From: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
To: "'Brijesh Singh'" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"Fenghua Yu" <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Paul Mackerras" <paulus@samba.org>,
"Christoph Lameter" <cl@linux.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Radim Krcmár" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Piotr Luc" <piotr.luc@intel.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Dave Airlie" <airlied@redhat.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>,
"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Reza Arbab" <arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Laura Abbott" <labbott@redhat.com>,
"Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>,
"Ard.Biesheuvel@zytor.com" <Ard.Biesheuvel@zytor.com>
Subject: RE: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 07:45:25 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <063D6719AE5E284EB5DD2968C1650D6DD00436A7@AcuExch.aculab.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <589d65a4-eb09-bae9-e8b4-a2d78ca6b509@amd.com>
From: Brijesh Singh
> Sent: 26 July 2017 21:07
...
> I am not sure if I understand your concern.
>
> Are you commenting on amount of code duplication ? If so, I can certainly improve
> and use the similar macro used into header file to generate the functions body.
If you are careful the real functions could expand the inline functions
that get used when SEV is compiled out.
Oh, if you are looking at this, can you fix memcpy_to_io()
so that it is never 'rep movsb'?
David
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
To: 'Brijesh Singh' <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"Fenghua Yu" <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Paul Mackerras" <paulus@samba.org>,
"Christoph Lameter" <cl@linux.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Radim Krcmár" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Piotr Luc" <piotr.luc@intel.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Dave Airlie" <airlied@redhat.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>,
"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: RE: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 07:45:25 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <063D6719AE5E284EB5DD2968C1650D6DD00436A7@AcuExch.aculab.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <589d65a4-eb09-bae9-e8b4-a2d78ca6b509@amd.com>
From: Brijesh Singh
> Sent: 26 July 2017 21:07
...
> I am not sure if I understand your concern.
>
> Are you commenting on amount of code duplication ? If so, I can certainly improve
> and use the similar macro used into header file to generate the functions body.
If you are careful the real functions could expand the inline functions
that get used when SEV is compiled out.
Oh, if you are looking at this, can you fix memcpy_to_io()
so that it is never 'rep movsb'?
David
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
To: 'Brijesh Singh' <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"Fenghua Yu" <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Paul Mackerras" <paulus@samba.org>,
"Christoph Lameter" <cl@linux.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Radim Krcmár" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Piotr Luc" <piotr.luc@intel.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Dave Airlie" <airlied@redhat.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>,
"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Reza Arbab" <arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Laura Abbott" <labbott@redhat.com>,
"Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>,
"Ard.Biesheuvel@zytor.com" <Ard.Biesheuvel@zytor.com>
Subject: RE: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 07:45:25 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <063D6719AE5E284EB5DD2968C1650D6DD00436A7@AcuExch.aculab.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <589d65a4-eb09-bae9-e8b4-a2d78ca6b509@amd.com>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-27 7:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 226+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-24 19:07 [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 5:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 5:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 5:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:59 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 14:59 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 14:59 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 10:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 10:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 10:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:13 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:13 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:13 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-09 18:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-09 18:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 8:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 8:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 8:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 4:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 4:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 4:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-26 16:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-26 16:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-27 13:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 13:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 13:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 14:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 14:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 14:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 16:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-10 13:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-10 13:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-10 13:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 13:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 13:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 13:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 14:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 14:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 14:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 8:47 ` David Laight
2017-07-28 8:47 ` David Laight
2017-07-28 8:47 ` David Laight
2017-08-17 18:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 10:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 10:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 10:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 15:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 15:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 15:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-31 8:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31 8:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31 8:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31 22:19 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-31 22:19 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-31 22:19 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-02 4:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-02 4:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-02 4:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-07 3:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-07 3:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-07 3:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 9:51 ` David Laight
2017-07-25 9:51 ` David Laight
2017-07-25 9:51 ` David Laight
2017-07-26 10:45 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-26 10:45 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-26 19:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 19:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 19:26 ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 19:26 ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 19:26 ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 19:26 ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 20:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 20:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 7:45 ` David Laight [this message]
2017-07-27 7:45 ` David Laight
2017-07-27 7:45 ` David Laight
2017-08-22 16:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-22 16:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 12:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 12:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:13 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:13 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:48 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:48 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 16:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 16:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 16:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 16:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-23 15:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-23 15:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-23 15:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-24 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-24 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-24 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-25 12:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-25 12:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-25 12:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 10:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 10:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 10:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 11:49 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 11:49 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 11:49 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-29 10:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-29 10:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-29 10:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 16:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 16:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 16:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 17:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 17:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 17:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-01 22:52 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-01 22:52 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-01 22:52 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-02 3:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-09-02 3:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-09-02 3:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-09-03 2:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-03 2:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-03 2:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-04 17:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:47 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-04 17:47 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-04 17:47 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-31 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-31 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-31 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov
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