From: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
To: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>,
Rouven Czerwinski <r.czerwinski@pengutronix.de>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
jejb@linux.ibm.com, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
"tee-dev @ lists . linaro . org" <tee-dev@lists.linaro.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [Tee-dev] [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support
Date: Thu, 01 Aug 2019 10:39:25 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAFA6WYNzW-+N3rcKMCJ0wK9peuq97CETnxMSwxixN7844XinTw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAE=NcrbujsM8wYJXq+s=o5Vy1xY1b0uKYBGvp6UP5ex70HrB2Q@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, 1 Aug 2019 at 14:00, Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 10:58 AM Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> > > Anyway, just my .02c. I guess having any new support in the kernel for
> > > new trust sources is good and improvement from the current state. I
> > > can certainly make my stuff work with your setup as well, what ever
> > > people think is the best.
> >
> > Yes your implementation can very well fit under trusted keys
> > abstraction framework without creating a new keytype: "ext-trusted".
>
> The fundamental problem with the 'standardized kernel tee' still
> exists - it will never be generic in real life. Getting all this in
> the kernel will solve your problem and sell this particular product,
> but it is quite unlikely to help that many users. If the security is
> truly important to you, would you really trust any of this code to
> someone else? In this day and age, I really doubt many do.
There are already multiple platforms supported by OP-TEE [1] which
could benefit from this trusted keys interface.
> Everyone
> does their own thing, so this is why I really see all that as a
> userspace problem.
>
IMO, we should try to use standardized interfaces which are well
thought off rather than implementing your own.
[1] https://optee.readthedocs.io/general/platforms.html
-Sumit
>
> --
> Janne
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
To: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Cc: Rouven Czerwinski <r.czerwinski@pengutronix.de>,
"tee-dev @ lists . linaro . org" <tee-dev@lists.linaro.org>,
Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
jejb@linux.ibm.com, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [Tee-dev] [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support
Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2019 15:57:25 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAFA6WYNzW-+N3rcKMCJ0wK9peuq97CETnxMSwxixN7844XinTw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAE=NcrbujsM8wYJXq+s=o5Vy1xY1b0uKYBGvp6UP5ex70HrB2Q@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, 1 Aug 2019 at 14:00, Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 10:58 AM Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> > > Anyway, just my .02c. I guess having any new support in the kernel for
> > > new trust sources is good and improvement from the current state. I
> > > can certainly make my stuff work with your setup as well, what ever
> > > people think is the best.
> >
> > Yes your implementation can very well fit under trusted keys
> > abstraction framework without creating a new keytype: "ext-trusted".
>
> The fundamental problem with the 'standardized kernel tee' still
> exists - it will never be generic in real life. Getting all this in
> the kernel will solve your problem and sell this particular product,
> but it is quite unlikely to help that many users. If the security is
> truly important to you, would you really trust any of this code to
> someone else? In this day and age, I really doubt many do.
There are already multiple platforms supported by OP-TEE [1] which
could benefit from this trusted keys interface.
> Everyone
> does their own thing, so this is why I really see all that as a
> userspace problem.
>
IMO, we should try to use standardized interfaces which are well
thought off rather than implementing your own.
[1] https://optee.readthedocs.io/general/platforms.html
-Sumit
>
> --
> Janne
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
To: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>,
Rouven Czerwinski <r.czerwinski@pengutronix.de>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
jejb@linux.ibm.com, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
"tee-dev @ lists . linaro . org" <tee-dev@lists.linaro.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [Tee-dev] [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support
Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2019 15:57:25 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAFA6WYNzW-+N3rcKMCJ0wK9peuq97CETnxMSwxixN7844XinTw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAE=NcrbujsM8wYJXq+s=o5Vy1xY1b0uKYBGvp6UP5ex70HrB2Q@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, 1 Aug 2019 at 14:00, Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 10:58 AM Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> > > Anyway, just my .02c. I guess having any new support in the kernel for
> > > new trust sources is good and improvement from the current state. I
> > > can certainly make my stuff work with your setup as well, what ever
> > > people think is the best.
> >
> > Yes your implementation can very well fit under trusted keys
> > abstraction framework without creating a new keytype: "ext-trusted".
>
> The fundamental problem with the 'standardized kernel tee' still
> exists - it will never be generic in real life. Getting all this in
> the kernel will solve your problem and sell this particular product,
> but it is quite unlikely to help that many users. If the security is
> truly important to you, would you really trust any of this code to
> someone else? In this day and age, I really doubt many do.
There are already multiple platforms supported by OP-TEE [1] which
could benefit from this trusted keys interface.
> Everyone
> does their own thing, so this is why I really see all that as a
> userspace problem.
>
IMO, we should try to use standardized interfaces which are well
thought off rather than implementing your own.
[1] https://optee.readthedocs.io/general/platforms.html
-Sumit
>
> --
> Janne
_______________________________________________
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linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-08-01 10:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-07-30 12:23 [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 1/6] tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 2/6] tee: enable support to register kernel memory Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-08 22:26 ` [Tee-dev] " Stuart Yoder
2019-08-08 22:26 ` Stuart Yoder
2019-08-08 22:26 ` Stuart Yoder
2019-08-09 5:36 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-09 5:48 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-09 5:36 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 3/6] tee: add private login method for kernel clients Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 4/6] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 5/6] doc: keys: Document usage of " Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 6/6] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for " Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 7:11 ` [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 7:11 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 7:11 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 10:21 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 10:21 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 10:21 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 13:58 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 13:59 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 13:58 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 6:21 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 6:21 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 6:21 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 7:40 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 7:52 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 7:40 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 7:59 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 7:59 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 7:59 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 10:00 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 10:12 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 10:00 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 10:40 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 10:40 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 10:40 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 10:26 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 10:38 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 10:26 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 11:02 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 11:02 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 11:02 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 14:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 14:35 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 14:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 6:36 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 6:36 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 6:36 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 6:50 ` [Tee-dev] " Rouven Czerwinski
2019-08-01 6:50 ` Rouven Czerwinski
2019-08-01 6:50 ` Rouven Czerwinski
2019-08-01 7:30 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 7:30 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 7:30 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 7:58 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 7:58 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 7:58 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 8:30 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 8:30 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 8:30 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 10:27 ` Sumit Garg [this message]
2019-08-01 10:39 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 10:27 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-04 20:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-04 20:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-04 20:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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