linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
To: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: lizefan@huawei.com, mingo@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org,
	richard@nod.at, "Frédéric Weisbecker" <fweisbec@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 4/4] cgroups: implement the PIDs subsystem
Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2015 10:43:12 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAOviyagHJhxD8E+CeEdy399ARPaNyyiSJSJjByK=5ALN5jxbJw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150422162954.GF10738@htj.duckdns.org>

Hi Tejun,

>> +     rcu_read_lock();
>> +     css = task_css(current, pids_cgrp_id);
>> +     if (!css_tryget_online(css)) {
>> +             retval = -EBUSY;
>> +             goto err_rcu_unlock;
>> +     }
>> +     rcu_read_unlock();
>
> Hmmm... so, the above is guaranteed to succeed in finite amount of
> time (the race window is actually very narrow) and it'd be silly to
> fail fork because a task was being moved across cgroups.
>
> I think it'd be a good idea to implement task_get_css() which loops
> and returns the current css for the requested subsystem with reference
> count bumped and it can use css_tryget() too.  Holding a ref doesn't
> prevent css from dying anyway, so it doesn't make any difference.

Hmmm, okay. I'll work on this later.

>> +     rcu_read_lock();
>> +     css = task_css(task, pids_cgrp_id);
>> +     css_get(css);
>
> Why is this safe?  What guarantees that css's ref isn't already zero
> at this point?

Because it's already been exposed by pids_fork, so the current css_set
(which contains the current css)'s ref has been bumped. There isn't a
guarantee that there is a ref to css, but there is a guarantee the
css_set it is in has a ref. The problem with using tryget is that we
can't fail here.

>> +static ssize_t pids_max_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, char *buf,
>> +                           size_t nbytes, loff_t off)
>> +{
>> +     struct cgroup_subsys_state *css = of_css(of);
>> +     struct pids_cgroup *pids = css_pids(css);
>> +     int64_t limit;
>> +     int err;
>> +
>> +     buf = strstrip(buf);
>> +     if (!strcmp(buf, PIDS_MAX_STR)) {
>> +             limit = PIDS_MAX;
>> +             goto set_limit;
>> +     }
>> +
>> +     err = kstrtoll(buf, 0, &limit);
>> +     if (err)
>> +             return err;
>> +
>> +     /* We use INT_MAX as the maximum value of pid_t. */
>> +     if (limit < 0 || limit > INT_MAX)
>
> This is kinda weird if we're using PIDS_MAX for max as it may end up
> showing "max" after some larger number is written to the file.

The reason for this is because I believe you said "PIDS_MAX isn't
meant to be exposed to userspace" (one of the previous patchsets used
PIDS_MAX as the maximum valid value).

--
Aleksa Sarai (cyphar)
www.cyphar.com

  reply	other threads:[~2015-04-23  0:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-04-19 12:22 [PATCH v10 0/4] cgroups: add pids subsystem Aleksa Sarai
2015-04-19 12:22 ` [PATCH v10 1/4] cgroups: use bitmask to filter for_each_subsys Aleksa Sarai
2015-04-22 15:25   ` Tejun Heo
2015-04-22 15:42     ` Peter Zijlstra
2015-04-22 16:02       ` Tejun Heo
2015-04-26 16:05         ` Aleksa Sarai
2015-04-26 16:09           ` Tejun Heo
2015-05-13  5:44             ` Aleksa Sarai
2015-05-13 13:50               ` Tejun Heo
2015-04-22 15:30   ` Tejun Heo
2015-04-19 12:22 ` [PATCH v10 2/4] cgroups: replace explicit ss_mask checking with for_each_subsys_which Aleksa Sarai
2015-04-22 15:31   ` Tejun Heo
2015-04-19 12:22 ` [PATCH v10 3/4] cgroups: allow a cgroup subsystem to reject a fork Aleksa Sarai
2015-04-22 15:54   ` Tejun Heo
2015-04-24 13:59     ` Aleksa Sarai
2015-04-24 15:48       ` Tejun Heo
2015-05-14 10:57     ` Aleksa Sarai
2015-05-14 15:08       ` Tejun Heo
2015-04-19 12:22 ` [PATCH v10 4/4] cgroups: implement the PIDs subsystem Aleksa Sarai
2015-04-22 16:29   ` Tejun Heo
2015-04-23  0:43     ` Aleksa Sarai [this message]
2015-04-24 15:36       ` Tejun Heo
2015-05-13 17:04         ` Aleksa Sarai
2015-05-13 17:29           ` Tejun Heo
2015-05-13 17:44             ` Aleksa Sarai
2015-05-13 17:47               ` Tejun Heo
2015-05-16  3:59                 ` Aleksa Sarai
2015-05-18  1:24                   ` Tejun Heo
2015-04-24 14:24     ` Aleksa Sarai
2015-04-24 14:07 Aleksa Sarai
2015-04-24 15:26 ` Tejun Heo

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to='CAOviyagHJhxD8E+CeEdy399ARPaNyyiSJSJjByK=5ALN5jxbJw@mail.gmail.com' \
    --to=cyphar@cyphar.com \
    --cc=cgroups@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=fweisbec@gmail.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=lizefan@huawei.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=richard@nod.at \
    --cc=tj@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).