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From: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	vegard.nossum@oracle.com, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>,
	Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2013 19:25:23 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20131213002523.GA20706@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKmrtgH8tAGuYd9-gh5-EXqAsPy+XoRMc9DNLDngNH2ug@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 01:13:41PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:

 > - who will keep adding these triggers going forward?

also..

- Who will test the existing triggers are doing the right thing when related code changes.

We could add something to tests/ maybe for each exploit() addition, to make sure some
new change isn't introducing an oopsable (or worse!) bug in the actual exploit test.

It does mean someone needs to be regularly running said tests though.
As history has shown, things like nx_test have been broken for months at a time without
anyone complaining.  Perhaps Fenguang Wu can add something to the daily test runs if
we add an over all "make test-secure" target or similar.

	Dave


  parent reply	other threads:[~2013-12-13  0:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-12-12 16:52 [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 2/9] exploit: report to audit subsystem when available vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 3/9] hfs: Known exploit detection for CVE-2011-4330 vegard.nossum
2013-12-13  8:00   ` Dan Carpenter
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 4/9] net: Known exploit detection for CVE-2012-2136 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 5/9] hfsplus: Known exploit detection for CVE-2012-2319 vegard.nossum
2013-12-13  1:40   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13 11:14   ` One Thousand Gnomes
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 6/9] x86: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-0268 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 7/9] drm/i915: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-0913 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 8/9] userns: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-1959 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 9/9] perf: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-2094 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 19:06 ` [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-12 21:13   ` Kees Cook
2013-12-12 23:50     ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-12 23:55       ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 11:10         ` One Thousand Gnomes
2013-12-13 14:21           ` Jiri Kosina
2013-12-13  9:20       ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 22:49         ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13 13:06       ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 15:55         ` Jason Cooper
2013-12-13 23:07         ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13  0:25     ` Dave Jones [this message]
2013-12-13  0:45       ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-12-13  1:42       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13  1:44         ` Dave Jones
2013-12-13  5:09         ` James Morris
2013-12-13  5:46           ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-13 13:19             ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 10:21           ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 10:31         ` Alexander Holler
2013-12-13 11:48           ` Dan Carpenter
2013-12-13 11:57             ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13 13:23             ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 18:00               ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 17:58         ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 18:14           ` Linus Torvalds
2013-12-13 18:37             ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13  5:27     ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-13  9:32       ` Jiri Kosina
2013-12-13 18:07       ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13  9:12     ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 13:27       ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13  8:20   ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-14 23:59   ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13 12:54 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-16  5:17 ` Sasha Levin
2013-12-19  6:14 ` David Rientjes

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