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From: joeyli <jlee@suse.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	keescook@chromium.org, hpa@zytor.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH V3 11/11] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures when in Secure Boot mode
Date: Thu, 05 Sep 2013 16:24:28 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1378369468.6193.3.camel@linux-s257.site> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1378252218-18798-12-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

於 二,2013-09-03 於 19:50 -0400,Matthew Garrett 提到:
> UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
> only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may also
> require that all kernel modules also be signed. Add a configuration option
> that enforces this automatically when enabled.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
> ---
>  Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt       |  2 ++
>  arch/x86/Kconfig                      | 10 ++++++++++
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c      | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h |  3 ++-
>  arch/x86/kernel/setup.c               |  6 ++++++
>  include/linux/module.h                |  6 ++++++
>  kernel/module.c                       |  7 +++++++
>  7 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
> index 199f453..ec38acf 100644
> --- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
> @@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ Offset	Proto	Name		Meaning
>  1E9/001	ALL	eddbuf_entries	Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
>  1EA/001	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries	Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
>  				(below)
> +1EB/001	ALL     kbd_status      Numlock is enabled
> +1EC/001	ALL     secure_boot	Secure boot is enabled in the firmware
>  1EF/001	ALL	sentinel	Used to detect broken bootloaders
>  290/040	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
>  2D0/A00	ALL	e820_map	E820 memory map table
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index b32ebf9..6a6c19b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -1581,6 +1581,16 @@ config EFI_STUB
>  
>  	  See Documentation/x86/efi-stub.txt for more information.
>  
> +config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE
> +        def_bool n

Maybe need add "select MODULE_SIG" to here for auto enable kernel module
signature check when user select this option?

> +	prompt "Force module signing when UEFI Secure Boot is enabled"
> +	---help---
> +	  UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the
> +	  firmware will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain
> +	  use cases may also require that all kernel modules also be signed.
> +	  Say Y here to automatically enable module signature enforcement
> +	  when a system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled.

Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: joeyli <jlee-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>
To: Matthew Garrett
	<matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org,
	hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH V3 11/11] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures when in Secure Boot mode
Date: Thu, 05 Sep 2013 16:24:28 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1378369468.6193.3.camel@linux-s257.site> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1378252218-18798-12-git-send-email-matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>

於 二,2013-09-03 於 19:50 -0400,Matthew Garrett 提到:
> UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
> only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may also
> require that all kernel modules also be signed. Add a configuration option
> that enforces this automatically when enabled.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
> ---
>  Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt       |  2 ++
>  arch/x86/Kconfig                      | 10 ++++++++++
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c      | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h |  3 ++-
>  arch/x86/kernel/setup.c               |  6 ++++++
>  include/linux/module.h                |  6 ++++++
>  kernel/module.c                       |  7 +++++++
>  7 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
> index 199f453..ec38acf 100644
> --- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
> @@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ Offset	Proto	Name		Meaning
>  1E9/001	ALL	eddbuf_entries	Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
>  1EA/001	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries	Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
>  				(below)
> +1EB/001	ALL     kbd_status      Numlock is enabled
> +1EC/001	ALL     secure_boot	Secure boot is enabled in the firmware
>  1EF/001	ALL	sentinel	Used to detect broken bootloaders
>  290/040	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
>  2D0/A00	ALL	e820_map	E820 memory map table
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index b32ebf9..6a6c19b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -1581,6 +1581,16 @@ config EFI_STUB
>  
>  	  See Documentation/x86/efi-stub.txt for more information.
>  
> +config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE
> +        def_bool n

Maybe need add "select MODULE_SIG" to here for auto enable kernel module
signature check when user select this option?

> +	prompt "Force module signing when UEFI Secure Boot is enabled"
> +	---help---
> +	  UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the
> +	  firmware will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain
> +	  use cases may also require that all kernel modules also be signed.
> +	  Say Y here to automatically enable module signature enforcement
> +	  when a system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled.

Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee

  parent reply	other threads:[~2013-09-05  8:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 108+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-09-03 23:50 Matthew Garrett
2013-09-03 23:50 ` (unknown), Matthew Garrett
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 01/11] Add secure_modules() call Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04  0:45   ` James Morris
2013-09-04  0:45     ` James Morris
2013-09-05  2:14   ` joeyli
2013-09-05  2:14     ` joeyli
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 02/11] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is enabled Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04  0:45   ` James Morris
2013-09-04  0:45     ` James Morris
2013-09-04 16:57   ` David Woodhouse
2013-09-04 16:57     ` David Woodhouse
2013-09-04 17:04     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 17:04       ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 18:58       ` David Woodhouse
2013-09-04 19:01         ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 19:01           ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 19:31           ` David Woodhouse
2013-09-04 19:31             ` David Woodhouse
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 03/11] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04  0:45   ` James Morris
2013-09-05  3:52   ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-05  3:52     ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-05  3:58     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-05  3:58       ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-05 15:36       ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-05 15:36         ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 04/11] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04  0:46   ` James Morris
2013-09-04  0:46     ` James Morris
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 05/11] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04  0:46   ` James Morris
2013-09-04  0:46     ` James Morris
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 06/11] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04  0:47   ` James Morris
2013-09-04  0:47     ` James Morris
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 07/11] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter " Matthew Garrett
2013-09-03 23:50   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 08/11] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module loading restrictions Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04  0:48   ` James Morris
2013-09-04  0:48     ` James Morris
2013-09-04 20:09   ` jerry.hoemann
2013-09-04 20:09     ` jerry.hoemann-VXdhtT5mjnY
2013-09-04 20:12     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 20:12       ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 20:12       ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 20:14     ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-04 20:14       ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-04 20:14       ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-08  6:40   ` Greg KH
2013-09-08  6:40     ` Greg KH
2013-09-08  6:44     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08  6:44       ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08  7:24       ` Greg KH
2013-09-08  7:24         ` Greg KH
2013-09-08 14:40         ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 14:40           ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 15:51         ` Kees Cook
2013-09-08 15:51           ` Kees Cook
2013-09-08 16:18           ` Greg KH
2013-09-08 16:18             ` Greg KH
2013-09-08 16:24             ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 16:24               ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 16:39               ` Greg KH
2013-09-08 16:39                 ` Greg KH
2013-09-08 16:59                 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 16:59                   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 17:22                   ` Greg KH
2013-09-08 17:22                     ` Greg KH
2013-09-08 17:25                     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 17:25                       ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 17:11           ` James Bottomley
2013-09-08 17:11             ` James Bottomley
2013-09-08 17:15             ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 17:15               ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 17:22               ` James Bottomley
2013-09-08 17:22                 ` James Bottomley
2013-09-08 17:27                 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 17:27                   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 17:32                   ` James Bottomley
2013-09-08 17:32                     ` James Bottomley
2013-09-08 17:38                     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-08 17:38                       ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 09/11] uswsusp: Disable when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04  0:48   ` James Morris
2013-09-04  0:48     ` James Morris
2013-09-05  3:20   ` joeyli
2013-09-05  3:20     ` joeyli
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 10/11] x86: Restrict MSR access " Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04  0:49   ` James Morris
2013-09-04  0:49     ` James Morris
2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 11/11] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2013-09-03 23:50   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04  1:42   ` James Morris
2013-09-04  1:42     ` James Morris
2013-09-04  1:42     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04  1:42       ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-05  3:13   ` joeyli
2013-09-05  8:24   ` joeyli [this message]
2013-09-05  8:24     ` joeyli
2013-09-05 10:16   ` Matt Fleming
2013-09-05 10:16     ` Matt Fleming
2013-09-05 12:54     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-05 12:54       ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-04 15:53 ` Kees Cook
2013-09-04 15:53   ` Re: Kees Cook
2013-09-04 16:05   ` Re: Josh Boyer
2013-09-04 16:05     ` Re: Josh Boyer

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