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From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
To: <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>,
	Babu Moger <Babu.Moger@amd.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v4 6/7] x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 19:50:02 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221201015003.295769-7-kim.phillips@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221201015003.295769-1-kim.phillips@amd.com>

The AMD Zen4 core supports a new feature called Automatic IBRS.

It is a "set-and-forget" feature that means that, like
Intel's Enhanced IBRS, h/w manages its IBRS mitigation
resources automatically across CPL transitions.

The feature is advertised by CPUID_Fn80000021_EAX bit 8 and is
enabled by setting MSR C000_0080 (EFER) bit 21.

Enable Automatic IBRS by default if the CPU feature is present.
It typically provides greater performance over the incumbent
generic retpolines mitigation.

Reuse the SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS spectre_v2_mitigation enum.
AMD Automatic IBRS and Intel Enhanced IBRS have similar
bugs.c enablement.  Add NO_EIBRS_PBRSB to cpu_vuln_whitelist,
since AMD Automatic IBRS isn't affected by PBRSB-eIBRS.

Also allow for spectre_v2=autoibrs on the kernel command line.
'spectre_v2=autoibrs,retpoline' and 'autoibrs,lfence' are
honoured but not required.  AutoIBRS will also be enabled if
the =eibrs[,{lfence,retpoline}] variants are specified.

Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
---
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |  9 +++++---
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h              |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 23 ++++++++++++-------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                  | 17 ++++++++------
 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index a465d5242774..880016d06a8a 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -5698,9 +5698,12 @@
 			retpoline,generic - Retpolines
 			retpoline,lfence  - LFENCE; indirect branch
 			retpoline,amd     - alias for retpoline,lfence
-			eibrs		  - enhanced IBRS
-			eibrs,retpoline   - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
-			eibrs,lfence      - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
+			eibrs		  - Enhanced/Auto IBRS
+			autoibrs	  - Enhanced/Auto IBRS
+			eibrs,retpoline   - Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines
+			autoibrs,retpoline- Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines
+			eibrs,lfence      - Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE
+			autoibrs,lfence   - Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE
 			ibrs		  - use IBRS to protect kernel
 
 			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 37ff47552bcb..6843d6241203 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #define _EFER_SVME		12 /* Enable virtualization */
 #define _EFER_LMSLE		13 /* Long Mode Segment Limit Enable */
 #define _EFER_FFXSR		14 /* Enable Fast FXSAVE/FXRSTOR */
+#define _EFER_AUTOIBRS		21 /* Enable Automatic IBRS */
 
 #define EFER_SCE		(1<<_EFER_SCE)
 #define EFER_LME		(1<<_EFER_LME)
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@
 #define EFER_SVME		(1<<_EFER_SVME)
 #define EFER_LMSLE		(1<<_EFER_LMSLE)
 #define EFER_FFXSR		(1<<_EFER_FFXSR)
+#define EFER_AUTOIBRS		(1<<_EFER_AUTOIBRS)
 
 /* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 84c14e11db90..b17786d87b40 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1222,9 +1222,9 @@ static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
 	[SPECTRE_V2_NONE]			= "Vulnerable",
 	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE]			= "Mitigation: Retpolines",
 	[SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE]			= "Mitigation: LFENCE",
-	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS]			= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
-	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE",
-	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS]			= "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS + LFENCE",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS + Retpolines",
 	[SPECTRE_V2_IBRS]			= "Mitigation: IBRS",
 };
 
@@ -1240,8 +1240,11 @@ static const struct {
 	{ "retpoline,lfence",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE,  false },
 	{ "retpoline,generic",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false },
 	{ "eibrs",		SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS,		  false },
+	{ "autoibrs",		SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS,		  false },
 	{ "eibrs,lfence",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE,	  false },
+	{ "autoibrs,lfence",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE,	  false },
 	{ "eibrs,retpoline",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,	  false },
+	{ "autoibrs,retpoline",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,	  false },
 	{ "auto",		SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,		  false },
 	{ "ibrs",		SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS,              false },
 };
@@ -1293,7 +1296,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
 	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
 	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
-		pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have eIBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+		pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have Enhanced or Automatic IBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
 		       mitigation_options[i].option);
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 	}
@@ -1479,8 +1482,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 		pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
 
 	if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
-		x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
-		write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) {
+			msr_set_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_AUTOIBRS);
+		} else {
+			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+			write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
+		}
 	}
 
 	switch (mode) {
@@ -1564,8 +1571,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	/*
 	 * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware.  IBRS
 	 * and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around
-	 * firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced IBRS aren't otherwise
-	 * enabled.
+	 * firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced / Automatic IBRS aren't
+	 * otherwise enabled.
 	 *
 	 * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because
 	 * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 8d28cd7c9072..965596433e81 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1226,7 +1226,7 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 	VULNWL_AMD(0x12,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
 
 	/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
-	VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+	VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
 	VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
 
 	/* Zhaoxin Family 7 */
@@ -1338,8 +1338,16 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	   !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 
-	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
+	/*
+	 * AMD's AutoIBRS is equivalent to Intel's eIBRS - use the Intel feature
+	 * flag and protect from vendor-specific bugs via the whitelist.
+	 */
+	if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) {
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
+		if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) &&
+		    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
+			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
+	}
 
 	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
 	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
@@ -1401,11 +1409,6 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
 	}
 
-	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) &&
-	    !cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) &&
-	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
-		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
-
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-12-01  1:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-12-01  1:49 [PATCH v4 0/7] x86/cpu, kvm: Support AMD Automatic IBRS Kim Phillips
2022-12-01  1:49 ` [PATCH v4 1/7] x86/cpu: Define a scattered No Nested Data Breakpoints feature bit Kim Phillips
2022-12-05 10:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-05 17:32     ` Kim Phillips
2022-12-05 20:20       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-05 22:05         ` Kim Phillips
2022-12-01  1:49 ` [PATCH v4 2/7] x86/cpu: Define a scattered Null Selector Clears Base " Kim Phillips
2022-12-01  1:49 ` [PATCH v4 3/7] x86/cpu: Make X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC a scattered " Kim Phillips
2022-12-01  1:50 ` [PATCH v4 4/7] x86/cpu, kvm: Move CPUID 0x80000021 EAX feature bits propagation to kvm_set_cpu_caps() Kim Phillips
2022-12-01  1:50 ` [PATCH v4 5/7] x86/cpu: Define a scattered AMD Automatic IBRS feature bit Kim Phillips
2022-12-01  1:50 ` Kim Phillips [this message]
2022-12-02 16:31   ` [PATCH v4 6/7] x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS Pawan Gupta
2022-12-02 17:40   ` Dave Hansen
2022-12-01  1:50 ` [PATCH v4 7/7] x86/cpu, kvm: Propagate the AMD Automatic IBRS feature to the guest Kim Phillips

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