total, 54 passed, 0 failed
* riscv: 22 total, 22 passed, 0 failed
* s390: 21 total, 21 passed, 0 failed
* sh: 24 total, 24 passed, 0 failed
* sparc: 12 total, 12 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 56 total, 54 passed, 2 failed
## Test suites summary
* fwts
* igt-gpu-tools
* kunit
* kvm-unit-tests
* libgpiod
* libhugetlbfs
* log-parser-boot
* log-parser-test
* ltp-cap_bounds
* ltp-commands
* ltp-containers
* ltp-controllers
* ltp-cpuhotplug
* ltp-crypto
* ltp-cve
* ltp-dio
* ltp-fcntl-locktests
* ltp-filecaps
* ltp-fs
* ltp-fs_bind
* ltp-fs_perms_simple
* ltp-fsx
* ltp-hugetlb
* ltp-io
* ltp-ipc
* ltp-math
* ltp-mm
* ltp-nptl
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty
* ltp-sched
* ltp-securebits
* ltp-smoke
* ltp-syscalls
* ltp-tracing
* network-basic-tests
* packetdrill
* perf
* perf/Zstd-perf.data-compression
* rcutorture
* ssuite
* v4l2-compliance
* vdso
--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (91 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 19:36 ` Naresh Kamboju
@ 2022-07-22 21:59 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-07-23 4:21 ` Ron Economos
2022-07-23 8:55 ` Sudip Mukherjee (Codethink)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Guenter Roeck @ 2022-07-22 21:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: linux-kernel, stable, torvalds, akpm, shuah, patches,
lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli, sudipm.mukherjee,
slade
On Fri, Jul 22, 2022 at 11:10:34AM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.57 release.
> There are 89 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sun, 24 Jul 2022 09:10:51 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
Build results:
total: 159 pass: 159 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
total: 488 pass: 488 fail: 0
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Guenter
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (92 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-22 21:59 ` Guenter Roeck
@ 2022-07-23 4:21 ` Ron Economos
2022-07-23 8:55 ` Sudip Mukherjee (Codethink)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Ron Economos @ 2022-07-23 4:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
Cc: stable, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches, lkft-triage,
pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli, sudipm.mukherjee, slade
On 7/22/22 2:10 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.57 release.
> There are 89 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sun, 24 Jul 2022 09:10:51 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.57-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.15.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
Built and booted successfully on RISC-V RV64 (HiFive Unmatched).
Tested-by: Ron Economos <re@w6rz.net>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (93 preceding siblings ...)
2022-07-23 4:21 ` Ron Economos
@ 2022-07-23 8:55 ` Sudip Mukherjee (Codethink)
94 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Sudip Mukherjee (Codethink) @ 2022-07-23 8:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: linux-kernel, stable, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli, slade
Hi Greg,
On Fri, Jul 22, 2022 at 11:10:34AM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.57 release.
> There are 89 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sun, 24 Jul 2022 09:10:51 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
Build test (gcc version 11.3.1 20220706):
mips: 62 configs -> no failure
arm: 99 configs -> no failure
arm64: 3 configs -> no failure
x86_64: 4 configs -> no failure
alpha allmodconfig -> no failure
csky allmodconfig -> no failure
powerpc allmodconfig -> no failure
riscv allmodconfig -> no failure
s390 allmodconfig -> no failure
xtensa allmodconfig -> no failure
Boot test:
x86_64: Booted on my test laptop. No regression.
x86_64: Booted on qemu. No regression. [1]
arm64: Booted on rpi4b (4GB model). No regression. [2]
mips: Booted on ci20 board. No regression. [3]
[1]. https://openqa.qa.codethink.co.uk/tests/1545
[2]. https://openqa.qa.codethink.co.uk/tests/1548
[3]. https://openqa.qa.codethink.co.uk/tests/1551
Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudip.mukherjee@codethink.co.uk>
--
Regards
Sudip
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread