From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v3 14/29] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state
Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2018 14:56:43 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJKvb=3vu3_b-NNdr_=KwvgO9qa96Qo5qzSZuiy2=+Oig@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1810020747380.20364@namei.org>
On Mon, Oct 1, 2018 at 2:47 PM, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> wrote:
> On Mon, 24 Sep 2018, Kees Cook wrote:
>
>> In preparation for lifting the "is this LSM enabled?" logic out of the
>> individual LSMs, pass in any special enabled state tracking (as needed
>> for SELinux, AppArmor, and LoadPin). This should be an "int" to include
>> handling any future cases where "enabled" is exposed via sysctl which
>> has no "bool" type.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> ---
>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
>> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 5 +++--
>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 +
>> 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> index 5056f7374b3d..2a41e8e6f6e5 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> @@ -2044,6 +2044,7 @@ extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
>> struct lsm_info {
>> const char *name; /* Populated automatically. */
>> unsigned long flags; /* Optional: flags describing LSM */
>> + int *enabled; /* Optional: NULL means enabled. */
>
> This seems potentially confusing.
>
> Perhaps initialize 'enabled' to a default int pointer, like:
>
> static int lsm_default_enabled = 1;
>
> Then,
>
> DEFINE_LSM(foobar)
> flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
> .enabled = &lsm_default_enabled,
> .init = foobar_init,
> END_LSM;
The reason I didn't do this is because there are only two LSMs that
expose this "enabled" variable, so I didn't like making the other LSMs
have to declare this. Internally, though, this is exactly what the
infrastructure does: if it finds a NULL, it aims it at
&lsm_default_enabled (in a later patch).
However, it seems more discussion is needed on the "enable" bit of
this, so I'll reply to John in a moment...
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-01 21:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-25 0:18 [PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 01/29] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:53 ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:05 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 02/29] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:56 ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:05 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 03/29] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:57 ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:06 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 04/29] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-09-26 16:35 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-09-26 18:35 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-30 23:25 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-10-01 1:01 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:07 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 21:23 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-10-01 22:38 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 05/29] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:59 ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:08 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 06/29] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:10 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 07/29] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:12 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 08/29] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:13 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 09/29] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:14 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 10/29] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:14 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 11/29] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:15 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 12/29] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:17 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 22:03 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 13/29] LoadPin: Rename "enable" to "enforce" Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:17 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 14/29] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:18 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 21:47 ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:56 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-10-01 22:20 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 22:29 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 22:53 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 15/29] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:18 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 16/29] LSM: Prepare for arbitrary LSM enabling Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:22 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 17/29] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:34 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 18/29] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:46 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 22:27 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 22:48 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 23:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 23:38 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 23:57 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 23:44 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 23:49 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 19/29] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:47 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 20/29] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 21/29] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 22/29] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 23/29] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 24/29] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 25/29] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 26/29] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 27/29] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 28/29] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 29/29] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-28 15:55 ` [PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Casey Schaufler
2018-09-28 20:01 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-28 20:25 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-28 20:33 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-28 20:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-29 10:48 ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-09-29 18:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-30 2:36 ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-09-30 16:57 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-29 18:19 ` John Johansen
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