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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Cc: a.fatoum@pengutronix.de, Jason@zx2c4.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
	zohar@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, sumit.garg@linaro.org,
	david@sigma-star.at, michael@walle.cc, john.ernberg@actia.se,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
	davem@davemloft.net, j.luebbe@pengutronix.de,
	ebiggers@kernel.org, richard@nod.at, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, sahil.malhotra@nxp.com,
	kshitiz.varshney@nxp.com, horia.geanta@nxp.com, V.Sethi@nxp.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH HBK: 0/8] HW BOUND KEY as TRUSTED KEY
Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2022 11:58:17 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YxcLqepquOuOOjvq@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220906065157.10662-1-pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>

On Tue, Sep 06, 2022 at 12:21:49PM +0530, Pankaj Gupta wrote:
> Hardware Bound key(HBK), is never acessible as plain key outside of the
                                    ~~~~~~~~~
                                    accesible.

> hardware boundary. Thus, it is un-usable, even if somehow fetched
> from kernel memory. It ensures run-time security.

Why is it called "HBK" here and "hw" in the context of keyctl?

> This patchset adds generic support for classing the Hardware Bound Key,
> based on:
> 
> - Newly added flag-'is_hbk', added to the tfm.
> 
>   Consumer of the kernel crypto api, after allocating
>   the transformation, sets this flag based on the basis
>   of the type of key consumer has.
> 
> - This helps to influence the core processing logic
>   for the encapsulated algorithm.
> 
> - This flag is set by the consumer after allocating
>   the tfm and before calling the function crypto_xxx_setkey().
> 
> First implementation is based on CAAM.

CAAM is implementation of what exactly?

I'm sorry but I don't know your definition of unusable.

BR, Jarkko

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-09-06  8:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-09-06  6:51 [RFC PATCH HBK: 0/8] HW BOUND KEY as TRUSTED KEY Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06  6:51 ` [RFC PATCH HBK: 1/8] keys-trusted: new cmd line option added Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06 13:01   ` Ben Boeckel
2022-09-07  7:22     ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06  6:51 ` [RFC PATCH HBK: 2/8] hw-bound-key: flag-is_hbk added to the tfm Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06  6:43   ` Herbert Xu
2022-09-07  7:22     ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-07  7:26       ` Herbert Xu
2022-09-07  9:58         ` Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-07 10:10           ` Herbert Xu
2022-09-12 17:19             ` Varun Sethi
2022-09-13  2:05               ` Herbert Xu
2022-09-13 10:01                 ` Varun Sethi
2022-09-13 10:28                   ` Herbert Xu
2022-09-21 11:07                     ` Varun Sethi
2022-09-06  6:51 ` [RFC PATCH HBK: 3/8] sk_cipher: checking for hw bound operation Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06  6:51 ` [RFC PATCH HBK: 4/8] keys-trusted: re-factored caam based trusted key Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06  6:51 ` [RFC PATCH HBK: 5/8] caam blob-gen: moving blob_priv to caam_drv_private Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06  6:51 ` [RFC PATCH HBK: 6/8] KEYS: trusted: caam based black key Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06 13:03   ` Ben Boeckel
2022-09-07  7:22     ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06  6:51 ` [RFC PATCH HBK: 7/8] caam alg: symmetric key ciphers are updated Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06  6:51 ` [RFC PATCH HBK: 8/8] dm-crypt: consumer-app setting the flag-is_hbk Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06  7:12 ` [RFC PATCH HBK: 0/8] HW BOUND KEY as TRUSTED KEY Michael Walle
2022-09-07  7:22   ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-07  7:29     ` Michael Walle
2022-09-07  7:46       ` [EXT] " David Gstir
2022-09-07  8:11         ` Michael Walle
2022-09-07  9:57           ` Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06  8:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2022-09-07  7:22   ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-07  8:10     ` Jan Lübbe
2022-09-07  9:57       ` Pankaj Gupta
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2022-09-05 14:36 Pankaj Gupta

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