From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v3 18/29] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable=
Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2018 14:46:54 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <68e4e323-3216-7e77-2807-c3207126ae68@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180925001832.18322-19-keescook@chromium.org>
On 09/24/2018 05:18 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> This introduces the "lsm.enable=..." and "lsm.disable=..." boot parameters
> which each can contain a comma-separated list of LSMs to enable or
> disable, respectively. The string "all" matches all LSMs.
>
> This has very similar functionality to the existing per-LSM enable
> handling ("apparmor.enabled=...", etc), but provides a centralized
> place to perform the changes. These parameters take precedent over any
> LSM-specific boot parameters.
>
> Disabling an LSM means it will not be considered when performing
> initializations. Enabling an LSM means either undoing a previous
> LSM-specific boot parameter disabling or a undoing a default-disabled
> CONFIG setting.
>
> For example: "lsm.disable=apparmor apparmor.enabled=1" will result in
> AppArmor being disabled. "selinux.enabled=0 lsm.enable=selinux" will
> result in SELinux being enabled.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
I don't like this. It brings about conflicting kernel params that are
bound to confuse users. Its pretty easy for a user to understand that
when they specify a parameter manually at boot, that it overrides the
build time default. But conflicting kernel parameters are a lot harder
to deal with.
I prefer a plain enabled= list being an override of the default build
time value. Where conflicts with LSM-specific configs always result in
the LSM being disabled with a complaint about the conflict.
Though I have yet to be convinced its worth the cost, I do recognize
it is sometimes convenient to disable a single LSM, instead of typing
in a whole list of what to enable. If we have to have conflicting
kernel parameters I would prefer that the conflict throw up a warning
and leaving the LSM with the conflicting config disabled.
> ---
> .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 ++++++++++
> security/Kconfig | 4 +++-
> security/security.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index 32d323ee9218..67c90985d2b8 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -2276,6 +2276,18 @@
>
> lsm.debug [SECURITY] Enable LSM initialization debugging output.
>
> + lsm.disable=lsm1,...,lsmN
> + [SECURITY] Comma-separated list of LSMs to disable
> + at boot time. This overrides "lsm.enable=",
> + CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE, and any per-LSM CONFIGs and boot
> + parameters.
> +
> + lsm.enable=lsm1,...,lsmN
> + [SECURITY] Comma-separated list of LSMs to enable
> + at boot time. This overrides any omissions from
> + CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE, and any per-LSM CONFIGs and
> + boot parameters.
> +
> machvec= [IA-64] Force the use of a particular machine-vector
> (machvec) in a generic kernel.
> Example: machvec=hpzx1_swiotlb
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index 71306b046270..1a82a006cc62 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -282,7 +282,9 @@ config LSM_ENABLE
> help
> A comma-separate list of LSMs to enable by default at boot. The
> default is "all", to enable all LSM modules at boot. Any LSMs
> - not listed here will be disabled by default.
> + not listed here will be disabled by default. This can be
> + changed with the "lsm.enable=" and "lsm.disable=" boot
> + parameters.
>
> endmenu
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 7ecb9879a863..456a3f73bc36 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ char *lsm_names;
> /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
> static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
> CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
> +static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_enable;
> +static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_disable;
>
> static __initconst const char * const builtin_lsm_enable = CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE;
>
> @@ -185,6 +187,10 @@ static void __init prepare_lsm_enable(void)
> {
> /* Prepare defaults. */
> parse_lsm_enable(builtin_lsm_enable, default_enabled, true);
> +
> + /* Process "lsm.enable=" and "lsm.disable=", if given. */
> + parse_lsm_enable(chosen_lsm_enable, set_enabled, true);
> + parse_lsm_enable(chosen_lsm_disable, set_enabled, false);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -240,6 +246,22 @@ static int __init enable_debug(char *str)
> }
> __setup("lsm.debug", enable_debug);
>
> +/* Explicitly enable a list of LSMs. */
> +static int __init enable_lsm(char *str)
> +{
> + chosen_lsm_enable = str;
> + return 1;
> +}
> +__setup("lsm.enable=", enable_lsm);
> +
> +/* Explicitly disable a list of LSMs. */
> +static int __init disable_lsm(char *str)
> +{
> + chosen_lsm_disable = str;
> + return 1;
> +}
> +__setup("lsm.disable=", disable_lsm);
> +
> static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm)
> {
> const char *last;
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-01 21:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-25 0:18 [PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 01/29] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:53 ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:05 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 02/29] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:56 ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:05 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 03/29] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:57 ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:06 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 04/29] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-09-26 16:35 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-09-26 18:35 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-30 23:25 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-10-01 1:01 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:07 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 21:23 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-10-01 22:38 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 05/29] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:59 ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:08 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 06/29] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:10 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 07/29] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:12 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 08/29] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:13 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 09/29] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:14 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 10/29] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:14 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 11/29] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:15 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 12/29] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:17 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 22:03 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 13/29] LoadPin: Rename "enable" to "enforce" Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:17 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 14/29] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:18 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 21:47 ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 22:20 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 22:29 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 22:53 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 15/29] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:18 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 16/29] LSM: Prepare for arbitrary LSM enabling Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:22 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 17/29] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:34 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 18/29] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:46 ` John Johansen [this message]
2018-10-01 22:27 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 22:48 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 23:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 23:38 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 23:57 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 23:44 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 23:49 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 19/29] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:47 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 20/29] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 21/29] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 22/29] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 23/29] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 24/29] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 25/29] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 26/29] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 27/29] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 28/29] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 29/29] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-28 15:55 ` [PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Casey Schaufler
2018-09-28 20:01 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-28 20:25 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-28 20:33 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-28 20:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-29 10:48 ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-09-29 18:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-30 2:36 ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-09-30 16:57 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-29 18:19 ` John Johansen
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=68e4e323-3216-7e77-2807-c3207126ae68@canonical.com \
--to=john.johansen@canonical.com \
--cc=casey.schaufler@intel.com \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp \
--cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).