From: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
To: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Cc: "tee-dev @ lists . linaro . org" <tee-dev@lists.linaro.org>,
Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
jejb@linux.ibm.com, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support
Date: Thu, 01 Aug 2019 10:40:26 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAE=NcrY7zA1OkKwpVrPbPd+c0OymZeAgT2hp6xZ3HQOgbXaZjg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFA6WYOwcO5-cyaJf3tMMAdyVHJo=BzmCWtsjA3S8aj5g-GZxQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 1:00 PM Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> wrote:
> > > Here TEE isn't similar to a user-space crypto library. In our case TEE
> > > is based on ARM TrustZone which only allows TEE communications to be
> > > initiated from privileged mode. So why would you like to route
> > > communications via user-mode (which is less secure) when we have
> > > standardised TEE interface available in kernel?
> >
> > The physical access guards for reading/writing the involved critical
> > memory are identical as far as I know? Layered security is generally a
> > good thing, and the userspace pass actually adds a layer, so not sure
> > which is really safer?
>
> AFAIK, layered security is better in case we move from lower privilege
> level to higher privilege level rather than in reverse order.
You can look at this in many ways. Another way to look at it is that
the services should be provided with the least amount of permissions
required for the task. Further you can containerize something, the
better.
As for your PLATFORMS support: it is all nice, but there is no way to
convince op-tee or any other tee to be adopted by many real users.
Every serious user can and will do their own thing, or at very best,
buy it from someone who did their own thing and is trusted. There is
zero chance that samsung, huawei, apple, nsa, google, rambus, payment
system vendors, .. would actually share the tee (or probably even the
interfaces). It is just too vital and people do not trust each other
anymore :(
Anyway, enough about the topic from my side. I guess people will tell
what they want, I'm fine with any, and it is all progress from the
current state :)
--
Janne
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
To: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
dhowells@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>,
Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"tee-dev @ lists . linaro . org" <tee-dev@lists.linaro.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support
Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2019 13:40:26 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAE=NcrY7zA1OkKwpVrPbPd+c0OymZeAgT2hp6xZ3HQOgbXaZjg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFA6WYOwcO5-cyaJf3tMMAdyVHJo=BzmCWtsjA3S8aj5g-GZxQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 1:00 PM Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> wrote:
> > > Here TEE isn't similar to a user-space crypto library. In our case TEE
> > > is based on ARM TrustZone which only allows TEE communications to be
> > > initiated from privileged mode. So why would you like to route
> > > communications via user-mode (which is less secure) when we have
> > > standardised TEE interface available in kernel?
> >
> > The physical access guards for reading/writing the involved critical
> > memory are identical as far as I know? Layered security is generally a
> > good thing, and the userspace pass actually adds a layer, so not sure
> > which is really safer?
>
> AFAIK, layered security is better in case we move from lower privilege
> level to higher privilege level rather than in reverse order.
You can look at this in many ways. Another way to look at it is that
the services should be provided with the least amount of permissions
required for the task. Further you can containerize something, the
better.
As for your PLATFORMS support: it is all nice, but there is no way to
convince op-tee or any other tee to be adopted by many real users.
Every serious user can and will do their own thing, or at very best,
buy it from someone who did their own thing and is trusted. There is
zero chance that samsung, huawei, apple, nsa, google, rambus, payment
system vendors, .. would actually share the tee (or probably even the
interfaces). It is just too vital and people do not trust each other
anymore :(
Anyway, enough about the topic from my side. I guess people will tell
what they want, I'm fine with any, and it is all progress from the
current state :)
--
Janne
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
To: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Cc: "tee-dev @ lists . linaro . org" <tee-dev@lists.linaro.org>,
Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
jejb@linux.ibm.com, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support
Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2019 13:40:26 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAE=NcrY7zA1OkKwpVrPbPd+c0OymZeAgT2hp6xZ3HQOgbXaZjg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFA6WYOwcO5-cyaJf3tMMAdyVHJo=BzmCWtsjA3S8aj5g-GZxQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 1:00 PM Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> wrote:
> > > Here TEE isn't similar to a user-space crypto library. In our case TEE
> > > is based on ARM TrustZone which only allows TEE communications to be
> > > initiated from privileged mode. So why would you like to route
> > > communications via user-mode (which is less secure) when we have
> > > standardised TEE interface available in kernel?
> >
> > The physical access guards for reading/writing the involved critical
> > memory are identical as far as I know? Layered security is generally a
> > good thing, and the userspace pass actually adds a layer, so not sure
> > which is really safer?
>
> AFAIK, layered security is better in case we move from lower privilege
> level to higher privilege level rather than in reverse order.
You can look at this in many ways. Another way to look at it is that
the services should be provided with the least amount of permissions
required for the task. Further you can containerize something, the
better.
As for your PLATFORMS support: it is all nice, but there is no way to
convince op-tee or any other tee to be adopted by many real users.
Every serious user can and will do their own thing, or at very best,
buy it from someone who did their own thing and is trusted. There is
zero chance that samsung, huawei, apple, nsa, google, rambus, payment
system vendors, .. would actually share the tee (or probably even the
interfaces). It is just too vital and people do not trust each other
anymore :(
Anyway, enough about the topic from my side. I guess people will tell
what they want, I'm fine with any, and it is all progress from the
current state :)
--
Janne
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-08-01 10:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-07-30 12:23 [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 1/6] tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 2/6] tee: enable support to register kernel memory Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-08 22:26 ` [Tee-dev] " Stuart Yoder
2019-08-08 22:26 ` Stuart Yoder
2019-08-08 22:26 ` Stuart Yoder
2019-08-09 5:36 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-09 5:48 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-09 5:36 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 3/6] tee: add private login method for kernel clients Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 4/6] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 5/6] doc: keys: Document usage of " Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 6/6] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for " Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 7:11 ` [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 7:11 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 7:11 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 10:21 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 10:21 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 10:21 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 13:58 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 13:59 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 13:58 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 6:21 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 6:21 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 6:21 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 7:40 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 7:52 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 7:40 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 7:59 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 7:59 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 7:59 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 10:00 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 10:12 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 10:00 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 10:40 ` Janne Karhunen [this message]
2019-08-01 10:40 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 10:40 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 10:26 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 10:38 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 10:26 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 11:02 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 11:02 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 11:02 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 14:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 14:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 14:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 6:36 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 6:36 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 6:36 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 6:50 ` [Tee-dev] " Rouven Czerwinski
2019-08-01 6:50 ` Rouven Czerwinski
2019-08-01 6:50 ` Rouven Czerwinski
2019-08-01 7:30 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 7:30 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 7:30 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 7:58 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 7:58 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 7:58 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 8:30 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 8:30 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 8:30 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 10:27 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 10:39 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 10:27 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-04 20:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-04 20:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-04 20:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to='CAE=NcrY7zA1OkKwpVrPbPd+c0OymZeAgT2hp6xZ3HQOgbXaZjg@mail.gmail.com' \
--to=janne.karhunen@gmail.com \
--cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=daniel.thompson@linaro.org \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=jejb@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=jens.wiklander@linaro.org \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=sumit.garg@linaro.org \
--cc=tee-dev@lists.linaro.org \
--cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.