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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	davem@davemloft.net, hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com,
	oleg@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
	mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
	eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
	scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net,
	eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
	coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 07/12] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO
Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2012 12:20:13 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLVwYev3EmLOKuEdyaqieGzWgVpFcgodnUbUkbMbiJVqQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1330140111-17201-7-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org>

On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 7:21 PM, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> wrote:
> This change adds the SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO as a valid return value from a
> seccomp filter.  Additionally, it makes the first use of the lower
> 16-bits for storing a filter-supplied errno.  16-bits is more than
> enough for the errno-base.h calls.
>
> Returning errors instead of immediately terminating processes that
> violate seccomp policy allow for broader use of this functionality
> for kernel attack surface reduction.  For example, a linux container
> could maintain a whitelist of pre-existing system calls but drop
> all new ones with errnos.  This would keep a logically static attack
> surface while providing errnos that may allow for graceful failure
> without the downside of do_exit() on a bad call.
>
> v11: - check for NULL filter (keescook@chromium.org)
> v10: - change loaders to fn
>  v9: - n/a
>  v8: - update Kconfig to note new need for syscall_set_return_value.
>     - reordered such that TRAP behavior follows on later.
>     - made the for loop a little less indent-y
>  v7: - introduced
>
> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

> +       /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
> +       if (unlikely(current->seccomp.filter == NULL))
> +               ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;

Any reason to not just immediately return in this case?

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
ChromeOS Security

  reply	other threads:[~2012-02-25 20:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-02-25  3:21 [PATCH v11 01/12] sk_run_filter: add support for custom load_pointer Will Drewry
2012-02-25  3:21 ` [PATCH v11 02/12] net/compat.c,linux/filter.h: share compat_sock_fprog Will Drewry
2012-02-25  3:21 ` [PATCH v11 03/12] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Will Drewry
2012-02-25  3:21 ` [PATCH v11 04/12] asm/syscall.h: add syscall_get_arch Will Drewry
2012-02-25  3:21 ` [PATCH v11 05/12] arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h Will Drewry
2012-02-25  3:21 ` [PATCH v11 06/12] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-02-26 20:28   ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 16:23     ` Will Drewry
2012-02-27 16:49       ` Eric Paris
2012-02-27 18:55         ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 19:25           ` Eric Paris
2012-02-27 20:00             ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 20:34               ` Eric Paris
2012-02-27 20:49                 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 17:09   ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 19:54     ` Will Drewry
2012-02-27 20:15       ` Kees Cook
2012-02-28 15:13       ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-28 17:18         ` Will Drewry
2012-02-28  6:51   ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-28  7:52     ` Kees Cook
2012-02-28 17:17     ` Will Drewry
2012-02-28 17:47       ` Markus Gutschke
2012-02-25  3:21 ` [PATCH v11 07/12] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO Will Drewry
2012-02-25 20:20   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2012-02-27 16:22     ` Will Drewry
2012-02-27 17:11   ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 18:09     ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 18:14       ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 18:35         ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-02-27 19:14           ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 19:54             ` Will Drewry
2012-02-25  3:21 ` [PATCH v11 08/12] signal, x86: add SIGSYS info and make it synchronous Will Drewry
2012-02-27 17:22   ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 17:34     ` Roland McGrath
2012-02-27 18:08       ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 20:24     ` Will Drewry
2012-02-28 16:02       ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-28 17:06         ` Will Drewry
2012-02-25  3:21 ` [PATCH v11 09/12] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP Will Drewry
2012-02-25  3:21 ` [PATCH v11 10/12] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support Will Drewry
2012-02-27 17:54   ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 19:47     ` Will Drewry
2012-02-28 16:43       ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-28 17:04         ` Will Drewry
2012-02-28 18:34           ` Will Drewry
2012-02-29 16:14             ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-29 16:33               ` Will Drewry
2012-02-29 17:09                 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-29 17:41                   ` Roland McGrath
2012-02-29 17:51                     ` Will Drewry
2012-02-25  3:21 ` [PATCH v11 11/12] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Will Drewry
2012-02-25  3:21 ` [PATCH v11 12/12] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry

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