From: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
To: Rouven Czerwinski <r.czerwinski@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>,
Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
jejb@linux.ibm.com, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
"tee-dev @ lists . linaro . org" <tee-dev@lists.linaro.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
dhowells@redhat.com, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [Tee-dev] [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support
Date: Thu, 01 Aug 2019 07:30:06 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAE=NcraqD9FNM0Gk9UGhPGi3heVzZrAKGc1gNZxoe1OnDaQ=pA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <19d9be198619e951750dedeb4d0a7f372083b42c.camel@pengutronix.de>
On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 9:50 AM Rouven Czerwinski
<r.czerwinski@pengutronix.de> wrote:
> > I'm aware of it - I have implemented a large part of the GP TEE APIs
> > earlier (primarily the crypto functions). Does the TEE you work with
> > actually support GP properly? Can I take a look at the code?
>
> AFAIK Sumit is working with the OP-TEE implementation, which can be
> found on github: https://github.com/op-tee/optee_os
Thanks, I will take a look. The fundamental problem with these things
is that there are infinite amount of ways how TEEs and ROTs can be
done in terms of the hardware and software. I really doubt there are 2
implementations in existence that are even remotely compatible in real
life. As such, all things TEE/ROT would logically really belong in the
userland and thanks to the bpfilter folks now the umh logic really
makes that possible ... I think. The key implementation I did was just
an RFC on the concept, what if we start to move the stuff that really
belongs in the userspace to this pseudo-userland. It's not kernel, but
it's not commonly accessible userland either. The shared memory would
also work without any modifications between the umh based TEE/ROT
driver and the userland if needed.
Anyway, just my .02c. I guess having any new support in the kernel for
new trust sources is good and improvement from the current state. I
can certainly make my stuff work with your setup as well, what ever
people think is the best.
--
Janne
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
To: Rouven Czerwinski <r.czerwinski@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>,
"tee-dev @ lists . linaro . org" <tee-dev@lists.linaro.org>,
Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
jejb@linux.ibm.com, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [Tee-dev] [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support
Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2019 10:30:06 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAE=NcraqD9FNM0Gk9UGhPGi3heVzZrAKGc1gNZxoe1OnDaQ=pA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <19d9be198619e951750dedeb4d0a7f372083b42c.camel@pengutronix.de>
On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 9:50 AM Rouven Czerwinski
<r.czerwinski@pengutronix.de> wrote:
> > I'm aware of it - I have implemented a large part of the GP TEE APIs
> > earlier (primarily the crypto functions). Does the TEE you work with
> > actually support GP properly? Can I take a look at the code?
>
> AFAIK Sumit is working with the OP-TEE implementation, which can be
> found on github: https://github.com/op-tee/optee_os
Thanks, I will take a look. The fundamental problem with these things
is that there are infinite amount of ways how TEEs and ROTs can be
done in terms of the hardware and software. I really doubt there are 2
implementations in existence that are even remotely compatible in real
life. As such, all things TEE/ROT would logically really belong in the
userland and thanks to the bpfilter folks now the umh logic really
makes that possible ... I think. The key implementation I did was just
an RFC on the concept, what if we start to move the stuff that really
belongs in the userspace to this pseudo-userland. It's not kernel, but
it's not commonly accessible userland either. The shared memory would
also work without any modifications between the umh based TEE/ROT
driver and the userland if needed.
Anyway, just my .02c. I guess having any new support in the kernel for
new trust sources is good and improvement from the current state. I
can certainly make my stuff work with your setup as well, what ever
people think is the best.
--
Janne
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
To: Rouven Czerwinski <r.czerwinski@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>,
Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
jejb@linux.ibm.com, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
"tee-dev @ lists . linaro . org" <tee-dev@lists.linaro.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
dhowells@redhat.com, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [Tee-dev] [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support
Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2019 10:30:06 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAE=NcraqD9FNM0Gk9UGhPGi3heVzZrAKGc1gNZxoe1OnDaQ=pA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <19d9be198619e951750dedeb4d0a7f372083b42c.camel@pengutronix.de>
On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 9:50 AM Rouven Czerwinski
<r.czerwinski@pengutronix.de> wrote:
> > I'm aware of it - I have implemented a large part of the GP TEE APIs
> > earlier (primarily the crypto functions). Does the TEE you work with
> > actually support GP properly? Can I take a look at the code?
>
> AFAIK Sumit is working with the OP-TEE implementation, which can be
> found on github: https://github.com/op-tee/optee_os
Thanks, I will take a look. The fundamental problem with these things
is that there are infinite amount of ways how TEEs and ROTs can be
done in terms of the hardware and software. I really doubt there are 2
implementations in existence that are even remotely compatible in real
life. As such, all things TEE/ROT would logically really belong in the
userland and thanks to the bpfilter folks now the umh logic really
makes that possible ... I think. The key implementation I did was just
an RFC on the concept, what if we start to move the stuff that really
belongs in the userspace to this pseudo-userland. It's not kernel, but
it's not commonly accessible userland either. The shared memory would
also work without any modifications between the umh based TEE/ROT
driver and the userland if needed.
Anyway, just my .02c. I guess having any new support in the kernel for
new trust sources is good and improvement from the current state. I
can certainly make my stuff work with your setup as well, what ever
people think is the best.
--
Janne
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-08-01 7:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-07-30 12:23 [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 1/6] tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 2/6] tee: enable support to register kernel memory Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-08 22:26 ` [Tee-dev] " Stuart Yoder
2019-08-08 22:26 ` Stuart Yoder
2019-08-08 22:26 ` Stuart Yoder
2019-08-09 5:36 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-09 5:48 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-09 5:36 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 3/6] tee: add private login method for kernel clients Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 4/6] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 5/6] doc: keys: Document usage of " Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 6/6] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for " Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 7:11 ` [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 7:11 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 7:11 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 10:21 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 10:21 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 10:21 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 13:58 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 13:59 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 13:58 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 6:21 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 6:21 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 6:21 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 7:40 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 7:52 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 7:40 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 7:59 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 7:59 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 7:59 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 10:00 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 10:12 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 10:00 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 10:40 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 10:40 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 10:40 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 10:26 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 10:38 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 10:26 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 11:02 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 11:02 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 11:02 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 14:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 14:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 14:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 6:36 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 6:36 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 6:36 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 6:50 ` [Tee-dev] " Rouven Czerwinski
2019-08-01 6:50 ` Rouven Czerwinski
2019-08-01 6:50 ` Rouven Czerwinski
2019-08-01 7:30 ` Janne Karhunen [this message]
2019-08-01 7:30 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 7:30 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 7:58 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 7:58 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 7:58 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 8:30 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 8:30 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 8:30 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 10:27 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 10:39 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 10:27 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-04 20:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-04 20:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-04 20:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to='CAE=NcraqD9FNM0Gk9UGhPGi3heVzZrAKGc1gNZxoe1OnDaQ=pA@mail.gmail.com' \
--to=janne.karhunen@gmail.com \
--cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=daniel.thompson@linaro.org \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=jejb@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=r.czerwinski@pengutronix.de \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=sumit.garg@linaro.org \
--cc=tee-dev@lists.linaro.org \
--cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.