From: Markus Gutschke <markus@chromium.org>
To: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
davem@davemloft.net, hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com,
oleg@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
scarybeasts@gmail.com, pmoore@redhat.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net,
eric.dumazet@gmail.com, coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
keescook@chromium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 06/12] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2012 09:47:59 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAE6n16kLOOrAV6_7_t_-PnfYoNsJ5yJfHveWykO7qQiFYKb3nQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABqD9haZpe-i8kyHJDj4umCLyZ3E877aobabvW8_+aXeC+kTbg@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Feb 28, 2012 at 09:17, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 28, 2012 at 12:51 AM, Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu> wrote:
>> Wouldn't it make more sense to always kill with SIGSYS, also for mode 1?
>> I suppose it's too late for that now.
>
> It would but I don't want to go and change existing ABI.
Just for the record, when this discussion came up about two years ago,
it was established that other than Chrome, there are currently no
users of Seccomp, as mode 1 is just too difficult to use for most
potential applications.
Chrome doesn't rely on the exit status of a process that violated the
seccomp restrictions, so it is highly unlikely you would break
existing userspace, if you changed the ABI. On the other hand, as mode
2 is so much more powerful than mode 1, it is unlikely that we will
see future userspace applications make use of mode 1.
In other words, changing the ABI is unlikely to cause harm, but also
unlikely to do any good. I don't have any strong opinion either way;
just providing an additional data point.
Markus
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-02-28 17:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-02-25 3:21 [PATCH v11 01/12] sk_run_filter: add support for custom load_pointer Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 02/12] net/compat.c,linux/filter.h: share compat_sock_fprog Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 03/12] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 04/12] asm/syscall.h: add syscall_get_arch Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 05/12] arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 06/12] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-02-26 20:28 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 16:23 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-27 16:49 ` Eric Paris
2012-02-27 18:55 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 19:25 ` Eric Paris
2012-02-27 20:00 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 20:34 ` Eric Paris
2012-02-27 20:49 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 17:09 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 19:54 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-27 20:15 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-28 15:13 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-28 17:18 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-28 6:51 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-28 7:52 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-28 17:17 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-28 17:47 ` Markus Gutschke [this message]
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 07/12] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO Will Drewry
2012-02-25 20:20 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 16:22 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-27 17:11 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 18:09 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 18:14 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 18:35 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-02-27 19:14 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 19:54 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 08/12] signal, x86: add SIGSYS info and make it synchronous Will Drewry
2012-02-27 17:22 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 17:34 ` Roland McGrath
2012-02-27 18:08 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 20:24 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-28 16:02 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-28 17:06 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 09/12] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 10/12] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support Will Drewry
2012-02-27 17:54 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 19:47 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-28 16:43 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-28 17:04 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-28 18:34 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-29 16:14 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-29 16:33 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-29 17:09 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-29 17:41 ` Roland McGrath
2012-02-29 17:51 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 11/12] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 12/12] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
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