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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 06/38] Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2022 15:13:19 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220310140808.323981477@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220310140808.136149678@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>

commit 82ca67321f55a8d1da6ac3ed611da3c32818bb37 upstream.

The config RANDOMIZE_SLAB does not exist, the authors probably intended to
refer to the config RANDOMIZE_BASE, which provides kernel address-space
randomization. They probably just confused SLAB with BASE (these two
four-letter words coincidentally share three common letters), as they also
point out the config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM as further randomization within
the same sentence.

Fix the reference of the config for kernel address-space randomization to
the config that provides that.

Fixes: 6e88559470f5 ("Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211230171940.27558-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/hw-vuln/spectre.rst |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/Documentation/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ Spectre variant 2
    before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits
    using the firmware.
 
-   Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y
+   Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y
    and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes
    attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.
 



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-03-10 14:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-10 14:13 [PATCH 4.9 00/38] 4.9.306-rc2 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 01/38] x86/speculation: Add RETPOLINE_AMD support to the inline asm CALL_NOSPEC variant Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 02/38] x86/retpoline: Make CONFIG_RETPOLINE depend on compiler support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 03/38] x86/retpoline: Remove minimal retpoline support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 04/38] Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 05/38] Documentation: Add swapgs description to the Spectre v1 documentation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 07/38] x86/speculation: Merge one test in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 08/38] x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amd Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 09/38] x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 10/38] x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 11/38] Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 12/38] x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 13/38] x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 14/38] x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 15/38] x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 16/38] x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 17/38] arm/arm64: Provide a wrapper for SMCCC 1.1 calls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 18/38] arm/arm64: smccc/psci: add arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 19/38] ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 20/38] ARM: early traps initialisation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 21/38] ARM: use LOADADDR() to get load address of sections Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 22/38] ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 23/38] ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 24/38] ARM: fix build error when BPF_SYSCALL is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 25/38] ARM: fix co-processor register typo Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 26/38] ARM: Do not use NOCROSSREFS directive with ld.lld Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 27/38] x86/build: Fix compiler support check for CONFIG_RETPOLINE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 28/38] x86, modpost: Replace last remnants of RETPOLINE with CONFIG_RETPOLINE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 29/38] ARM: fix build warning in proc-v7-bugs.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 30/38] xen/xenbus: dont let xenbus_grant_ring() remove grants in error case Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 31/38] xen/grant-table: add gnttab_try_end_foreign_access() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 32/38] xen/blkfront: dont use gnttab_query_foreign_access() for mapped status Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 33/38] xen/netfront: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 34/38] xen/scsifront: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 35/38] xen/gntalloc: dont use gnttab_query_foreign_access() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 36/38] xen: remove gnttab_query_foreign_access() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 37/38] xen/gnttab: fix gnttab_end_foreign_access() without page specified Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:13 ` [PATCH 4.9 38/38] xen/netfront: react properly to failing gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 18:00 ` [PATCH 4.9 00/38] 4.9.306-rc2 review Pavel Machek
2022-03-10 18:48 ` Jon Hunter
2022-03-10 19:35 ` Shuah Khan
2022-03-10 20:14 ` Florian Fainelli
2022-03-11  1:13 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-03-11 13:35 ` Naresh Kamboju

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