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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>,
	Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>,
	Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 07/38] x86/speculation: Merge one test in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation()
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2022 15:13:20 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220310140808.351995623@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220310140808.136149678@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

commit a5ce9f2bb665d1d2b31f139a02dbaa2dfbb62fa6 upstream.

Merge the test whether the CPU supports STIBP into the test which
determines whether STIBP is required. Thus try to simplify what is
already an insane logic.

Remove a superfluous newline in a comment, while at it.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200615065806.GB14668@zn.tnic
[fllinden@amazon.com: fixed contextual conflict (comment) for 4.19]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |   13 ++++---------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -755,10 +755,12 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum s
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * If enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not
+	 * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not
 	 * required.
 	 */
-	if (!smt_possible || spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
+	    !smt_possible ||
+	    spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
 		return;
 
 	/*
@@ -770,12 +772,6 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum s
 	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON))
 		mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED;
 
-	/*
-	 * If STIBP is not available, clear the STIBP mode.
-	 */
-	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
-		mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
-
 	spectre_v2_user_stibp = mode;
 
 set_mode:
@@ -1254,7 +1250,6 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_stru
 		if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
 		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
 			return 0;
-
 		/*
 		 * With strict mode for both IBPB and STIBP, the instruction
 		 * code paths avoid checking this task flag and instead,



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-03-10 14:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-10 14:13 [PATCH 4.9 00/38] 4.9.306-rc2 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 01/38] x86/speculation: Add RETPOLINE_AMD support to the inline asm CALL_NOSPEC variant Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 02/38] x86/retpoline: Make CONFIG_RETPOLINE depend on compiler support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 03/38] x86/retpoline: Remove minimal retpoline support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 04/38] Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 05/38] Documentation: Add swapgs description to the Spectre v1 documentation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 06/38] Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 08/38] x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amd Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 09/38] x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 10/38] x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 11/38] Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 12/38] x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 13/38] x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 14/38] x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 15/38] x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 16/38] x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 17/38] arm/arm64: Provide a wrapper for SMCCC 1.1 calls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 18/38] arm/arm64: smccc/psci: add arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 19/38] ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 20/38] ARM: early traps initialisation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 21/38] ARM: use LOADADDR() to get load address of sections Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 22/38] ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 23/38] ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 24/38] ARM: fix build error when BPF_SYSCALL is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 25/38] ARM: fix co-processor register typo Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 26/38] ARM: Do not use NOCROSSREFS directive with ld.lld Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 27/38] x86/build: Fix compiler support check for CONFIG_RETPOLINE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 28/38] x86, modpost: Replace last remnants of RETPOLINE with CONFIG_RETPOLINE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 29/38] ARM: fix build warning in proc-v7-bugs.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 30/38] xen/xenbus: dont let xenbus_grant_ring() remove grants in error case Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 31/38] xen/grant-table: add gnttab_try_end_foreign_access() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 32/38] xen/blkfront: dont use gnttab_query_foreign_access() for mapped status Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 33/38] xen/netfront: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 34/38] xen/scsifront: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 35/38] xen/gntalloc: dont use gnttab_query_foreign_access() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 36/38] xen: remove gnttab_query_foreign_access() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 37/38] xen/gnttab: fix gnttab_end_foreign_access() without page specified Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 38/38] xen/netfront: react properly to failing gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 18:00 ` [PATCH 4.9 00/38] 4.9.306-rc2 review Pavel Machek
2022-03-10 18:48 ` Jon Hunter
2022-03-10 19:35 ` Shuah Khan
2022-03-10 20:14 ` Florian Fainelli
2022-03-11  1:13 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-03-11 13:35 ` Naresh Kamboju

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