From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
srinivas.eeda@oracle.com, Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 03/38] x86/retpoline: Remove minimal retpoline support
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2022 15:13:16 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220310140808.238974462@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220310140808.136149678@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
commit ef014aae8f1cd2793e4e014bbb102bed53f852b7 upstream.
Now that CONFIG_RETPOLINE hard depends on compiler support, there is no
reason to keep the minimal retpoline support around which only provided
basic protection in the assembly files.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: <srinivas.eeda@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f06f0a89-5587-45db-8ed2-0a9d6638d5c0@default
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 --
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 13 ++-----------
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -223,8 +223,6 @@
/* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */
enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
SPECTRE_V2_NONE,
- SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL,
- SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD,
SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD,
SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED,
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -784,8 +784,6 @@ set_mode:
static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
[SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
- [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL] = "Vulnerable: Minimal generic ASM retpoline",
- [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD] = "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline",
[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
[SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
@@ -810,11 +808,6 @@ static void __init spec_v2_print_cond(co
pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason);
}
-static inline bool retp_compiler(void)
-{
- return __is_defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE);
-}
-
static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
{
enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
@@ -912,14 +905,12 @@ retpoline_auto:
pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n");
goto retpoline_generic;
}
- mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD :
- SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD;
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD;
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD);
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
} else {
retpoline_generic:
- mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC :
- SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL;
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC;
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-10 14:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-10 14:13 [PATCH 4.9 00/38] 4.9.306-rc2 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 01/38] x86/speculation: Add RETPOLINE_AMD support to the inline asm CALL_NOSPEC variant Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 02/38] x86/retpoline: Make CONFIG_RETPOLINE depend on compiler support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 04/38] Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 05/38] Documentation: Add swapgs description to the Spectre v1 documentation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 06/38] Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 07/38] x86/speculation: Merge one test in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 08/38] x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amd Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 09/38] x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 10/38] x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 11/38] Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 12/38] x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 13/38] x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 14/38] x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 15/38] x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 16/38] x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 17/38] arm/arm64: Provide a wrapper for SMCCC 1.1 calls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 18/38] arm/arm64: smccc/psci: add arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 19/38] ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 20/38] ARM: early traps initialisation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 21/38] ARM: use LOADADDR() to get load address of sections Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 22/38] ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 23/38] ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 24/38] ARM: fix build error when BPF_SYSCALL is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 25/38] ARM: fix co-processor register typo Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 26/38] ARM: Do not use NOCROSSREFS directive with ld.lld Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 27/38] x86/build: Fix compiler support check for CONFIG_RETPOLINE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 28/38] x86, modpost: Replace last remnants of RETPOLINE with CONFIG_RETPOLINE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 29/38] ARM: fix build warning in proc-v7-bugs.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 30/38] xen/xenbus: dont let xenbus_grant_ring() remove grants in error case Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 31/38] xen/grant-table: add gnttab_try_end_foreign_access() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 32/38] xen/blkfront: dont use gnttab_query_foreign_access() for mapped status Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 33/38] xen/netfront: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 34/38] xen/scsifront: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 35/38] xen/gntalloc: dont use gnttab_query_foreign_access() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 36/38] xen: remove gnttab_query_foreign_access() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 37/38] xen/gnttab: fix gnttab_end_foreign_access() without page specified Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 38/38] xen/netfront: react properly to failing gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 18:00 ` [PATCH 4.9 00/38] 4.9.306-rc2 review Pavel Machek
2022-03-10 18:48 ` Jon Hunter
2022-03-10 19:35 ` Shuah Khan
2022-03-10 20:14 ` Florian Fainelli
2022-03-11 1:13 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-03-11 13:35 ` Naresh Kamboju
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