All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	"Piotr Luc" <piotr.luc@intel.com>,
	"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"Fenghua Yu" <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	"Lu Baolu" <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
	"Reza Arbab" <arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	"Laura Abbott" <labbott@redhat.com>,
	"Ard Biesheuvel" <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Eric Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	"Benjamin Herrenschmidt" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	"Paul Mackerras" <paulus@samba.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Dave Airlie" <airlied@redhat.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Tejun Heo" <tj@kernel.org>,
	"Christoph Lameter" <cl@linux.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2017 11:18:42 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <0810a732-9c77-a543-ffeb-7fd2d8f46266@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170829102258.gxk227js4yw47qi3@pd.tnic>

Hi Boris,

On 08/29/2017 05:22 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:

[...]

> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 02:07:56PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> Some KVM specific MSR's (steal-time, asyncpf, avic_eio) allocates per-CPU
> 
> 		   MSRs
> 
>> variable at compile time and share its physical address with hypervisor.
> 
> That sentence needs changing - the MSRs don't allocate - for them gets
> allocated.
> 
>> It presents a challege when SEV is active in guest OS, when SEV is active,
>> the guest memory is encrypted with guest key hence hypervisor will not
>> able to modify the guest memory. When SEV is active, we need to clear the
>> encryption attribute (aka C-bit) of shared physical addresses so that both
>> guest and hypervisor can access the data.
> 
> This whole paragraph needs rewriting.
> 

I will improve the commit message in next rev.

[...]

>> +/* NOTE: function is marked as __ref because it is used by __init functions */
> 
> No need for that comment.
> 
> What should you look into is why do you need to call the early versions:
> 
> " * producing a warning (of course, no warning does not mean code is
>   * correct, so optimally document why the __ref is needed and why it's OK)."
> 
> And we do have the normal set_memory_decrypted() etc helpers so why
> aren't we using those?
> 

Since kvm_guest_init() is called early in the boot process hence we will not
able to use set_memory_decrypted() function. IIRC, if we try calling
set_memory_decrypted() early then we will hit a BUG_ON [1] -- mainly when it
tries to flush the caches.

[1] http://elixir.free-electrons.com/linux/latest/source/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c#L167



> If you need to use the early ones too, then you probably need to
> differentiate this in the callers by passing a "bool early", which calls
> the proper flavor.
> 

Sure I can rearrange code to make it more readable and use "bool early"
parameter to differentiate it.


>> +static int __ref kvm_map_hv_shared_decrypted(void)
>> +{
>> +	static int once, ret;
>> +	int cpu;
>> +
>> +	if (once)
>> +		return ret;
> 
> So this function gets called per-CPU but you need to do this ugly "once"
> thing - i.e., global function called in a per-CPU context.
> 
> Why can't you do that mapping only on the current CPU and then
> when that function is called on the next CPU, it will do the same thing
> on that next CPU?
> 


Yes, it can be done but I remember running into issues during the CPU hot plug.
The patch uses early_set_memory_decrypted() -- which calls
kernel_physical_mapping_init() to split the large pages into smaller. IIRC, the
API did not work after the system is successfully booted. After the system is
booted we must use the set_memory_decrypted().

I was trying to avoid mixing early and no-early set_memory_decrypted() but if
feedback is: use early_set_memory_decrypted() only if its required otherwise
use set_memory_decrypted() then I can improve the logic in next rev. thanks


[...]

>> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
>> index da0be9a..52854cf 100644
>> --- a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
>> +++ b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
>> @@ -783,6 +783,9 @@
>>   	. = ALIGN(cacheline);						\
>>   	*(.data..percpu)						\
>>   	*(.data..percpu..shared_aligned)				\
>> +	. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);						\
>> +	*(.data..percpu..hv_shared)					\
>> +	. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);						\
>>   	VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__per_cpu_end) = .;
> 
> Yeah, no, you can't do that. That's adding this section unconditionally
> on *every* arch. You need to do some ifdeffery like it is done at the
> beginning of that file and have this only on the arch which supports SEV.
> 


Will do . thanks

-Brijesh

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>, Piotr Luc <piotr.luc@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
	Reza Arbab <arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundat>
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2017 11:18:42 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <0810a732-9c77-a543-ffeb-7fd2d8f46266@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170829102258.gxk227js4yw47qi3@pd.tnic>

Hi Boris,

On 08/29/2017 05:22 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:

[...]

> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 02:07:56PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> Some KVM specific MSR's (steal-time, asyncpf, avic_eio) allocates per-CPU
> 
> 		   MSRs
> 
>> variable at compile time and share its physical address with hypervisor.
> 
> That sentence needs changing - the MSRs don't allocate - for them gets
> allocated.
> 
>> It presents a challege when SEV is active in guest OS, when SEV is active,
>> the guest memory is encrypted with guest key hence hypervisor will not
>> able to modify the guest memory. When SEV is active, we need to clear the
>> encryption attribute (aka C-bit) of shared physical addresses so that both
>> guest and hypervisor can access the data.
> 
> This whole paragraph needs rewriting.
> 

I will improve the commit message in next rev.

[...]

>> +/* NOTE: function is marked as __ref because it is used by __init functions */
> 
> No need for that comment.
> 
> What should you look into is why do you need to call the early versions:
> 
> " * producing a warning (of course, no warning does not mean code is
>   * correct, so optimally document why the __ref is needed and why it's OK)."
> 
> And we do have the normal set_memory_decrypted() etc helpers so why
> aren't we using those?
> 

Since kvm_guest_init() is called early in the boot process hence we will not
able to use set_memory_decrypted() function. IIRC, if we try calling
set_memory_decrypted() early then we will hit a BUG_ON [1] -- mainly when it
tries to flush the caches.

[1] http://elixir.free-electrons.com/linux/latest/source/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c#L167



> If you need to use the early ones too, then you probably need to
> differentiate this in the callers by passing a "bool early", which calls
> the proper flavor.
> 

Sure I can rearrange code to make it more readable and use "bool early"
parameter to differentiate it.


>> +static int __ref kvm_map_hv_shared_decrypted(void)
>> +{
>> +	static int once, ret;
>> +	int cpu;
>> +
>> +	if (once)
>> +		return ret;
> 
> So this function gets called per-CPU but you need to do this ugly "once"
> thing - i.e., global function called in a per-CPU context.
> 
> Why can't you do that mapping only on the current CPU and then
> when that function is called on the next CPU, it will do the same thing
> on that next CPU?
> 


Yes, it can be done but I remember running into issues during the CPU hot plug.
The patch uses early_set_memory_decrypted() -- which calls
kernel_physical_mapping_init() to split the large pages into smaller. IIRC, the
API did not work after the system is successfully booted. After the system is
booted we must use the set_memory_decrypted().

I was trying to avoid mixing early and no-early set_memory_decrypted() but if
feedback is: use early_set_memory_decrypted() only if its required otherwise
use set_memory_decrypted() then I can improve the logic in next rev. thanks


[...]

>> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
>> index da0be9a..52854cf 100644
>> --- a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
>> +++ b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
>> @@ -783,6 +783,9 @@
>>   	. = ALIGN(cacheline);						\
>>   	*(.data..percpu)						\
>>   	*(.data..percpu..shared_aligned)				\
>> +	. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);						\
>> +	*(.data..percpu..hv_shared)					\
>> +	. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);						\
>>   	VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__per_cpu_end) = .;
> 
> Yeah, no, you can't do that. That's adding this section unconditionally
> on *every* arch. You need to do some ifdeffery like it is done at the
> beginning of that file and have this only on the arch which supports SEV.
> 


Will do . thanks

-Brijesh

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>, Piotr Luc <piotr.luc@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
	Reza Arbab <arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundat
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2017 11:18:42 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <0810a732-9c77-a543-ffeb-7fd2d8f46266@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170829102258.gxk227js4yw47qi3@pd.tnic>

Hi Boris,

On 08/29/2017 05:22 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:

[...]

> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 02:07:56PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> Some KVM specific MSR's (steal-time, asyncpf, avic_eio) allocates per-CPU
> 
> 		   MSRs
> 
>> variable at compile time and share its physical address with hypervisor.
> 
> That sentence needs changing - the MSRs don't allocate - for them gets
> allocated.
> 
>> It presents a challege when SEV is active in guest OS, when SEV is active,
>> the guest memory is encrypted with guest key hence hypervisor will not
>> able to modify the guest memory. When SEV is active, we need to clear the
>> encryption attribute (aka C-bit) of shared physical addresses so that both
>> guest and hypervisor can access the data.
> 
> This whole paragraph needs rewriting.
> 

I will improve the commit message in next rev.

[...]

>> +/* NOTE: function is marked as __ref because it is used by __init functions */
> 
> No need for that comment.
> 
> What should you look into is why do you need to call the early versions:
> 
> " * producing a warning (of course, no warning does not mean code is
>   * correct, so optimally document why the __ref is needed and why it's OK)."
> 
> And we do have the normal set_memory_decrypted() etc helpers so why
> aren't we using those?
> 

Since kvm_guest_init() is called early in the boot process hence we will not
able to use set_memory_decrypted() function. IIRC, if we try calling
set_memory_decrypted() early then we will hit a BUG_ON [1] -- mainly when it
tries to flush the caches.

[1] http://elixir.free-electrons.com/linux/latest/source/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c#L167



> If you need to use the early ones too, then you probably need to
> differentiate this in the callers by passing a "bool early", which calls
> the proper flavor.
> 

Sure I can rearrange code to make it more readable and use "bool early"
parameter to differentiate it.


>> +static int __ref kvm_map_hv_shared_decrypted(void)
>> +{
>> +	static int once, ret;
>> +	int cpu;
>> +
>> +	if (once)
>> +		return ret;
> 
> So this function gets called per-CPU but you need to do this ugly "once"
> thing - i.e., global function called in a per-CPU context.
> 
> Why can't you do that mapping only on the current CPU and then
> when that function is called on the next CPU, it will do the same thing
> on that next CPU?
> 


Yes, it can be done but I remember running into issues during the CPU hot plug.
The patch uses early_set_memory_decrypted() -- which calls
kernel_physical_mapping_init() to split the large pages into smaller. IIRC, the
API did not work after the system is successfully booted. After the system is
booted we must use the set_memory_decrypted().

I was trying to avoid mixing early and no-early set_memory_decrypted() but if
feedback is: use early_set_memory_decrypted() only if its required otherwise
use set_memory_decrypted() then I can improve the logic in next rev. thanks


[...]

>> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
>> index da0be9a..52854cf 100644
>> --- a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
>> +++ b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
>> @@ -783,6 +783,9 @@
>>   	. = ALIGN(cacheline);						\
>>   	*(.data..percpu)						\
>>   	*(.data..percpu..shared_aligned)				\
>> +	. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);						\
>> +	*(.data..percpu..hv_shared)					\
>> +	. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);						\
>>   	VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__per_cpu_end) = .;
> 
> Yeah, no, you can't do that. That's adding this section unconditionally
> on *every* arch. You need to do some ifdeffery like it is done at the
> beginning of that file and have this only on the arch which supports SEV.
> 


Will do . thanks

-Brijesh

  reply	other threads:[~2017-08-30 16:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 226+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-24 19:07 [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25  5:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25  5:45     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25  5:45     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:59     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 14:59       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 14:59       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 10:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 10:26     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 10:26     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:29     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:29       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:29       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:36       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:36         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:36         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:58         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:58           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:58           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:13           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:13             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:13             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:29             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:29               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:29               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:33               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:33                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:33                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-09 18:17                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-09 18:17                   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17  8:12                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17  8:12                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17  8:12                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26  4:28   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26  4:28     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26  4:28     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:47     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-26 16:47       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-26 16:47       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-27 13:39       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 13:39         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 13:39         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 14:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 14:44     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 14:44     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 16:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:03     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:03     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-10 13:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-10 13:03       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-10 13:03       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 13:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 13:31     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 13:31     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 14:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 14:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 14:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28  8:47     ` David Laight
2017-07-28  8:47       ` David Laight
2017-07-28  8:47       ` David Laight
2017-08-17 18:21       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:21         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 10:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 10:31     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 10:31     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:42     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 15:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 15:23     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 15:23     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:55     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:55       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:55       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-31  8:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31  8:26     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31  8:26     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31 22:19   ` Kees Cook
2017-07-31 22:19     ` Kees Cook
2017-07-31 22:19     ` Kees Cook
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-02  4:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-02  4:02     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-02  4:02     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:22     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:22       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:22       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-07  3:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-07  3:48     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-07  3:48     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:35     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:35       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:35       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25  9:51   ` David Laight
2017-07-25  9:51     ` David Laight
2017-07-25  9:51     ` David Laight
2017-07-26 10:45     ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-26 10:45       ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-26 19:24       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 19:24         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 19:26         ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 19:26           ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 19:26           ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 19:26           ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 20:07           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 20:07             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27  7:45             ` David Laight
2017-07-27  7:45               ` David Laight
2017-07-27  7:45               ` David Laight
2017-08-22 16:52             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-22 16:52               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 12:24               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 12:24                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:13                 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:13                   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:40                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:40                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:48                     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:48                       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 16:22                       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 16:22                         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 16:27                         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 16:27                           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-23 15:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-23 15:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-23 15:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-24 18:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-24 18:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-24 18:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-25 12:54       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-25 12:54         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-25 12:54         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 10:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 10:51     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 10:51     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 11:49     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 11:49       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 11:49       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-29 10:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-29 10:22     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-29 10:22     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 16:18     ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-08-30 16:18       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 16:18       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 17:46       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 17:46         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 17:46         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-01 22:52         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-01 22:52           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-01 22:52           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-02  3:21           ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-09-02  3:21             ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-09-02  3:21             ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-09-03  2:34             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-03  2:34               ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-03  2:34               ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-04 17:05           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:05             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:05             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:47             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-04 17:47               ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-04 17:47               ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-31 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-31 15:06     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-31 15:06     ` Borislav Petkov

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=0810a732-9c77-a543-ffeb-7fd2d8f46266@amd.com \
    --to=brijesh.singh@amd.com \
    --cc=airlied@redhat.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    --cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=baolu.lu@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=benh@kernel.crashing.org \
    --cc=bp@suse.de \
    --cc=cl@linux.com \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=fenghua.yu@intel.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=konrad.wilk@oracle.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=labbott@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=matt@codeblueprint.co.uk \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=paulus@samba.org \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=piotr.luc@intel.com \
    --cc=rkrcmar@redhat.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=tj@kernel.org \
    --cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.