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* [PATCH v7 00/11] Retpoline: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel
@ 2018-01-09 14:43 David Woodhouse
  2018-01-09 14:43 ` [PATCH v7 01/11] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support David Woodhouse
                   ` (10 more replies)
  0 siblings, 11 replies; 65+ messages in thread
From: David Woodhouse @ 2018-01-09 14:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andi Kleen
  Cc: Paul Turner, LKML, Linus Torvalds, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Tim Chen,
	Dave Hansen, tglx, Kees Cook, Rik van Riel, Peter Zijlstra,
	Andy Lutomirski, Jiri Kosina, gnomes, x86

This is a mitigation for the 'variant 2' attack described in
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html

Using GCC patches available from the hjl/indirect/gcc-7-branch/master
branch of https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commits/hjl and by manually
patching assembler code, all vulnerable indirect branches (that occur
after userspace first runs) are eliminated from the kernel.

They are replaced with a 'retpoline' call sequence which deliberately
prevents speculation.

Fedora 27 packages of the updated compiler are available at
https://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/taskinfo?taskID=24065739


v1: Initial post.
v2: Add CONFIG_RETPOLINE to build kernel without it.
    Change warning messages.
    Hide modpost warning message
v3: Update to the latest CET-capable retpoline version
    Reinstate ALTERNATIVE support
v4: Finish reconciling Andi's and my patch sets, bug fixes.
    Exclude objtool support for now
    Add 'noretpoline' boot option
    Add AMD retpoline alternative
v5: Silence MODVERSIONS warnings
    Use pause;jmp loop instead of lfence;jmp
    Switch to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE positive feature logic
    Emit thunks inline from assembler macros
    Merge AMD support into initial patch
v6: Update to latest GCC patches with no dots in symbols
    Fix MODVERSIONS properly(ish)
    Fix typo breaking 32-bit, introduced in V5
    Never set X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD yet, pending confirmation
v7: Further bikeshedding on macro names
    Stuff RSB on kernel entry
    Implement 'spectre_v2=' command line option for IBRS/IBPB too
    Revert to precisely the asm sequences from the Google paper

Andi Kleen (3):
  x86/retpoline: Temporarily disable objtool when CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y
  x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
  x86/retpoline: Avoid return buffer underflows on context switch

David Woodhouse (8):
  x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support
  x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation
  x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps
  x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps
  x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps
  x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps
  x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps
  x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps

 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  28 +++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                                |  17 ++-
 arch/x86/Kconfig.debug                          |   6 +-
 arch/x86/Makefile                               |  10 ++
 arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S               |   5 +-
 arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S     |   3 +-
 arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S    |   3 +-
 arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S       |   3 +-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S                       |  22 +++-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S                       |  29 ++++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h           |  25 ++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h              |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h                 |  18 +--
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h            | 158 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h            |   5 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      | 122 +++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S                     |   6 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S                     |   8 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c                        |   9 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c                         |   3 +
 arch/x86/lib/Makefile                           |   1 +
 arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S                      |   7 +-
 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S                        |  48 +++++++
 23 files changed, 499 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S

-- 
2.7.4

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 65+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v8 04/12] x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation
@ 2018-01-11 21:46 David Woodhouse
  2018-01-11 23:23 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 65+ messages in thread
From: David Woodhouse @ 2018-01-11 21:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andi Kleen
  Cc: Paul Turner, LKML, Linus Torvalds, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Tim Chen,
	Dave Hansen, tglx, Kees Cook, Rik van Riel, Peter Zijlstra,
	Andy Lutomirski, Jiri Kosina, gnomes, x86, thomas.lendacky,
	Josh Poimboeuf

Add a spectre_v2= option to select the mitigation used for the indirect
branch speculation vulnerability.

Currently, the only option available is retpoline, in its various forms.
This will be expanded to cover the new IBRS/IBPB microcode features.

The RETPOLINE_AMD feature relies on a serializing LFENCE for speculation
control. For AMD hardware, only set RETPOLINE_AMD if LFENCE is a
serializing instruction, which is indicated by the LFENCE_RDTSC feature.

[ tglx: Folded back the LFENCE/AMD fixes and reworked it so IBRS
  	integration becomes simple ]

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515508997-6154-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  28 +++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h            |  10 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      | 158 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                    |   4 -
 4 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 9059917..8122b5f 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2599,6 +2599,11 @@
 	nosmt		[KNL,S390] Disable symmetric multithreading (SMT).
 			Equivalent to smt=1.
 
+	nospectre_v2	[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
+			(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
+			allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
+			to spectre_v2=off.
+
 	noxsave		[BUGS=X86] Disables x86 extended register state save
 			and restore using xsave. The kernel will fallback to
 			enabling legacy floating-point and sse state.
@@ -3908,6 +3913,29 @@
 	sonypi.*=	[HW] Sony Programmable I/O Control Device driver
 			See Documentation/laptops/sonypi.txt
 
+	spectre_v2=	[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
+
+			on   - unconditionally enable
+			off  - unconditionally disable
+			auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is
+			       vulnerable
+
+			Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
+			mitigation method at run time according to the
+			CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
+			CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
+			compiler with which the kernel was built.
+
+			Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
+
+			retpoline	  - replace indirect branches
+			retpoline,generic - google's original retpoline
+			retpoline,amd     - AMD-specific minimal thunk
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			spectre_v2=auto.
+
 	spia_io_base=	[HW,MTD]
 	spia_fio_base=
 	spia_pedr=
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index e20e92e..ea034fa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -124,5 +124,15 @@
 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
 #endif
 
+/* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */
+enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
+	SPECTRE_V2_NONE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL,
+	SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD,
+	SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
+	SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD,
+	SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
+};
+
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 #endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 76ad6cb..e4dc261 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/utsname.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
+
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
 #include <asm/bugs.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
@@ -21,6 +24,8 @@
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/set_memory.h>
 
+static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
+
 void __init check_bugs(void)
 {
 	identify_boot_cpu();
@@ -30,6 +35,9 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 		print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
 	}
 
+	/* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
+	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 	/*
 	 * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
@@ -62,6 +70,153 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 #endif
 }
 
+/* The kernel command line selection */
+enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,
+};
+
+static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
+	[SPECTRE_V2_NONE]			= "Vulnerable",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL]		= "Vulnerable: Minimal generic ASM retpoline",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD]	= "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC]		= "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD]		= "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
+};
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 mitigation: " fmt
+
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+
+static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+		pr_info("%s\n", reason);
+}
+
+static void __init spec2_print_if_secure(const char *reason)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+		pr_info("%s\n", reason);
+}
+
+static inline bool retp_compiler(void)
+{
+	return __is_defined(RETPOLINE);
+}
+
+static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
+{
+	int len = strlen(opt);
+
+	return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
+}
+
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
+{
+	char arg[20];
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg,
+				  sizeof(arg));
+	if (ret > 0)  {
+		if (match_option(arg, ret, "off")) {
+			goto disable;
+		} else if (match_option(arg, ret, "on")) {
+			spec2_print_if_secure("force enabled on command line.");
+			return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE;
+		} else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline")) {
+			spec2_print_if_insecure("retpoline selected on command line.");
+			return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE;
+		} else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,amd")) {
+			if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
+				pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n");
+				return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+			}
+			spec2_print_if_insecure("AMD retpoline selected on command line.");
+			return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD;
+		} else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,generic")) {
+			spec2_print_if_insecure("generic retpoline selected on command line.");
+			return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC;
+		} else if (match_option(arg, ret, "auto")) {
+			return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+disable:
+	spec2_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
+	return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
+}
+
+static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
+	enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the CPU is not affected and the command line mode is NONE or AUTO
+	 * then nothing to do.
+	 */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) &&
+	    (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO))
+		return;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
+		return;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
+		/* FALLTRHU */
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
+		goto retpoline_auto;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD:
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
+			goto retpoline_amd;
+		break;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC:
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
+			goto retpoline_generic;
+		break;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE:
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
+			goto retpoline_auto;
+		break;
+	}
+	pr_err("kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
+	return;
+
+retpoline_auto:
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
+	retpoline_amd:
+		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
+			pr_err("LFENCE not serializing. Switching to generic retpoline\n");
+			goto retpoline_generic;
+		}
+		mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD :
+					 SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD;
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD);
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
+	} else {
+	retpoline_generic:
+		mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC :
+					 SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL;
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
+	}
+
+	spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
+	pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
 ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
 			  struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
@@ -86,6 +241,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
 {
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
 		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
-	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]);
 }
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 7a671d1..372ba3f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -905,10 +905,6 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
-	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
-#endif
-
 	fpu__init_system(c);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
-- 
2.7.4

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 65+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2018-01-11 23:28 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 65+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
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2018-01-09 14:43 [PATCH v7 00/11] Retpoline: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel David Woodhouse
2018-01-09 14:43 ` [PATCH v7 01/11] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support David Woodhouse
2018-01-09 15:55   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 17:34   ` tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 18:13   ` tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 18:40   ` tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-09 14:43 ` [PATCH v7 02/11] x86/retpoline: Temporarily disable objtool when CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y David Woodhouse
2018-01-09 15:56   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for Andi Kleen
2018-01-10  5:58   ` [PATCH v7 02/11] " Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-10 10:12     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-10 17:34   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for Andi Kleen
2018-01-10 18:13   ` tip-bot for Andi Kleen
2018-01-10 18:40   ` tip-bot for Andi Kleen
2018-01-09 14:43 ` [PATCH v7 03/11] x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation David Woodhouse
2018-01-09 15:56   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 17:35   ` tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 18:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-10 18:06       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 18:10         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 18:14   ` tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 18:33     ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-10 18:35       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 18:41   ` tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-09 14:43 ` [PATCH v7 04/11] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps David Woodhouse
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2018-01-09 14:43 ` [PATCH v7 05/11] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry " David Woodhouse
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2018-01-10  3:54   ` [v7, 05/11] " Andrei Vagin
2018-01-10  4:30     ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-10  4:39       ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-10  5:23         ` Andrei Vagin
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2018-01-09 14:43 ` [PATCH v7 07/11] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert " David Woodhouse
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2018-01-09 14:43 ` [PATCH v7 08/11] x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall " David Woodhouse
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2018-01-09 14:43 ` [PATCH v7 09/11] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler " David Woodhouse
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2018-01-09 14:43 ` [PATCH v7 10/11] x86/retpoline/irq32: " David Woodhouse
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2018-01-10 17:38   ` tip-bot for Andi Kleen
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2018-01-09 14:43 ` [PATCH v7 11/11] x86/retpoline: Avoid return buffer underflows on context switch David Woodhouse
2018-01-09 15:59   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for Andi Kleen
2018-01-11 21:46 [PATCH v8 04/12] x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation David Woodhouse
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