[PATCHv6 00/16] x86/tdx: Add kexec support

[PATCHv6 00/16] x86/tdx: Add kexec support

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

The patchset adds bits and pieces to get kexec (and crashkernel) work on
TDX guest.

The last patch implements CPU offlining according to the approved ACPI
spec change poposal[1]. It unlocks kexec with all CPUs visible in the target
kernel. It requires BIOS-side enabling. If it missing we fallback to booting
2nd kernel with single CPU.

Please review. I would be glad for any feedback.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/13356251.uLZWGnKmhe@kreacher

v6:
  - Rebased to v6.8-rc1;
  - Provide default noop callbacks from .enc_kexec_stop_conversion and
    .enc_kexec_unshare_mem;
  - Split off patch that introduces .enc_kexec_* callbacks;
  - asm_acpi_mp_play_dead(): program CR3 directly from RSI, no MOV to RAX
    required;
  - Restructure how smp_ops.stop_this_cpu() hooked up in crash_nmi_callback();
  - kvmclock patch got merged via KVM tree;
v5:
  - Rename smp_ops.crash_play_dead to smp_ops.stop_this_cpu and use it in
    stop_this_cpu();
  - Split off enc_kexec_stop_conversion() from enc_kexec_unshare_mem();
  - Introduce kernel_ident_mapping_free();
  - Add explicit include for alternatives and stringify.
  - Add barrier() after setting conversion_allowed to false;
  - Mark cpu_hotplug_offline_disabled __ro_after_init;
  - Print error if failed to hand over CPU to BIOS;
  - Update comments and commit messages;
v4:
  - Fix build for !KEXEC_CORE;
  - Cleaner ATLERNATIVE use;
  - Update commit messages and comments;
  - Add Reviewed-bys;
v3:
  - Rework acpi_mp_crash_stop_other_cpus() to avoid invoking hotplug state
    machine;
  - Free page tables if reset vector setup failed;
  - Change asm_acpi_mp_play_dead() to pass reset vector and PGD as arguments;
  - Mark acpi_mp_* variables as static and __ro_after_init;
  - Use u32 for apicid;
  - Disable CPU offlining if reset vector setup failed;
  - Rename madt.S -> madt_playdead.S;
  - Mark tdx_kexec_unshare_mem() as static;
  - Rebase onto up-to-date tip/master;
  - Whitespace fixes;
  - Reorder patches;
  - Add Reviewed-bys;
  - Update comments and commit messages;
v2:
  - Rework how unsharing hook ups into kexec codepath;
  - Rework kvmclock_disable() fix based on Sean's;
  - s/cpu_hotplug_not_supported()/cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining()/;
  - use play_dead_common() to implement acpi_mp_play_dead();
  - cond_resched() in tdx_shared_memory_show();
  - s/target kernel/second kernel/;
  - Update commit messages and comments;

Kirill A. Shutemov (16):
  x86/acpi: Extract ACPI MADT wakeup code into a separate file
  x86/apic: Mark acpi_mp_wake_* variables as __ro_after_init
  cpu/hotplug: Add support for declaring CPU offlining not supported
  cpu/hotplug, x86/acpi: Disable CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup
  x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest
  x86/mm: Make x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_*() return errno
  x86/mm: Return correct level from lookup_address() if pte is none
  x86/tdx: Account shared memory
  x86/mm: Adding callbacks to prepare encrypted memory for kexec
  x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec
  x86/mm: Make e820_end_ram_pfn() cover E820_TYPE_ACPI ranges
  x86/acpi: Rename fields in acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup structure
  x86/acpi: Do not attempt to bring up secondary CPUs in kexec case
  x86/smp: Add smp_ops.stop_this_cpu() callback
  x86/mm: Introduce kernel_ident_mapping_free()
  x86/acpi: Add support for CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup method

 arch/x86/Kconfig                     |   7 +
 arch/x86/coco/core.c                 |   1 -
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c              | 209 ++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c                |   9 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h          |   7 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/init.h          |   3 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h           |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h      |   6 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile        |  11 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c          |  86 +-------
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.S |  28 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c   | 292 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/crash.c              |   5 +
 arch/x86/kernel/e820.c               |   9 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c            |   7 +
 arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c             |  18 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S |   5 +
 arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c           |   8 +-
 arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c              |  73 +++++++
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c        |   8 +-
 arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c         |  17 +-
 include/acpi/actbl2.h                |  19 +-
 include/linux/cc_platform.h          |  10 -
 include/linux/cpu.h                  |   2 +
 kernel/cpu.c                         |  12 +-
 26 files changed, 714 insertions(+), 140 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.S
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c

-- 
2.43.0

[PATCHv6 01/16] x86/acpi: Extract ACPI MADT wakeup code into a separate file

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

In order to prepare for the expansion of support for the ACPI MADT
wakeup method, move the relevant code into a separate file.

Introduce a new configuration option to clearly indicate dependencies
without the use of ifdefs.

There have been no functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                   |  7 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h        |  5 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile      | 11 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c        | 86 +-----------------------------
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 5edec175b9bf..1c1c06f6c0f1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1108,6 +1108,13 @@ config X86_LOCAL_APIC
 	depends on X86_64 || SMP || X86_32_NON_STANDARD || X86_UP_APIC || PCI_MSI
 	select IRQ_DOMAIN_HIERARCHY
 
+config X86_ACPI_MADT_WAKEUP
+	def_bool y
+	depends on X86_64
+	depends on ACPI
+	depends on SMP
+	depends on X86_LOCAL_APIC
+
 config X86_IO_APIC
 	def_bool y
 	depends on X86_LOCAL_APIC || X86_UP_IOAPIC
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
index f896eed4516c..2625b915ae7f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
@@ -76,6 +76,11 @@ static inline bool acpi_skip_set_wakeup_address(void)
 
 #define acpi_skip_set_wakeup_address acpi_skip_set_wakeup_address
 
+union acpi_subtable_headers;
+
+int __init acpi_parse_mp_wake(union acpi_subtable_headers *header,
+			      const unsigned long end);
+
 /*
  * Check if the CPU can handle C2 and deeper
  */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile
index fc17b3f136fe..8c7329c88a75 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile
@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 
-obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI)		+= boot.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_SLEEP)	+= sleep.o wakeup_$(BITS).o
-obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_APEI)		+= apei.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_CPPC_LIB)	+= cppc.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI)			+= boot.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_SLEEP)		+= sleep.o wakeup_$(BITS).o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_APEI)			+= apei.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_CPPC_LIB)		+= cppc.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_ACPI_MADT_WAKEUP)	+= madt_wakeup.o
 
 ifneq ($(CONFIG_ACPI_PROCESSOR),)
-obj-y				+= cstate.o
+obj-y					+= cstate.o
 endif
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
index 85a3ce2a3666..df3384dc42c7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
@@ -67,13 +67,6 @@ static bool has_lapic_cpus __initdata;
 static bool acpi_support_online_capable;
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-/* Physical address of the Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure mailbox */
-static u64 acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr;
-/* Virtual address of the Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure mailbox */
-static struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup_mailbox *acpi_mp_wake_mailbox;
-#endif
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC
 /*
  * Locks related to IOAPIC hotplug
@@ -370,60 +363,6 @@ acpi_parse_lapic_nmi(union acpi_subtable_headers * header, const unsigned long e
 
 	return 0;
 }
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-static int acpi_wakeup_cpu(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_ip)
-{
-	/*
-	 * Remap mailbox memory only for the first call to acpi_wakeup_cpu().
-	 *
-	 * Wakeup of secondary CPUs is fully serialized in the core code.
-	 * No need to protect acpi_mp_wake_mailbox from concurrent accesses.
-	 */
-	if (!acpi_mp_wake_mailbox) {
-		acpi_mp_wake_mailbox = memremap(acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr,
-						sizeof(*acpi_mp_wake_mailbox),
-						MEMREMAP_WB);
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Mailbox memory is shared between the firmware and OS. Firmware will
-	 * listen on mailbox command address, and once it receives the wakeup
-	 * command, the CPU associated with the given apicid will be booted.
-	 *
-	 * The value of 'apic_id' and 'wakeup_vector' must be visible to the
-	 * firmware before the wakeup command is visible.  smp_store_release()
-	 * ensures ordering and visibility.
-	 */
-	acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->apic_id	    = apicid;
-	acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->wakeup_vector = start_ip;
-	smp_store_release(&acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->command,
-			  ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_WAKEUP);
-
-	/*
-	 * Wait for the CPU to wake up.
-	 *
-	 * The CPU being woken up is essentially in a spin loop waiting to be
-	 * woken up. It should not take long for it wake up and acknowledge by
-	 * zeroing out ->command.
-	 *
-	 * ACPI specification doesn't provide any guidance on how long kernel
-	 * has to wait for a wake up acknowledgement. It also doesn't provide
-	 * a way to cancel a wake up request if it takes too long.
-	 *
-	 * In TDX environment, the VMM has control over how long it takes to
-	 * wake up secondary. It can postpone scheduling secondary vCPU
-	 * indefinitely. Giving up on wake up request and reporting error opens
-	 * possible attack vector for VMM: it can wake up a secondary CPU when
-	 * kernel doesn't expect it. Wait until positive result of the wake up
-	 * request.
-	 */
-	while (READ_ONCE(acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->command))
-		cpu_relax();
-
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC
@@ -1159,29 +1098,6 @@ static int __init acpi_parse_madt_lapic_entries(void)
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-static int __init acpi_parse_mp_wake(union acpi_subtable_headers *header,
-				     const unsigned long end)
-{
-	struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup *mp_wake;
-
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP))
-		return -ENODEV;
-
-	mp_wake = (struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup *)header;
-	if (BAD_MADT_ENTRY(mp_wake, end))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	acpi_table_print_madt_entry(&header->common);
-
-	acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr = mp_wake->base_address;
-
-	apic_update_callback(wakeup_secondary_cpu_64, acpi_wakeup_cpu);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif				/* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 #endif				/* CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC */
 
 #ifdef	CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC
@@ -1378,7 +1294,7 @@ static void __init acpi_process_madt(void)
 				smp_found_config = 1;
 			}
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ACPI_MADT_WAKEUP
 			/*
 			 * Parse MADT MP Wake entry.
 			 */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7f164d38bd0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+#include <linux/acpi.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/barrier.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+
+/* Physical address of the Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure mailbox */
+static u64 acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr;
+
+/* Virtual address of the Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure mailbox */
+static struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup_mailbox *acpi_mp_wake_mailbox;
+
+static int acpi_wakeup_cpu(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_ip)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Remap mailbox memory only for the first call to acpi_wakeup_cpu().
+	 *
+	 * Wakeup of secondary CPUs is fully serialized in the core code.
+	 * No need to protect acpi_mp_wake_mailbox from concurrent accesses.
+	 */
+	if (!acpi_mp_wake_mailbox) {
+		acpi_mp_wake_mailbox = memremap(acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr,
+						sizeof(*acpi_mp_wake_mailbox),
+						MEMREMAP_WB);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Mailbox memory is shared between the firmware and OS. Firmware will
+	 * listen on mailbox command address, and once it receives the wakeup
+	 * command, the CPU associated with the given apicid will be booted.
+	 *
+	 * The value of 'apic_id' and 'wakeup_vector' must be visible to the
+	 * firmware before the wakeup command is visible.  smp_store_release()
+	 * ensures ordering and visibility.
+	 */
+	acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->apic_id	    = apicid;
+	acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->wakeup_vector = start_ip;
+	smp_store_release(&acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->command,
+			  ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_WAKEUP);
+
+	/*
+	 * Wait for the CPU to wake up.
+	 *
+	 * The CPU being woken up is essentially in a spin loop waiting to be
+	 * woken up. It should not take long for it wake up and acknowledge by
+	 * zeroing out ->command.
+	 *
+	 * ACPI specification doesn't provide any guidance on how long kernel
+	 * has to wait for a wake up acknowledgment. It also doesn't provide
+	 * a way to cancel a wake up request if it takes too long.
+	 *
+	 * In TDX environment, the VMM has control over how long it takes to
+	 * wake up secondary. It can postpone scheduling secondary vCPU
+	 * indefinitely. Giving up on wake up request and reporting error opens
+	 * possible attack vector for VMM: it can wake up a secondary CPU when
+	 * kernel doesn't expect it. Wait until positive result of the wake up
+	 * request.
+	 */
+	while (READ_ONCE(acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->command))
+		cpu_relax();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int __init acpi_parse_mp_wake(union acpi_subtable_headers *header,
+			      const unsigned long end)
+{
+	struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup *mp_wake;
+
+	mp_wake = (struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup *)header;
+	if (BAD_MADT_ENTRY(mp_wake, end))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	acpi_table_print_madt_entry(&header->common);
+
+	acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr = mp_wake->base_address;
+
+	apic_update_callback(wakeup_secondary_cpu_64, acpi_wakeup_cpu);
+
+	return 0;
+}
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCHv6 02/16] x86/apic: Mark acpi_mp_wake_* variables as __ro_after_init

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr and acpi_mp_wake_mailbox initialized once
during ACPI MADT init and never changed.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
index 7f164d38bd0b..cf79ea6f3007 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 
 /* Physical address of the Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure mailbox */
-static u64 acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr;
+static u64 acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr __ro_after_init;
 
 /* Virtual address of the Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure mailbox */
-static struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup_mailbox *acpi_mp_wake_mailbox;
+static struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup_mailbox *acpi_mp_wake_mailbox __ro_after_init;
 
 static int acpi_wakeup_cpu(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_ip)
 {
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCHv6 03/16] cpu/hotplug: Add support for declaring CPU offlining not supported

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

The ACPI MADT mailbox wakeup method doesn't allow to offline CPU after
it got woke up.

Currently offlining hotplug is prevented based on the confidential
computing attribute which is set for Intel TDX. But TDX is not
the only possible user of the wake up method. The MADT wakeup can be
implemented outside of a confidential computing environment. Offline
support is a property of the wakeup method, not the CoCo implementation.

Introduce cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining() that can be called to indicate
that CPU offlining should be disabled.

This function is going to replace CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED for ACPI
MADT wakeup method.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---
 include/linux/cpu.h |  2 ++
 kernel/cpu.c        | 13 ++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h
index dcb89c987164..aa89ef93a884 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ extern void cpus_read_lock(void);
 extern void cpus_read_unlock(void);
 extern int  cpus_read_trylock(void);
 extern void lockdep_assert_cpus_held(void);
+extern void cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining(void);
 extern void cpu_hotplug_disable(void);
 extern void cpu_hotplug_enable(void);
 void clear_tasks_mm_cpumask(int cpu);
@@ -154,6 +155,7 @@ static inline void cpus_read_lock(void) { }
 static inline void cpus_read_unlock(void) { }
 static inline int  cpus_read_trylock(void) { return true; }
 static inline void lockdep_assert_cpus_held(void) { }
+static inline void cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining(void) { }
 static inline void cpu_hotplug_disable(void) { }
 static inline void cpu_hotplug_enable(void) { }
 static inline int remove_cpu(unsigned int cpu) { return -EPERM; }
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index e6ec3ba4950b..7c28a07afe8b 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -484,6 +484,8 @@ static int cpu_hotplug_disabled;
 
 DEFINE_STATIC_PERCPU_RWSEM(cpu_hotplug_lock);
 
+static bool cpu_hotplug_offline_disabled __ro_after_init;
+
 void cpus_read_lock(void)
 {
 	percpu_down_read(&cpu_hotplug_lock);
@@ -543,6 +545,14 @@ static void lockdep_release_cpus_lock(void)
 	rwsem_release(&cpu_hotplug_lock.dep_map, _THIS_IP_);
 }
 
+/* Declare CPU offlining not supported */
+void cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining(void)
+{
+	cpu_maps_update_begin();
+	cpu_hotplug_offline_disabled = true;
+	cpu_maps_update_done();
+}
+
 /*
  * Wait for currently running CPU hotplug operations to complete (if any) and
  * disable future CPU hotplug (from sysfs). The 'cpu_add_remove_lock' protects
@@ -1522,7 +1532,8 @@ static int cpu_down_maps_locked(unsigned int cpu, enum cpuhp_state target)
 	 * If the platform does not support hotplug, report it explicitly to
 	 * differentiate it from a transient offlining failure.
 	 */
-	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED))
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED) ||
+	    cpu_hotplug_offline_disabled)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	if (cpu_hotplug_disabled)
 		return -EBUSY;
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCHv6 04/16] cpu/hotplug, x86/acpi: Disable CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

ACPI MADT doesn't allow to offline CPU after it got woke up.

Currently CPU hotplug is prevented based on the confidential computing
attribute which is set for Intel TDX. But TDX is not the only possible
user of the wake up method.

Disable CPU offlining on ACPI MADT wakeup enumeration.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---
 arch/x86/coco/core.c               |  1 -
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c |  3 +++
 include/linux/cc_platform.h        | 10 ----------
 kernel/cpu.c                       |  3 +--
 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
index eeec9986570e..f07c3bb7deab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ static bool noinstr intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
 {
 	switch (attr) {
 	case CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO:
-	case CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED:
 	case CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT:
 	case CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT:
 		return true;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
index cf79ea6f3007..d222be8d7a07 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
 #include <linux/acpi.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
 #include <asm/apic.h>
 #include <asm/barrier.h>
@@ -76,6 +77,8 @@ int __init acpi_parse_mp_wake(union acpi_subtable_headers *header,
 
 	acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr = mp_wake->base_address;
 
+	cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining();
+
 	apic_update_callback(wakeup_secondary_cpu_64, acpi_wakeup_cpu);
 
 	return 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/cc_platform.h b/include/linux/cc_platform.h
index cb0d6cd1c12f..d08dd65b5c43 100644
--- a/include/linux/cc_platform.h
+++ b/include/linux/cc_platform.h
@@ -80,16 +80,6 @@ enum cc_attr {
 	 * using AMD SEV-SNP features.
 	 */
 	CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP,
-
-	/**
-	 * @CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED: Hotplug is not supported or disabled.
-	 *
-	 * The platform/OS is running as a guest/virtual machine does not
-	 * support CPU hotplug feature.
-	 *
-	 * Examples include TDX Guest.
-	 */
-	CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED,
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index 7c28a07afe8b..3ffdbb1f7bb4 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -1532,8 +1532,7 @@ static int cpu_down_maps_locked(unsigned int cpu, enum cpuhp_state target)
 	 * If the platform does not support hotplug, report it explicitly to
 	 * differentiate it from a transient offlining failure.
 	 */
-	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED) ||
-	    cpu_hotplug_offline_disabled)
+	if (cpu_hotplug_offline_disabled)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	if (cpu_hotplug_disabled)
 		return -EBUSY;
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCHv6 05/16] x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

TDX guests are not allowed to clear CR4.MCE. Attempt to clear it leads
to #VE.

Use alternatives to keep the flag during kexec for TDX guests.

The change doesn't affect non-TDX-guest environments.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
index 56cab1bb25f5..e144bcf60cbe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <linux/stringify.h>
+#include <asm/alternative.h>
 #include <asm/page_types.h>
 #include <asm/kexec.h>
 #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
@@ -145,12 +147,15 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped)
 	 * Set cr4 to a known state:
 	 *  - physical address extension enabled
 	 *  - 5-level paging, if it was enabled before
+	 *  - Machine check exception on TDX guest. Clearing MCE is not allowed
+	 *    in TDX guests.
 	 */
 	movl	$X86_CR4_PAE, %eax
 	testq	$X86_CR4_LA57, %r13
 	jz	1f
 	orl	$X86_CR4_LA57, %eax
 1:
+	ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(orl $X86_CR4_MCE, %eax), X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST
 	movq	%rax, %cr4
 
 	jmp 1f
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCHv6 06/16] x86/mm: Make x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_*() return errno

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

TDX is going to have more than one reason to fail
enc_status_change_prepare().

Change the callback to return errno instead of assuming -EIO;
enc_status_change_finish() changed too to keep the interface symmetric.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c         | 20 +++++++++++---------
 arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c           |  9 +++------
 arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c      |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c   |  8 ++++----
 arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c    |  9 +++++----
 6 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
index c1cb90369915..26fa47db5782 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
@@ -798,28 +798,30 @@ static bool tdx_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, bool enc)
 	return true;
 }
 
-static bool tdx_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
-					  bool enc)
+static int tdx_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
+					 bool enc)
 {
 	/*
 	 * Only handle shared->private conversion here.
 	 * See the comment in tdx_early_init().
 	 */
-	if (enc)
-		return tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc);
-	return true;
+	if (enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static bool tdx_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
+static int tdx_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
 					 bool enc)
 {
 	/*
 	 * Only handle private->shared conversion here.
 	 * See the comment in tdx_early_init().
 	 */
-	if (!enc)
-		return tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc);
-	return true;
+	if (!enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 void __init tdx_early_init(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
index 7dcbf153ad72..49b4f427268f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
@@ -510,13 +510,12 @@ static int hv_mark_gpa_visibility(u16 count, const u64 pfn[],
  * with host. This function works as wrap of hv_mark_gpa_visibility()
  * with memory base and size.
  */
-static bool hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bool enc)
+static int hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bool enc)
 {
 	enum hv_mem_host_visibility visibility = enc ?
 			VMBUS_PAGE_NOT_VISIBLE : VMBUS_PAGE_VISIBLE_READ_WRITE;
 	u64 *pfn_array;
 	int ret = 0;
-	bool result = true;
 	int i, pfn;
 
 	pfn_array = kmalloc(HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -530,17 +529,15 @@ static bool hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bo
 		if (pfn == HV_MAX_MODIFY_GPA_REP_COUNT || i == pagecount - 1) {
 			ret = hv_mark_gpa_visibility(pfn, pfn_array,
 						     visibility);
-			if (ret) {
-				result = false;
+			if (ret)
 				goto err_free_pfn_array;
-			}
 			pfn = 0;
 		}
 	}
 
  err_free_pfn_array:
 	kfree(pfn_array);
-	return result;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static bool hv_vtom_tlb_flush_required(bool private)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
index c878616a18b8..c9503fe2d13a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
@@ -150,8 +150,8 @@ struct x86_init_acpi {
  * @enc_cache_flush_required	Returns true if a cache flush is needed before changing page encryption status
  */
 struct x86_guest {
-	bool (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
-	bool (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
+	int (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
+	int (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
 	bool (*enc_tlb_flush_required)(bool enc);
 	bool (*enc_cache_flush_required)(void);
 };
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
index a37ebd3b4773..f0f54e109eb9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
@@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ struct x86_cpuinit_ops x86_cpuinit = {
 
 static void default_nmi_init(void) { };
 
-static bool enc_status_change_prepare_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return true; }
-static bool enc_status_change_finish_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return true; }
+static int enc_status_change_prepare_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return 0; }
+static int enc_status_change_finish_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return 0; }
 static bool enc_tlb_flush_required_noop(bool enc) { return false; }
 static bool enc_cache_flush_required_noop(void) { return false; }
 static bool is_private_mmio_noop(u64 addr) {return false; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
index 70b91de2e053..d314e577836d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static void enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size, bool enc)
 #endif
 }
 
-static bool amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
+static int amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
 {
 	/*
 	 * To maintain the security guarantees of SEV-SNP guests, make sure
@@ -292,11 +292,11 @@ static bool amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool
 	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP) && !enc)
 		snp_set_memory_shared(vaddr, npages);
 
-	return true;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* Return true unconditionally: return value doesn't matter for the SEV side */
-static bool amd_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
+static int amd_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
 {
 	/*
 	 * After memory is mapped encrypted in the page table, validate it
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static bool amd_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool e
 	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		enc_dec_hypercall(vaddr, npages << PAGE_SHIFT, enc);
 
-	return true;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static void __init __set_clr_pte_enc(pte_t *kpte, int level, bool enc)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
index e9b448d1b1b7..f92da8c9a86d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
@@ -2152,8 +2152,9 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
 		cpa_flush(&cpa, x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required());
 
 	/* Notify hypervisor that we are about to set/clr encryption attribute. */
-	if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc))
-		return -EIO;
+	ret = x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1);
 
@@ -2168,8 +2169,8 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
 
 	/* Notify hypervisor that we have successfully set/clr encryption attribute. */
 	if (!ret) {
-		if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish(addr, numpages, enc))
-			ret = -EIO;
+		ret = x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish(addr,
+								  numpages, enc);
 	}
 
 	return ret;
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCHv6 07/16] x86/mm: Return correct level from lookup_address() if pte is none

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

lookup_address() only returns correct page table level for the entry if
the entry is not none.

Make the helper to always return correct 'level'. It allows to implement
iterator over kernel page tables using lookup_address().

Add one more entry into enum pg_level to indicate size of VA covered by
one PGD entry in 5-level paging mode.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 1 +
 arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c         | 8 ++++----
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
index 0b748ee16b3d..3f648ffdfbe5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
@@ -548,6 +548,7 @@ enum pg_level {
 	PG_LEVEL_2M,
 	PG_LEVEL_1G,
 	PG_LEVEL_512G,
+	PG_LEVEL_256T,
 	PG_LEVEL_NUM
 };
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
index f92da8c9a86d..3612e3167147 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
@@ -666,32 +666,32 @@ pte_t *lookup_address_in_pgd(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address,
 	pud_t *pud;
 	pmd_t *pmd;
 
-	*level = PG_LEVEL_NONE;
+	*level = PG_LEVEL_256T;
 
 	if (pgd_none(*pgd))
 		return NULL;
 
+	*level = PG_LEVEL_512G;
 	p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, address);
 	if (p4d_none(*p4d))
 		return NULL;
 
-	*level = PG_LEVEL_512G;
 	if (p4d_large(*p4d) || !p4d_present(*p4d))
 		return (pte_t *)p4d;
 
+	*level = PG_LEVEL_1G;
 	pud = pud_offset(p4d, address);
 	if (pud_none(*pud))
 		return NULL;
 
-	*level = PG_LEVEL_1G;
 	if (pud_large(*pud) || !pud_present(*pud))
 		return (pte_t *)pud;
 
+	*level = PG_LEVEL_2M;
 	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
 	if (pmd_none(*pmd))
 		return NULL;
 
-	*level = PG_LEVEL_2M;
 	if (pmd_large(*pmd) || !pmd_present(*pmd))
 		return (pte_t *)pmd;
 
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCHv6 08/16] x86/tdx: Account shared memory

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

The kernel will convert all shared memory back to private during kexec.
The direct mapping page tables will provide information on which memory
is shared.

It is extremely important to convert all shared memory. If a page is
missed, it will cause the second kernel to crash when it accesses it.

Keep track of the number of shared pages. This will allow for
cross-checking against the shared information in the direct mapping and
reporting if the shared bit is lost.

Include a debugfs interface that allows for the check to be performed at
any point.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
index 26fa47db5782..fd212c9bad89 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "tdx: " fmt
 
 #include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/debugfs.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
 #include <asm/coco.h>
@@ -38,6 +39,13 @@
 
 #define TDREPORT_SUBTYPE_0	0
 
+static atomic_long_t nr_shared;
+
+static inline bool pte_decrypted(pte_t pte)
+{
+	return cc_mkdec(pte_val(pte)) == pte_val(pte);
+}
+
 /* Called from __tdx_hypercall() for unrecoverable failure */
 noinstr void __noreturn __tdx_hypercall_failed(void)
 {
@@ -821,6 +829,11 @@ static int tdx_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
 	if (!enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc))
 		return -EIO;
 
+	if (enc)
+		atomic_long_sub(numpages, &nr_shared);
+	else
+		atomic_long_add(numpages, &nr_shared);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -896,3 +909,59 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void)
 
 	pr_info("Guest detected\n");
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
+static int tdx_shared_memory_show(struct seq_file *m, void *p)
+{
+	unsigned long addr, end;
+	unsigned long found = 0;
+
+	addr = PAGE_OFFSET;
+	end  = PAGE_OFFSET + get_max_mapped();
+
+	while (addr < end) {
+		unsigned long size;
+		unsigned int level;
+		pte_t *pte;
+
+		pte = lookup_address(addr, &level);
+		size = page_level_size(level);
+
+		if (pte && pte_decrypted(*pte))
+			found += size / PAGE_SIZE;
+
+		addr += size;
+
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+
+	seq_printf(m, "Number of shared pages in kernel page tables:  %16lu\n",
+		   found);
+	seq_printf(m, "Number of pages accounted as shared:           %16ld\n",
+		   atomic_long_read(&nr_shared));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int tdx_shared_memory_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return single_open(file, tdx_shared_memory_show, NULL);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations tdx_shared_memory_fops = {
+	.open           = tdx_shared_memory_open,
+	.read           = seq_read,
+	.llseek         = seq_lseek,
+	.release        = single_release,
+};
+
+static __init int debug_tdx_shared_memory(void)
+{
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST))
+		return 0;
+
+	debugfs_create_file("tdx_shared_memory", 0400, arch_debugfs_dir,
+			    NULL, &tdx_shared_memory_fops);
+	return 0;
+}
+fs_initcall(debug_tdx_shared_memory);
+#endif
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCHv6 09/16] x86/mm: Adding callbacks to prepare encrypted memory for kexec

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

AMD SEV and Intel TDX guests allocate shared buffers for performing I/O.
This is done by allocating pages normally from the buddy allocator and
then converting them to shared using set_memory_decrypted().

On kexec, the second kernel is unaware of which memory has been
converted in this manner. It only sees E820_TYPE_RAM. Accessing shared
memory as private is fatal.

Therefore, the memory state must be reset to its original state before
starting the new kernel with kexec.

The process of converting shared memory back to private occurs in two
steps:

- enc_kexec_stop_conversion() stops new conversions.

- enc_kexec_unshare_mem() unshares all existing shared memory, reverting
  it back to private.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/crash.c         |  5 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c        | 12 ++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c      |  4 ++++
 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
index c9503fe2d13a..3196ff20a29e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
@@ -154,6 +154,8 @@ struct x86_guest {
 	int (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
 	bool (*enc_tlb_flush_required)(bool enc);
 	bool (*enc_cache_flush_required)(void);
+	void (*enc_kexec_stop_conversion)(bool crash);
+	void (*enc_kexec_unshare_mem)(void);
 };
 
 /**
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
index b6b044356f1b..6585a5f2c2ba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
@@ -107,6 +107,11 @@ void native_machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)
 
 	crash_smp_send_stop();
 
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
+		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_stop_conversion(true);
+		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_unshare_mem();
+	}
+
 	cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization();
 
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
index 830425e6d38e..0574d4ad6b41 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/objtool.h>
 #include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <acpi/reboot.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
 #include <asm/apic.h>
@@ -716,6 +717,14 @@ static void native_machine_emergency_restart(void)
 
 void native_machine_shutdown(void)
 {
+	/*
+	 * Call enc_kexec_stop_conversion() while all CPUs are still active and
+	 * interrupts are enabled. This will allow all in-flight memory
+	 * conversions to finish cleanly.
+	 */
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && kexec_in_progress)
+		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_stop_conversion(false);
+
 	/* Stop the cpus and apics */
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC
 	/*
@@ -752,6 +761,9 @@ void native_machine_shutdown(void)
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	x86_platform.iommu_shutdown();
 #endif
+
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && kexec_in_progress)
+		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_unshare_mem();
 }
 
 static void __machine_emergency_restart(int emergency)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
index f0f54e109eb9..b95206ebc621 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ static int enc_status_change_prepare_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool
 static int enc_status_change_finish_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return 0; }
 static bool enc_tlb_flush_required_noop(bool enc) { return false; }
 static bool enc_cache_flush_required_noop(void) { return false; }
+static void enc_kexec_stop_conversion_noop(bool crash) {}
+static void enc_kexec_unshare_mem_noop(void) {}
 static bool is_private_mmio_noop(u64 addr) {return false; }
 
 struct x86_platform_ops x86_platform __ro_after_init = {
@@ -158,6 +160,8 @@ struct x86_platform_ops x86_platform __ro_after_init = {
 		.enc_status_change_finish  = enc_status_change_finish_noop,
 		.enc_tlb_flush_required	   = enc_tlb_flush_required_noop,
 		.enc_cache_flush_required  = enc_cache_flush_required_noop,
+		.enc_kexec_stop_conversion = enc_kexec_stop_conversion_noop,
+		.enc_kexec_unshare_mem     = enc_kexec_unshare_mem_noop,
 	},
 };
 
-- 
2.43.0

Re: [PATCHv6 09/16] x86/mm: Adding callbacks to prepare encrypted memory for kexec

[Nikolay Borisov]

On 24.01.24 г. 14:55 ч., Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> AMD SEV and Intel TDX guests allocate shared buffers for performing I/O.
> This is done by allocating pages normally from the buddy allocator and
> then converting them to shared using set_memory_decrypted().
> 
> On kexec, the second kernel is unaware of which memory has been
> converted in this manner. It only sees E820_TYPE_RAM. Accessing shared
> memory as private is fatal.
> 
> Therefore, the memory state must be reset to its original state before
> starting the new kernel with kexec.
> 
> The process of converting shared memory back to private occurs in two
> steps:
> 
> - enc_kexec_stop_conversion() stops new conversions.
> 
> - enc_kexec_unshare_mem() unshares all existing shared memory, reverting
>    it back to private.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>

[PATCHv6 10/16] x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

TDX guests allocate shared buffers to perform I/O. It is done by
allocating pages normally from the buddy allocator and converting them
to shared with set_memory_decrypted().

The second kernel has no idea what memory is converted this way. It only
sees E820_TYPE_RAM.

Accessing shared memory via private mapping is fatal. It leads to
unrecoverable TD exit.

On kexec walk direct mapping and convert all shared memory back to
private. It makes all RAM private again and second kernel may use it
normally.

The conversion occurs in two steps: stopping new conversions and
unsharing all memory. In the case of normal kexec, the stopping of
conversions takes place while scheduling is still functioning. This
allows for waiting until any ongoing conversions are finished. The
second step is carried out when all CPUs except one are inactive and
interrupts are disabled. This prevents any conflicts with code that may
access shared memory.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 124 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 122 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
index fd212c9bad89..bb77a927a831 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
@@ -6,8 +6,10 @@
 
 #include <linux/cpufeature.h>
 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <asm/coco.h>
 #include <asm/tdx.h>
 #include <asm/vmx.h>
@@ -15,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <asm/insn.h>
 #include <asm/insn-eval.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/set_memory.h>
 
 /* MMIO direction */
 #define EPT_READ	0
@@ -41,6 +44,9 @@
 
 static atomic_long_t nr_shared;
 
+static atomic_t conversions_in_progress;
+static bool conversion_allowed = true;
+
 static inline bool pte_decrypted(pte_t pte)
 {
 	return cc_mkdec(pte_val(pte)) == pte_val(pte);
@@ -726,6 +732,14 @@ static bool tdx_tlb_flush_required(bool private)
 
 static bool tdx_cache_flush_required(void)
 {
+	/*
+	 * Avoid issuing CLFLUSH on set_memory_decrypted() if conversions
+	 * stopped. Otherwise it can race with unshare_all_memory() and trigger
+	 * implicit conversion to shared.
+	 */
+	if (!conversion_allowed)
+		return false;
+
 	/*
 	 * AMD SME/SEV can avoid cache flushing if HW enforces cache coherence.
 	 * TDX doesn't have such capability.
@@ -809,12 +823,25 @@ static bool tdx_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, bool enc)
 static int tdx_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
 					 bool enc)
 {
+	atomic_inc(&conversions_in_progress);
+
+	/*
+	 * Check after bumping conversions_in_progress to serialize
+	 * against tdx_kexec_stop_conversion().
+	 */
+	if (!conversion_allowed) {
+		atomic_dec(&conversions_in_progress);
+		return -EBUSY;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Only handle shared->private conversion here.
 	 * See the comment in tdx_early_init().
 	 */
-	if (enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc))
+	if (enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc)) {
+		atomic_dec(&conversions_in_progress);
 		return -EIO;
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -826,17 +853,107 @@ static int tdx_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
 	 * Only handle private->shared conversion here.
 	 * See the comment in tdx_early_init().
 	 */
-	if (!enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc))
+	if (!enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc)) {
+		atomic_dec(&conversions_in_progress);
 		return -EIO;
+	}
 
 	if (enc)
 		atomic_long_sub(numpages, &nr_shared);
 	else
 		atomic_long_add(numpages, &nr_shared);
 
+	atomic_dec(&conversions_in_progress);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void tdx_kexec_stop_conversion(bool crash)
+{
+	/* Stop new private<->shared conversions */
+	conversion_allowed = false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Make sure conversion_allowed is cleared before checking
+	 * conversions_in_progress.
+	 */
+	barrier();
+
+	/*
+	 * Crash kernel reaches here with interrupts disabled: can't wait for
+	 * conversions to finish.
+	 *
+	 * If race happened, just report and proceed.
+	 */
+	if (!crash) {
+		unsigned long timeout;
+
+		/*
+		 * Wait for in-flight conversions to complete.
+		 *
+		 * Do not wait more than 30 seconds.
+		 */
+		timeout = 30 * USEC_PER_SEC;
+		while (atomic_read(&conversions_in_progress) && timeout--)
+			udelay(1);
+	}
+
+	if (atomic_read(&conversions_in_progress))
+		pr_warn("Failed to finish shared<->private conversions\n");
+}
+
+static void tdx_kexec_unshare_mem(void)
+{
+	unsigned long addr, end;
+	long found = 0, shared;
+
+	/*
+	 * Walk direct mapping and convert all shared memory back to private,
+	 */
+
+	addr = PAGE_OFFSET;
+	end  = PAGE_OFFSET + get_max_mapped();
+
+	while (addr < end) {
+		unsigned long size;
+		unsigned int level;
+		pte_t *pte;
+
+		pte = lookup_address(addr, &level);
+		size = page_level_size(level);
+
+		if (pte && pte_decrypted(*pte)) {
+			int pages = size / PAGE_SIZE;
+
+			/*
+			 * Touching memory with shared bit set triggers implicit
+			 * conversion to shared.
+			 *
+			 * Make sure nobody touches the shared range from
+			 * now on.
+			 */
+			set_pte(pte, __pte(0));
+
+			if (!tdx_enc_status_changed(addr, pages, true)) {
+				pr_err("Failed to unshare range %#lx-%#lx\n",
+				       addr, addr + size);
+			}
+
+			found += pages;
+		}
+
+		addr += size;
+	}
+
+	__flush_tlb_all();
+
+	shared = atomic_long_read(&nr_shared);
+	if (shared != found) {
+		pr_err("shared page accounting is off\n");
+		pr_err("nr_shared = %ld, nr_found = %ld\n", shared, found);
+	}
+}
+
 void __init tdx_early_init(void)
 {
 	struct tdx_module_args args = {
@@ -896,6 +1013,9 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void)
 	x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required  = tdx_cache_flush_required;
 	x86_platform.guest.enc_tlb_flush_required    = tdx_tlb_flush_required;
 
+	x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_stop_conversion = tdx_kexec_stop_conversion;
+	x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_unshare_mem     = tdx_kexec_unshare_mem;
+
 	/*
 	 * TDX intercepts the RDMSR to read the X2APIC ID in the parallel
 	 * bringup low level code. That raises #VE which cannot be handled
-- 
2.43.0

Re: [PATCHv6 10/16] x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec

[Kalra, Ashish]

Hello Kirill,

On 1/24/2024 6:55 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> TDX guests allocate shared buffers to perform I/O. It is done by
> allocating pages normally from the buddy allocator and converting them
> to shared with set_memory_decrypted().
>
> The second kernel has no idea what memory is converted this way. It only
> sees E820_TYPE_RAM.
>
> Accessing shared memory via private mapping is fatal. It leads to
> unrecoverable TD exit.
>
> On kexec walk direct mapping and convert all shared memory back to
> private. It makes all RAM private again and second kernel may use it
> normally.
>
> The conversion occurs in two steps: stopping new conversions and
> unsharing all memory. In the case of normal kexec, the stopping of
> conversions takes place while scheduling is still functioning. This
> allows for waiting until any ongoing conversions are finished. The
> second step is carried out when all CPUs except one are inactive and
> interrupts are disabled. This prevents any conflicts with code that may
> access shared memory.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 124 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>   1 file changed, 122 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
<snip>
> +static void tdx_kexec_stop_conversion(bool crash)
> +{
> +	/* Stop new private<->shared conversions */
> +	conversion_allowed = false;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Make sure conversion_allowed is cleared before checking
> +	 * conversions_in_progress.
> +	 */
> +	barrier();
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Crash kernel reaches here with interrupts disabled: can't wait for
> +	 * conversions to finish.
> +	 *
> +	 * If race happened, just report and proceed.
> +	 */
> +	if (!crash) {
> +		unsigned long timeout;
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * Wait for in-flight conversions to complete.
> +		 *
> +		 * Do not wait more than 30 seconds.
> +		 */
> +		timeout = 30 * USEC_PER_SEC;
> +		while (atomic_read(&conversions_in_progress) && timeout--)
> +			udelay(1);
> +	}
> +
> +	if (atomic_read(&conversions_in_progress))
> +		pr_warn("Failed to finish shared<->private conversions\n");
> +}
> +
> +static void tdx_kexec_unshare_mem(void)
> +{
> +	unsigned long addr, end;
> +	long found = 0, shared;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Walk direct mapping and convert all shared memory back to private,
> +	 */
> +
> +	addr = PAGE_OFFSET;
> +	end  = PAGE_OFFSET + get_max_mapped();
> +
> +	while (addr < end) {
> +		unsigned long size;
> +		unsigned int level;
> +		pte_t *pte;
> +
> +		pte = lookup_address(addr, &level);
> +		size = page_level_size(level);
> +
> +		if (pte && pte_decrypted(*pte)) {
> +			int pages = size / PAGE_SIZE;
> +
> +			/*
> +			 * Touching memory with shared bit set triggers implicit
> +			 * conversion to shared.
> +			 *
> +			 * Make sure nobody touches the shared range from
> +			 * now on.
> +			 */
> +			set_pte(pte, __pte(0));
> +
> +			if (!tdx_enc_status_changed(addr, pages, true)) {
> +				pr_err("Failed to unshare range %#lx-%#lx\n",
> +				       addr, addr + size);
> +			}
> +
> +			found += pages;
> +		}
> +
> +		addr += size;
> +	}
> +
> +	__flush_tlb_all();
> +
> +	shared = atomic_long_read(&nr_shared);
> +	if (shared != found) {
> +		pr_err("shared page accounting is off\n");
> +		pr_err("nr_shared = %ld, nr_found = %ld\n", shared, found);
> +	}
> +}
In case of SNP and crash/kdump case, we need to prevent the boot_ghcb 
being converted to shared (in snp_kexec_unshare_mem()) as the boot_ghcb 
is required to handle all I/O for disabling IO-APIC/lapic, hpet, etc., 
as the enc_kexec_unshare_mem() callback is invoked before the apics, 
hpet, etc. are disabled.

Is there any reason why enc_kexec_unshare_mem() callback is invoked in 
crash case before the IO-APIC/lapic, hpet, etc. are shutdown/disabled ?

In case of kexec, enc_kexec_unshare_mem() callback is invoked after the 
IO-APIC/lapic, hpet, iommu, etc. have already been disabled/shutdown, 
hence, this callback can transition all guest shared memory (including 
boot_ghcb) back to private.

Thanks, Ashish

Re: [PATCHv6 10/16] x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

On Mon, Jan 29, 2024 at 04:24:09AM -0600, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
> In case of SNP and crash/kdump case, we need to prevent the boot_ghcb being
> converted to shared (in snp_kexec_unshare_mem()) as the boot_ghcb is
> required to handle all I/O for disabling IO-APIC/lapic, hpet, etc., as the
> enc_kexec_unshare_mem() callback is invoked before the apics, hpet, etc. are
> disabled.
> 
> Is there any reason why enc_kexec_unshare_mem() callback is invoked in crash
> case before the IO-APIC/lapic, hpet, etc. are shutdown/disabled ?

Not really. Either way works for TDX. I've tested the patch below. Is it
what you want?

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
index 6585a5f2c2ba..3001f4857ed7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
@@ -107,11 +107,6 @@ void native_machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)
 
 	crash_smp_send_stop();
 
-	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
-		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_stop_conversion(true);
-		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_unshare_mem();
-	}
-
 	cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization();
 
 	/*
@@ -129,6 +124,12 @@ void native_machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)
 #ifdef CONFIG_HPET_TIMER
 	hpet_disable();
 #endif
+
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
+		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_stop_conversion(true);
+		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_unshare_mem();
+	}
+
 	crash_save_cpu(regs, safe_smp_processor_id());
 }
 
-- 
  Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov

Re: [PATCHv6 10/16] x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec

[Kalra, Ashish]

Hello Kirill,

On 1/29/2024 4:36 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 29, 2024 at 04:24:09AM -0600, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
>> In case of SNP and crash/kdump case, we need to prevent the boot_ghcb being
>> converted to shared (in snp_kexec_unshare_mem()) as the boot_ghcb is
>> required to handle all I/O for disabling IO-APIC/lapic, hpet, etc., as the
>> enc_kexec_unshare_mem() callback is invoked before the apics, hpet, etc. are
>> disabled.
>>
>> Is there any reason why enc_kexec_unshare_mem() callback is invoked in crash
>> case before the IO-APIC/lapic, hpet, etc. are shutdown/disabled ?
> Not really. Either way works for TDX. I've tested the patch below. Is it
> what you want?
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
> index 6585a5f2c2ba..3001f4857ed7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
> @@ -107,11 +107,6 @@ void native_machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)
>   
>   	crash_smp_send_stop();
>   
> -	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
> -		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_stop_conversion(true);
> -		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_unshare_mem();
> -	}
> -
>   	cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization();
>   
>   	/*
> @@ -129,6 +124,12 @@ void native_machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)
>   #ifdef CONFIG_HPET_TIMER
>   	hpet_disable();
>   #endif
> +
> +	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
> +		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_stop_conversion(true);
> +		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_unshare_mem();
> +	}
> +
>   	crash_save_cpu(regs, safe_smp_processor_id());
>   }
>   

Yes, this will work for SNP.

Thanks, Ashish

Re: [PATCHv6 10/16] x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

On Mon, Jan 29, 2024 at 07:09:37AM -0600, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
> Hello Kirill,
> 
> On 1/29/2024 4:36 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > On Mon, Jan 29, 2024 at 04:24:09AM -0600, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
> > > In case of SNP and crash/kdump case, we need to prevent the boot_ghcb being
> > > converted to shared (in snp_kexec_unshare_mem()) as the boot_ghcb is
> > > required to handle all I/O for disabling IO-APIC/lapic, hpet, etc., as the
> > > enc_kexec_unshare_mem() callback is invoked before the apics, hpet, etc. are
> > > disabled.
> > > 
> > > Is there any reason why enc_kexec_unshare_mem() callback is invoked in crash
> > > case before the IO-APIC/lapic, hpet, etc. are shutdown/disabled ?
> > Not really. Either way works for TDX. I've tested the patch below. Is it
> > what you want?
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
> > index 6585a5f2c2ba..3001f4857ed7 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
> > @@ -107,11 +107,6 @@ void native_machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)
> >   	crash_smp_send_stop();
> > -	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
> > -		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_stop_conversion(true);
> > -		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_unshare_mem();
> > -	}
> > -
> >   	cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization();
> >   	/*
> > @@ -129,6 +124,12 @@ void native_machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)
> >   #ifdef CONFIG_HPET_TIMER
> >   	hpet_disable();
> >   #endif
> > +
> > +	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
> > +		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_stop_conversion(true);
> > +		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_unshare_mem();
> > +	}
> > +
> >   	crash_save_cpu(regs, safe_smp_processor_id());
> >   }
> 
> Yes, this will work for SNP.

Okay, good. Will include the change into the next version of the patchset.

-- 
  Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov

[PATCHv6 11/16] x86/mm: Make e820_end_ram_pfn() cover E820_TYPE_ACPI ranges

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

e820__end_of_ram_pfn() is used to calculate max_pfn which, among other
things, guides where direct mapping ends. Any memory above max_pfn is
not going to be present in the direct mapping.

e820__end_of_ram_pfn() finds the end of the ram based on the highest
E820_TYPE_RAM range. But it doesn't includes E820_TYPE_ACPI ranges into
calculation.

Despite the name, E820_TYPE_ACPI covers not only ACPI data, but also EFI
tables and might be required by kernel to function properly.

Usually the problem is hidden because there is some E820_TYPE_RAM memory
above E820_TYPE_ACPI. But crashkernel only presents pre-allocated crash
memory as E820_TYPE_RAM on boot. If the preallocated range is small, it
can fit under the last E820_TYPE_ACPI range.

Modify e820__end_of_ram_pfn() and e820__end_of_low_ram_pfn() to cover
E820_TYPE_ACPI memory.

The problem was discovered during debugging kexec for TDX guest. TDX
guest uses E820_TYPE_ACPI to store the unaccepted memory bitmap and pass
it between the kernels on kexec.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/e820.c | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c b/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c
index fb8cf953380d..99c80680dc9e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c
@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ u64 __init e820__memblock_alloc_reserved(u64 size, u64 align)
 /*
  * Find the highest page frame number we have available
  */
-static unsigned long __init e820_end_pfn(unsigned long limit_pfn, enum e820_type type)
+static unsigned long __init e820_end_ram_pfn(unsigned long limit_pfn)
 {
 	int i;
 	unsigned long last_pfn = 0;
@@ -838,7 +838,8 @@ static unsigned long __init e820_end_pfn(unsigned long limit_pfn, enum e820_type
 		unsigned long start_pfn;
 		unsigned long end_pfn;
 
-		if (entry->type != type)
+		if (entry->type != E820_TYPE_RAM &&
+		    entry->type != E820_TYPE_ACPI)
 			continue;
 
 		start_pfn = entry->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
@@ -864,12 +865,12 @@ static unsigned long __init e820_end_pfn(unsigned long limit_pfn, enum e820_type
 
 unsigned long __init e820__end_of_ram_pfn(void)
 {
-	return e820_end_pfn(MAX_ARCH_PFN, E820_TYPE_RAM);
+	return e820_end_ram_pfn(MAX_ARCH_PFN);
 }
 
 unsigned long __init e820__end_of_low_ram_pfn(void)
 {
-	return e820_end_pfn(1UL << (32 - PAGE_SHIFT), E820_TYPE_RAM);
+	return e820_end_ram_pfn(1UL << (32 - PAGE_SHIFT));
 }
 
 static void __init early_panic(char *msg)
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCHv6 12/16] x86/acpi: Rename fields in acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup structure

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

To prepare for the addition of support for MADT wakeup structure version
1, it is necessary to provide more appropriate names for the fields in
the structure.

The field 'mailbox_version' renamed as 'version'. This field signifies
the version of the structure and the related protocols, rather than the
version of the mailbox. This field has not been utilized in the code
thus far.

The field 'base_address' renamed as 'mailbox_address' to clarify the
kind of address it represents. In version 1, the structure includes the
reset vector address. Clear and distinct naming helps to prevent any
confusion.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c | 2 +-
 include/acpi/actbl2.h              | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
index d222be8d7a07..004801b9b151 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ int __init acpi_parse_mp_wake(union acpi_subtable_headers *header,
 
 	acpi_table_print_madt_entry(&header->common);
 
-	acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr = mp_wake->base_address;
+	acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr = mp_wake->mailbox_address;
 
 	cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining();
 
diff --git a/include/acpi/actbl2.h b/include/acpi/actbl2.h
index 9775384d61c6..e1a395af7591 100644
--- a/include/acpi/actbl2.h
+++ b/include/acpi/actbl2.h
@@ -1117,9 +1117,9 @@ struct acpi_madt_generic_translator {
 
 struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup {
 	struct acpi_subtable_header header;
-	u16 mailbox_version;
+	u16 version;
 	u32 reserved;		/* reserved - must be zero */
-	u64 base_address;
+	u64 mailbox_address;
 };
 
 #define ACPI_MULTIPROC_WAKEUP_MB_OS_SIZE        2032
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCHv6 13/16] x86/acpi: Do not attempt to bring up secondary CPUs in kexec case

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

ACPI MADT doesn't allow to offline a CPU after it was onlined. This
limits kexec: the second kernel won't be able to use more than one CPU.

To prevent a kexec kernel from onlining secondary CPUs invalidate the
mailbox address in the ACPI MADT wakeup structure which prevents a
kexec kernel to use it.

This is safe as the booting kernel has the mailbox address cached
already and acpi_wakeup_cpu() uses the cached value to bring up the
secondary CPUs.

Note: This is a Linux specific convention and not covered by the
      ACPI specification.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
index 004801b9b151..30820f9de5af 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@ static struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup_mailbox *acpi_mp_wake_mailbox __ro_afte
 
 static int acpi_wakeup_cpu(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_ip)
 {
+	if (!acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr) {
+		pr_warn_once("No MADT mailbox: cannot bringup secondary CPUs. Booting with kexec?\n");
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Remap mailbox memory only for the first call to acpi_wakeup_cpu().
 	 *
@@ -64,6 +69,28 @@ static int acpi_wakeup_cpu(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_ip)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void acpi_mp_disable_offlining(struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup *mp_wake)
+{
+	cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining();
+
+	/*
+	 * ACPI MADT doesn't allow to offline a CPU after it was onlined. This
+	 * limits kexec: the second kernel won't be able to use more than one CPU.
+	 *
+	 * To prevent a kexec kernel from onlining secondary CPUs invalidate the
+	 * mailbox address in the ACPI MADT wakeup structure which prevents a
+	 * kexec kernel to use it.
+	 *
+	 * This is safe as the booting kernel has the mailbox address cached
+	 * already and acpi_wakeup_cpu() uses the cached value to bring up the
+	 * secondary CPUs.
+	 *
+	 * Note: This is a Linux specific convention and not covered by the
+	 *       ACPI specification.
+	 */
+	mp_wake->mailbox_address = 0;
+}
+
 int __init acpi_parse_mp_wake(union acpi_subtable_headers *header,
 			      const unsigned long end)
 {
@@ -77,7 +104,7 @@ int __init acpi_parse_mp_wake(union acpi_subtable_headers *header,
 
 	acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr = mp_wake->mailbox_address;
 
-	cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining();
+	acpi_mp_disable_offlining(mp_wake);
 
 	apic_update_callback(wakeup_secondary_cpu_64, acpi_wakeup_cpu);
 
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCHv6 14/16] x86/smp: Add smp_ops.stop_this_cpu() callback

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

If the helper is defined, it is called instead of halt() to stop the CPU
at the end of stop_this_cpu() and on crash CPU shutdown.

ACPI MADT will use it to hand over the CPU to BIOS in order to be able
to wake it up again after kexec.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h | 1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c  | 7 +++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c   | 6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h
index 4fab2ed454f3..390d53fd34f9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ struct smp_ops {
 	int (*cpu_disable)(void);
 	void (*cpu_die)(unsigned int cpu);
 	void (*play_dead)(void);
+	void (*stop_this_cpu)(void);
 
 	void (*send_call_func_ipi)(const struct cpumask *mask);
 	void (*send_call_func_single_ipi)(int cpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index ab49ade31b0d..00c1b957476d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -835,6 +835,13 @@ void __noreturn stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)
 	 */
 	cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, &cpus_stop_mask);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+	if (smp_ops.stop_this_cpu) {
+		smp_ops.stop_this_cpu();
+		unreachable();
+	}
+#endif
+
 	for (;;) {
 		/*
 		 * Use native_halt() so that memory contents don't change
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
index 0574d4ad6b41..0a75efe579c0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
@@ -880,6 +880,12 @@ static int crash_nmi_callback(unsigned int val, struct pt_regs *regs)
 	cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization();
 
 	atomic_dec(&waiting_for_crash_ipi);
+
+	if (smp_ops.stop_this_cpu) {
+		smp_ops.stop_this_cpu();
+		unreachable();
+	}
+
 	/* Assume hlt works */
 	halt();
 	for (;;)
-- 
2.43.0

Re: [PATCHv6 14/16] x86/smp: Add smp_ops.stop_this_cpu() callback

[Huang, Kai]

On Wed, 2024-01-24 at 14:55 +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> If the helper is defined, it is called instead of halt() to stop the CPU
> at the end of stop_this_cpu() and on crash CPU shutdown.
> 
> ACPI MADT will use it to hand over the CPU to BIOS in order to be able
> to wake it up again after kexec.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>

> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h | 1 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/process.c  | 7 +++++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c   | 6 ++++++
>  3 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h
> index 4fab2ed454f3..390d53fd34f9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h
> @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ struct smp_ops {
>  	int (*cpu_disable)(void);
>  	void (*cpu_die)(unsigned int cpu);
>  	void (*play_dead)(void);
> +	void (*stop_this_cpu)(void);
>  
>  	void (*send_call_func_ipi)(const struct cpumask *mask);
>  	void (*send_call_func_single_ipi)(int cpu);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> index ab49ade31b0d..00c1b957476d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> @@ -835,6 +835,13 @@ void __noreturn stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)
>  	 */
>  	cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, &cpus_stop_mask);
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
> +	if (smp_ops.stop_this_cpu) {
> +		smp_ops.stop_this_cpu();
> +		unreachable();
> +	}
> +#endif
> +
>  	for (;;) {
>  		/*
>  		 * Use native_halt() so that memory contents don't change
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> index 0574d4ad6b41..0a75efe579c0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> @@ -880,6 +880,12 @@ static int crash_nmi_callback(unsigned int val, struct pt_regs *regs)
>  	cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization();
>  
>  	atomic_dec(&waiting_for_crash_ipi);
> +
> +	if (smp_ops.stop_this_cpu) {
> +		smp_ops.stop_this_cpu();
> +		unreachable();
> +	}
> +
>  	/* Assume hlt works */
>  	halt();
>  	for (;;)

[PATCHv6 15/16] x86/mm: Introduce kernel_ident_mapping_free()

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

The helper complements kernel_ident_mapping_init(): it frees the
identity mapping that was previously allocated. It will be used in the
error path to free a partially allocated mapping or if the mapping is no
longer needed.

The caller provides a struct x86_mapping_info with the free_pgd_page()
callback hooked up and the pgd_t to free.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/init.h |  3 ++
 arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c     | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 76 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h
index cc9ccf61b6bd..14d72727d7ee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 
 struct x86_mapping_info {
 	void *(*alloc_pgt_page)(void *); /* allocate buf for page table */
+	void (*free_pgt_page)(void *, void *); /* free buf for page table */
 	void *context;			 /* context for alloc_pgt_page */
 	unsigned long page_flag;	 /* page flag for PMD or PUD entry */
 	unsigned long offset;		 /* ident mapping offset */
@@ -16,4 +17,6 @@ struct x86_mapping_info {
 int kernel_ident_mapping_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd_page,
 				unsigned long pstart, unsigned long pend);
 
+void kernel_ident_mapping_free(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd);
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_INIT_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
index 968d7005f4a7..3996af7b4abf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
@@ -4,6 +4,79 @@
  * included by both the compressed kernel and the regular kernel.
  */
 
+static void free_pte(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pmd_t *pmd)
+{
+	pte_t *pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, 0);
+
+	info->free_pgt_page(pte, info->context);
+}
+
+static void free_pmd(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pud_t *pud)
+{
+	pmd_t *pmd = pmd_offset(pud, 0);
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++) {
+		if (!pmd_present(pmd[i]))
+			continue;
+
+		if (pmd_leaf(pmd[i]))
+			continue;
+
+		free_pte(info, &pmd[i]);
+	}
+
+	info->free_pgt_page(pmd, info->context);
+}
+
+static void free_pud(struct x86_mapping_info *info, p4d_t *p4d)
+{
+	pud_t *pud = pud_offset(p4d, 0);
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PUD; i++) {
+		if (!pud_present(pud[i]))
+			continue;
+
+		if (pud_leaf(pud[i]))
+			continue;
+
+		free_pmd(info, &pud[i]);
+	}
+
+	info->free_pgt_page(pud, info->context);
+}
+
+static void free_p4d(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd)
+{
+	p4d_t *p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, 0);
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_P4D; i++) {
+		if (!p4d_present(p4d[i]))
+			continue;
+
+		free_pud(info, &p4d[i]);
+	}
+
+	if (pgtable_l5_enabled())
+		info->free_pgt_page(pgd, info->context);
+}
+
+void kernel_ident_mapping_free(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PGD; i++) {
+		if (!pgd_present(pgd[i]))
+			continue;
+
+		free_p4d(info, &pgd[i]);
+	}
+
+	info->free_pgt_page(pgd, info->context);
+}
+
 static void ident_pmd_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pmd_t *pmd_page,
 			   unsigned long addr, unsigned long end)
 {
-- 
2.43.0

Re: [PATCHv6 15/16] x86/mm: Introduce kernel_ident_mapping_free()

[Huang, Kai]

On Wed, 2024-01-24 at 14:55 +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> The helper complements kernel_ident_mapping_init(): it frees the
> identity mapping that was previously allocated. It will be used in the
> error path to free a partially allocated mapping or if the mapping is no
> longer needed.
> 
> The caller provides a struct x86_mapping_info with the free_pgd_page()
> callback hooked up and the pgd_t to free.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

FWIW:

Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>

> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/init.h |  3 ++
>  arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c     | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 76 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h
> index cc9ccf61b6bd..14d72727d7ee 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h
> @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
>  
>  struct x86_mapping_info {
>  	void *(*alloc_pgt_page)(void *); /* allocate buf for page table */
> +	void (*free_pgt_page)(void *, void *); /* free buf for page table */
>  	void *context;			 /* context for alloc_pgt_page */
>  	unsigned long page_flag;	 /* page flag for PMD or PUD entry */
>  	unsigned long offset;		 /* ident mapping offset */
> @@ -16,4 +17,6 @@ struct x86_mapping_info {
>  int kernel_ident_mapping_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd_page,
>  				unsigned long pstart, unsigned long pend);
>  
> +void kernel_ident_mapping_free(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd);
> +
>  #endif /* _ASM_X86_INIT_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
> index 968d7005f4a7..3996af7b4abf 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
> @@ -4,6 +4,79 @@
>   * included by both the compressed kernel and the regular kernel.
>   */
>  
> +static void free_pte(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pmd_t *pmd)
> +{
> +	pte_t *pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, 0);
> +
> +	info->free_pgt_page(pte, info->context);
> +}
> +
> +static void free_pmd(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pud_t *pud)
> +{
> +	pmd_t *pmd = pmd_offset(pud, 0);
> +	int i;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++) {
> +		if (!pmd_present(pmd[i]))
> +			continue;
> +
> +		if (pmd_leaf(pmd[i]))
> +			continue;
> +
> +		free_pte(info, &pmd[i]);
> +	}
> +
> +	info->free_pgt_page(pmd, info->context);
> +}
> +
> +static void free_pud(struct x86_mapping_info *info, p4d_t *p4d)
> +{
> +	pud_t *pud = pud_offset(p4d, 0);
> +	int i;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PUD; i++) {
> +		if (!pud_present(pud[i]))
> +			continue;
> +
> +		if (pud_leaf(pud[i]))
> +			continue;
> +
> +		free_pmd(info, &pud[i]);
> +	}
> +
> +	info->free_pgt_page(pud, info->context);
> +}
> +
> +static void free_p4d(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd)
> +{
> +	p4d_t *p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, 0);
> +	int i;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_P4D; i++) {
> +		if (!p4d_present(p4d[i]))
> +			continue;
> +
> +		free_pud(info, &p4d[i]);
> +	}
> +
> +	if (pgtable_l5_enabled())
> +		info->free_pgt_page(pgd, info->context);
> +}
> +
> +void kernel_ident_mapping_free(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd)
> +{
> +	int i;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PGD; i++) {
> +		if (!pgd_present(pgd[i]))
> +			continue;
> +
> +		free_p4d(info, &pgd[i]);
> +	}
> +
> +	info->free_pgt_page(pgd, info->context);
> +}
> +
>  static void ident_pmd_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pmd_t *pmd_page,
>  			   unsigned long addr, unsigned long end)
>  {

[PATCHv6 16/16] x86/acpi: Add support for CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup method

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

MADT Multiprocessor Wakeup structure version 1 brings support of CPU
offlining: BIOS provides a reset vector where the CPU has to jump to
for offlining itself. The new TEST mailbox command can be used to test
whether the CPU offlined itself which means the BIOS has control over
the CPU and can online it again via the ACPI MADT wakeup method.

Add CPU offling support for the ACPI MADT wakeup method by implementing
custom cpu_die(), play_dead() and stop_this_cpu() SMP operations.

CPU offlining makes is possible to hand over secondary CPUs over kexec,
not limiting the second kernel to a single CPU.

The change conforms to the approved ACPI spec change proposal. See the
Link.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/13356251.uLZWGnKmhe@kreacher
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h          |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile        |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.S |  28 ++++
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c   | 184 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 include/acpi/actbl2.h                |  15 ++-
 5 files changed, 227 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.S

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
index 2625b915ae7f..021cafa214c2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ union acpi_subtable_headers;
 int __init acpi_parse_mp_wake(union acpi_subtable_headers *header,
 			      const unsigned long end);
 
+void asm_acpi_mp_play_dead(u64 reset_vector, u64 pgd_pa);
+
 /*
  * Check if the CPU can handle C2 and deeper
  */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile
index 8c7329c88a75..37b1f28846de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI)			+= boot.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_SLEEP)		+= sleep.o wakeup_$(BITS).o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_APEI)			+= apei.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_CPPC_LIB)		+= cppc.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_X86_ACPI_MADT_WAKEUP)	+= madt_wakeup.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_ACPI_MADT_WAKEUP)	+= madt_wakeup.o madt_playdead.o
 
 ifneq ($(CONFIG_ACPI_PROCESSOR),)
 obj-y					+= cstate.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.S b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4e498d28cdc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.S
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/page_types.h>
+#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+
+	.text
+	.align PAGE_SIZE
+
+/*
+ * asm_acpi_mp_play_dead() - Hand over control of the CPU to the BIOS
+ *
+ * rdi: Address of the ACPI MADT MPWK ResetVector
+ * rsi: PGD of the identity mapping
+ */
+SYM_FUNC_START(asm_acpi_mp_play_dead)
+	/* Turn off global entries. Following CR3 write will flush them. */
+	movq	%cr4, %rdx
+	andq	$~(X86_CR4_PGE), %rdx
+	movq	%rdx, %cr4
+
+	/* Switch to identity mapping */
+	movq	%rsi, %cr3
+
+	/* Jump to reset vector */
+	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
+	jmp	*%rdi
+SYM_FUNC_END(asm_acpi_mp_play_dead)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
index 30820f9de5af..9e984e2191ba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
@@ -1,10 +1,19 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
 #include <linux/acpi.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/kexec.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#include <linux/sched/hotplug.h>
 #include <asm/apic.h>
 #include <asm/barrier.h>
+#include <asm/init.h>
+#include <asm/intel_pt.h>
+#include <asm/nmi.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/reboot.h>
 
 /* Physical address of the Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure mailbox */
 static u64 acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr __ro_after_init;
@@ -12,6 +21,154 @@ static u64 acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr __ro_after_init;
 /* Virtual address of the Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure mailbox */
 static struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup_mailbox *acpi_mp_wake_mailbox __ro_after_init;
 
+static u64 acpi_mp_pgd __ro_after_init;
+static u64 acpi_mp_reset_vector_paddr __ro_after_init;
+
+static void acpi_mp_stop_this_cpu(void)
+{
+	asm_acpi_mp_play_dead(acpi_mp_reset_vector_paddr, acpi_mp_pgd);
+}
+
+static void acpi_mp_play_dead(void)
+{
+	play_dead_common();
+	asm_acpi_mp_play_dead(acpi_mp_reset_vector_paddr, acpi_mp_pgd);
+}
+
+static void acpi_mp_cpu_die(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	u32 apicid = per_cpu(x86_cpu_to_apicid, cpu);
+	unsigned long timeout;
+
+	/*
+	 * Use TEST mailbox command to prove that BIOS got control over
+	 * the CPU before declaring it dead.
+	 *
+	 * BIOS has to clear 'command' field of the mailbox.
+	 */
+	acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->apic_id = apicid;
+	smp_store_release(&acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->command,
+			  ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_TEST);
+
+	/* Don't wait longer than a second. */
+	timeout = USEC_PER_SEC;
+	while (READ_ONCE(acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->command) && --timeout)
+		udelay(1);
+
+	if (!timeout)
+		pr_err("Failed to hand over CPU %d to BIOS\n", cpu);
+}
+
+/* The argument is required to match type of x86_mapping_info::alloc_pgt_page */
+static void __init *alloc_pgt_page(void *dummy)
+{
+	return memblock_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void __init free_pgt_page(void *pgt, void *dummy)
+{
+	return memblock_free(pgt, PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Make sure asm_acpi_mp_play_dead() is present in the identity mapping at
+ * the same place as in the kernel page tables. asm_acpi_mp_play_dead() switches
+ * to the identity mapping and the function has be present at the same spot in
+ * the virtual address space before and after switching page tables.
+ */
+static int __init init_transition_pgtable(pgd_t *pgd)
+{
+	pgprot_t prot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC_NOENC;
+	unsigned long vaddr, paddr;
+	p4d_t *p4d;
+	pud_t *pud;
+	pmd_t *pmd;
+	pte_t *pte;
+
+	vaddr = (unsigned long)asm_acpi_mp_play_dead;
+	pgd += pgd_index(vaddr);
+	if (!pgd_present(*pgd)) {
+		p4d = (p4d_t *)alloc_pgt_page(NULL);
+		if (!p4d)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(p4d) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
+	}
+	p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, vaddr);
+	if (!p4d_present(*p4d)) {
+		pud = (pud_t *)alloc_pgt_page(NULL);
+		if (!pud)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(__pa(pud) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
+	}
+	pud = pud_offset(p4d, vaddr);
+	if (!pud_present(*pud)) {
+		pmd = (pmd_t *)alloc_pgt_page(NULL);
+		if (!pmd)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		set_pud(pud, __pud(__pa(pmd) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
+	}
+	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, vaddr);
+	if (!pmd_present(*pmd)) {
+		pte = (pte_t *)alloc_pgt_page(NULL);
+		if (!pte)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(__pa(pte) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
+	}
+	pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, vaddr);
+
+	paddr = __pa(vaddr);
+	set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, prot));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init acpi_mp_setup_reset(u64 reset_vector)
+{
+	pgd_t *pgd;
+	struct x86_mapping_info info = {
+		.alloc_pgt_page = alloc_pgt_page,
+		.free_pgt_page	= free_pgt_page,
+		.page_flag      = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC,
+		.kernpg_flag    = _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC,
+	};
+
+	pgd = alloc_pgt_page(NULL);
+	if (!pgd)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (int i = 0; i < nr_pfn_mapped; i++) {
+		unsigned long mstart, mend;
+
+		mstart = pfn_mapped[i].start << PAGE_SHIFT;
+		mend   = pfn_mapped[i].end << PAGE_SHIFT;
+		if (kernel_ident_mapping_init(&info, pgd, mstart, mend)) {
+			kernel_ident_mapping_free(&info, pgd);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (kernel_ident_mapping_init(&info, pgd,
+				      PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN(reset_vector),
+				      PAGE_ALIGN(reset_vector + 1))) {
+		kernel_ident_mapping_free(&info, pgd);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (init_transition_pgtable(pgd)) {
+		kernel_ident_mapping_free(&info, pgd);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	smp_ops.play_dead = acpi_mp_play_dead;
+	smp_ops.stop_this_cpu = acpi_mp_stop_this_cpu;
+	smp_ops.cpu_die = acpi_mp_cpu_die;
+
+	acpi_mp_reset_vector_paddr = reset_vector;
+	acpi_mp_pgd = __pa(pgd);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int acpi_wakeup_cpu(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_ip)
 {
 	if (!acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr) {
@@ -97,14 +254,37 @@ int __init acpi_parse_mp_wake(union acpi_subtable_headers *header,
 	struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup *mp_wake;
 
 	mp_wake = (struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup *)header;
-	if (BAD_MADT_ENTRY(mp_wake, end))
+
+	/*
+	 * Cannot use the standard BAD_MADT_ENTRY() to sanity check the @mp_wake
+	 * entry.  'sizeof (struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup)' can be larger
+	 * than the actual size of the MP wakeup entry in ACPI table because the
+	 * 'reset_vector' is only available in the V1 MP wakeup structure.
+	 */
+	if (!mp_wake)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (end - (unsigned long)mp_wake < ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_SIZE_V0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (mp_wake->header.length < ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_SIZE_V0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	acpi_table_print_madt_entry(&header->common);
 
 	acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr = mp_wake->mailbox_address;
 
-	acpi_mp_disable_offlining(mp_wake);
+	if (mp_wake->version >= ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_VERSION_V1 &&
+	    mp_wake->header.length >= ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_SIZE_V1) {
+		if (acpi_mp_setup_reset(mp_wake->reset_vector)) {
+			pr_warn("Failed to setup MADT reset vector\n");
+			acpi_mp_disable_offlining(mp_wake);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * CPU offlining requires version 1 of the ACPI MADT wakeup
+		 * structure.
+		 */
+		acpi_mp_disable_offlining(mp_wake);
+	}
 
 	apic_update_callback(wakeup_secondary_cpu_64, acpi_wakeup_cpu);
 
diff --git a/include/acpi/actbl2.h b/include/acpi/actbl2.h
index e1a395af7591..2aedda70ef88 100644
--- a/include/acpi/actbl2.h
+++ b/include/acpi/actbl2.h
@@ -1120,8 +1120,20 @@ struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup {
 	u16 version;
 	u32 reserved;		/* reserved - must be zero */
 	u64 mailbox_address;
+	u64 reset_vector;
 };
 
+/* Values for Version field above */
+
+enum acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup_version {
+	ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_VERSION_NONE = 0,
+	ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_VERSION_V1 = 1,
+	ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_VERSION_RESERVED = 2, /* 2 and greater are reserved */
+};
+
+#define ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_SIZE_V0	16
+#define ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_SIZE_V1	24
+
 #define ACPI_MULTIPROC_WAKEUP_MB_OS_SIZE        2032
 #define ACPI_MULTIPROC_WAKEUP_MB_FIRMWARE_SIZE  2048
 
@@ -1134,7 +1146,8 @@ struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup_mailbox {
 	u8 reserved_firmware[ACPI_MULTIPROC_WAKEUP_MB_FIRMWARE_SIZE];	/* reserved for firmware use */
 };
 
-#define ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_WAKEUP    1
+#define ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_WAKEUP	1
+#define ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_TEST	2
 
 /* 17: CPU Core Interrupt Controller (ACPI 6.5) */
 
-- 
2.43.0

Re: [PATCHv6 16/16] x86/acpi: Add support for CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup method

[Huang, Kai]

On Wed, 2024-01-24 at 14:55 +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> MADT Multiprocessor Wakeup structure version 1 brings support of CPU
> offlining: BIOS provides a reset vector where the CPU has to jump to
> for offlining itself. The new TEST mailbox command can be used to test
> whether the CPU offlined itself which means the BIOS has control over
> the CPU and can online it again via the ACPI MADT wakeup method.
> 
> Add CPU offling support for the ACPI MADT wakeup method by implementing
> custom cpu_die(), play_dead() and stop_this_cpu() SMP operations.
> 
> CPU offlining makes is possible to hand over secondary CPUs over kexec,
> not limiting the second kernel to a single CPU.
> 
> The change conforms to the approved ACPI spec change proposal. See the
> Link.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/13356251.uLZWGnKmhe@kreacher

FWIW:

Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>

[...]

> +
> +static int __init acpi_mp_setup_reset(u64 reset_vector)
> +{
> +	pgd_t *pgd;
> +	struct x86_mapping_info info = {
> +		.alloc_pgt_page = alloc_pgt_page,
> +		.free_pgt_page	= free_pgt_page,
> +		.page_flag      = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC,
> +		.kernpg_flag    = _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC,
> +	};

Nit: Reverse Christmas-tree style

[...]

>  
> -#define ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_WAKEUP    1
> +#define ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_WAKEUP	1

Nit: Is this change intended?

> +#define ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_TEST	2
> 

Re: [PATCHv6 16/16] x86/acpi: Add support for CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup method

[kirill.shutemov]

On Fri, Jan 26, 2024 at 02:21:30PM +0000, Huang, Kai wrote:
> > +static int __init acpi_mp_setup_reset(u64 reset_vector)
> > +{
> > +	pgd_t *pgd;
> > +	struct x86_mapping_info info = {
> > +		.alloc_pgt_page = alloc_pgt_page,
> > +		.free_pgt_page	= free_pgt_page,
> > +		.page_flag      = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC,
> > +		.kernpg_flag    = _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC,
> > +	};
> 
> Nit: Reverse Christmas-tree style
> 
> [...]

Okay, will fix if new version is required.

> >  
> > -#define ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_WAKEUP    1
> > +#define ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_WAKEUP	1
> 
> Nit: Is this change intended?

Yes. Changed to indentation with tabs.

-- 
  Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov

Re: [PATCHv6 16/16] x86/acpi: Add support for CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup method

[Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan]

On 1/24/24 4:55 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> MADT Multiprocessor Wakeup structure version 1 brings support of CPU
> offlining: BIOS provides a reset vector where the CPU has to jump to
> for offlining itself. The new TEST mailbox command can be used to test
> whether the CPU offlined itself which means the BIOS has control over
> the CPU and can online it again via the ACPI MADT wakeup method.
>
> Add CPU offling support for the ACPI MADT wakeup method by implementing
> custom cpu_die(), play_dead() and stop_this_cpu() SMP operations.
>
> CPU offlining makes is possible to hand over secondary CPUs over kexec,
> not limiting the second kernel to a single CPU.
>
> The change conforms to the approved ACPI spec change proposal. See the
> Link.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/13356251.uLZWGnKmhe@kreacher
> ---

Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>

>  arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h          |   2 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile        |   2 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.S |  28 ++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c   | 184 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  include/acpi/actbl2.h                |  15 ++-
>  5 files changed, 227 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.S
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
> index 2625b915ae7f..021cafa214c2 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
> @@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ union acpi_subtable_headers;
>  int __init acpi_parse_mp_wake(union acpi_subtable_headers *header,
>  			      const unsigned long end);
>  
> +void asm_acpi_mp_play_dead(u64 reset_vector, u64 pgd_pa);
> +
>  /*
>   * Check if the CPU can handle C2 and deeper
>   */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile
> index 8c7329c88a75..37b1f28846de 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile
> @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI)			+= boot.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_SLEEP)		+= sleep.o wakeup_$(BITS).o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_APEI)			+= apei.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_CPPC_LIB)		+= cppc.o
> -obj-$(CONFIG_X86_ACPI_MADT_WAKEUP)	+= madt_wakeup.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_ACPI_MADT_WAKEUP)	+= madt_wakeup.o madt_playdead.o
>  
>  ifneq ($(CONFIG_ACPI_PROCESSOR),)
>  obj-y					+= cstate.o
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.S b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.S
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..4e498d28cdc8
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.S
> @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +#include <linux/linkage.h>
> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
> +#include <asm/page_types.h>
> +#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
> +
> +	.text
> +	.align PAGE_SIZE
> +
> +/*
> + * asm_acpi_mp_play_dead() - Hand over control of the CPU to the BIOS
> + *
> + * rdi: Address of the ACPI MADT MPWK ResetVector
> + * rsi: PGD of the identity mapping
> + */
> +SYM_FUNC_START(asm_acpi_mp_play_dead)
> +	/* Turn off global entries. Following CR3 write will flush them. */
> +	movq	%cr4, %rdx
> +	andq	$~(X86_CR4_PGE), %rdx
> +	movq	%rdx, %cr4
> +
> +	/* Switch to identity mapping */
> +	movq	%rsi, %cr3
> +
> +	/* Jump to reset vector */
> +	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
> +	jmp	*%rdi
> +SYM_FUNC_END(asm_acpi_mp_play_dead)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
> index 30820f9de5af..9e984e2191ba 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
> @@ -1,10 +1,19 @@
>  // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
>  #include <linux/acpi.h>
>  #include <linux/cpu.h>
> +#include <linux/delay.h>
>  #include <linux/io.h>
> +#include <linux/kexec.h>
> +#include <linux/memblock.h>
> +#include <linux/pgtable.h>
> +#include <linux/sched/hotplug.h>
>  #include <asm/apic.h>
>  #include <asm/barrier.h>
> +#include <asm/init.h>
> +#include <asm/intel_pt.h>
> +#include <asm/nmi.h>
>  #include <asm/processor.h>
> +#include <asm/reboot.h>
>  
>  /* Physical address of the Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure mailbox */
>  static u64 acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr __ro_after_init;
> @@ -12,6 +21,154 @@ static u64 acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr __ro_after_init;
>  /* Virtual address of the Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure mailbox */
>  static struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup_mailbox *acpi_mp_wake_mailbox __ro_after_init;
>  
> +static u64 acpi_mp_pgd __ro_after_init;
> +static u64 acpi_mp_reset_vector_paddr __ro_after_init;
> +
> +static void acpi_mp_stop_this_cpu(void)
> +{
> +	asm_acpi_mp_play_dead(acpi_mp_reset_vector_paddr, acpi_mp_pgd);
> +}
> +
> +static void acpi_mp_play_dead(void)
> +{
> +	play_dead_common();
> +	asm_acpi_mp_play_dead(acpi_mp_reset_vector_paddr, acpi_mp_pgd);
> +}
> +
> +static void acpi_mp_cpu_die(unsigned int cpu)
> +{
> +	u32 apicid = per_cpu(x86_cpu_to_apicid, cpu);
> +	unsigned long timeout;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Use TEST mailbox command to prove that BIOS got control over
> +	 * the CPU before declaring it dead.
> +	 *
> +	 * BIOS has to clear 'command' field of the mailbox.
> +	 */
> +	acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->apic_id = apicid;
> +	smp_store_release(&acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->command,
> +			  ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_TEST);
> +
> +	/* Don't wait longer than a second. */
> +	timeout = USEC_PER_SEC;
> +	while (READ_ONCE(acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->command) && --timeout)
> +		udelay(1);
> +
> +	if (!timeout)
Nit: IMO, since you are dumping failure error message (not timeout
message), you can use non zero acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->command
check. But it is up to you.
> +		pr_err("Failed to hand over CPU %d to BIOS\n", cpu);
> +}
> +
> +/* The argument is required to match type of x86_mapping_info::alloc_pgt_page */
> +static void __init *alloc_pgt_page(void *dummy)
> +{
> +	return memblock_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
> +}
> +
> +static void __init free_pgt_page(void *pgt, void *dummy)
> +{
> +	return memblock_free(pgt, PAGE_SIZE);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Make sure asm_acpi_mp_play_dead() is present in the identity mapping at
> + * the same place as in the kernel page tables. asm_acpi_mp_play_dead() switches
> + * to the identity mapping and the function has be present at the same spot in
> + * the virtual address space before and after switching page tables.
> + */
> +static int __init init_transition_pgtable(pgd_t *pgd)
> +{
> +	pgprot_t prot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC_NOENC;
> +	unsigned long vaddr, paddr;
> +	p4d_t *p4d;
> +	pud_t *pud;
> +	pmd_t *pmd;
> +	pte_t *pte;
> +
> +	vaddr = (unsigned long)asm_acpi_mp_play_dead;
> +	pgd += pgd_index(vaddr);
> +	if (!pgd_present(*pgd)) {
> +		p4d = (p4d_t *)alloc_pgt_page(NULL);
> +		if (!p4d)
> +			return -ENOMEM;
> +		set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(p4d) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
> +	}
> +	p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, vaddr);
> +	if (!p4d_present(*p4d)) {
> +		pud = (pud_t *)alloc_pgt_page(NULL);
> +		if (!pud)
> +			return -ENOMEM;
> +		set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(__pa(pud) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
> +	}
> +	pud = pud_offset(p4d, vaddr);
> +	if (!pud_present(*pud)) {
> +		pmd = (pmd_t *)alloc_pgt_page(NULL);
> +		if (!pmd)
> +			return -ENOMEM;
> +		set_pud(pud, __pud(__pa(pmd) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
> +	}
> +	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, vaddr);
> +	if (!pmd_present(*pmd)) {
> +		pte = (pte_t *)alloc_pgt_page(NULL);
> +		if (!pte)
> +			return -ENOMEM;
> +		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(__pa(pte) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
> +	}
> +	pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, vaddr);
> +
> +	paddr = __pa(vaddr);
> +	set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, prot));
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int __init acpi_mp_setup_reset(u64 reset_vector)
> +{
> +	pgd_t *pgd;
> +	struct x86_mapping_info info = {
> +		.alloc_pgt_page = alloc_pgt_page,
> +		.free_pgt_page	= free_pgt_page,
> +		.page_flag      = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC,
> +		.kernpg_flag    = _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC,
> +	};
> +
> +	pgd = alloc_pgt_page(NULL);
> +	if (!pgd)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	for (int i = 0; i < nr_pfn_mapped; i++) {
> +		unsigned long mstart, mend;
> +
> +		mstart = pfn_mapped[i].start << PAGE_SHIFT;
> +		mend   = pfn_mapped[i].end << PAGE_SHIFT;
> +		if (kernel_ident_mapping_init(&info, pgd, mstart, mend)) {
> +			kernel_ident_mapping_free(&info, pgd);
> +			return -ENOMEM;
> +		}
> +	}
> +
> +	if (kernel_ident_mapping_init(&info, pgd,
> +				      PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN(reset_vector),
> +				      PAGE_ALIGN(reset_vector + 1))) {
> +		kernel_ident_mapping_free(&info, pgd);
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (init_transition_pgtable(pgd)) {
> +		kernel_ident_mapping_free(&info, pgd);
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +	}
> +
> +	smp_ops.play_dead = acpi_mp_play_dead;
> +	smp_ops.stop_this_cpu = acpi_mp_stop_this_cpu;
> +	smp_ops.cpu_die = acpi_mp_cpu_die;
> +
> +	acpi_mp_reset_vector_paddr = reset_vector;
> +	acpi_mp_pgd = __pa(pgd);
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  static int acpi_wakeup_cpu(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_ip)
>  {
>  	if (!acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr) {
> @@ -97,14 +254,37 @@ int __init acpi_parse_mp_wake(union acpi_subtable_headers *header,
>  	struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup *mp_wake;
>  
>  	mp_wake = (struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup *)header;
> -	if (BAD_MADT_ENTRY(mp_wake, end))
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Cannot use the standard BAD_MADT_ENTRY() to sanity check the @mp_wake
> +	 * entry.  'sizeof (struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup)' can be larger
> +	 * than the actual size of the MP wakeup entry in ACPI table because the
> +	 * 'reset_vector' is only available in the V1 MP wakeup structure.
> +	 */
> +	if (!mp_wake)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	if (end - (unsigned long)mp_wake < ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_SIZE_V0)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	if (mp_wake->header.length < ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_SIZE_V0)
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
>  	acpi_table_print_madt_entry(&header->common);
>  
>  	acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr = mp_wake->mailbox_address;
>  
> -	acpi_mp_disable_offlining(mp_wake);
> +	if (mp_wake->version >= ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_VERSION_V1 &&
> +	    mp_wake->header.length >= ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_SIZE_V1) {
> +		if (acpi_mp_setup_reset(mp_wake->reset_vector)) {
> +			pr_warn("Failed to setup MADT reset vector\n");
> +			acpi_mp_disable_offlining(mp_wake);
> +		}
> +	} else {
> +		/*
> +		 * CPU offlining requires version 1 of the ACPI MADT wakeup
> +		 * structure.
> +		 */
> +		acpi_mp_disable_offlining(mp_wake);
> +	}
>  
>  	apic_update_callback(wakeup_secondary_cpu_64, acpi_wakeup_cpu);
>  
> diff --git a/include/acpi/actbl2.h b/include/acpi/actbl2.h
> index e1a395af7591..2aedda70ef88 100644
> --- a/include/acpi/actbl2.h
> +++ b/include/acpi/actbl2.h
> @@ -1120,8 +1120,20 @@ struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup {
>  	u16 version;
>  	u32 reserved;		/* reserved - must be zero */
>  	u64 mailbox_address;
> +	u64 reset_vector;
>  };
>  
> +/* Values for Version field above */
> +
> +enum acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup_version {
> +	ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_VERSION_NONE = 0,
> +	ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_VERSION_V1 = 1,
> +	ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_VERSION_RESERVED = 2, /* 2 and greater are reserved */
> +};
> +
> +#define ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_SIZE_V0	16
> +#define ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_SIZE_V1	24
> +
>  #define ACPI_MULTIPROC_WAKEUP_MB_OS_SIZE        2032
>  #define ACPI_MULTIPROC_WAKEUP_MB_FIRMWARE_SIZE  2048
>  
> @@ -1134,7 +1146,8 @@ struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup_mailbox {
>  	u8 reserved_firmware[ACPI_MULTIPROC_WAKEUP_MB_FIRMWARE_SIZE];	/* reserved for firmware use */
>  };
>  
> -#define ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_WAKEUP    1
> +#define ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_WAKEUP	1
> +#define ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_TEST	2
>  
>  /* 17: CPU Core Interrupt Controller (ACPI 6.5) */
>  

-- 
Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
Linux Kernel Developer

Re: [PATCHv6 16/16] x86/acpi: Add support for CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup method

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

On Fri, Jan 26, 2024 at 12:03:14PM -0800, Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan wrote:
> > +	/* Don't wait longer than a second. */
> > +	timeout = USEC_PER_SEC;
> > +	while (READ_ONCE(acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->command) && --timeout)
> > +		udelay(1);
> > +
> > +	if (!timeout)
> Nit: IMO, since you are dumping failure error message (not timeout
> message), you can use non zero acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->command
> check. But it is up to you.

I think my version is pretty idiomatic. The same pattern used in other
places. For instance, test_nmi_ipi().
-- 
  Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov

Re: [PATCHv6 00/16] x86/tdx: Add kexec support

[Paolo Bonzini]

On 1/24/24 13:55, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> The patchset adds bits and pieces to get kexec (and crashkernel) work on
> TDX guest.
> 
> The last patch implements CPU offlining according to the approved ACPI
> spec change poposal[1]. It unlocks kexec with all CPUs visible in the target
> kernel. It requires BIOS-side enabling. If it missing we fallback to booting
> 2nd kernel with single CPU.
> 
> Please review. I would be glad for any feedback.

Hi Kirill,

I have a very basic question: is there a reason why this series does not 
revert commit cb8eb06d50fc, "x86/virt/tdx: Disable TDX host support when 
kexec is enabled"?

Thanks,

Paolo

Re: [PATCHv6 00/16] x86/tdx: Add kexec support

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

On Tue, Jan 30, 2024 at 02:43:15PM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 1/24/24 13:55, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > The patchset adds bits and pieces to get kexec (and crashkernel) work on
> > TDX guest.
> > 
> > The last patch implements CPU offlining according to the approved ACPI
> > spec change poposal[1]. It unlocks kexec with all CPUs visible in the target
> > kernel. It requires BIOS-side enabling. If it missing we fallback to booting
> > 2nd kernel with single CPU.
> > 
> > Please review. I would be glad for any feedback.
> 
> Hi Kirill,
> 
> I have a very basic question: is there a reason why this series does not
> revert commit cb8eb06d50fc, "x86/virt/tdx: Disable TDX host support when
> kexec is enabled"?

My patchset enables kexec for TDX guest. The commit you refer blocks kexec
for host. TDX host and guest have totally different problems with handling
kexec. Kai looks on how to get host kexec functional.

-- 
  Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov

Re: [PATCHv6 00/16] x86/tdx: Add kexec support

[Paolo Bonzini]

On Tue, Jan 30, 2024 at 3:34 PM Kirill A. Shutemov
<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jan 30, 2024 at 02:43:15PM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > On 1/24/24 13:55, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > > The patchset adds bits and pieces to get kexec (and crashkernel) work on
> > > TDX guest.
> > >
> > > The last patch implements CPU offlining according to the approved ACPI
> > > spec change poposal[1]. It unlocks kexec with all CPUs visible in the target
> > > kernel. It requires BIOS-side enabling. If it missing we fallback to booting
> > > 2nd kernel with single CPU.
> > >
> > > Please review. I would be glad for any feedback.
> >
> > Hi Kirill,
> >
> > I have a very basic question: is there a reason why this series does not
> > revert commit cb8eb06d50fc, "x86/virt/tdx: Disable TDX host support when
> > kexec is enabled"?
>
> My patchset enables kexec for TDX guest. The commit you refer blocks kexec
> for host. TDX host and guest have totally different problems with handling
> kexec. Kai looks on how to get host kexec functional.

Yeah, that was right there in the cover letter (and I should have
gotten a clue from the many references to CC_* constants...). Somebody
pointed me to this series as "the TDX kexec series from Intel" and I
had some tunnel vision issues. Sorry for the noise!

But since I have your attention, do you have a pointer to the
corresponding edk2 series? Thanks,

Paolo

Re: [PATCHv6 00/16] x86/tdx: Add kexec support

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

On Tue, Jan 30, 2024 at 03:59:34PM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 30, 2024 at 3:34 PM Kirill A. Shutemov
> <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Jan 30, 2024 at 02:43:15PM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > > On 1/24/24 13:55, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > > > The patchset adds bits and pieces to get kexec (and crashkernel) work on
> > > > TDX guest.
> > > >
> > > > The last patch implements CPU offlining according to the approved ACPI
> > > > spec change poposal[1]. It unlocks kexec with all CPUs visible in the target
> > > > kernel. It requires BIOS-side enabling. If it missing we fallback to booting
> > > > 2nd kernel with single CPU.
> > > >
> > > > Please review. I would be glad for any feedback.
> > >
> > > Hi Kirill,
> > >
> > > I have a very basic question: is there a reason why this series does not
> > > revert commit cb8eb06d50fc, "x86/virt/tdx: Disable TDX host support when
> > > kexec is enabled"?
> >
> > My patchset enables kexec for TDX guest. The commit you refer blocks kexec
> > for host. TDX host and guest have totally different problems with handling
> > kexec. Kai looks on how to get host kexec functional.
> 
> Yeah, that was right there in the cover letter (and I should have
> gotten a clue from the many references to CC_* constants...). Somebody
> pointed me to this series as "the TDX kexec series from Intel" and I
> had some tunnel vision issues. Sorry for the noise!
> 
> But since I have your attention, do you have a pointer to the
> corresponding edk2 series?

Relevant code can be found here:

https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/commits/tdvf-kexec/

-- 
  Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov

RE: [PATCHv6 00/16] x86/tdx: Add kexec support

[Huang, Kai]

> Hi Kirill,
> 
> I have a very basic question: is there a reason why this series does not revert
> commit cb8eb06d50fc, "x86/virt/tdx: Disable TDX host support when kexec is
> enabled"?
> 

Hi Paolo,

(Sorry I am replying using Outlook)

This series is for TDX guest, but not TDX host.

For TDX host kexec support I am working on a series to address.  It's in Intel internal review but I plan to send it out soon.

Things got a little bit late behind original schedule because currently I am in travel for Chinese New Year and sometimes not convenient to get access to Linux machine or even network.

Re: [PATCHv6 00/16] x86/tdx: Add kexec support

[Nikolay Borisov]

On 30.01.24 г. 15:43 ч., Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 1/24/24 13:55, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>> The patchset adds bits and pieces to get kexec (and crashkernel) work on
>> TDX guest.
>>
>> The last patch implements CPU offlining according to the approved ACPI
>> spec change poposal[1]. It unlocks kexec with all CPUs visible in the 
>> target
>> kernel. It requires BIOS-side enabling. If it missing we fallback to 
>> booting
>> 2nd kernel with single CPU.
>>
>> Please review. I would be glad for any feedback.
> 
> Hi Kirill,
> 
> I have a very basic question: is there a reason why this series does not 
> revert commit cb8eb06d50fc, "x86/virt/tdx: Disable TDX host support when 
> kexec is enabled"?

While on the topic, Paolo do you think it's  better to have a runtime 
disable of kexec rather than at compile time:

[RFC PATCH] x86/virt/tdx: Disable KEXEC in the presence of TDX

20240118160118.1899299-1-nik.borisov@suse.com

I'm trying to get traction for this patch.


> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Paolo
> 
> 

Re: [PATCHv6 00/16] x86/tdx: Add kexec support

[Baoquan He]

On 01/31/24 at 09:31am, Nikolay Borisov wrote:
> 
> 
> On 30.01.24 г. 15:43 ч., Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > On 1/24/24 13:55, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > > The patchset adds bits and pieces to get kexec (and crashkernel) work on
> > > TDX guest.
> > > 
> > > The last patch implements CPU offlining according to the approved ACPI
> > > spec change poposal[1]. It unlocks kexec with all CPUs visible in
> > > the target
> > > kernel. It requires BIOS-side enabling. If it missing we fallback to
> > > booting
> > > 2nd kernel with single CPU.
> > > 
> > > Please review. I would be glad for any feedback.
> > 
> > Hi Kirill,
> > 
> > I have a very basic question: is there a reason why this series does not
> > revert commit cb8eb06d50fc, "x86/virt/tdx: Disable TDX host support when
> > kexec is enabled"?
> 
> While on the topic, Paolo do you think it's  better to have a runtime
> disable of kexec rather than at compile time:
> 
> [RFC PATCH] x86/virt/tdx: Disable KEXEC in the presence of TDX
> 
> 20240118160118.1899299-1-nik.borisov@suse.com

Runtime disabling kexec looks better than at cmpile time, esp for
distros. While from above patch, making using of kexec_load_disabled to 
achive the runtime disabling may not be so good. Because we have a front
door to enable it through:

/proc/sys/kernel/kexec_load_disabled

If there's a flag or status to check if TDX host is enabled, and does
the checking in kexec_load_permitted(), that could be better. Anyway, I
saw Huang, Kai has posted the tdx host support patchset.

> 
> I'm trying to get traction for this patch.
> 
> 
> > 
> > Thanks,
> > 
> > Paolo
> > 
> > 
> 

Re: [PATCHv6 00/16] x86/tdx: Add kexec support

[Nikolay Borisov]

On 31.01.24 г. 14:47 ч., Baoquan He wrote:
> On 01/31/24 at 09:31am, Nikolay Borisov wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 30.01.24 г. 15:43 ч., Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>>> On 1/24/24 13:55, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>>>> The patchset adds bits and pieces to get kexec (and crashkernel) work on
>>>> TDX guest.
>>>>
>>>> The last patch implements CPU offlining according to the approved ACPI
>>>> spec change poposal[1]. It unlocks kexec with all CPUs visible in
>>>> the target
>>>> kernel. It requires BIOS-side enabling. If it missing we fallback to
>>>> booting
>>>> 2nd kernel with single CPU.
>>>>
>>>> Please review. I would be glad for any feedback.
>>>
>>> Hi Kirill,
>>>
>>> I have a very basic question: is there a reason why this series does not
>>> revert commit cb8eb06d50fc, "x86/virt/tdx: Disable TDX host support when
>>> kexec is enabled"?
>>
>> While on the topic, Paolo do you think it's  better to have a runtime
>> disable of kexec rather than at compile time:
>>
>> [RFC PATCH] x86/virt/tdx: Disable KEXEC in the presence of TDX
>>
>> 20240118160118.1899299-1-nik.borisov@suse.com
> 
> Runtime disabling kexec looks better than at cmpile time, esp for
> distros. While from above patch, making using of kexec_load_disabled to
> achive the runtime disabling may not be so good. Because we have a front
> door to enable it through:
> 
> /proc/sys/kernel/kexec_load_disabled

AFAIU it can't be enabled via this sysctl because the handler for it 
expects only 1 to be written to it:

      2                 .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax, 

      1                 .extra1         = SYSCTL_ONE, 

   994                  .extra2         = SYSCTL_ONE,

> 
> If there's a flag or status to check if TDX host is enabled, and does
> the checking in kexec_load_permitted(), that could be better. Anyway, I
> saw Huang, Kai has posted the tdx host support patchset.
> 
>>
>> I'm trying to get traction for this patch.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>>
>>> Paolo
>>>
>>>
>>
> 

RE: [PATCHv6 00/16] x86/tdx: Add kexec support

[Huang, Kai]

> > Runtime disabling kexec looks better than at cmpile time, esp for
> > distros. While from above patch, making using of kexec_load_disabled
> > to achive the runtime disabling may not be so good. Because we have a
> > front door to enable it through:
> >
> > /proc/sys/kernel/kexec_load_disabled
> 
> AFAIU it can't be enabled via this sysctl because the handler for it expects
> only 1 to be written to it:
> 
>       2                 .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
> 
>       1                 .extra1         = SYSCTL_ONE,
> 
>    994                  .extra2         = SYSCTL_ONE,
> 

This is also my understanding.  

The documentation also says once it is turned to disable we cannot turn back again:

kexec_load_disable
===================

A toggle indicating if the syscalls ``kexec_load`` and
``kexec_file_load`` have been disabled.
This value defaults to 0 (false: ``kexec_*load`` enabled), but can be
set to 1 (true: ``kexec_*load`` disabled).
Once true, kexec can no longer be used, and the toggle cannot be set
back to false.
......

Re: [PATCHv6 00/16] x86/tdx: Add kexec support

[Baoquan He]

On 01/31/24 at 01:07pm, Huang, Kai wrote:
> > > Runtime disabling kexec looks better than at cmpile time, esp for
> > > distros. While from above patch, making using of kexec_load_disabled
> > > to achive the runtime disabling may not be so good. Because we have a
> > > front door to enable it through:
> > >
> > > /proc/sys/kernel/kexec_load_disabled
> > 
> > AFAIU it can't be enabled via this sysctl because the handler for it expects
> > only 1 to be written to it:
> > 
> >       2                 .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
> > 
> >       1                 .extra1         = SYSCTL_ONE,
> > 
> >    994                  .extra2         = SYSCTL_ONE,
> > 
> 
> This is also my understanding.  
> 
> The documentation also says once it is turned to disable we cannot turn back again:
> 
> kexec_load_disable
> ===================
> 
> A toggle indicating if the syscalls ``kexec_load`` and
> ``kexec_file_load`` have been disabled.
> This value defaults to 0 (false: ``kexec_*load`` enabled), but can be
> set to 1 (true: ``kexec_*load`` disabled).
> Once true, kexec can no longer be used, and the toggle cannot be set
> back to false.

you are quite right, I have never noticed this, thanks.

Then then mentioned patch looks good to me.