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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, matthew.garrett@nebula.com,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 04/16] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2016 21:47:45 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <147933286579.19316.5236862894522647474.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <147933283664.19316.12454053022687659937.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
only load signed bootloaders and kernels.  Certain use cases may also
require that all kernel modules also be signed.  Add a configuration option
that to lock down the kernel - which includes requiring validly signed
modules - if the kernel is secure-booted.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---

 arch/x86/Kconfig        |   12 ++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c |    7 +++++++
 kernel/module.c         |    2 +-
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index bada636d1065..5b19997d88d0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1786,6 +1786,18 @@ config EFI_MIXED
 
 	   If unsure, say N.
 
+config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN
+	def_bool n
+	depends on EFI
+	prompt "Lock down the kernel when UEFI Secure Boot is enabled"
+	---help---
+	  UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware
+	  will only load signed bootloaders and kernels.  Certain use cases may
+	  also require that all kernel modules also be signed and that
+	  userspace is prevented from directly changing the running kernel
+	  image.  Say Y here to automatically lock down the kernel when a
+	  system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled.
+
 config SECCOMP
 	def_bool y
 	prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 9c337b0e8ba7..9521acce8378 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
 #include <linux/crash_dump.h>
 #include <linux/tboot.h>
 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <video/edid.h>
 
@@ -1160,6 +1161,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
 
 	io_delay_init();
 
+	if (boot_params.secure_boot &&
+	    IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN)) {
+		lock_kernel_down();
+		pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration.
 	 */
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index f57dd63186e6..2a021c340efd 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2744,7 +2744,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 	}
 
 	/* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
-	if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce)
+	if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce && !kernel_is_locked_down())
 		err = 0;
 
 	return err;

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-11-16 21:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 101+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-11-16 21:47 [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2016-11-16 22:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-16 22:20     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-16 22:40   ` David Howells
2016-12-25 21:20   ` Pavel Machek
2016-12-25 21:44   ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-17 12:37   ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services David Howells
2016-11-22  0:31       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 10:20       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 10:20         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 14:17       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:58         ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 15:52         ` David Howells
2016-11-22 15:52           ` David Howells
2016-11-22 16:25           ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 16:25             ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 16:40           ` David Howells
2016-11-22 16:51             ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: " David Howells
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions David Howells
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-22 10:44       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 10:49         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-22 10:49           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-22 14:47       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 20:30         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23  0:02         ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:52       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:52         ` David Howells
2016-11-22 20:36         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 20:36           ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 14:57       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:57         ` David Howells
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells
2016-11-22 13:03       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2016-11-22 13:04       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 11:42   ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-21 11:42     ` David Howells
2016-11-21 11:52     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 11:52       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 12:41     ` David Howells
2016-11-21 12:41       ` David Howells
2016-11-21 13:14       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 15:17         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 15:17           ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 15:25           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 11:46   ` David Howells
2016-11-21 19:58     ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 03/16] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` David Howells [this message]
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2016-11-17 21:58   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 11:58     ` Josh Boyer
2016-11-18 12:10       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 12:10         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 17:28   ` David Howells
2016-11-18 17:28     ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 06/16] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 07/16] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 08/16] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 09/16] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 10/16] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 11/16] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48   ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 12/16] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 13/16] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 14/16] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49 ` [PATCH 15/16] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49 ` [PATCH 16/16] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49   ` David Howells
2016-11-16 22:27 ` [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-16 22:27   ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-21 19:53   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-30 14:27     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-16 22:28 ` Justin Forbes
2016-11-21 23:10 ` [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed David Howells
2016-11-22  6:12   ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-22  6:12     ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-23 12:58   ` David Howells
2016-11-23 19:21     ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-24 17:34     ` David Howells
2016-11-24 17:34       ` David Howells
2016-11-24 20:19       ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-25 14:49       ` David Howells
2016-11-28 22:32   ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-28 22:32     ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29  0:11   ` David Howells
2016-11-29  0:23     ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29 14:03     ` David Howells
2016-11-29 14:35       ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29 14:35         ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-30 14:41       ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-30 14:41         ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-30 16:25       ` David Howells
2016-11-30 16:25         ` David Howells
2016-11-29 10:40   ` David Howells

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