From: joeyli <jlee@suse.com> To: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org, hpa@zytor.com Subject: Re: [PATCH V3 11/11] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures when in Secure Boot mode Date: Thu, 05 Sep 2013 16:24:28 +0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1378369468.6193.3.camel@linux-s257.site> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1378252218-18798-12-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> 於 二,2013-09-03 於 19:50 -0400,Matthew Garrett 提到: > UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will > only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may also > require that all kernel modules also be signed. Add a configuration option > that enforces this automatically when enabled. > > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com> > --- > Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 ++ > arch/x86/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++++ > arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 3 ++- > arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 6 ++++++ > include/linux/module.h | 6 ++++++ > kernel/module.c | 7 +++++++ > 7 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt > index 199f453..ec38acf 100644 > --- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt > +++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt > @@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning > 1E9/001 ALL eddbuf_entries Number of entries in eddbuf (below) > 1EA/001 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer > (below) > +1EB/001 ALL kbd_status Numlock is enabled > +1EC/001 ALL secure_boot Secure boot is enabled in the firmware > 1EF/001 ALL sentinel Used to detect broken bootloaders > 290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures > 2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table > diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig > index b32ebf9..6a6c19b 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig > @@ -1581,6 +1581,16 @@ config EFI_STUB > > See Documentation/x86/efi-stub.txt for more information. > > +config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE > + def_bool n Maybe need add "select MODULE_SIG" to here for auto enable kernel module signature check when user select this option? > + prompt "Force module signing when UEFI Secure Boot is enabled" > + ---help--- > + UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the > + firmware will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain > + use cases may also require that all kernel modules also be signed. > + Say Y here to automatically enable module signature enforcement > + when a system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled. Thanks a lot! Joey Lee
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: joeyli <jlee-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org> To: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org, hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org Subject: Re: [PATCH V3 11/11] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures when in Secure Boot mode Date: Thu, 05 Sep 2013 16:24:28 +0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1378369468.6193.3.camel@linux-s257.site> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1378252218-18798-12-git-send-email-matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> 於 二,2013-09-03 於 19:50 -0400,Matthew Garrett 提到: > UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will > only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may also > require that all kernel modules also be signed. Add a configuration option > that enforces this automatically when enabled. > > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> > --- > Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 ++ > arch/x86/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++++ > arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 3 ++- > arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 6 ++++++ > include/linux/module.h | 6 ++++++ > kernel/module.c | 7 +++++++ > 7 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt > index 199f453..ec38acf 100644 > --- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt > +++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt > @@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning > 1E9/001 ALL eddbuf_entries Number of entries in eddbuf (below) > 1EA/001 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer > (below) > +1EB/001 ALL kbd_status Numlock is enabled > +1EC/001 ALL secure_boot Secure boot is enabled in the firmware > 1EF/001 ALL sentinel Used to detect broken bootloaders > 290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures > 2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table > diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig > index b32ebf9..6a6c19b 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig > @@ -1581,6 +1581,16 @@ config EFI_STUB > > See Documentation/x86/efi-stub.txt for more information. > > +config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE > + def_bool n Maybe need add "select MODULE_SIG" to here for auto enable kernel module signature check when user select this option? > + prompt "Force module signing when UEFI Secure Boot is enabled" > + ---help--- > + UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the > + firmware will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain > + use cases may also require that all kernel modules also be signed. > + Say Y here to automatically enable module signature enforcement > + when a system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled. Thanks a lot! Joey Lee
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-09-05 8:23 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 108+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2013-09-03 23:50 Matthew Garrett 2013-09-03 23:50 ` (unknown), Matthew Garrett 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 01/11] Add secure_modules() call Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 0:45 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 0:45 ` James Morris 2013-09-05 2:14 ` joeyli 2013-09-05 2:14 ` joeyli 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 02/11] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is enabled Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 0:45 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 0:45 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 16:57 ` David Woodhouse 2013-09-04 16:57 ` David Woodhouse 2013-09-04 17:04 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 17:04 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 18:58 ` David Woodhouse 2013-09-04 19:01 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 19:01 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 19:31 ` David Woodhouse 2013-09-04 19:31 ` David Woodhouse 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 03/11] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 0:45 ` James Morris 2013-09-05 3:52 ` H. Peter Anvin 2013-09-05 3:52 ` H. Peter Anvin 2013-09-05 3:58 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-05 3:58 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-05 15:36 ` H. Peter Anvin 2013-09-05 15:36 ` H. Peter Anvin 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 04/11] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 0:46 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 0:46 ` James Morris 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 05/11] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 0:46 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 0:46 ` James Morris 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 06/11] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 0:47 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 0:47 ` James Morris 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 07/11] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter " Matthew Garrett 2013-09-03 23:50 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 08/11] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module loading restrictions Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 0:48 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 0:48 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 20:09 ` jerry.hoemann 2013-09-04 20:09 ` jerry.hoemann-VXdhtT5mjnY 2013-09-04 20:12 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 20:12 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 20:12 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 20:14 ` Josh Boyer 2013-09-04 20:14 ` Josh Boyer 2013-09-04 20:14 ` Josh Boyer 2013-09-08 6:40 ` Greg KH 2013-09-08 6:40 ` Greg KH 2013-09-08 6:44 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 6:44 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 7:24 ` Greg KH 2013-09-08 7:24 ` Greg KH 2013-09-08 14:40 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 14:40 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 15:51 ` Kees Cook 2013-09-08 15:51 ` Kees Cook 2013-09-08 16:18 ` Greg KH 2013-09-08 16:18 ` Greg KH 2013-09-08 16:24 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 16:24 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 16:39 ` Greg KH 2013-09-08 16:39 ` Greg KH 2013-09-08 16:59 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 16:59 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 17:22 ` Greg KH 2013-09-08 17:22 ` Greg KH 2013-09-08 17:25 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 17:25 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 17:11 ` James Bottomley 2013-09-08 17:11 ` James Bottomley 2013-09-08 17:15 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 17:15 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 17:22 ` James Bottomley 2013-09-08 17:22 ` James Bottomley 2013-09-08 17:27 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 17:27 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 17:32 ` James Bottomley 2013-09-08 17:32 ` James Bottomley 2013-09-08 17:38 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 17:38 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 09/11] uswsusp: Disable when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 0:48 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 0:48 ` James Morris 2013-09-05 3:20 ` joeyli 2013-09-05 3:20 ` joeyli 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 10/11] x86: Restrict MSR access " Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 0:49 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 0:49 ` James Morris 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 11/11] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett 2013-09-03 23:50 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 1:42 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 1:42 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 1:42 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 1:42 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-05 3:13 ` joeyli 2013-09-05 8:24 ` joeyli [this message] 2013-09-05 8:24 ` joeyli 2013-09-05 10:16 ` Matt Fleming 2013-09-05 10:16 ` Matt Fleming 2013-09-05 12:54 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-05 12:54 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 15:53 ` Kees Cook 2013-09-04 15:53 ` Re: Kees Cook 2013-09-04 16:05 ` Re: Josh Boyer 2013-09-04 16:05 ` Re: Josh Boyer
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