From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> To: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com> Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, "linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>, "keescook@chromium.org" <keescook@chromium.org>, "hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH V3 08/11] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module loading restrictions Date: Sun, 8 Sep 2013 00:24:08 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20130908072408.GA5092@kroah.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1378622648.2300.4.camel@x230> On Sun, Sep 08, 2013 at 06:44:08AM +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote: > On Sat, 2013-09-07 at 23:40 -0700, Greg KH wrote: > > On Tue, Sep 03, 2013 at 07:50:15PM -0400, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > > kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which > > > is something that module signing enforcement is meant to prevent. It makes > > > sense to disable kexec in this situation. > > > > I see no match between kexec and signed kernel modules. > > sig_enforce is there to prevent anyone (including root) from installing > new kernel code in the running kernel. No, it's to enforce kernel modules to be signed or not. That's all. > Allowing kexec to run untrusted code allows root to install new kernel > code in the running kernel. Which has nothing to do with signed kernel modules. > At the most trivial level, grab the address of sig_enforce from > kallsyms, jump to a kernel that doesn't enforce STRICT_DEVMEM, modify > sig_enforce, jump back to the old kernel. Which proves what? > > In fact, I personally _want_ signed kernel modules, and still the option > > to run kexec. kexec is to run a whole new kernel/OS, not a tiny kernel > > module. > > No, kexec is to run anything. It's expressly not limited to launching > new kernels. It's easiest to demonstrate an attack using a Linux kernel, > but you could launch a toy payload that did nothing other than modify > one byte and then returned to the launch kernel. Fair enough, but again, this has nothing to do with signed kernel modules. If you are really worried about kexec doing something like this, then add signed kexec binary support, but don't suddenly stop kexec from working just because signed modules are enabled, the two have nothing to do with each other. > > If you apply this, you break everyone who is currently relying on kexec > > (i.e. kdump, bootloaders, etc.), from using signed kernel modules, which > > personally, seems like a very bad idea. > > Enforcing signed modules provides you with no additional security if you > have kexec enabled. It's better to make that obvious. Then document the heck out of it, don't disable a valid use case just because it possibly could be used in some way that is different from the original system. If you take this to an extreme, kexec shouldn't be here at all, as it can do anything in the kernel wherever it wants to. kexec has nothing to do with signed modules, don't tie them together. thanks, greg k-h
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Greg KH <gregkh-hQyY1W1yCW8ekmWlsbkhG0B+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org> To: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> Cc: "linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org" <linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>, "linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org" <linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>, "keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org" <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>, "hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH V3 08/11] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module loading restrictions Date: Sun, 8 Sep 2013 00:24:08 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20130908072408.GA5092@kroah.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1378622648.2300.4.camel@x230> On Sun, Sep 08, 2013 at 06:44:08AM +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote: > On Sat, 2013-09-07 at 23:40 -0700, Greg KH wrote: > > On Tue, Sep 03, 2013 at 07:50:15PM -0400, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > > kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which > > > is something that module signing enforcement is meant to prevent. It makes > > > sense to disable kexec in this situation. > > > > I see no match between kexec and signed kernel modules. > > sig_enforce is there to prevent anyone (including root) from installing > new kernel code in the running kernel. No, it's to enforce kernel modules to be signed or not. That's all. > Allowing kexec to run untrusted code allows root to install new kernel > code in the running kernel. Which has nothing to do with signed kernel modules. > At the most trivial level, grab the address of sig_enforce from > kallsyms, jump to a kernel that doesn't enforce STRICT_DEVMEM, modify > sig_enforce, jump back to the old kernel. Which proves what? > > In fact, I personally _want_ signed kernel modules, and still the option > > to run kexec. kexec is to run a whole new kernel/OS, not a tiny kernel > > module. > > No, kexec is to run anything. It's expressly not limited to launching > new kernels. It's easiest to demonstrate an attack using a Linux kernel, > but you could launch a toy payload that did nothing other than modify > one byte and then returned to the launch kernel. Fair enough, but again, this has nothing to do with signed kernel modules. If you are really worried about kexec doing something like this, then add signed kexec binary support, but don't suddenly stop kexec from working just because signed modules are enabled, the two have nothing to do with each other. > > If you apply this, you break everyone who is currently relying on kexec > > (i.e. kdump, bootloaders, etc.), from using signed kernel modules, which > > personally, seems like a very bad idea. > > Enforcing signed modules provides you with no additional security if you > have kexec enabled. It's better to make that obvious. Then document the heck out of it, don't disable a valid use case just because it possibly could be used in some way that is different from the original system. If you take this to an extreme, kexec shouldn't be here at all, as it can do anything in the kernel wherever it wants to. kexec has nothing to do with signed modules, don't tie them together. thanks, greg k-h
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-09-08 7:21 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 108+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2013-09-03 23:50 Matthew Garrett 2013-09-03 23:50 ` (unknown), Matthew Garrett 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 01/11] Add secure_modules() call Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 0:45 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 0:45 ` James Morris 2013-09-05 2:14 ` joeyli 2013-09-05 2:14 ` joeyli 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 02/11] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is enabled Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 0:45 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 0:45 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 16:57 ` David Woodhouse 2013-09-04 16:57 ` David Woodhouse 2013-09-04 17:04 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 17:04 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 18:58 ` David Woodhouse 2013-09-04 19:01 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 19:01 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 19:31 ` David Woodhouse 2013-09-04 19:31 ` David Woodhouse 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 03/11] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 0:45 ` James Morris 2013-09-05 3:52 ` H. Peter Anvin 2013-09-05 3:52 ` H. Peter Anvin 2013-09-05 3:58 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-05 3:58 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-05 15:36 ` H. Peter Anvin 2013-09-05 15:36 ` H. Peter Anvin 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 04/11] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 0:46 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 0:46 ` James Morris 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 05/11] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 0:46 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 0:46 ` James Morris 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 06/11] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 0:47 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 0:47 ` James Morris 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 07/11] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter " Matthew Garrett 2013-09-03 23:50 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 08/11] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module loading restrictions Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 0:48 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 0:48 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 20:09 ` jerry.hoemann 2013-09-04 20:09 ` jerry.hoemann-VXdhtT5mjnY 2013-09-04 20:12 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 20:12 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 20:12 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 20:14 ` Josh Boyer 2013-09-04 20:14 ` Josh Boyer 2013-09-04 20:14 ` Josh Boyer 2013-09-08 6:40 ` Greg KH 2013-09-08 6:40 ` Greg KH 2013-09-08 6:44 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 6:44 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 7:24 ` Greg KH [this message] 2013-09-08 7:24 ` Greg KH 2013-09-08 14:40 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 14:40 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 15:51 ` Kees Cook 2013-09-08 15:51 ` Kees Cook 2013-09-08 16:18 ` Greg KH 2013-09-08 16:18 ` Greg KH 2013-09-08 16:24 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 16:24 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 16:39 ` Greg KH 2013-09-08 16:39 ` Greg KH 2013-09-08 16:59 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 16:59 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 17:22 ` Greg KH 2013-09-08 17:22 ` Greg KH 2013-09-08 17:25 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 17:25 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 17:11 ` James Bottomley 2013-09-08 17:11 ` James Bottomley 2013-09-08 17:15 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 17:15 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 17:22 ` James Bottomley 2013-09-08 17:22 ` James Bottomley 2013-09-08 17:27 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 17:27 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 17:32 ` James Bottomley 2013-09-08 17:32 ` James Bottomley 2013-09-08 17:38 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-08 17:38 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 09/11] uswsusp: Disable when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 0:48 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 0:48 ` James Morris 2013-09-05 3:20 ` joeyli 2013-09-05 3:20 ` joeyli 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 10/11] x86: Restrict MSR access " Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 0:49 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 0:49 ` James Morris 2013-09-03 23:50 ` [PATCH V3 11/11] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett 2013-09-03 23:50 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 1:42 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 1:42 ` James Morris 2013-09-04 1:42 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 1:42 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-05 3:13 ` joeyli 2013-09-05 8:24 ` joeyli 2013-09-05 8:24 ` joeyli 2013-09-05 10:16 ` Matt Fleming 2013-09-05 10:16 ` Matt Fleming 2013-09-05 12:54 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-05 12:54 ` Matthew Garrett 2013-09-04 15:53 ` Kees Cook 2013-09-04 15:53 ` Re: Kees Cook 2013-09-04 16:05 ` Re: Josh Boyer 2013-09-04 16:05 ` Re: Josh Boyer
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