From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>,
"Piotr Luc" <piotr.luc@intel.com>,
"Fenghua Yu" <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"Lu Baolu" <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
"Reza Arbab" <arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
"Laura Abbott" <labbott@redhat.com>,
"Ard Biesheuvel" <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Eric Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"Benjamin Herrenschmidt" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
"Paul Mackerras" <paulus@samba.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Dave Airlie" <airlied@redhat.com>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Tejun Heo" <tj@kernel.org>,
"Christoph Lameter" <cl@linux.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 10:29:40 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d6fdba78-034b-d9e2-15ae-00547821a855@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170725151301.GC26029@nazgul.tnic>
On 7/25/2017 10:13 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 09:58:54AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> True, but it is more about being accurate and making sure the value is
>> correct where ever it may be used.
>
> So early_identify_cpu() initializes phys_bits to 32 on 32-bit.
> Subtracting it there would actually make actively it wrong, AFAICT.
But early_identify_cpu() calls get_cpu_cap() which will check for cpuid
leaf 0x80000008 support and set x86_phys_bits. I'll try to build and
run a 32-bit kernel and see how this all flows.
Thanks,
Tom
>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>, Piotr Luc <piotr.luc@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
Reza Arbab <arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Eric
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 10:29:40 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d6fdba78-034b-d9e2-15ae-00547821a855@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170725151301.GC26029@nazgul.tnic>
On 7/25/2017 10:13 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 09:58:54AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> True, but it is more about being accurate and making sure the value is
>> correct where ever it may be used.
>
> So early_identify_cpu() initializes phys_bits to 32 on 32-bit.
> Subtracting it there would actually make actively it wrong, AFAICT.
But early_identify_cpu() calls get_cpu_cap() which will check for cpuid
leaf 0x80000008 support and set x86_phys_bits. I'll try to build and
run a 32-bit kernel and see how this all flows.
Thanks,
Tom
>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>, Piotr Luc <piotr.luc@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
Reza Arbab <arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Eric Biederman
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 10:29:40 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d6fdba78-034b-d9e2-15ae-00547821a855@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170725151301.GC26029@nazgul.tnic>
On 7/25/2017 10:13 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 09:58:54AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> True, but it is more about being accurate and making sure the value is
>> correct where ever it may be used.
>
> So early_identify_cpu() initializes phys_bits to 32 on 32-bit.
> Subtracting it there would actually make actively it wrong, AFAICT.
But early_identify_cpu() calls get_cpu_cap() which will check for cpuid
leaf 0x80000008 support and set x86_phys_bits. I'll try to build and
run a 32-bit kernel and see how this all flows.
Thanks,
Tom
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-25 15:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 226+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-24 19:07 [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 5:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 5:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 5:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:59 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 14:59 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 14:59 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 10:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 10:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 10:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:13 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:13 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:13 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:29 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-07-25 15:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-09 18:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-09 18:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 8:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 8:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 8:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 4:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 4:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 4:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-26 16:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-26 16:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-27 13:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 13:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 13:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 14:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 14:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 14:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 16:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-10 13:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-10 13:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-10 13:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 13:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 13:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 13:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 14:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 14:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 14:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 8:47 ` David Laight
2017-07-28 8:47 ` David Laight
2017-07-28 8:47 ` David Laight
2017-08-17 18:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 10:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 10:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 10:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 15:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 15:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 15:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-31 8:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31 8:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31 8:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31 22:19 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-31 22:19 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-31 22:19 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-02 4:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-02 4:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-02 4:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-07 3:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-07 3:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-07 3:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 9:51 ` David Laight
2017-07-25 9:51 ` David Laight
2017-07-25 9:51 ` David Laight
2017-07-26 10:45 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-26 10:45 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-26 19:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 19:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 19:26 ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 19:26 ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 19:26 ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 19:26 ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 20:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 20:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 7:45 ` David Laight
2017-07-27 7:45 ` David Laight
2017-07-27 7:45 ` David Laight
2017-08-22 16:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-22 16:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 12:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 12:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:13 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:13 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:48 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:48 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 16:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 16:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 16:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 16:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-23 15:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-23 15:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-23 15:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-24 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-24 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-24 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-25 12:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-25 12:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-25 12:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 10:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 10:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 10:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 11:49 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 11:49 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 11:49 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-29 10:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-29 10:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-29 10:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 16:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 16:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 16:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 17:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 17:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 17:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-01 22:52 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-01 22:52 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-01 22:52 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-02 3:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-09-02 3:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-09-02 3:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-09-03 2:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-03 2:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-03 2:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-04 17:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:47 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-04 17:47 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-04 17:47 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-31 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-31 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-31 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov
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