From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
davem@davemloft.net, hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com,
peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net,
eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 07/12] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2012 10:09:38 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJQhfSSwTU5fSGR_Q57LAQBFW25A_FtR2GFsxyT_ibnzQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20120227171132.GB10608@redhat.com>
On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 9:11 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote:
> On 02/24, Will Drewry wrote:
>>
>> static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
>> {
>> struct seccomp_filter *f;
>> - u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
>> static const struct bpf_load_fn fns = {
>> bpf_load,
>> sizeof(struct seccomp_data),
>> };
>> + u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
>> const void *sc_ptr = (const void *)(uintptr_t)syscall;
>>
>> + /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
>> + if (unlikely(current->seccomp.filter == NULL))
>> + ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
>
> Is "seccomp.filter == NULL" really possible?
It should not be, but I'm much more comfortable with this failing
closed. I think it's important to be as defensive as possible with
this code given its intended use.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
ChromeOS Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-02-27 18:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-02-25 3:21 [PATCH v11 01/12] sk_run_filter: add support for custom load_pointer Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 02/12] net/compat.c,linux/filter.h: share compat_sock_fprog Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 03/12] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 04/12] asm/syscall.h: add syscall_get_arch Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 05/12] arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 06/12] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-02-26 20:28 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 16:23 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-27 16:49 ` Eric Paris
2012-02-27 18:55 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 19:25 ` Eric Paris
2012-02-27 20:00 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 20:34 ` Eric Paris
2012-02-27 20:49 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 17:09 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 19:54 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-27 20:15 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-28 15:13 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-28 17:18 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-28 6:51 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-28 7:52 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-28 17:17 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-28 17:47 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 07/12] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO Will Drewry
2012-02-25 20:20 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 16:22 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-27 17:11 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 18:09 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2012-02-27 18:14 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 18:35 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-02-27 19:14 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-27 19:54 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 08/12] signal, x86: add SIGSYS info and make it synchronous Will Drewry
2012-02-27 17:22 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 17:34 ` Roland McGrath
2012-02-27 18:08 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 20:24 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-28 16:02 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-28 17:06 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 09/12] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 10/12] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support Will Drewry
2012-02-27 17:54 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-27 19:47 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-28 16:43 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-28 17:04 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-28 18:34 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-29 16:14 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-29 16:33 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-29 17:09 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-29 17:41 ` Roland McGrath
2012-02-29 17:51 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 11/12] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Will Drewry
2012-02-25 3:21 ` [PATCH v11 12/12] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
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