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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com,pbonzini@redhat.com,tglx@linutronix.de,x86@kernel.org,bp@alien8.de,Dave
	Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [RFC][PATCH 24/34] x86/cpu: Establish 'min_cache_bits' configuration
Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2024 10:39:58 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240222183958.F5A0812A@davehans-spike.ostc.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240222183926.517AFCD2@davehans-spike.ostc.intel.com>


From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>

Continue moving towards a setup where code never tweaks 'boot_cpu_data'.

Code must establish their intent in 'x86_addr_config' and then later
code will use that config information to establish the system-wide
config.

The L1TF wants to tweak x86_cache_bits.  Let it do this, but move
the code away from bugs.c so that ti can be easily called earlier
en boot.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
---

 b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h |    6 +++++
 b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c       |   41 -------------------------------------
 b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c     |    2 +
 b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c      |   40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)

diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h~bsp-min_cache_bits arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h~bsp-min_cache_bits	2024-02-22 10:09:00.220915031 -0800
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h	2024-02-22 10:09:00.224915188 -0800
@@ -177,6 +177,12 @@ struct x86_addr_config {
 	 * will take place at a more coarse granularity.
 	 */
 	u8 cache_align_mult;
+
+	/*
+	 * Specify a floor for the number of bits that the CPU
+	 * caches comprehend.  Used only for L1TF mitigation.
+	 */
+	u8 min_cache_bits;
 };
 
 /*
diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c~bsp-min_cache_bits arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c~bsp-min_cache_bits	2024-02-22 10:09:00.220915031 -0800
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c	2024-02-22 10:09:00.224915188 -0800
@@ -2237,45 +2237,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_mitigation);
 enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_vmx_mitigation);
 
-/*
- * These CPUs all support 44bits physical address space internally in the
- * cache but CPUID can report a smaller number of physical address bits.
- *
- * The L1TF mitigation uses the top most address bit for the inversion of
- * non present PTEs. When the installed memory reaches into the top most
- * address bit due to memory holes, which has been observed on machines
- * which report 36bits physical address bits and have 32G RAM installed,
- * then the mitigation range check in l1tf_select_mitigation() triggers.
- * This is a false positive because the mitigation is still possible due to
- * the fact that the cache uses 44bit internally. Use the cache bits
- * instead of the reported physical bits and adjust them on the affected
- * machines to 44bit if the reported bits are less than 44.
- */
-static void override_cache_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
-{
-	if (c->x86 != 6)
-		return;
-
-	switch (c->x86_model) {
-	case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_L:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_G:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_G:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE:
-		if (c->x86_cache_bits < 44)
-			c->x86_cache_bits = 44;
-		break;
-	}
-}
-
 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
 {
 	u64 half_pa;
@@ -2288,8 +2249,6 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigatio
 	else if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
 		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
 
-	override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
-
 	switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
 	case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
 	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c~bsp-min_cache_bits arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c~bsp-min_cache_bits	2024-02-22 10:09:00.220915031 -0800
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c	2024-02-22 10:09:00.228915345 -0800
@@ -1139,6 +1139,8 @@ void get_cpu_address_sizes(struct cpuinf
 	x86_config.clflush_size = detect_clflush_size(c);
 
 	c->x86_cache_bits = x86_config.phys_bits;
+	if (c->x86_cache_bits < bsp_addr_config.min_cache_bits)
+		c->x86_cache_bits = bsp_addr_config.min_cache_bits;
 
 	x86_config.cache_alignment = x86_clflush_size();
 	if (bsp_addr_config.cache_align_mult)
diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c~bsp-min_cache_bits arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c~bsp-min_cache_bits	2024-02-22 10:09:00.224915188 -0800
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c	2024-02-22 10:09:00.228915345 -0800
@@ -395,6 +395,44 @@ detect_keyid_bits:
 	return keyid_bits;
 }
 
+/*
+ * These CPUs all support 44bits physical address space internally in the
+ * cache but CPUID can report a smaller number of physical address bits.
+ *
+ * The L1TF mitigation uses the top most address bit for the inversion of
+ * non present PTEs. When the installed memory reaches into the top most
+ * address bit due to memory holes, which has been observed on machines
+ * which report 36bits physical address bits and have 32G RAM installed,
+ * then the mitigation range check in l1tf_select_mitigation() triggers.
+ * This is a false positive because the mitigation is still possible due to
+ * the fact that the cache uses 44bit internally. Use the cache bits
+ * instead of the reported physical bits and adjust them on the affected
+ * machines to 44bit if the reported bits are less than 44.
+ */
+static void set_min_cache_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	if (c->x86 != 6)
+		return;
+
+	switch (c->x86_model) {
+	case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_L:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_G:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_G:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE:
+		bsp_addr_config.min_cache_bits = 44;
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
 static void bsp_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	int keyid_bits = 0;
@@ -418,6 +456,8 @@ static void bsp_init_intel(struct cpuinf
 	/* Netburst reports 64 bytes clflush size, but does IO in 128 bytes */
 	if (c->x86 == 15)
 		bsp_addr_config.cache_align_mult = 2;
+
+	set_min_cache_bits(c);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
_

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-02-22 18:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-22 18:39 [RFC][PATCH 00/34] [RFC] x86: Rework system-wide configuration masquerading as per-cpu data Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 01/34] x86/xen: Explain why calling get_cpu_cap() so early is a hack Dave Hansen
2024-03-07 16:27   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 02/34] x86/xen: Remove early "debug" physical address lookups Dave Hansen
2024-03-07 17:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-03-11 13:16   ` Jürgen Groß
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 03/34] x86/pci: Assume that clflush size is always provided Dave Hansen
2024-03-08  8:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 04/34] x86/mm: Introduce physical address limit helper Dave Hansen
2024-02-27 11:05   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 05/34] x86/cpu: Move /proc per-cpu ->x86_phys_bits reference to global one Dave Hansen
2024-02-27 11:05   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 06/34] x86/boot: Use consistent value for iomem_resource.end Dave Hansen
2024-02-27 10:59   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28 14:22     ` Zhang, Rui
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 07/34] x86/mm: Introduce virtual address space limit helper Dave Hansen
2024-02-27 11:09   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 08/34] x86/cpu: Add CLFLUSH size helper Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 09/34] x86/cpu: Introduce address configuration structure Dave Hansen
2024-02-27 23:47   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28 17:29     ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 10/34] x86/cpu/amd: Use new "address configuration" infrastructure Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 11/34] x86/cpu/intel: Prepare MKTME for " Dave Hansen
2024-02-23 11:33   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-02-23 16:22     ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-26 12:14       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-02-27 21:48         ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28 15:20           ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-02-28 16:57             ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 12/34] x86/cpu/intel: Actually use "address configuration" infrastructure for MKTME Dave Hansen
2024-02-23 11:41   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-02-23 16:16     ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 13/34] x86/boot: Use address reduction config to handle erratum Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 14/34] x86/cpu: Remove default physical address space settings Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 15/34] x86/cpu: Remove default x86_phys_bits assignment Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 16/34] x86/cpu: Move physical address limit out of cpuinfo_x86 Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 17/34] x86/cpu: Move virtual " Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 18/34] x86/cpu/centaur: Move cache alignment override to BSP init Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 19/34] x86/cpu: Introduce cache alignment multiplier Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 20/34] x86/cpu: Remove superfluous cache alignment assignments Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 21/34] x86/cpu: Consolidate CLFLUSH size setting Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 22/34] x86/cpu: Move CLFLUSH size into global config Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 23/34] x86/cpu: Move cache alignment configuration to global struct Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 25/34] x86/cpu: Move cache bits to global config Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 26/34] x86/cpu: Zap superfluous get_cpu_address_sizes() Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 27/34] x86/cpu: Enforce read-only x86_config state (lightly) Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 28/34] x86/cpu: Return sane defaults for early x86_config reads Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 29/34] x86/xen: Remove extra get_cpu_address_sizes() call Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 30/34] x86/cpu/centaur: Mark BSP init function as __init Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 31/34] x86/cpu/intel: " Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 32/34] x86/cpu/amd: Move memory encryption detection Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 33/34] x86/cpu: Make get_cpu_address_sizes() static and __init Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 34/34] x86/cpu: Mark new boot CPU and config structures appropriately Dave Hansen

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