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From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering
Date: Fri, 28 Sep 2018 16:25:41 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <cb49b4c4-a379-7a8e-41a6-6e6a4afb6fe5@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKQVDW8Wp0ESv2raa0xJnHCCMNqFCzZ5jSVXQ=Dp7FF8A@mail.gmail.com>

On 09/28/2018 04:01 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 28, 2018 at 8:55 AM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> On 9/24/2018 5:18 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> v3:
>>> - add CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE and refactor resulting logic
>>
>> Kees, you can add my
>>
>>          Reviewed-by:Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>
>> for this entire patch set. Thank you for taking this on, it's
>> a significant and important chunk of the LSM infrastructure
>> update.
> 
> Thanks!
> 
> John, you'd looked at this a bit too -- do the results line up with
> your expectations?
> 
> Any thoughts from SELinux, TOMOYO, or IMA folks?

What's it relative to?  First patch fails for me on current security/next.

Is there a branch in your repo that has the v3 patches?

> 
> -Kees
> 
>>
>>
>>> ...
>>> Breakdown of patches:
>>>
>>> Infrastructure improvements (no logical changes):
>>>    LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization
>>>    vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section
>>>    LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info
>>>    LSM: Remove initcall tracing
>>>    LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info
>>>    vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA
>>>    LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM()
>>>    LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info
>>>    LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure
>>>    LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures
>>>
>>> Split "integrity" out into "ordered initialization" (no logical changes):
>>>    LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR
>>>    LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization
>>>
>>> Provide centralized LSM enable/disable infrastructure:
>>>    LoadPin: Rename "enable" to "enforce"
>>>    LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state
>>>    LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs
>>>    LSM: Prepare for arbitrary LSM enabling
>>>    LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE
>>>    LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable=
>>>    LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic
>>>    LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable
>>>
>>> Provide centralized LSM ordering infrastructure:
>>>    LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init
>>>    LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER
>>>    LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering
>>>
>>> Move minor LSMs into ordered LSM initialization:
>>>    LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM
>>>    Yama: Initialize as ordered LSM
>>>    LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order
>>>    capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST
>>>
>>> Move major LSMs into ordered LSM initialization:
>>>    LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM
>>>    LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization
>>>
>>> -Kees
>>>
>>>   .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |  20 +
>>>   arch/arc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S                 |   1 -
>>>   arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S             |   1 -
>>>   arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S               |   1 -
>>>   arch/h8300/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S               |   1 -
>>>   arch/microblaze/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S          |   2 -
>>>   arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S             |   2 -
>>>   arch/um/include/asm/common.lds.S              |   2 -
>>>   arch/xtensa/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S              |   1 -
>>>   include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h             |  25 +-
>>>   include/linux/init.h                          |   2 -
>>>   include/linux/lsm_hooks.h                     |  43 ++-
>>>   include/linux/module.h                        |   1 -
>>>   security/Kconfig                              |  61 ++-
>>>   security/apparmor/lsm.c                       |  16 +-
>>>   security/commoncap.c                          |   8 +-
>>>   security/integrity/iint.c                     |   5 +-
>>>   security/loadpin/Kconfig                      |   4 +-
>>>   security/loadpin/loadpin.c                    |  28 +-
>>>   security/security.c                           | 351 +++++++++++++++---
>>>   security/selinux/hooks.c                      |  16 +-
>>>   security/smack/smack_lsm.c                    |   8 +-
>>>   security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c                      |   7 +-
>>>   security/yama/yama_lsm.c                      |   7 +-
>>>   24 files changed, 438 insertions(+), 175 deletions(-)
>>>
>>
> 
> 
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2018-09-28 20:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-09-25  0:18 [PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 01/29] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:53   ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:05   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 02/29] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:56   ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:05   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 03/29] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:57   ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:06   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 04/29] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-09-26 16:35   ` Steven Rostedt
2018-09-26 18:35     ` Kees Cook
2018-09-30 23:25       ` Steven Rostedt
2018-10-01  1:01         ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:07   ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 21:23     ` Steven Rostedt
2018-10-01 22:38       ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 05/29] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:59   ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:08   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 06/29] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:10   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 07/29] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:12   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 08/29] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:13   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 09/29] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:14   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 10/29] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:14   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 11/29] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:15   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 12/29] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:17   ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 22:03     ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 13/29] LoadPin: Rename "enable" to "enforce" Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:17   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 14/29] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:18   ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 21:47   ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:56     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 22:20       ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 22:29         ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 22:53           ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 15/29] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:18   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 16/29] LSM: Prepare for arbitrary LSM enabling Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:22   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 17/29] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:34   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 18/29] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:46   ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 22:27     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 22:48       ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 23:30         ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 23:38           ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 23:57             ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 23:44           ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 23:49             ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 19/29] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:47   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 20/29] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 21/29] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 22/29] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 23/29] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 24/29] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 25/29] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 26/29] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 27/29] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 28/29] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 29/29] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-28 15:55 ` [PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Casey Schaufler
2018-09-28 20:01   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-28 20:25     ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2018-09-28 20:33       ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-28 20:54         ` Kees Cook
2018-09-29 10:48     ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-09-29 18:18       ` Kees Cook
2018-09-30  2:36         ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-09-30 16:57           ` Kees Cook
2018-09-29 18:19       ` John Johansen

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